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INTRODUCTION 
"The Economist is conscious of enjoying a little re-
flected glory from your achievements; it will always be 
proud of the fact that the man who was its Italian Cor-
respondent for so long was President of Italy..." 
Walter T. Layton, to Luigi Einaudi, May 2, 1955 
1. EINAUDI AND THE ECONOMIST 
Luigi Einaudi's thirty-year contribution to the prestigious English weekly 
newspaper The Economist, which until now had remained only partially 
identified, undoubtedly represents an important part of his prodigious activ-
ity as a journalist. In fact it may be said that after November 1925, when 
Fascist censorship prevented him from publishing in Italy, Einaudi's articles 
for The Economist became a major outlet for his views on current events. 
When the partnership between Einaudi and the newspaper began, in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, The Economist was an influential exam-
ple of the great independent English press, an expression of that classical libe-
ralismi of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which was also an essen-
tial component of Einaudi's own liberal vision.1 Founded in 1843 to cam-
paign against the Corn Laws,2 The Economist was originally a means of po-
1 Einaudi was certainly influenced in. his beliefs by his self-conscious Anglophilia; as an ex-
ample, it is sufficient to quote from a well-known article pubHshed in 1916 in La Riforma Sociale-, 
"We were among the few to worship Great Britain..., English ideas and its way of reasoning and 
conceiving life, freedom and politics" ("Germanofili ed anglofili", La Riforma Sociale, XXIII, 
1916, p. 300). The most important writings by Einaudi on Iiberalism are collected in: BENEDETTO 
CROCE - LUIGI EINAUDI, Liberismo e liberalismo (edited by Paolo Solari), Milano, Ricciardi, 1957 . 
On Einaudi's Iiberalism see: L. EINAUDI, Memorandum (edited by G. Berta) with an essay by 
Norberto Bobbio, Venezia, Marsilio, 1 9 9 4 ; F . FORTE, Luigi Einaudi: Il Mercato e il Buongoverno, 
Torino, Einaudi, 1982; P. GOBETTI, "Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi", in La Rivoluzione Liberale, 
I, 1922, p. 37-38, now in Scritti Politici (edited by P. Spriano), Torino, Einaudi, 1969; G. MA-
RONGIU, Luigi Einaudi, Genova, ECIG, 1 9 9 3 . 
2 On the history of The Economist see: The Economist 1843-1943. A Centenary Volume, 
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liticai propaganda for the ideology and principles of free trade, a champion 
of absolute economie individualism and opponent of public intervention in 
the economy. From 1861, under the editorship of Walter Bagehot - author 
of the famous Lombard Street, which Einaudi himself translated into Italian 
in 1905 3 - The Economist went on to become a fundamental source of ana-
lysis of English and international politicai and business life, as well as a focus 
for criticai reflection on the English liberal ruling class. And for such a news-
paper, Luigi Einaudi was, as The Economisti own obituary of him said, 
"surely the most distinguished of ali foreign correspondents" (The Econo-
mist, November 4, 1961). 
Luigi Einaudi's name first appears in the pages of The Economist on 
March 21, 1908, in a "Letter to the Editor", dated "Turin, March 9, 
1908", on Italian finance. In 1908, the thirty-four-year-old Einaudi was ai-
ready well known in Italy as a scholar and joumalist: he was Professor of 
Public Finance in the Faculty of Law at both the University of Turin 
and the Bocconi University of Milan, and had published important works 
on public finance and economie history. He was also co-editor of La Rifor-
ma Sociale, a liberal-leaning research journal on the problems of Italian so-
ciety, founded in 1894 by Francesco Saverio Nitti and Luigi Roux on the 
model of The Economie journal-and of which he was to become editor-in-
chief a few years later. As a journalist, he was an important contributor to II 
Corriere della Sera, after having written for La Stampa from 1896 to 1902.4 
From 1908 to the beginning of 1920, Einaudi's contributions to The Econ-
omist were quite frequent although somewhat irregular. In these years he 
was only one of the newspaper's correspondents from Italy, together with 
English journalists and other important representatives of Italian intellec-
tual and politicai life. The latter included Edoardo Giretti, industrialist 
and major exponent of liberal politicai journalism, and Luigi Fioatt i , 
Treasury Minister in both the Giolitti and Sonnino governments, Prime 
Minister himself from March 1910 to March 1911, and also a contributor 
to II Corriere della Sera. However, very soon Einaudi certainly became the 
London, Oxford University Press, 1943; R. D. EDWARDS, The Pursuit ofReason: The Economist 
1843-1993, London, H . Hamilton, 1 9 9 3 . G. BERTA, Capitali in gioco. Cultura economica e vita 
finanziaria nella City di fine Ottocento, Venezia, Marsilio, 1990. 
3 Lombard Street, in Einaudi's translation, was published in the fourth series of the "Bi-
blioteca dell'Economista", Turin, Unione Tipografìco-Editrice Torinese. It was reprinted in 
1986 in the "Saggi di Economia" series published by Cassa di Risparmio di Torino. 
4 Einaudi's Italian-language articles are collected in Cronache economiche e politiche di un 
trentennio (1893-1925), volumes I-VIII, Torino, Einaudi, 1959-1965. 
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most important, if not in fact the only, Italian correspondent of The Econ-
omist. This was most likely due to his unrivalled capacity to satisfy the stan-
dards and expectations of the English newspaper: accurate analysis of the 
facts, the use of a great amount of data, well-founded argumentation, and 
the appropriate reserve with regard to personal politicai convictions. 
In Aprii 1920, the editor of The Economist, Hartley Withers, wrote 
to Einaudi with an offer of a permanent contribution. Einaudi accepted 
and went on to write regularly for the newspaper until the beginning of 
the nineteen-forties. In 1931, Walter T. Layton,5 editor of The Economist 
from 1922 to 1938, asked Einaudi to send letters twice monthly "to 
reach us on the first and third Thursday of each month", adding: "if, 
however, in the interval between your letters, any event of outstanding 
importance should occur which, in your opinion, merits immediate no-
tice in our columns, perhaps you would be good enough to send a short 
note covering that particular item of news" (letter of November 6, 1931, 
in Einaudi Archives). Actually it appears that Einaudi seldom adhered to 
these requirements, though in any case not ali of the articles he wrote 
were published. Between 1920 and 1935 he appears to have published 
more than 220 articles for The Economist, an average of around 14 a 
year. Einaudi contributed to several sections of the newspaper, princi-
pally "Overseas Correspondence", but also the "Monthly Supplement" 
and the annual "Commercial History & Review". Einaudi's name ap-
pears for the last time on August 17, 1946, in a "Letter to the Editor" 
signed as the Governor of the Bank of Italy and "for many years Turin 
correspondent of The Economist". 
On Einaudi's contribution to The Economist, Riccardo Faucci, in his bio-
graphy of this 'great Italian liberal', writes: "The tenor of this correspondence 
is descriptive. Criticai comments are sober and controlled. However it cannot 
be said that it was an anonymous routine work".6 In fact, it seems to have 
been anything but anonymous or routine. Einaudi chronicled the economie, 
financial and politicai events of Italy, from the government of Giolitti to the 
Fascist regime, with a clear task in mind: to present those events in a way ac-
cessible to English readers, particularly those involved in the world of econ-
5 Walter T. Layton, a brilliant Cambridge economist, was an important member of the 
small but very influential group of radicai liberals (together with John Maynard Keynes, Hubert 
Henderson, Dennis Robertson, Josiah Charles Stamp and William Beveridge) which dominated 
English intellectual and academic life between the two wars (see: DAVID HUBBACK, NO Ordinary 
Press Baron: A Life of Walter Layton, London, Weindenfeld & Nicolson, 1985). 
6 FAUCCI R , Luigi Einaudi, Torino, Utet, 1986 , p. 2 6 3 . 
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omy and finance who represented the most influential part of the newspa-
per's readership. But, more than this, Einaudi also critically analysed the ac-
tions of the protagonists in the Italian economie and politicai arena from a 
theoretical and moral standpoint; a standpoint which most readers of The 
Economist shared. Even when the freedom to express his judgement was se-
verely restricted, in the Fascist era, Einaudi stili made his opinion clear in con-
trolied criticai comments. This introduction offers a survey of this rich and 
important contribution. 
2 . THE FIRST PHASE OF EINAUDI'S CONTRIBUTION: FROM 1 9 0 8 TO THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 
2.1. The pre-war period: the analysis of the economie situation in Italy and 
the criticism of the Giolitti governments 
Einaudi's contribution to The Economist began in March 1908, in the 
middle of the Giolitti era, during the economie crisis which had exploded 
in the summer and autumn of the year before. A crisis which brought eco-
nomie growth to a standstill and highlighted the weak points of the Italian 
industriai development begun in the last years of the nineteenth century. Ori-
ginating in the financial markets of the United States, the crisis quickly spread 
to European countries. Although the economically strongest countries were 
soon able to rediscover the path of rapid growth, the crisis severely damaged 
the Italian economy. A consciousness of the difficulties of the Italian situa-
tion, in the years immediately after the crisis, was a distinctive feature of Ei-
naudi's contribution. Flis first letter to the editor on March 21, 1908, was in 
fact a criticism of a previous anonymous article, dated March 7 and entided 
"Relief for Italian Taxpayers", which optimistically described the state of Ita-
lian public finance and foresaw a reduction in taxes. Einaudi maintained that: 
"it is not correct to consider as certain a reduction of taxation", because "the 
surpluses of the last years have been swallowed by the increased expenditure" 
- meaning public works, public servant salary increases and national defence 
or, as he saw it, "in the main squandered to satisfy petty interests". 
In his first articles in the pre-war period, Einaudi gave a decidedly differ-
ent and much more problematical picture of Italian public finance and eco-
nomie development than Luigi Luzzatti, whose articles in The Economist1 
7 "Luzzatti on Italian Finance", The Economist, August 22, 1908, p. 353, and "Italian Fi-
nance", The Economist, September 19, 1908, p. 518. 
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proudly presented a robust and lively national economy. Einaudi's articles 
from 1908 to 1914 - of which thirty are either certain or highly probable, tes-
tifying to an already quite significami correspondence - offered a stark por-
trayal of Italy: a country which had renounced its Cavourian liberal principles 
and was ruled by a politicai class that was corrupt and in decline; a country 
financially unstable because of crippling public debt, distorted in its develop-
ment by an economie policy of agricultural and industriai protectionism, and 
struggling to adjust because of over-investment in protected industries. The 
focal point of Einaudi's analysis is the issue of public finance: "We are at a 
turning point in the ftnancial history of the country", he wrote on January 
23, 1908, presenting a dramatic picture of the previous two decades. The 
years from 1890 to 1898, he argued, were among the worst in Italian national 
finance because of the Abyssinian War, the banking crisis, the protectionist 
tariff, the riots in Sicily, the southern provinces and Milan; ali of which exer-
cised "a sinister influence on the state budget" - the surpluses were few and 
small and the deficits great. However, he continues, the adoption of a policy 
of parsimony and the curtailment of expenses, together with great progress in 
agriculture and industry, reacted favourably on the state budget and the years 
following saw notable surpluses. 
Einaudi emphasized that during this period the country's economie 
growth was not limited by the deficit of its foreign trade. After the intro-
duction of a wheat duty in 1894, unable to cover its own internai require-
ments, Italy had been obliged to import huge quantities of wheat and flour, 
and thus, wrote Einaudi, "a conspicuous feature in the external trade of 
Italy during the last 20 years has been a Constant and increasing excess 
of the imports over exports" (May 14, 1910). In spite of this fact, "the rate 
of exchange has scarcely reached the gold point, and has been for nearly 
the whole time not against but for Italy" (ibid). What helped Italian con-
sumer to pay for the surplus of imported merchandise were the remit-
tances of Italian emigrants, particularly those who had settled in South 
and North America. Emigration, Einaudi argued, was not simply the result 
of the fact that Italy was a country of high birth-rate, thus having a naturai 
tendency to emigration, but also because of the protectionist policy in agri-
culture which "has proved strongly against the interests of the great mass 
of agriculturists, and only profitable to a little combined band of landlords 
and privileged manufacturers", and moreover "has reacted against any 
progress of agriculture" (ibid). 
The protectionist policy in agriculture and industry was a major issue in 
Einaudi's articles in both The Economist and II Corriere della Sera. Einaudi 
did not hesitate to speak of the "scandalous protection" of these sectors, 
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which received government favours. These special interests included 
mining, iron and steel manufacturing, shipbuilding and engineering, as 
well as the companies managing the state railways and the shipping con-
nections with the islands and other continents. Analysing both a bill which 
proposed to continue "the evil system of shipping bounties to Italian ship-
yards and shipowners" and the efforts made by the interested parties to 
secure regulations "which will shut off foreign competition in the transpor-
tation of Italian emigrants from and to Italian ports, and of coal" - a matter 
of great importarne to British shipowners - Einaudi wrote: 
The navigation bounties are apparently given to foster the mercantile marine, 
but in reality will be entirely transferred from shipowners to the shipyards in the 
shape of an increased price for ships launched in Italy. Owing to the protectionist 
system the bounties will have to be divided between the shipyards and the iron 
and steel manufacturers, machinery makers, and naval engineers, who furnish 
the highly protected materials for shipbuilding. Ali these interests have constituted 
a potent, tariff-nursed trust, generally known as the 'gruppo siderurgico'. (Octo-
ber 16, 1909) 
The cotton industry, too, enjoyed high protection. In Einaudi's words, 
it represented "a striking instance of the ... mischief of protection to the 
economical development of Italy and her trade" (February 4, 1911). It 
had been highly favoured by the Tariff Reform Act of 1887: "capital 
was attracted into the industry by the prospect of inflated profits, old 
plants were extended and improved. A great many new concerns were 
started" (ibid). But home consumption did not increase in proportion to 
the increased production, and the Italian cotton manufacturers were faced 
with the necessity of finding an outlet for this regular surplus of produc-
tion: "as a matter of fact", Einaudi continued, "the export trade has been 
carried on at prices which do not cover the high cost of the protected pro-
duction". When the crisis occurred, Italian exports became "more and 
more unremunerative" (ibid). He concluded that: "protection has caused 
over-production, increased prices for Italians, reduced purchasing power, 
and a ruinous export trade at unprofitable rates" (ibid). In the years after 
1897-8, protectionist policy had gone along with the continuous increase in 
public expenditure, which brought about the progressive diminution of 
surpluses. Hence 
the equilibrium of the budget... is maintained only through this source of revenue: 
...the burdens placed on the Italian people by the excessive duty which the gov-
ernment retains on imported flour and corn. (December 19, 1908) 
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After the 1907 crisis Einaudi believed that "the epoch of great sur-
pluses has come to an end" and that "our Governors must exercise great 
caution if the delicate fabric of our national credit is not to be shaken" 
(ibid). The question was how to recover the path of stable economie 
growth: 
The cruciai economie problem of the moment seems to be the elimination of 
the consequences of past over-investment and the freedom to be given to labour 
and capital to invest in industries naturai to our country, (ibid) 
The correct answer, Einaudi wrote in a letter to the editor on Septem-
ber 27, 1913, was not "the old protectionist method, which claims State aid 
to suffering industries, and higher and more scientific protection to pro-
mising branches of industry and agriculture", but: 
the new free trade method - which is a revival of the older Cavourian system -
which insists on the necessity of freeing the numerous branches of Italian industry 
and agriculture, whose productivity is high and naturally rising, and which are 
capable of utilising the great capabilities of our intelligent, able, skilful working 
people, from the chains of high prices of raw materials and food. 
In the pre-war years of his contribution to The Economist, Einaudi also 
criticized the politicai system in power in Italy, on the occasion of the Tri-
poli Expedition of 1911. In October and November of that year Einaudi 
wrote to The Economist, signing himself "Italicus", in order to explain 
to English readers "the raid of Tripoli".8 After underlining the huge eco-
nomie cost of the war and the negative welfare effect on the country, he 
described an effectively negative politicai situation, characterised above 
ali by the parliamentary dictatorship of Giolitti. Einaudi called Giolitti 
"the real master of Italy" though certainly no "great statesman" and 
"not a man of strong convinctions"; "a white-haired man of seventy... very 
fond of power" who dispensed great and petty favours in order to control 
parliament: 
Signor Giolitti is... not the man to be embarassed by differences of opinion. To 
the Radicals he gave some places in the Cabinet, and as the Radicals are men with-
out any ideas, save the idea that places are desirable, their group was quickly paci-
fied. To the Socialists he also offered a place, which was accepted by one of their 
8 These articles caused a stir in Italy, and great speculation about the real identity of "Ita-
licus": this in turn aroused the indignation of the editor of The Economist (see the letter of Feb-
ruary 2, 1912, in appendix A). 
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leaders. The Socialist Party, indeed, preferred to keep itself free from direct Govern-
mental responsibility, but obtained, as a return for silence and support, the promise 
of universal suffrage, and of the monopoly of life assurance as a step to old-age pen-
sions...9 The quiet of Cabinet life in the Chamber seemed to be thus assured, as the 
opposition was limited to the small group of Republicans and the non-combative 
followers of Signore Sonnino and Luzzatti. (October 21, 1911) 
Einaudi also identified the change in politicai ideals taking place in 
Italy, with the rise of nationalism, which in part forced Giolitti to embark 
on the Tripoli enterprise: 
The Tripoli enterprise is not exclusively a politician's device to gain power... 
This enterprise was forced on [Giolitti] by the Yellow Press, which, in its turn, has 
been profiting by a peculiar state of mind of the younger generations. The Tripoli 
movement is an intellectual movement. In the Ninenties young men turned to So-
cialism. The years from 1890 to 1900 were the golden age of Socialism. Ali were 
Socialists, ali that was enthusiastic and ardent in Italy. After 1900 Signor Giolitti's 
politics transformed Socialism... Socialism went into power; Socialist members 
were in high favour in Govermental circles. With favour carne some good things: 
impartiality towards working men during the labour struggles, some new labour 
legislation, etc. With favour carne also corruption. The Socialist members are to-
day as much favour-seeking, place-hunting men as the other members... The de-
generation of Socialism left the new generation without ideals, without wrongs to 
be remedied, without a word to congregate around. Nationalism arose in this 
wilderness. (October 28, 1911) 
In this period, the only institution of which this Italian economist had a 
good opinion, the only institution in which he had confidence, was the 
Bank of Italy, directed by Bonaldo Stringher. "The Bank of Italy in the 
15 years past", Einaudi wrote on Aprii 17, 1909, presenting the annual 
bank report, "has been extremely well managed, and has acquired a pro-
minent position among the European banks of issue". He defined its an-
nual report as "the most important financial document of the year". 
Thanks to the bank's patient reconstruction, it had been possible to over-
come "the utter ruin of the Italian banks of issue prior to 1894" (ibid). 
9 E i n a u d i strongly contested the life-insurance nationalisation proposai, which he consid-
ered an "ill-judged confiscation of private property as no compensation whatever was to be 
granted to national and foreign companies". Moreover it was, according to him, "a long step to-
ward the enlargment of bureaucracy, the greatest perii now confronting Italy" (letter of October 
28). In 1911, on the pages of II Corriere della Sera and La Riforma Sociale, Einaudi launched a 
campaign against the proposai which had partial success (see FAUCCI, pp. 106-111, and FORTE 
pp. 94-103). 
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Close attention, confidence and high opinion would be constants of Einau-
di's position with regard to the Bank of Italy in ali his articles for The Econ-
omist. In December 1930, Einaudi wrote a short obituary of Bonaldo 
Stringher in which he maintained that his death was a "grave loss both 
to the bank and to the country". Stringher had been, he said, "the princi-
pal author" of the Bank Act of 1893, which constituted "the foundation of 
Italian banking law"; and "under his guidance the Bank of Italy greatly im-
proved its position and successfully withstood the crisis of 1907 and the 
stili greater strain imposed by the war" (ibid). Einaudi concluded that: 
"the balance sheet of the Bank of Italy at the time of his death is a testimo-
nial of the soundness of his administration", and defined Stringher's an-
nual reports as "a classic source of the economie history of Italy during 
the first thirty years of this century" (ibid). 
2.2. The war period: controlied criticism 
During the war period Einaudi reduced his contribution to The Econ-
omist both in terms of the number of articles he wrote10 and the variety of 
subject-matter. Whilst, as Faucci shows, Einaudi expressed two attitudes in 
Il Corriere della Sera - the 'preacher', talking of the duties of the Italian 
people, advocating economy and saving, and the 'scholar', critically analys-
ing the government's economie policy - on the pages of The Economist he 
curtailed any doctrinal passion, simply discussing the major economie is-
sues, at most sometimes criticising public intervention or cautiously expres-
sing his worries. The Italian financial situation and the war loan were his 
principal subjects. As in II Corriere, between 1915 and 1918, Einaudi com-
mented upon the numerous loans required by the war economy.11 These 
represented the principal cause of indebtedness, in order to finance 
greatly-increased public expenditure. Einaudi also noted the loans' surpris-
10 During the war The Economist relied on a number of correpondents from Italy, perhaps 
to ensure a more varied and general picture than any single correspondent could have offered: 
some correspondences are dated Verona, and others are sent by one or more anonymous corre-
spondents from the north of Italy, who, in some cases, may also be Einaudi, although we have 
been unable to find any confirmation of this fact. 
11 In December 1915, Einaudi also published a long arride in the Economie Journal on Ita-
lian finance at the request of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes wrote: "Dear Professor Einaudi, 
Professor Edgeworth tells me that you are now writing about the Italian war loan. If you are, 
perhaps, able to spare the time to write a summary statement of this Italian financial position 
for the September Economie Journal I should be extremely obliged to you..." (letter of July 
26, 1915, in the Fondazione Einaudi Archives). 
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ing success. With regard to this, at the beginning of 1918, he wrote: "Dur-
ing the period from July 1914 to October 1917 the Italian market has ab-
sorbed readily a mass of State securities which in time of peace would have 
seemed impossible" (January 26, 1918). So it would have seemed if this 
were not already recognised as a cruciai aspect of the Italian socio-econom-
ic fabric: 
One of the greatest economie forces of Italy is its net of small saving and pop-
ular banks, which are diffused ali over the country and draw from locai sources 
their funds, which are mainly devoted to financing agriculture, commerce and in-
dustry. (ibid.) 
Einaudi's fundamental concerns in this period shared by many poli-
ticians, entrepreneurs and the Bank of Italy itself - were the downward 
trend in the value of the lira and the unfavourable balance of interna-
tional exchanges. He attributed rising inflation to the increase of circu-
lating paper necessitated by the policy of financing the war, and he 
was aware that in time of war it was not possible to stabilize the currency 
by decreasing that circulation. On the matter of international exchanges, 
Einaudi explained to the English readers that the deficit was aggravated 
by the great decrease of remittances from Italian emigrants, a fact which 
he considered temporary and one the fourth war loan was in fact issued 
to redress. Although Einaudi criticized those interventions which overly 
restricted the free-working of the market, he showed more moderation 
than in his articles published in II Corriere. And the same was true of 
his attitude towards the 1916 decree limiting the dividends of joint-stock 
companies in order to compulsorily increase their reserves. Einaudi 
wrote: 
It would be in the public interest if some means could be devised to give se-
curity to industry, for nothing checks enterprise so effectively as uncertainty con-
cerning fiscal measures. (September 16, 1916). 
Similarly, he objected to a subsequent socialist-journal campaign against 
the war profiteers, which proposed confiscation by taxation, because this 
made "the industriai world frightened: an indefinite limitation threatened 
stagnation in the industriai world" (November 25, 1916). 
On the whole during the war period, Einaudi sought to present an un-
dramatic view of the Italian situation on the pages of The Economist, soft-
ening criticism which was, in contrast, much stronger in his articles for II 
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Corriere. In ali likelihood this was to reassure the Anglo-Saxon world of the 
financial solvency of the country, which was at that time heavily indebted 
to both the United Kingdom and the United States. 
3 . THE SECOND PHASE OF EINAUDI'S CONTRIBUTION: FROM POST-WAR CRISIS TO 
THE FIRST PERIOD OF FASCISM IN POWER, 1 9 1 9 - 2 5 
3.1. The immediate post-war years: Economie instahility and politicai crisis 
The post-war years were particularly agitated ones for Italy. Many and 
momentous were the problems to be faced by the end of the war: a public 
debt higher than national income and a rate of inflation higher than ali the 
other important allied countries; the fall of_the lira and a balance of trade 
deficit not entirely paid for by the remittances of Italiarremigrants; increas-
ing difficulties for industries and banks caused by the assault on the big 
banks by industrialists; and last but certainly not least, rising social unrest. 
During this period Einaudi's activity as a journalist was prolific for both II 
Corriere della Sera and The Economist. In fact, 1920 saw the start of the 
period of Einaudi's greatest and most frequent contributions to the English 
newspaper: fifteen of his articles were published in 1920, twenty-four in 
1921, thirteen in 1922; and this high rate continued in the years that fol-
lowed. On the pages of The Economist Einaudi continued to inform the 
British public of events in Italy, but with a renewed polemical vein, deeply 
aware of the gravity of his country's situation, having, as it had, borne a 
tremendous wartime effort: "Italy is, of ali the Allies, the country which 
has sustained the most crushing financial effort, relative to her previous 
wealth" (February 1, 1919). 
In June 1919 Nitti became Prime Minister and Einaudi, from his eco-
nomically orthodox point of view, did not skimp criticism of the new gov-
ernment's interventions. He opposed the new general tariff proposed in 
autumn that year because its trend was "distinctly protectionist", and 
the extraordinary capital taxes on increments of capital owing to the war 
and on dividends of shares and other bearer securities, of Aprii 1920. In-
stead, he commended the proposai to stop the bread subsidy, a move how-
ever which brought about the fall of the Nitti cabinet in June 1920. Never-
theless, Einaudi believed that "the worst point has been passed", that a 
"stop has been put to new increases in notes issued" (May 29, 1920), 
due essentially to the outstanding success of the sixth national loan. The 
economie situation did not improve, though, when Giolitti was returned 
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to power. The end of his cabinet, thirteen months later in July 1921, saw 
things even begin to get worse: between October and November inflation 
increased, the lira was depreciated, share quotations fell. Einaudi consid-
ered the bourses a sensitive short-term indicator of the general mood of 
the country's economy. On November 13, 1920, he enumerated the causes 
of malaise: the huge deficit in the state budget, the fear of the coming com-
pulsory inscription of ali stock and share-holders and the confiscation of 
war profits, the unwilligness to put an end to the bread subsidy, and work-
ers' industriai action. Ali of these were seen as factors which "are pointing 
to liquidation, restriction of the spirit of enterprise and inaction of specu-
latore".12 The fact which perhaps most worried Einaudi was the advent of 
the workers' control of industry: with the occupation of factories by metal 
and engineering workers in the Autumn of 1920, and the start of "an ex-
periment in Sovietism", Einaudi wrote that the matter had "ceased to be 
one only of wages" and that "civil war seems impending" (September 
18, 1920). At the same time, he strongly criticized the government's ab-
sence: "it has proclaimed its neutrality between the two belligerents, but 
this profession is hardly compatible with toleration of assault on private 
and public property, organisation of armed forces, etc" (ibid). Einaudi re-
mained sceptical about the possibility that a 'communist experiment' 
would succeed: 
It is not however probable that the Communist experiment will be made this 
time. Italians are not apt to stretch things to their extremes. They are a compro-
mising folk, somewhat after the manner of Britishers, though only after a shower 
of high words and extravagant menaces. Above ali, we are a nation of small land-
owners, in which the propertied classes outnumber the true proletariat. They 
need only a strong Government, strong in ideas and leadership to put matters 
right. (ibid) 
In November that year the politicai horizon cleared and foreign ex-
changes improved due both to international factors, such as The Treaty 
of Rapallo, and internai events, such as the municipal elections, which 
12 Einaudi's criticism of the economie policy of Giolitti's government, in both II Corriere 
della Sera and The Economist, was so vehement that it actually worried Italian leaders: in a letter 
from Filippo Meda, Treasury Minister, to Bonaldo Stringher, Governor of the Bank of Italy, da-
ted November 3, 1920, it was suggested that Einaudi's articles presented Italy's financial situa-
tion in such a bad light that they were influencing the excessive depreciation of the lira. "He 
should sacrifice his spirit of criticism on the aitar of patriotism", Meda wrote. The letter is pub-
lished in: L'Italia e il sistema finanziario internazionale 1919-1936 (edited by Marcello De Cecco), 
Collana storica della Banca d'Italia, Bari, Laterza, 1993. 
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"have not gone so well for the Communist party as they anticipateci" Ei-
naudi wrote on November 27, and the introduction of a bill for the reduc-
tion of the infamous bread subsidy. By Aprii 16, 1921, Einaudi could write 
that "the social and politicai atmosphere is clearing" and the "nightmare" 
of an imminent communist revolution in Italy "is gone and gone for ever". 
Consequently he looked almost optimistically at the prevailing economie 
problems, believing that, from a structural point of view, the Italian econ-
omy was not in such dreadful condition after ali. So, for example, already 
on October 16, 1920, and despite soaring foreign exchanges and fears over 
the closing of credits to Italian customers by foreign banks and trading 
firms, he maintained that the deficit of foreign trade was not a structural 
problem: 
If only we could have a year of continuous work, the balance of international 
commerce might return to normal condition, and so far as the depreciation, or, 
rather, the unstable value of the lira, depends on excess of imports over exports, 
the foreign exchanges would be stabilised. 
On the contrary, according to Einaudi, the two main causes of financial 
instability and economie crisis were the huge public deficit and the external 
debt. The "crushing load" of external debt, he wrote in June 1920, here in 
agreement with Keynes, "will be a source of great embarrassment for the 
Italian budget, for our foreign balance of payments and source of lasting 
friction between Italy and her allies", an opinion also shared by The Econ-
omist newspaper itself. At the end of 1921 he wrote: 
Public opinion has not lost the hope that The Economisti thesis of the total 
cancellation of the inter-Allied debts will ultimately prevail; as, otherwise, ali 
hopes of balancing budgets are lost and total confusion will prevail in our financial 
and monetary situation. (December 17, 1921) 
Of the second cruciai issue, the budgetary position and the internai 
deficit,13 Einaudi noted on November 5, 1921, that, notwithstanding the 
13 Einaudi's evaluation of the Italian budgetary position was less pessimistic than that ex-
pressed by Keynes in his The Economie Consequences of the Peace published at the end of 
1919. In a letter to Keynes on January 23, 1920, Einaudi, after congratulating Keynes on his fas-
cinating book, suggested that "perhaps your picture of Italian budgetary position is a little too 
pessimistic" (letter in the Fondazione Einaudi Archives). Again at Keynes' request, Einaudi 
wrote on the Italian financial situation in a supplement of The Manchester Guardian Commercial 
devoted to the 'Reconstruction of Europe', on July 27, 1922, maintaining that Italy would be able 
to solve her budgetary problems only if kept free from the 'obsession' of foreign debt. In several 
articles, on March 26, June 11 and August 6, 1921, and March 4, 1922, Einaudi emphasized the 
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reduction of notes issued and the improving trade balance, "foreign ex-
changes go up by leaps and bounds". He sought to explain this: 
Perhaps, in common with ali Europe, Italy is suffering from the widespread 
fear that the State will not be able to restore the equilibrium in its budget, and 
new paper issues will be in future inevitable. (ibid) 
He continued: 
If so, only a severe policy of economy and retrenchment will at length reverse 
the present downward tendency to the lira, (ibid) 
Even so, one year later in November 1922, Einaudi emphasized that 
the economie situation of the country was "not bad", "far from it", and 
the unfavourable movements of exchanges and prices were caused by 
"the awkward financial situation of the state",14 a judgment at that time 
shared by ali the Italian politicai leaders. The most urgent necessity was 
the reduction of public expenses, because Einaudi considered taxation, 
greatly increased under the Giolitti government, already excessive and 
unincreasable further: large sums could be saved, he wrote in an article 
of November 4, 1922, if state bounties and subsidies were reduced or 
suspended, war pensions revised, plans for public works restricted to a 
minimum, and the state railway and postai services reorganised and 
rationalised. 
Were the politicai forces able to meet the much-needed reductions? 
Politicai events made Einaudi pessimistic: Giolitti's cabinet had had to re-
sign in July 1921 simply because of opposition in the Chamber of Deputies 
to stopping new expenditures. Popular Catholics and Socialists lacked the 
courage to say no to any requested expenditure, "as they cater for the vote 
of multitudes crying always after state aid" (ibid). The Socialist-Labour 
party, Einaudi wrote on August 19, 1922, "is transforming itself from a re-
volutionary into a constitutional party", but "the economie policy of the 
Socialists would be dangerous, public work for unemployed, doles out 
improvement in public finance. Even in December 1921 when the crisis of the Banca di Sconto 
erupted, the government's intervention was evaluated positively because it proceeded with pru-
dence in providing financial assistance. 
14 It is worth noting that Einaudi considered the quantitative theory of money only "a par-
tial explanation" of the depreciation of the lira (article of November 5, 1921). For Einaudi on the 
quantity theory of money see: "Della moneta serbatoio di valori e di altri problemi monetari", 
Rivista di Storia Economica, IV, 1939, pp. 1-34. See also FORTE, Luigi Einaudi: il mercato e il 
buongoverno, pp. 265-275. 
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of public purse to Labour organisations, and a new vast army of followers 
to be satisfied at public expenses". At the moment when a large effort was 
required to restore the state budget, the politicai and social situation pre-
cipitated and stable cabinets could not be formed:15 "the air is full of bad 
temper and uncertanties", Einaudi had written on August 19, 1922. On 
December 2 of the same year he concluded that Italians were sick of their 
politicai leaders, "old, ineffectual, compromising, sceptic set of politi-
cians", and that the general feeling was one of profound distrust towards 
a parliament which, on the issue of finance, was characterised by "exces-
sive taxation, the system of piling tax upon tax, the demagogie persecution 
of savings and capital by taxes up to 100 per cent of income of capital". 
3.2. 1922-1925: Einaudi confronted with the laissez-faire policy of an un-
liheral government 
At the end of 1922 the Fascist party carne to power, and Alberto De 
Stefani was appointed Minister of Finance. Up to that point, Einaudi 
had written only twice about the Fascists on the pages of The Economist. 
The first time was on Aprii 16, 1921 (a few months after an article in II 
Corriere) and was a positive reference: "A while ago Italy seemed likely 
to be the first country to fall a prey to Moscovite communism and barbar-
ismi today the nightmare is gone and gone for ever"; according to Einaudi, 
merit for this also belonged to the Fascists "youths of the middle class, re-
turned men and officers". Then, on November 4, he examined the Fas-
cisti pre-election manifesto, expressing doubts about their capacity to halt 
new expenditure: "it is to be feared that Fascists... will hesitate before the 
task".16 He wrote that Mussolini, a man "passionate and full of vigour", 
"able to commit his party to headlong plunges into unknown seas", was 
"not an economist", had indeed said "only one economie sentence: 'Italy 
needs at the helm a man capable of saying No to ali requests of new expen-
diture'". And unfortunately "ali leaders are saying the same thing", Einau-
15 When Bonomi's cabinet resigned in February 1922, Einaudi, in order to emphasise the 
definitive end of the Giolitti era, wrote that Giolitti, "the old man, who for a long time was su-
preme in the Government of Italy, and without whose consent no one ever dared to form a Ca-
binet, and against whom no one revolted", was unable to form a new cabinet. "The man who has 
set his face against Giolitti and vetos his return to power is a Sicilian priest, Don Sturzo, the or-
ganiser of the popular party" (article of March 4, 1922). 
16 On the pages of II Corriere Einaudi's judgement was more favourable. Here Einaudi had 
no reservations in defining the Fascist programme as "the liberal programme of classic tradi-
tion", a judgement shared at that time by almost ali Italian economists. 
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di commented (ibid). However, on December 2, 1922, just after the elec-
tions, he considered "the first financial acts of the Fascist Government" as 
"promising": "they have abolished useless train services in the State rail-
ways and declared their intention to drop many Royal decrees instituting 
port authorities in minor ports". He added: "the most important act of 
the new Cabinet has been its demand for provisionai powers to collect 
and expend revenue till June 30, 1923". This bill gave the government 
an absolute power never before entrusted to an executive by parliament, 
and had occurred, Einaudi claimed, as a result of the negative reaction 
of the public to the old politicai class. An article published on December 
2, 1922, showed Einaudi, totally disillusioned by the inability of the old po-
liticai class to get Italy out of chaos, hopeful that the Fascists defined "a 
[new] set of politician, young, energetic, full of vigour", able to manage 
the Italian economy, reliant on the fact that "most of the new Ministers 
are capable men, truly desirous of doing well". 
In The Economist17 Einaudi supported the government's economie 
policy throughout 1923, though in II Corriere he expressed doubt and even 
dissent about Fascism's illiberal politicai methods.18 On January 13, 1923, 
Einaudi wrote that "free trade ideas... are making some progress in Italy"; 
on March 10, he maintained that the two Royal Decrees, "regulating ship-
ping services and shipbuilding, two main causes of huge afterwar expenses 
to the Treasury", were going in the right direction; and a month later, on 
Aprii 14, he believed there was increased hope that the public budget 
would balance and that "Signor De Stefani, Minister of Finance has taken 
another step in the truly gigantic task of simplifying our complicated tax 
system". In his first annual article on the situation of Italy, published in 
the monthly supplement of The Economist on February 17, 1923, Einaudi 
underlined the decrease in the budget deficit. The greatest decrease in the 
budget deficit had taken place when Giolitti abolished the bread subsidy 
17 Even though macroeconomic issues prevailed in Einaudi's articles in this period, they 
were not the only subject he discussed on the pages of The Economist. Other issues also attracted 
his attention, among them the failed attempt of a group of Turin industrialists (Agnelli, Gualino 
and Abegg) to gain control of the Credito Italiano bank and thus a great source of credit, an 
occasion for Einaudi to warn bank direttore that in future they would have to "take great care 
not to let a similar attack develop" (May 24, 1924). 
18 For example, in an article of May 14,1923, he wrote: "We were and we are opponents of 
certain tendencies and methods of internai policy and of the constitutional reform wanted, so it is 
said, by the government; our opposition to it is suggested by the same reasons of principle which 
make us praise the reforming work of the government in the financial issue" ("Il risanamento 
economico e finanziario dell'Italia nel discorso del Ministro delle finanze a Milano " Il Corriere 
della Sera, May 14, 1923). 
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but, on May 26, 1923, Einaudi insisted that since then "the betterment was 
continuous" and "Signor De Stefani deserves great credit for the valiant 
efforts to eliminate the causes which compel the Treasury to incur new 
debts"; and on September 22 he wrote that "Signor De Stefani is quietly 
adding, almost every week, something to his rebuilding of our financial sys-
tem". At the year's end, there was also a positive judgement on the restruc-
turing of public services (December 8, 1923). 
By the beginning of 1924 Einaudi could evaluate the state of the Ita-
lian economy in positive and genuinely optimistic terms: "the gold-value 
of the lira, after touching bottom in 1920, had not varied much in the 
last years"; "new savings are being increasingly invested in industriai en-
terprises" (January 5, 1924). Public finance was also improving on Aprii 
12, 1924, he wrote that the state of public finance was "sound" and that 
"Italy can face the future without uncertainty". "The foundations of Ita-
lian economics are strong, and the outlook for the future is promising", 
he announced in an article on November 29. Two outstanding problems 
did, however, stili concern Einaudi. The first of these was the external 
debt (that is, the war debts), which was "the only remaining stum-
bling-block in our public finance" (February 9, 1924). Einaudi insisted 
that the debt had to be cancelled otherwise the recovery of national fi-
nance would be impossible. Furthermore, as he had emphasized some 
months previously, the issue was clouding Anglo-Italian relationships; 
a serious fact which could undermine "a fundamental principle of Italian 
foreign policy" from 1860 onwards, namely "to maintain friendly rela-
tionships with Great Britain" (January 20, 1923). The second problem 
was that of the stabilisation or the revaluation of the lira. Einaudi was 
in favour of stabilisation: although he recognized that "public opinion 
in Italy stili clings firmly to the hope that in some future day the lira will 
be restored to the old gold parity", he was not convinced because he saw 
that it would determine great difficulties "in the balancing of the public 
Budget and in the dislocation of industries" (Aprii 14, 1923). On Aprii 
12, 1924, he noted that it was not "wholly clear" if the government and 
the Bank of Italy were aiming solely at stabilisation or also at a revalua-
tion of the lira, commenting that "perhaps their policy is not definitely 
settled". On November 29, 1924, he reaffirmed his own position: "the 
increasing stabilisation of the lira", he said, was a "potent element in 
economie progress". 
How was it possible to support the liberal economie policy of a politi-
cally un-liberal government? This issue was dramatically present in Einau-
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di's articles in II Corriere della Sera between 1923-24, and seemed to be-
come a moral contradiction increasingly difficult to sustain. It eventually 
caused his dissociation from Fascismi the Matteotti abduction and murder 
made Einaudi fully aware of the impossibility for a liberal to support the 
Fascist regime.19 This rupture is scarcely visible in the articles published 
in The Economist, consciously restricted as they were to the discussion 
of economie and financial issues. However the restriction and his sup-
pressed indignation with the state of affairs were both notable in his de-
scription of the Matteotti affair: 
Politicai events have been prominent since the meeting of the new Legislature. 
As my letters relate to economie affairs, I will only note that the lurid Matteotti 
affair acted as a check on the frantic upward movement which was going on in 
Italian Stock Exchange. (June 28, 1924) 
Criticai references to Italian politicai events were not absent in subse-
quent articles but they were few and controlled. It should be remembered 
that the Fascist regime was strongly condemned on the pages of The Econ-
omist in articles written by English journalists, ie. journalists free from the 
risk of Fascist repression, (see for example articles of June 24, and Novem-
ber 15, 1924; and the subsequent conciliatory remarks on, for example, 
January 10, 1925). 
In July 1925 De Stefani resigned: his work, Einaudi wrote on August 
15, 1925, "will be long remembered": 
During his tenure of office the Italian Budget position was turned from a huge 
deficit to a small surplus... Signor De Stefani was a strong opponent of new expen-
diture, and, so far as he could go, worked against Protection. 
However, in De Stefani's "well-meant endeavour to revaluate the lira, 
he shook financial markets" and the lira suffered instead of improving 
(ibid). De Stefani's successor was Giuseppe Volpi, and Einaudi, probably 
somewhat concerned, commented only that "he is endeavouring to keep 
himself in dose touch with banking and business circles" (ibid). In the en-
suing months the politicai climate worsened: at the end of the year Einaudi 
resigned from II Corriere della Sera after his friend Luigi Albertini was 
forced to give up the newspaper's editorship because of the Fascist's 
threats to suspend publication. From then on, The Economist became 
19 The issue of Einaudi and Fascism between 1922 and 1924 remains a subject of discussion 
among the historians: see the works of Faucci, Forte and Marongiu already cited. 
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the only newspaper in which Einaudi discussed and analysed Italian eco-
nomie events.20 
4 . THE THIRD PHASE OF EINAUDI'S CONTRIBUTION: ITALY UNDER THE FASCIST 
REGIME, 1 9 2 5 TO 1 9 3 5 
Between 1925 and 1935 Einaudi's articles in The Economist numbered 
143, an average of 13 per year. They analysed the most important issues of 
the period: the economie policy of Fascism and the search for a new 
macroeconomic equilibrium as a consequence of the 'quota 90' policy, 
the effects of the great crisis and the building of a corporate state.21 
4.1. 1925-1929: the analysis of the revaluation of the lira and the deflation-
ary policy 
Einaudi's articles between 1925 and 1929 focussed principally on the 
stabilisation/revaluation of the lira, which was also a centrai theme of po-
liticai and academic debate,22 and of the subsequent, difficult macroeco-
nomic adjustment. According to Einaudi, the first problem that had to 
be faced was the weakness of the lira. At the end of January 1925 the gold 
value of the lira sank to 21.5 % and a decree had to be issued introducing 
stringent regulations on speculative dealings in securities and foreign ex-
change transactions. A decree "which savours of war legislation", Einaudi 
commented (March 14, 1925). Although the fall of the lira had raised fears 
that "too many Italian capitalists are making investments abroad", Einaudi 
wrote: 
20 Of course, a complete evaluation of Einaudi's interpretation of Italian economie events 
from 1925/26 to the war would also need to examine the articles published in La Riforma Sociale 
until 1935 - a task beyond the aim of this introduction. 
21 According to Walter T. Layton: "Einaudi's regular pieces in The Economist were a thorn 
in the flesh of the Fascisti" ("In commemoration of President Luigi Einaudi", London 1962, see 
appendix B). 
22 For a survey of the debate see M. MARCONI, La politica monetaria del fascismo, Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 1982. For recent authoritative reconstruction of the monetary policy of Fascism, based 
on new documentation, see: F. COTULA and L. SPAVENTA, "Introduction" to La politica mone-
taria tra le due guerre, 1919-1935 (edited by Cotula and Spaventa), Collana storica della Banca 
d'Italia, Bari, Laterza, 1997; M. DE CECCO, "Introduction" to L'Italia e il sistema finanziario in-
ternazionale, 1919-1936 (edited by M. De Cecco), Collana storica della Banca d'Italia, Bari, La-
terza, 1993. 
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up to the present the emigration of capital is not noticeable so far as the average 
saver is concerned; it seems, indeed, to be limited to non-remittance to Italy of the 
proceeds of sales of Italian goods made in foreign countries. (ibid) 
Nonetheless, the decree provoked a rush of sales on the stock exchange 
and prices tumbled by a hundred points in only a few days. The Finance 
Minister, stili at that point De Stefani, was forced to revise the decree; but 
in March a new decree set a ceiling on the number of exchange and secur-
ity brokers and raised the guarantee which they had to deposit. At the same 
time the officiai rate of discount was increased. On Aprii 4, 1925, Einaudi 
wrote that: 
the Minister of Finance was evidently of the opinion that speculation was rife in 
the Italian Bourses, which was very much akin to a flight from the lira toward 
goods and securities representing goods, and he endeavoured to check this 
mania. 
For Einaudi, the only likely efficient remedy was to increase the price 
of money. In Aprii, the great turmoil in the stock exchanges obliged the 
government to intervene and suspend regulations, and on May 9 Einaudi 
commented: 
Recent events have taught the lesson that the stabilisation or restoration of 
the lira is not to be gained by direct intervention in the money market. The 
Stock Exchange regulations had the well-meaning aim of checking the specula-
tive mania, of decreasing the demand for paper money, and of facilitating the 
reduction of paper issues. The sensitiveness of the market proved stronger; 
the crisis alarmed everyone; captains of industry feared difficulties in raising 
much-needed capital; and the Government was obliged to authorise banks of 
issue to furnish funds to the market. Total paper issues increased... A failure 
of a well-aimed enterprise. 
The weakness of the lira continued, in July falling from 116 to the 
pound sterling to 133, "a rather alarming turn" (July 18, 1925), even 
though the quantity of paper issued was not increased. A chief cause 
of the instability of the lira, Einaudi believed, was the fear that Italy 
would never be able to pay off its foreign debt and the state would be 
"bound to bankrupty" (ibid). "Very small sums can be paid by our tax-
payers to the service of external debt" (ibid), he warned, because the 
burden of taxation was very high - he calculated that the rate of taxation, 
which had rapidly increased since the pre-war days, was 20-22.5% of to-
tal national income - and a further increase of it could only "favour the 
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flight of new savings away from the lira" (June 13, 1925). August and 
September saw an improvement of foreign exchanges due to the success 
of the so-called 'lira campaign' which lowered the exchange-rate to 115 
lire to the pound sterling.23 Einaudi defined this as a first step toward 
stabilisation, which would, he claimed, be characterised by a deflationary 
policy. He compared the situation of Italy to that of Great Britain after 
the adoption of the Cunliffe Report (1918) and of Germany after the col-
lapse of the paper-mark and the adoption of the renten-mark (1923). 
After showing the increase in the capital of joint-stock companies be-
tween 1922 and 1925, he insisted that: "the truth is that industriai devel-
opment had been more rapid than the increase of national savings... We 
are bound, therefore, to reduce the rate of progress" (October 10, 1925). 
In November a second step toward stabilisation was taken when the Ita-
lian mission for the settlement of the debt with the United States, begun 
at the end of October, proved successful. Einaudi, estimating the re-
maining public debt to be about 106,384 million lira or 900 million ster-
ling, commented: "the only uncertain item [of the public debt] is the 
British debt", and at that point the public debt was "a great sum but 
one which the state budget can bear" (December 19, 1925). The pro-
blemi of the inter-Allied debt more or less resolved, and therefore that 
of the structural weakness of the lira, the stabilisation of the lira was 
now a practical possibility. With regard to this, and the 100 million dol-
lar loan from the United States, negotiated by Volpi, to be utilised in the 
continuation of the policy of stabilisation, Einaudi wrote: 
The first step will probably be that the Bank of Italy, by skilful management of 
the loan fund, will maintain the rate of foreign exchanges at the selected leve! The 
second step will be the adoption of a sort of gold exchange system, (ibid) 
He concluded: 
Experience will teli at what precise point stable equilibrium can be reached, 
without laying on the Bank of Italy's shoulders an impossible task, (ibid) 
By the beginning of 1926, Einaudi's judgement of the Italian situation 
was positive: in the first six months of the financial year there was a sur-
plus, foreign exchanges improved and the quotation of the lira seemed 
23 At the sanie time, at the end of October, "the chain which seemed to bind together the 
Italian lira and the French frane broke down"; "an interesting feature", Einaudi commented on 
November 7. 
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to have stabilised at 120 pounds sterling, without artificial endeavours to 
maintain it; industry was also developing at a rapid pace, and unemploy-
ment was almost zero. On March 13, 1926, he hoped that: 
by maintaining the lira at a stabilised level, a new equilibrium of internai and ex-
ternal prices, a reduction of costs and a revival of faith in industriai securities will 
be reached. 
But at the end of Aprii the rate of exchange began again to increase: 
"the vagaries of the rate of exchange continue to be the most important 
problem in the economie life of Italy" (July 10, 1926). The problem, he 
maintained, lay not in the balance of trade nor the budget balance. The lat-
ter was "no longer a factor in the falling value of the lira", the treasury 
being, according to his calculation, "in a very strong position" (ibid). On 
the contrary, "the crux of the present situation lies in the risk of an increase 
in note issue", and such an increase could be consequent "upon an unfore-
seen obligation causing the Treasury to withdraw deposit from the Bank of 
Italy" (ibid). In fact, the public deposit was the source from which the 
Bank of Italy drew the means to make larger advances to commerce and 
industry, notwithstanding the decrease in note issue. Einaudi believed that 
"Italy has solved other bigger financial problems, and she will solve this 
lesser monetary problem", and that graduai restriction of discounts by 
the bank of issue were the method "by which it will be possible to put 
an end to risky business of financing industry through public deposits" 
(ibid). In November 1926 Einaudi welcomed two events he considered 
of far-reaching importance in the defence of the lira: the consolidation 
of the Treasury bills and the suppression of the 'autonomous' section of 
the consortium for industriai securities. The latter had been created in 
1922 with the purpose of salvaging, first, the Banca Italiana di Sconto, then 
the Banco di Roma, and Einaudi considered its liquidation to have been 
"slower than was deemed in accordance with the new deflationist policy" 
(November 13, 1926). 
At the beginning of 1927 the attainment of price equilibrium was stili 
under examination by Einaudi. Commenting on what he called "a revalua-
tion crisis", he wrote: 
Italy is indeed passing through a difficult adaptation to a new level of price; 
and, as usuai, some suffering is the inevitable accompaniment of the revaluation 
of the lira. But the final outcome of the process seems to be the elimination of 
the unfit, more liquidity in the banks, lower, and, therefore, saner valuations in 
the balance-sheets; more prudent ideas of future profits, and a consequent 
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compelled to amenti the lavv. There are admittedly many 
flaws in the present settlemcnt, but it is not impossible to 
attain any kind of ali-round " fairness " ; e.g., ordinary 
unsecured creditors who have been ruined by mark depre-
ciation will in no case get any compensation. The re-
opening of the question will result in a prolonged term of 
insecurity, which will incidentally react unfavourably on 
Germany's chance of getting foreign private credit. 
Even now it is (apart from the shortage of capital) impos-
sible to conclude safe mortgages, because the land 
registers no longer reveal precisely what is the extent of 
cxisting State and private claims. 
Company finance will also be lipset. In the new gold 
mark balance-sheets, which are slowly appearing, the 
extinction of bonded debts naturally plays a great róle. 
This is probably the chief cause why most companies are 
able to fix their new gold capital at higher than before 
the war. The following table, which summarises an 
analysis of 11 new gold mark balance-sheets made by the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, shows company bonded debts to be 
only 11 per cent, of the pre-war level : — 
1924 in 
Por Cent, 
of 1913. 
Land, baildings, and plant 90 
Securities and interests 25 
Cash and credits 56 
Wares 97 
Capital 143 
Reserves 85 
Bonds and mortgages 11 
Debts 64 
In eight of the eleven companies the new gold capital is 
bigger fhan the old ; in six land, buildings and plant 
are valued at higher than the old. The declines in 
credits and debts may be explained by the present greator 
prevalence of cash payments, which became the rule dur-
ing the infiation time. Up to June 20th only 24 com-
panies quoted on the Berlin Bourse had published gold 
mark balance-sheets. While the nominai paper mark 
capital of these companies has been reduced to anything 
from half to i-iooth in order to get the new gold mark 
capital, the latter is almost in every case higher than 
before the war. But whereas the pre-war average Bourse 
quotation was 170, the new average gold quotation is 
5S|. Some good authorities think that the companies 
are putting their new gold mark capital much too high. 
If so, dividends will be small ; and as German company 
law does not allow of the issue of shares under par, diffi-
culty may be met in raising new capital. A revision of 
the Third Taxation Decree on the Aufwertung question 
would, of course, involve revision of the new balance-
sheets. 
Bankruptcies are rapidly increasing, and the number 
of cases of suspended bankruptcy stili more rapidly. In 
Berlin several leading trades report depression. Unem-
ployment in the Rhineland is increasing, but this shows 
itself mainly in reduced working hours. In ali quarters 
the capital and credit shortage is made responsible for 
the depression, but it is officially pointed out that the 
difficulties of industry are in part due to a false under-
standing of the situation. Prices are stili slowly falling. 
The officiai wholesale index numiber for June iyth 
was 1 1 7 , against 1 17 .2 a week earlier; the officiai cost of 
living index for June i8th was 1 1 2 , against 1 1 3 a week 
earlier. 
Three of the leading shipping concerns, the Hamburg-
American, Norddeutsche Lloyd, and Hamburg South-
American companies, have issued their reports for 1923. 
Capitalisations are respectively 285-million marks (180 
million 1913) , 1,000 million marks ( 125 million 19 13) , and 
95 million marks (25 million 1913) . The balance-sheets 
and profit and loss accounts show the usuai confusion of 
values of different kinds, the capitals and reserves repre-
senting now nominai sums, while receipts and expenditure 
include indiscriminately " m a r k s " of ali values. No 
dividends are paid. The Hamburg-American Line's net 
profits were 299,999 billion paper marks ; Norddeutsche 
Lloyd, net profits, 150,240 billion paper marks ; Ham-
burg-South American, net profits, 749,203 billion paper 
marks. The Hamburg-American's fleet, including ships 
under construction, is 251 vessels, whereof 78 are sea-
going ships, of total tonnage 432>538, against 439 vessels, 
whereof 194 are seìa-going, of total tonnage, 1,360,360, in 
1 9 1 3 . The Norddeutsche Lloyd's fleet, including vessels 
under construction, is 401,963 tons, against 982,951 tons 
in 1 9 1 3 . 
ITALY.—POLITICS AND THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
F E V E R — P L E N T Y OF MONEY—NEW ISSTJIS — 
UNEMPLOYMENT—FOREIGN TRADE. 
(FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT.) 
TURIN, June 2 1 . 
POLITICAI, events have been prominent since the meeting 
of the new Legislature. As my letters relate to economie 
affairs, 1 will only note that the lurid Matteotti affair 
acted as a check on the frantic upward movement which 
was going on in Italian Stock Exchanges. If we take as 
basis 100 the quotations for December, 19 18 , the Bachi 
index number of State securities, which was as low as 
73.8 in September, 1920, reached 100.2 in January, 1924, 
101.3 in February, 103 .0 in March, 103.9 *n Aprii, and 
109.5 May, 1924. That is a general average; 5 per 
cent, consols, which at a time in 1920 went as low as 67, 
touch ed in early June 102.50. 
Yesterday (June 20th) they fell to 98.85. But the 
wildest fluctuations took place in " variàble dividend " 
shares. Bachi 's general index number (basis 100 at 
December, 1918) touched bottom in Aprii, 1922, at 56.45. 
At the end of 1922 the index was 72 .08 ; at the end of 
1923, 85.67. In 1924 every month, save Aprii, saw a rise 
to 89.79 January, 96. 18 in February, 1 0 1 . 7 0 in March, 
100.51 in Aprii, 1 14 .34 in May. 
The leaders in the upward movement were easily the 
siile shares, especially artificial silk. At a time, the 
greatest artificial silk concern, Snia-Vlscosa, with a paid 
capital of 600 millions lire, was capitalised at 1 ,500 
millions l ire; the next one in importance, the Soie de 
Chàtillon Company, with a paid capital of 75 millions, 
at 675 millions lire. Following these spectacular rises, 
operatori» multiplied ; crowds congregated every day on 
the floors and outside Stock Exchanges ; fortunes were 
made. Stock Exchange men were ali Fascists ; no more 
strikes, social peace, abundant work, State Budget in 
equilibrium, no more prosecution against capital. Every-
one was persuaded that Bourse quotations would rise in-
definitely. On this excited state of mind the Matteotti 
affair acted like a bombshell. Something like a stampede 
took place. Snia receded from 504 to 400, Chàtillon from 
900 to 680, Fiat from 754 to 565,Bank of Italy from 1 ,950 to 
1 ,625. Perhaps nothing more tragic will happen save losses 
suffered bv over-enthusiastic bulls. Money is abundant 
and is anxiously seeking employment. After many years, 
during which the State absorbed ali available savings, the 
situation has wholly changed. Public internai debt has 
decreased from 95.544 millions lire at June 30, 1923, to 
93.655 millions at Aprii 30, 1924. No wonder that the 
market situation was favourable to buoyancy and to new 
issues. In 1923 new issues of shares by joint stock com-
panies, less decreases of capital or winding-up of com-
panies, amounted to 2.131 million lire. In the first five 
months of 1924 the figure went up to 1978.8 million lire, 
against 5 1 5 . 2 in the corresponding months of 1923. 
As far as can be guessed by the belated unemployment 
figures, the industriai situation seems bette r than a year 
ago. At February 28, 1923, unemployed were 327,892 ; 
they decreased to a minimum of 1 78 ,6 12 at August 3 1 , 
1 9 2 3 ; seasonably rising to 258,580 at end of December, 
1923, to 280,765 at January 3 i s t , and decreasing to 
259>3^° a t February 29, 1924. 
Foreign trade in the months from January to -Aprii, 
1924, compared as follows with the corresponding period 
of 1922 and 1923 (in millions of lire) : — 
1922. 1923. 1924. 
Difference 
1922 & 
1924. 
Between 
1923 & 
1924. 
Excess of imports over 
exports 
4,837-7 
2,744-4 
5,525-5 
3,143-5 
5,815-8 
4,357-8 
+ 9781 
+1,613-4 
+ 290-3 
+ 1,214-3 
2,093-3 2,382 0 1 1,458 0 — 635-3 — 924-0 
The excess of imports is decreasing, thanks principally to 
more abundant exports, the most notable increases being 
in silk and artificial silk (from 850.1 million lire in 1923 to 
I»°77-3 million lire in 1924, fruits and vegetables (249.9 
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by a b o u t 2 6 0 mil l ion m a r k s a n d i m p o r t s dec l ined b j 
a b o u t 5 0 0 mi l l ion m a r k s . 
(Millions of marks.) 
Importa. Exporta. 
1925 4,023 520 
1926 3,571 504 
1927 4,326 441 
1928 4,203 631 
1929 3,817 701 
T h e p r o m i n e n t f e a t u r e of t h e agr icu l tura l s i tuat ion 
w a s t h e r is ing t ide of i n d e b t e d n e s s w h i c h n e i t h e r in-
c r e a s e d dut ies n o r S t a t e aid could m a t e r i a l l y reduce . 
A t h o r o u g h officiai inqui ry showed, however , t h a t t h e 
f in a n c ia l s t r i n g e n c y is m o s t m a r k e d in t h e la rge e s t a t e s 
of t h e e a s t , whi le w e s t a n d s o u t h of t h e E l b e agricul-
t u r e i s to lerably pr ospe r ou s . 
Keb. 15.] THE ECONOMIST. COMMERCIAL HISTORY & REVIEW OF 1929. 
1928. I n proport ion to e s t i m a t e s , however , r ece ip ts 
were only 6 6 per c e n t , in 1 9 2 9 , a s a g a i n s t 7 0 per c e n t , 
in the previous year . R e p a r a t i o n p a y m e n t s , w h i c h 
were portly respons ib le for t h e e x i g e n c i e s of p u b l i c 
finance, rose ( exc luding de l iver ies in k ind) f r o m 1 , 8 8 7 
jn 1928 to 2 , 1 5 0 mil l ion m a r k s in 1 9 2 9 . M u n i c i p a l 
finance carne t o a t u r n i n g p o i n t in N o v e m b e r , w h e n a 
eompulsory consol idat ion of t h e 2 , 0 0 0 mil l ion m a r k s 
fioating debt w a s decided upon a n d f u t u r e e x p e n d i t u r e 
made sub jec t t o severe l i m i t a t i o n . 
Industiry.—Industriai p r o d u c t i o n w a s cons iderably 
higher than in 1928 . T h e o u t p u t of pig iron rose f r o m 
11,804,000 m e t r i c tons to 1 3 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e t r i c t o n s ; out-
put of steel ingoia rose f r o m 1 4 , 5 1 7 , 0 0 0 t o 1 6 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 
| metric tons. T h i s r i se w a s s l ight ly in e x c e s s of t h e 
rate of world i n c r e a s e u n d e r ench o f t h e t w o h e a d s . 
Other production figures in t h e h e a v y industr ies a r e 
(January-November) : — 
(Thousand metric tona.) 
1927. 1928. 1929. 
Rolling-mill products . . . 11,782 10,699 11,555 
Coal 140,359 139,057 149,785 
Lignite 136,673 152,119 160,648 
In the R u h r coa l d i s t r i c t a c t i v i t y w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
intense, and coa l o u t p u t i n c r e a s e d during t h e y e a r b y 
23 per cent . , c o k e a n d b r i q u e t t e o u t p u t by a b o u t 
50 per cent . T h e eng ineer ing i n d u s t r y m a i n t a i n e d a 
high level of product ion a s r i s ing e x p o r t s m a d e up in 
quantity—if n o t in p r o f i t s — f o r t h e d imin ish ing h o m e 
demand. T h e e l e c t r o - t e c h n i c a l i n d u s t r y h a d a dull 
jear, the fal l ing off in d e m a n d for i t s p r o d u c t s re f lec t -
ing the general t r a d e d e p r e s s i o n ; e x p o r t s , however , 
were sat i s fac tory . T h e R o h s t a h l g e m e i n s c h a f t ( I n g o t 
Steel Syndicate) a g r e e m e n t c a r n e up for r e n e w a l and , 
after strenuous d iscuss ion , w a s e x t e n d e d for t e n y e a r s . 
No important n e w a m a l g a m a t i o n s are repor ted , b u t it 
is thought t h a t t h e m e r g e r of t h e t w o l a r g e s t b a n k s 
fili st imulate f u r t h e r i n d u s t r i a i c o n c e n t r a t i o n b y re -
moving. e l e m e n t s of r i v a l r y a m o n g t h e financial 
interests. I n t h i s connection. , r u m o u r s are af loat con-
ceming a possible m e r g e r i n t h e s h i p p i n g world. U n -
employment w a s c o m p a r a t i v e l y low during t h e first 
naif of t h e year , b u t rose a b o v e t h e previous y e a r ' s 
level from O c t o b e r . T h e m o n t h l y a v e r a g e of u n e m -
ployed in r e c e i p t of r e l i e f w a s 1 , 7 7 5 , 0 0 0 in D e c e m b e r , 
1929, as aga ins t 1 , 7 0 2 , 0 0 0 in D e c e m b e r , 1 9 2 8 . 
Prices and W a g e s — T h e officiai i n d e x of wholesa le 
prices in D e c e m b e r , .1929, w a s 1 3 4 . 3 , a s a g a i n s t 1 3 9 . 9 
in December, 1 9 2 8 ( 1 9 1 3 e q u a l s 1 0 0 ) . T h e decrease 
was mainly in foodstuf fs a n d in r a w a n d s e m i - m a n u -
factured m a t e r i a l s , while p r i c e s of m a n u f a c t u r e d goods 
decreased less. T h e officiai cos t -of - l iv ing index re -
mained a lmost u n c h a n g e d . - — D e c e m b e r , 1 9 2 9 1 5 2 . 6 ; 
Deoember, 1928 , 1 5 2 . 7 ( 1 9 1 3 e q u a l s 1 0 0 ) . T h e u p w a r d 
trend of wages c o n t i n u e d . O n t h e a v e r a g e , t h e w e e k l y 
tanff wages of ski l led l a b o u r i n c r e a s e d b y 4 . 8 per 
cent., those for unski l led l a b o u r b v 4 . 3 per c e n t , 
donng t h e y e a r . A c a l c u l a t i o n p u b l i s h e d b y t h e 
wtitut fiir Konjunkturforschung p u t s t h e to ta l y e a r l y 
OcomeB of ali e m p l o y e e s , inc luding c ivi l s e r v a n t s , a s 
rollows:— 
1927 40,000,000,000 
1928 45,000,000,000 
192 9 ? 46,000,000,000 
This means a 2 per c e n t , r i se in t h e a v e r a g e s t a n d a r d 
« living during t h e p a s t y e a r . 
. Tsrifls and C o m m e r c i a l A g r e e m e n t s . — A g r i c u l t u r a l 
"aport duties w e r e r a i s e d in J u n e a f t e r t h e ex i s t ing 
Animerei al a g r e e m e n t s wi th S w e d e n , S w i t z e r l a n d , 
«ance and F i n l a n d h a d b e e n a m e n d e d . A t t h e end o f 
year, a f u r t h e r r i se in a g r i c u l t u r a l d u t i e s w a s u n d e r 
®8cussion with a spec ia l provis ion f o r s l iding s c a l e s . 
loe industriai tariff o f 1 9 2 5 , w h i c h t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e 
o f 1929 , w a s e x t e n d e d w i t h o u t m a t e r i a l r e d u c -
?° s . a n d t h e G o v e r n m e n t i s n o w c o n t e m p l a t i n g 
Waitions and i n c r e a s e s . 
Agr icul ture .—Favourable c r o p s l ed t o an i n c r e a s e in 
jports of f a r m p r o d u c t s , w h i l e i m p o r t s w e r e f u r t h e r 
U c ed- S i n c e 1 9 2 7 a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s h a v e r i s e n 
I T A L Y . 
Fore ign T r a d e . — T h e c o r r e c t e d figures of t h e C e n t r a l 
I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s for 1 9 2 9 and previous y e a r s were 
as fol lows (prec ious m e t a l s a n d r e p a r a t i o n del iveries 
e x c l u d e d ) : — 
(In Millions.) 
Importa. Exports. Excess of Imports 
over Exports. 
Papor Paper Paper Present 
Lire. Lire. Lire. stabilised 
Lire.* 
1910-13 3,496 2,528 968 3,553 
192 0 18,105 8,742 9.363 11,190 
1921 17,227 9,300 7,927 7,384 
192 2 15,765 10,698 5,067 4,551 
192 3 17,189 - 12,757 4.432 3,872 
192 4 19,381 16,529 2,852 2,360 
1925 26,200 21,015 5,185 3,931 
1926 25,879 21,175 4,704 3,446 
192 7 20,375 15,632 7,743 4,602 
192 8 22,042 14,529 7,513 7,513 
1929t{ 21,353 14,886 6,467 6,467 
* For the sake of comparison the paper lire are converted iato 
old gold lire at the appropriate rate of exchange, and these are 
in their turn converted into present stabilised lire at the rate o f 
1 to 3 -67 . 
t Provisionai figures. 
t When expressed in lire of pre-war purchaeing power the 
excess of imports in 1929 àmounta to 1,504 millions as compared 
with the average of 968 millions in 1910-13. 
T h e decrease in t h e i m p o r t b a l a n c e in 1 9 2 9 i s whol ly 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e s e c o n d h a l f of t h e y e a r . I n t h e first 
h a l f t h e e x c e s s of i m p o r t s increased f r o m 4 , 7 5 0 to 4 , 8 9 7 
m i l l i o n l i re . T h e h e a v y i m p o r t s w e r e due t o coal , gaso-
l ine , corn a n d broken i r o n and s tee l . I n t h e s e c o n d h a l f 
of t h e year , however , owing to l esser i m p o r t s of w h e a t 
( 3 5 4 , 0 0 0 , a g a i n s t 9 4 6 , 0 0 0 tons ) , a n d of corn ( 2 4 4 , 0 0 0 , 
a g a i n s t 4 6 6 , 0 0 0 t o n s ) , i m p o r t s were lower at 
8 , 8 0 1 mi l l ion lire, a g a i n s t 9 , 2 5 1 mi l l ion l ire in 
1 9 2 8 ; and as t h e e x p o r t s were u n c h a n g e d ( 6 , 5 1 2 , 
a g a i n s t 6 , 4 8 9 m i l l i o n l ire) , t h e e x c e s s of i m p o r t s 
w e n t down f r o m 2 , 7 6 3 t o 1 , 5 7 0 m i l l i o n l ire. 
T h e hoped-for i n c r e a s e of e x p o r t s h a s fa i l ed to 
m a t e r i a l i s e during t h e p a s t year , a s r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and 
r e d u c t i o n of c o s t s in i n d u s t r y h a v e n o t y e t pr od u ce d 
suff ic ient resu l t , t h o u g h in agr icu l ture t h e w h e a t e a m -
p a i g n h a s m e t w i t h b e t t e r s u c c e s s . 
T h e i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e b a l a n c e of t r a d e b e c o m e s 
a l m o s t negl ig ib le w h e n expressed i n t e r m s o f l ire of 
p r e - w a r p u r c h a s i n g power . T o t h e def ic i t w e m u s t add 
t h e del iver ies on r e p a r a t i o n a c c o u n t s , w h i c h are t r u e 
p a i d i m p o r t s , as I t a l y h a s to p a y over t o G r e a t B r i t a i n 
a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s p r a c t i c a l l y t h e whole a m o u n t re-
c e i v e d b y G e r m a n y . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t i t e m in th is 
a c c o u n t is coal , of w h i c h w e i m p o r t e d 1 , 7 2 7 , 8 6 1 tons in 
1 9 2 5 , 2 , 8 9 1 , 3 8 1 t o n s in 1 9 2 6 , 3 , 0 8 8 , 9 0 6 tons in 1 9 2 7 , 
3 , 5 3 9 , 2 3 1 tons in 1 9 2 8 a n d 1 , 9 2 7 , 0 0 0 t o n s in t h e ' first 
e i g h t m o n t h s of 1 9 2 9 . 
O r o p s — A g r i c u l t u r a l y i e l d s g e n e r a l l y were b e t t e r in 
1 9 2 9 t h a n in 1 9 2 8 . C o m p a r a t i v e figures for several 
y e a r s a re g iven in t h e fol lowing t a b l e . 
4. The first page of article n. 181. 
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check on expenditure. Perhaps prudence will continue to give counsels of re-
straint in the coming months, but prudence and restraint were always in diffi-
cult times the best roads towards recovery and future prosperity. (January 8 
1927) 
One month later, on February 5, he stated that "the problem of the lira 
remains the crux of the industriai and general economie situation": the in-
dustrialists desired stable money, he wrote in Aprii, but the government 
remained bent on its revaluation policy which was beginning to have a 
marked effect on wholesale prices. In May the lira reached the level of 
90 to the pound sterling on December 21 it would be legally stabilised 
at the level of 92.46.24 Einaudi avoided judgment on the decision to main-
tain "quota 90", limiting himself to a summary of one of Mussolini's 
speeches in which, discussing the problem of the lira in "trenchant lan-
guage", the dictator said that the level of the lira represented "the recogni-
tion of the progress from a huge State Budget deficit to a substantial sur-
plus, of the end of paper inflation, and of a balanced account of interna-
tional payments" (June 11, 1927). Einaudi's positive reserve continued into 
September, when he wrote: 
statistics... do not reveal as yet a very pronounced state of crisis in consequence of 
the revaluation of the lira. Nor is it probable that we shall see in Italy spectacular 
figures of unemployed such as were or are usuai in industriai countries such as the 
United States, Great Britain, or Germany during the revaluation or stabilisation 
period. Italy being, like France, as yet predominantly a country of small cultivating 
landowners, economie cycles are bound to work more smoothly here. (September 
17, 1927) 
On October 22 he went as far as to say that the "Bank of Italy is at 
present in a very strong situation" and believed that "Italy could, if she 
wished, legally stabilise the lira at the present level of 90 lire to the pound 
sterling". By the end of the year, on December 24, and even in the pre-
sence of the bourses' inaction, the unfavourable opportunity for invest-
ment, the excess of savings and decrease in international trade, Einaudi 
only commented that the Italian process was analogous to the British pro-
cess of the return to gold in order to arrive at a new and stable equilibrium 
of prices, wages, taxes and debts, "a process through which we must per 
24 On the debate relating to "quota 90" see the works of Marconi, Cotula-Spaventa and De 
Cecco already cited. 
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force pass". In his now annual article on the Italian economy, Einaudi 
calmly noted that for 1927: 
ali data seems therefore to point out that the year was influenced by the revalua-
tion process, whose intensity was of a magnitude perhaps not inferior to any simi-
lar foreign process. This accounts for the present industriai crisis in Italy, which, 
even so, is only of moderate dimensions. (February 11, 1928) 
So at the beginning of 1928, Einaudi wrote that in many industries em-
ployers had to struggle "with the cost of production problem"; that "inter-
national and wholesale internai selling prices are in equilibrium with the 
stable monetary level; but wages and fixed-interest changes lag as yet be-
hind" (January 28, 1928). Though by the middle of the year he stili consid-
ered the stabilisation problem "as yet not over" (May 19, 1928), surveying 
the economy after the end of it (February 9, 1929), Einaudi referred to 
"the graduai passing of the revaluation crisis" after it had reached its worst 
point in the last months of 1927 and the first quarter of 1928. 
During the revaluation process, after the stabilisation of the lira, pro-
blems arose in Italy's balance of payments. The country appeared to Einau-
di to be passing through: 
a temporary crisis of adjustment, when imports are increasing toward capital 
equipment of a growing industriai and agricultural activity, but the consequent 
flow of export goods is as yet not abundant enough. (February 23, 1929)25 
The excess of imports over exports, due also to bad agricultural yields 
as well as the replacement of industriai stocks, was quite significant and, 
together with the structural decrease in the remittances of emigrants and 
the remaining high external debt, caused a serious problem for the balance 
of payments. Einaudi decribed it as "the most momentous problem with 
which Italy is confronted" (February 23, 1929). Already in January Einaudi 
had noted the decrease in gold reserves and greeted appreciatively the 
"wise action of the Bank of Italy [in raising the rate of discount] to coun-
teract the outward movement of its gold reserve" (January 12, 1929). On 
Aprii 27, 1929, in his regular comment on the Bank of Italy's annual re-
port, Einaudi summarized the 'Italian experience' of revaluation from an 
explicitly Ricardian point of view: 
25 In his annual survey of 1929 (February 15, 1930) Einaudi remarked that "the hoped-for 
increase of exports has failed to materialise during the past year, as rationalisation and reduction 
of costs in industry have not yet produced sufficient result". 
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Italian experience is perhaps one of the most interesting recent verifications of 
the Ricardian theory of the international movements of precious metal... The steps 
were as follows: 1) Before monetary reform, internai prices were adequate at a le-
vel of, say, 120 lire to £ 1 sterling, 2) Notes and other sight debts were adequate in 
amount to the level of prices, 3) After stabilisation at the level of 92.7, gold inter-
nai prices are in 1928 stili higher than foreign gold prices, 4) Therefore imports 
increased and export decreased... 5) A deficit arises which must somehow be paid, 
6) Gold securities of the Bank of Italy decrease, but notes and cheque circulation 
decrease also, 7) So far we have dealt with past history. Coming to prophecy, we 
may suppose that the decrease of note and cheque circulation, which, by the way, 
is continuing..., reduced stili further internai paper and gold prices. When the 
equilibrium between internai and foreign prices is finally restored, imports will 
again decrease and exports increase and the balance of international payments 
automatically be adjusted. The monetary manoeuvre will then be perfect. (Aprii 
27, 1929) 
Einaudi attributed the merit of this procedure to Stringher: 
Asfar as we can see, we are bound to compliment Signor Stringher on his ad-
mirable silent handling of the process. Nobody cares for the cries of those last 
remnants of inflationism, who would have preferred to keep the notes for internai 
use and borrow the gold securities toward meeting foreign engagements. Signor 
Stringher, in refusing these absurd claims, has deserved well of his country, (ibid) 
Equally convincingly, on May 11, 1929, Einaudi wrote: 
I explained in my last letter that the reduction of issues and of reserves going 
on in Italy at present is naturai and perfectly in accordance with orthodox rules. 
On the whole, Einaudi seemed fundamentally to agree with the mone-
tary policy and actions of the Bank of Italy, from which he emphasized his 
autonomy (verified also legally - see the article of July 28, 1928), and 
trusted that in the long run an equilibrium would be established. He ar-
gued that the recessive effects of the process of stabilisation and revalua-
tion were not altogether that dramatic, emphasising that the problem of 
unemployment was quantitatively small. He also outlined two points of 
great interest: a) that the cruciai point of every revaluation process is that 
"revaluation means contraction of prices and of private income"; but 
"state expenditure is mostly fixed and cannot be contracted, so that the 
burden of tax payers increases"; and hence "years must pass before the 
old equilibrium between private and public expenditure is restored" (Jan-
uary 11, 1930); and b) that the stabilisation of the lira, in abolishing any 
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chance of appreciation in lira holdings, has diminished "the incentive for 
emigrants to convert dollars and other gold savings into lire" (ibid), thus 
determining a structural change on the credit side of the Italian balance 
of payments. 
4.2. After 1929: the analysis of the Italian monetary policy in the period of 
the Great Crisis 
In October 1929, whilst in Italy the difficult process of adjustment was 
taking place, there was crisis on the New York Stock Exchange. Einaudi's 
first mention of it carne at the end of November: 
The New York slump had no appreciable influence on Italian Stock 
Exchanges. Since the middle of 1925 our bourses have been in a sleepy mood, 
transactions being limited to the professional operators, with no participation at 
ali by the public. (November 30, 1929) 
However, by the second half of 1930, the crisis had spread world -
wide and the Italian economy was not spared: state revenue inevitably de-
creased, industriai activity showed progressive slackening, with unemploy-
ment rising to about half a million, a severe slump in foreign trade and life-
less bourses. Einaudi detailed the worsening economie conditions but his 
principal worry was the state budget: on December 13, 1930, he reported 
that the "budget situation, which had been slowly deteriorating for some 
months, revealed disquieting symptoms at the end of October". The Gov-
ernment confronted the situation by imposing wage restrictions on public 
servants and launching a press campaign for a thorough-going reduction in 
the cost of living, which in some sectors saw widespread reductions in 
prices and wages. Einaudi doubted however that such measures were suf-
ficient to re-absorb the unemployment in the industriai sector: 
The continued fall of wholesale prices has maintained the distance. Wages are 
beginning to decrease; but the general average is only slightly affected. (ibid.) 
After May 1931 and the Credit-Anstald crisis, foreign exchange mar-
kets suffered heavy disturbances and, in September, Great Britain sus-
pended the gold standard. On October 3, 1931, Einaudi wrote: 
The first repercussion... was in Italy one of bewilderment... It is feared that if 
the British suspension were followed by other weak countries, the menace to our 
exporting industries and to our balance of trade, much improved in later months, 
may become very strong and react on the Bank of Italy gold reserves. 
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A week later he tried to allay his worst fears when he wrote of the suc-
cessful fight of the government, the treasury and the banks "to save the 
convertibility of the lira from world monetary turmoil" (October 10, 
1931); and somewhat optimistically he reported on October 17 that "ap-
parently the first shock of the British gold suspension has spent its force". 
In fact, government monetary policy continued to centre on the mainte-
nance of the lira at its level of stabilisation, established in 1927, and in or-
der to sustain this the officiai rate of discount was increased from 5 .5% to 
7%. At the same time, the Bank of Italy increased its gold bullion reserves: 
Einaudi remarked that this fact "seems to indicate a general tendency to 
leave the gold exchange system in favour of the gold standard proper" 
(November 7, 1931). In general Einaudi seemed to believe that "Italy is 
withstanding the shock of the world crisis better than other countries, 
mainly owing to the great number of landowners" (ibid). The Italian econ-
omy, he wrote, "is too secluded, too small-agriculturist, to be much con-
cerned with international monetary portents" (ibid). 
Yet the crisis worsened and industriai activity continued to slow down, 
in certain instances extremely so, and unemployment rose to one million in 
December 1931 and one and a quarter by the end of January 1933. The 
stock exchanges were "practically non-existent" (February 13, 1932) 
and, Einaudi noted, "the crisis is beginning to affect the revenue" (January 
9, 1932). For Italy the crisis reached its nadir at the end of 1932, after 
which industriai recovery was progressive. "Industriai activity is not much 
below the 1929 level", Einaudi finally wrote on July 13, 1935, unemploy-
ment having fallen to 755,000 by the middle of that year. This figure was 
not worrying because: 
in Italy... where people live mosdy on their farms or in small shops or are indepen-
dent artisans, the total may not be as alarming as it looks. It may be that in Italy, 
when the figure falls to, say, 600.000, there are no true unemployed. Some of the 
600.000 do not care to work at ali, and the rest are simply waiting for a better op-
portunity, earning a living meanwhile on casual jobs. Notwithstanding the 755.349 
men and women now on the unemployment rolls, entrepreneurs are at times find-
ing it difficult to obtain good hands. (ibid) 
What really worried Einaudi instead was the abandonment of free 
trade and the rise of mercantilism in international trade. When at the 
end of 1931 commercial restrictions were introduced in Italy - "Italy is 
joining, not without reluctance, in the general rate of commercial restric-
tions", he reported on January 9, 1932 - he commented: 
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England's abandonment of free trade has caused the fact to be recognised that 
it is impossible to export if everybody is refusing to buy (ibid), 
adding: 
From the excess of ili, we may thus at last hope for a ray of light in the shape 
of international agreements, even if these appear in the crude mercantilist garb of 
quotas, pooling of foreign exchanges and other devices strangely reminiscent of a 
bygone era. (ibid) 
Even in the worst moments of the country's economie crisis, Einaudi 
held faith in the established rules of economie orthodoxy. His opinion 
of the anti-inflationist monetary policy of the government and the Bank 
of Italy, and their defence of the lira, was substantially positive. He wrote 
on August 26, 1933: 
The stability of the lira has reacted on public psychology, stopping or redu-
cing the export of capital and even provoking not a few capitalists to recali bal-
ances, formerly held in foreign countries. 
Already on December 26, 1931, he had maintained that the limited de-
crease in the total reserves of the Bank of Italy was not "an excessive price 
to pay for the maintenance of the stability of the lira". 
Although by the end of 1933 there had been three officiai reductions 
in the rate of interest, in November 1934 it was raised to 4%, "mainly in 
defence of the gold and gold exchange reserves of the Bank of Italy" 
(February 17, 1934). But from then on the Bank of Italy's gold reserves 
continued to fall, and by the end of the year most people were asking for 
new restrictions on international trade. Einaudi, on June 9, 1934, had 
written that: 
In your correspondent's opinion, the present Italian balance of payments is 
not so precarious as capital exporters presumably imagine. 
On December 15 he explained that the fall of the gold reserve was 
caused by the interest and amortisation payments for the loans issued in 
foreign countries by the state and other public and private bodies between 
1926 and 1928, and the repurchase of Italian securities issued in foreign 
countries. He approved of the government's intervention: "The Govern-
ment [in counteracting the fall of reserves] most wisely has decided... to 
issue the... loan and raised the officiai rate of discount from 3 to 4 per 
cent". However, this was the last 'liberal' act of the Fascist government. 
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In December, faced with a further fall in total reserves, a decree was issued 
enforcing complete control of foreign exchange transactions.26 Italy aban-
doned the liberal policy in foreign exchange markets and started an explicit 
programme of dirigisme, a programme which was already present in other 
areas of the economy.27 In fact, the internai response to the crisis had been 
the progressive adoption of more dirigiste measures in the management of 
the economy. 
4.3. Criticai analysis of the increasing state intervention 
4.3.1. On the regulations in the bourses and foreign trade sectors 
On July 1931, Einaudi noted that "internai economie problems... are 
giving rise, as usuai, to a whole crop of legislative interventions". He dis-
agreed with such actions essentially because he considered them ineffica-
cious, when not actually harmful. Of such interventions in the bourses, 
in the autumn of 1930, he commented: 
Today, in Italy, as elsewhere, much ink is consumed in order to persuade the 
public to come back to the Stock Exchanges. It is doubtful whether good regula-
26 Einaudi continued to be unperturbed about the future of the lira and to oppose any un-
orthodox intervention. In an article of Aprii 20, 1935, commenting on the Bank of Italy's annual 
report, "which is, as usuai, the most important financial document of the year", he wrote: "the 
data collected by the Bank of Italy are such as to authorise the conclusion that the halving of the 
gold reserves... was mainly due to capital investments by Italians in foreign countries, and to pur-
chases, also by Italians, of foreign securities and of Italian securities issued in foreign countries... 
The stream of Italian capital seeking investment abroad is said by the report to be due to the 
excess of the rate of interest prevailing abroad over the internai rate, and also in the cheapness 
of sterling and dollar securities purchasable at the current rate of exchange. In some measure, 
therefore, the outflow of capital is due to the current cheap money policy. The recent reduction 
of the rate of discount from 4 per cent, to 3.50 per cent, is accordingly criticised in some quar-
ters". In a short note on August 3, 1935, commenting on a decree which suspended the Bank of 
Italy's obligation to keep a gold reserve of at least 40%, he wrote: "The vital points for the future 
of the lira are not the little more or the little less of the gold reserve, but the quantity of notes 
issued; and further, as has repeatedly been remarked in this correspondence, the composition 
of the 'discount' and 'advances' items... In the past Italy has experienced monetary troubles al-
most only as a result of the inordinate rise in 'discounts and advances', which means the issue of 
new notes against frozen assets... There is no trace now of such expansion... The severe tradition 
inherited from Stringher's days makes it reasonably certain that 'discount and advances' will be 
kept within due limits". 
27 The revaluation policy of the lira ended in September 1936 with the reduction of the 
gold parity of the lira, which meant a devaluation of about 41%, to the levels of the end of 
1927. Einaudi reported the fact without comment. A year later, on October 9, 1937, he remarked 
that "the alignment of the lira has given... a fillip to exports; but the favourable effects of it are 
progressively vanishing in the face of the increasing cost of imports". 
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tions can have such an effect; but it is certain that periods of crisis are sometimes 
useful, as they force on public opinion the necessity of reform. (September 27, 
1930) 
One year later, on the occasion of the introduction of new regulating 
powers in exchange-market transactions, he wrote: "The best cure, how-
ever, would be an improvement in the industriai situation" (August 29, 
1931). This criticism of protectionism was a frequent characteristic of Ei-
naudi's articles: at the beginning of 1929 he had opposed an increase in the 
sugar import duty: 
These increases will surely aid the extension and better culture of wheat and 
sugar-beet lands. But the cruciai question is whether they will also aid the lowering 
of the cost of living and therefore the cost of those agricultural and industriai 
goods which we must increasingly export in a competitive world if we are to 
pay for the increasing imports needed by our expanding population (January 
12, 1929); 
and then, in the following September, he attacked the proposai for an "in-
dustriai syndicate" to control trade, first considering it inapplicable - "the 
system necessarily presupposes a world syndicalisation of industry and 
trade carried to such an extent that at present it cannot be considered prac-
tical politics" - and secondly dangerous - "something of this kind worked 
during the war, and goes on now in the Russian collectivist system" (Sep-
tember 14, 1929). Increasingly he worried over the mercantilist revival in 
international trade, maintaining that Italy would only suffer from a policy 
of commercial restrictions. On July 21, 1934 he wrote: 
In a world of high tariffs, quotas and restrictions, a country which exports fine 
and varied agricultural and industriai goods as against raw materials and heavy im-
ports is bound to suffer. Equilibrium can, of course, be reached only by reducing 
costs; but... the most rigid costs are imported materials. The scaling down of Cus-
tom Tariffs is therefore the first condition of a return to equilibrium. 
Similarly a year later, on June 1, 1935, he wrote again: 
Another big step in the centralisation of foreign trade and foreign exchange 
business had been taken with the creation of the office of Superintendent of For-
eign Exchange, to be directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The multiplica-
tion of quotas, clearings, compensated exchanges, restrictions on the sale of ex-
change, etc., has caused the creation of many offices, sometimes mutually inter-
locking, and ali retarding business. 
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Restrictions had been introduced in order to stop the drain on the gold 
reserve, yet Einaudi countered that there was no evidence of any "direct 
correlation between the import surplus and the decrease in gold reserves" 
(March 2, 1935). And he remained an outspoken critic: 
The Italian economie system is being more and more controlied by State Agen-
cies. The recent creation of a Government monopoly for coal, tin, copper and nick-
el... Industriai autarky is expected to reduce the deficit in the balance of foreign pay-
ments. So far, however, the task is proving extremely arduous. (September 14, 1935) 
4.3.2. On the banks and firms salvage policy 
The most important intervention of the Fascist government in the real 
economy during the nineteen-thirties was undoubtedly the salvaging of in-
dustriai firms and banks in financial difficulties. At the beginning of the 
thirties, deflationist policy increased industriai difficulties which in turn re-
sulted in losses and precarious occurences of bank illiquidity and various 
financial crises. The Bank of Italy had to intervene to alleviate this situa-
tion, working to save two of the greatest 'mixed' banks, the Credito Italia-
no and the Banca Commerciale Italiana, which reduced the operating mar-
gin of the deflationary policy. At this point, the end of 1931, the govern-
ment intervened with the creation of the IMI, and then again in 1933 with 
the IRE Einaudi closely studied these developments on the pages of The 
Economist, providing a logicai account of them by and large which would 
seem to imply his substantial agreement with particular regard to the reor-
ganisation of banking system. The creation of the IRI was seen by Einaudi 
as the last step "towards the speedier liquidation of the frozen assets of the 
war and post war period (1915-1925)" (February 4,1933). The first step, 
Einaudi wrote, had been the salvage of the Banca Italiana di Sconto and 
the Banco di Roma, creating a special section of the consortium specifically 
for advances on industriai securities; the second step was the creation of 
the Istituto di Liquidazioni; and the third was made when, in 1931 and 
1932, "the necessity for further alleviation of the banking situation became 
apparent" (ibid), with the creation of the IMI. The latter however did not 
change the situation because of the "prudent" policy conducted by its 
chairman, Senator Mayer, and proved "incompatible with a rapid process 
of liquidation of frozen banking and industriai assets", which could "be 
better carried out by the IRI" (ibid). On Aprii 28, 1934, Einaudi published 
an important article on the Italian banking system in which he described its 
new features, particularly the predominance of the public character of 
credit which had been intensified by the crisis. He explained that the posi-
— XLI — 
ROBERTO MARCHIONATTI 
tion of the banks had gready changed for the better during the two pre-
vious years and maintained that "much of it is now of well-established 
growth": this was no "mushroom growth. It has survived the crisis of 
1893, 1914 and onwards, and 1929-33, it is now guided by men of experi-
ence and in its present variety may lie much of its strength". 
4.3.3. On the Italian corporative system 
The most ideologically striking intervention in the Fascist period was 
certainly the development of the corporative system and the subsequent 
cartellisation of the economy, a fact which Einaudi followed with obvious 
dislike and even perplexity and remarked on in hardly-veiled sarcastic 
terms. On September 11, 1926, he announced that "Fascism is endeavour-
ing to give unity to industry and commerce, and to subordinate ali econom-
ie life to government direction". A year later, he went further, saying that 
"the real point of interest in the economie policy of Italy is the method 
adopted for reaching the new equilibrium of prices, incomes, wages, public 
revenue, &c.", but that "the true agency working for a new equilibrium is 
the idea of a corporate state... [which] substitutes for the free reactions of 
the individuai the collective deliberations of the corporate representatives 
of various economie classes" (September 17, 1927). Exasperated some-
what, he concluded: "Only time will show what economie reactions will 
follow from the compulsory working of this pian" (ibid). By the end of 
1928 he sounded almost resigned: "The state assumes more and more 
the supreme direction of the economie life of the country" (November 
3, 1928). In an article of June 14, 1930, he began to evaluate the cost of 
the by then extensive structure of Italy's new corporative state. And in 
further analyses, though he allowed that "Corporativism... is making pro-
gress" - commenting: 
The lessons to be derived from the Italian experiment in the regulation of in-
dustry are, among others: (1) regulation cannot stop at one point, viz., wages or 
hours of labour; it must eventually be extended to ali relevant points (2) It cannot 
be entrusted, if it is to work quickly enough, to too large a body, such as an in-
dustriai parliament as a whole; smaller regulating bodies must be created, as such 
groups or guilds (3) it is possible to regulate everything, subject to the final appeal 
to the consumer, who cannot be coerced (4) In the Italian system the voice of the 
consumer is supposed to be felt in the legislative stage, through the Prime Minis-
ter's right of assent..." (May 21, 1932), -
he stili concluded ironically: 
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Is free competition's automatic machinery going to be succeeded by the sixth 
sense of the economie dictator?28 
Despite the fully-fledged programme of dirigisme underway in the 
country, Einaudi seemed not to believe that the formation of "corpora-
tions" was substantially changing the Italian social structure. On Novem-
ber 18, 1933, in the notable "Leading articles" section of The Economist, 
he wrote a piece, unsigned, as customary in that section, entitled "The 
New Italy" which summarised a speech by Mussolini to the National 
Council of Corporations. In his speech, the dictator had proclaimed that 
the general economie crisis was a crisis of the capitalist countries and 
that Italy's was not a capitalist system but a corporative one. Einaudi's 
article explained the essence of the corporative solution. In a subsequent 
article, on December 9, Einaudi mitigated the import of Mussolini's 
words, maintaining that corporations in no way altered the fabric of Ita-
lian society but simply implied its reorganisation. Einaudi claimed that 
the wider dimension of state intervention through the IRI was not the 
result of a conscious strategy of cartellisation or the construction of state 
socialism, but was based primarily on the necessity of rescuing firms and 
banks in temporary difficulties. In an article of June 9, 1934, he quoted 
another speech of Mussolini's which accused big business of being the 
cause of repeated state intervention, having conducted its affairs poorly: 
state intervention "at the present moment", Einaudi calculated, "is giv-
ing aid, through the IRI, to three-fourths of the Italian industriai and 
agricultural economy". 
5 . T H E LAST PHASE OF EINAUDI'S CONTRIBUTION: 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 4 0 
From 1936 on, we may identify the last phase of Einaudi's contribution 
to The Economist. The correspondence noticeably took on an aseptic 
28 Einaudi could not always mute his sarcasm toward Fascist interventionism. For example, 
commenting on the achievements of the Fascists in the ten years they had so far ruled Italy, he 
wrote: "From the economie point of view, the leading idea in public speeches has been that 
achievements such as roads built or improved, lands reclaimed, harbours enlarged, waterworks 
and electric plants multiplied, railways electrified, towns beautified, have been many and great, 
and they will in due time bear fruits. In the meantime people must have faith and face the crisis 
courageously" (article of 5 November, 1932). Then, ironically, he added: "It is, indeed, unfortu-
nate for Fascism... that such achievements are apt only to make themselves felt in the long run, 
while things are very indifferent in the short run". 
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tone29 and certainly became less frequent - 27 articles between 1936 and 
1940 and shorter, with judgements conspicuously rarer. The issues dealt 
with were various: the reorganisation of the banking system, the Bank of 
Italy becoming a pure centrai bank on the modem pattern, the country's 
financial structure, the increasingly autocratic policies, the difficulties of 
price control and the evil of protectionism. Einaudi stili attributed the poor 
performance of foreign trade to the latter: 
imports and exports both remain near the lowest level of the post-War period. 
This seems to be the inevitable fruit of bilateral balanced agreements, mone-
tary clearing and ali the paraphernalia of modem protectionism. (October 9, 
1937) 
The declaration of war ended Einaudi's regular correspondence with 
the newspaper, and his last regular contribution, devoted to Italy's fi-
nances, was published on June 15, 1940. 
6 . T H E POST-WAR OCCASIONAI, CONTRIBUTION 
After the Second World War, Einaudi wrote just two articles for The 
Economist, in March 1945 and August 1946. The first was a despatch from 
Rome entitled "Italy's finances", which discussed the budget report of the 
Treasury Secretary, Soleri. Regarding Italy's deficit, Einaudi identified the 
real problem as the size of the extraordinary war and transition-to-peace 
budget and suggested that: 
the first step to be taken is to put a final stop on those recurrent extraordinary 
expenditures which are the true causes of the permanent gap between revenue 
and expenditure. 
And the first of these continuai exorbitant expenditures was the bread 
subsidy, stili a problem since the end of the First World War. This was the 
occasion for Einaudi to make a partial 'revision' of his judgement of Gio-
litti. He remembered that it was Giolitti, in February 1921, who originally 
abolished the bread subsidy, and recognised that this decision finally ba-
lanced the state budget that year. At a distance of twenty years from his 
passionate opposition to Giolitti, after the experience of Fascism and a sec-
29 Faucci maintains that this had been so since 1934 but the articles of 1934-35 do not seem 
substantially different in tone from earlier ones. 
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ond world war, Einaudi defined his old adversary as "the last democratic 
liberal statesmen" before the Fascist era. 
Einaudi's last published appearance in The Economist was in August 
1946 and concerned the controversy surrounding the Franco-Italian bor-
der. It was, like thirty-eight years earlier when his correspondence with 
the newspaper began, a letter to the editor. It was signed, and the editorial 
staff added "Governor of the Bank of Italy and for many years Turin cor-
respondent of The Economist" to the name. In the letter, Einaudi ex-
plained to the English readers the problems involved in the dispute, trying 
to offer reasonable solutions, and entreated the Allies not to impose unjust 
penalties on Italy, an implicit warning not to repeat the errors of the victors 
towards the defeated made after the First World War: 
We are now a conquered country and expect penalties to be imposed. But the 
renunciation of the Upper Roya Valley offends tradition, national sentiment and 
just economie interests... To carry out the proposed unjust awards is truly the best 
method of reviving fascism and nationalism which, in my opinion were dead in 
Italy as from July 25, 1943. 
Our story would remain incomplete if we did not also mention the long 
and distinguished letter (see appendix) which was written to the editor of 
The Economist, G. Crowther, in June 1944 when Einaudi was stili a refu-
gee in Switzerland. Recalling his past contribution to the newpaper ("I was, 
as perhaps somebody in The Economisti staff will remember, for many 
years your regular Turin (Italian) correspondent"), he enclosed a memor-
andum "on some possible misunderstandings between Anglosaxon and 
Italian peoples" which, he said, had been written "merely for your infor-
mation" and "not necessarily intended for publication". Einaudi confessed 
his worries about the possibility of post-war Italy ever having a truly demo-
cratic system, in the way of the Swiss, Scandinavian, British or American 
systems. He explained that the pre-fascist Italian system of government 
had not been a truly democratic one: it was, as in many continental Eur-
opean countries, a centralized system where "once somebody has put his 
grip on the centrai piece of the machinery, he is the master of the country". 
In this sense, Einaudi wrote, "Fascism was only a rampant and corrupt ex-
aggeration of a pathological feature of our public life, viz. the absence of a 
true public life". But he concluded: 
Such reflection as I have made does not purport to say that a democratic sys-
tem of goverment ought not to be tried again in Italy. I am suggesting only that 
general free elections and that a freely elected Parliament will be only the begin-
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ning of the story. Democracy will be a reality only if and when Italians will abolish 
the prefects 
Einaudi's greatest politicai fear for the country was that "the most re-
solute party will conquer the governmental prefectoral machinery and then 
there will be again an end to freedom in Italy". 
7 . THE ECONOMIST a n d EINAUDI 
In 1954, in Einaudi's last year as President of Italy, The Economist 
dedicated an article to him entitled "A great Italian liberal", full of com-
mendations for his behaviour as president. He was praised for his out-
standing achievements despite the very limited powers conferred on him 
by the post-war constitution, for the exercise of his function as guardian 
of the constitution and his comprehensive activity in public affairs. The ar-
ticle recognised his decisive influence on the country's economy and fi-
nances, laying the foundations of Italy's "remarkable" economie recovery, 
and identied those such as Menichella and Pella who were carrying on the 
work Einaudi had begun first as Governor of the Bank of Italy and then as 
Minister of the Budget. The eulogy concluded in terms which need little 
comment: words of thanks for the work of "the most distinguished of ali 
foreign correspondents", words which must have certainly filled the old 
Anglophile with pride and, perhaps, a little sadness: 
When President Einaudi retires to his model farm in Piedmont in a year's 
time, his departure will mark the end of the last link with the great days of liberal 
pre-fascist Italy. And the forces of integrity, simplicity and love of liberty, already 
gravely weakened in this country, will suffer a further and, it may be, irreplaceable 
loss. 
Turin, September 1999. 
Roberto Marchionatti is associate professor of Economics at the University of 
Turin, where he teaches "History of Economie Thought" and "Industriai Eco-
nomics". He has been a visiting scholar in Economics at New York University 
and at the University of Cambridge, UK. He is the editor of Karl Marx: Criticai 
Responses (Routledge 1998) and the author of various books, as well as several ar-
ticles published in leading European and American Journals. 
X L V I — 
A NOTE ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE ARTICLES 
The attribution to Luigi Einaudi of articles in The Economist is by no 
means an easy task. Primarily this is because, in accordance with the tra-
dition of The Economist, the articles were normally published anony-
mously. In addition, in the words of Walter Layton reproduced at p. 
820 below, "in May 1941 the Economist office in Bouverie Street was de-
stroyed by enemy action and almost every file or document we possessed 
was burnt. Certainly no staff records survived". 
In 1971, based on manuscripts found in the initial collection of Einaudi's 
papers and now kept in the archives of the Fondazione Einaudi in Turin, 
Professor Luigi Firpo, editor of Bibliografia degli scritti di Luigi Einaudi (Bib-
liography of the Works of Luigi Einaudi), listed 3815 tides of works by Luigi 
Einaudi. Firpo's list included less than 50 articles written for The Economist 
between 1915 and 1946. However, the number of articles that could confi-
dendy be attributed to Einaudi increased substantially after the disclosure of 
several thousand papers by the Einaudi family at San Giacomo di Dogliani 
and subsequent acquisitions of archive materials (ali now kept in the Fonda-
zione Einaudi). Further identification of a great number of articles almost 
certainly attributable to Einaudi was enabled by examination of Einaudi's 
own correspondence and the evidence provided in 1974 by Graham Hutton, 
assistant editor of The Economist from 1933 to 1939. Comparison between 
the articles published in The Economist from Italian correspondents and Ei-
naudi's writings in II Corriere della Sera, from 1908 to 1925, and La Riforma 
Sociale, also permitted the identification of other articles attributable to Ei-
naudi with a good degree of probability. 
In publishing this material, the problem arose of establishing clear-cut cri-
teria for attribution. The present volume thus contains articles which we con-
sider to be of either certain or highly probable attribution to Luigi Einaudi. 
- We considered certain-, 
• signed articles 
• articles of which draft copies are kept in the Einaudi archives 
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• articles for which there is clear confirmation in Einaudi's correspondence 
with the editorial staff of The Economist, friends and colleagues 
• articles attributed definitively to Einaudi by Graham Hutton 
- We considered highly probable: 
• articles with the wording "From our correspondent, Turin" or dated 
Turin; in this case, attribution to Einaudi is highly likely because no other 
correspondent from Turin has ever been identified 
• articles for which reasonable confirmation exists in Einaudi's correspon-
dence with the editorial staff of The Economist, friends and colleagues 
• articles attributed in ali likelihood to Einaudi by Graham Hutton 
• articles which bear very strong similarities with Einaudi's writings in 11 
Corriere della Sera: during the period 1920 to 1922, some of these articles 
are dated Rome, where Einaudi often was in his capacity as a senator. In a 
small number of cases we also considered of probable attribution those 
articles which bear only nominai similarity to the writings in II Corriere 
della Sera but whose timing and other characteristics strongly suggest Ei-
naudi's authorship. 
In ali, we have attributed 295 articles to Luigi Einaudi. Of these, 139 
may be considered certain and 156 highly probable. We wish to emphasize 
two points: 
a) a number of articles which contain some evidence of attribution to 
Einaudi but outside the above criteria have not been included; 
b) particularly in the first years of his correspondence, the articles sent 
by Einaudi were used by staff writers of The Economist to write short notes 
on the economie situation of Italy: again, such articles have not been in-
cluded in the present volume unless Einaudi's contribution appeared clear 
and evident and editorial interpolation very limited. 
Each article is accompanied by a note outlining the reasons for the at-
tribution of the article to Luigi Einaudi in accordance with these criteria. 
R. M. 
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A 
LUIGI EINAUDI (1874-1961): 
A PERSONAL INTERPRETATION 
Luigi Einaudi was born in 1874 in the small market town of Carrù 
(Piedmont, Northern Italy). In 1888, his father died, and his mother took 
the children to live with her family in near-by Dogliani. In 1895, Einaudi 
graduated with highest honors in politicai economy from the University 
of Turin. That university, in the capital city of Piedmont, became his insti-
tutional base, as professor and rector, from 1902 until his death 59 years 
later. Por nearly a quarter century - until his dismissal forced by the fascist 
dictatorship in 1925 - Einaudi also taught courses at the Bocconi in Milan 
and the Polytechnic in Turin. 
Also in 1925, Einaudi resigned as editorial columnist with the Corriere 
della Sera to protest the abolishment of freedom of the press. He contin-
ued, however, to write in the Riforma Sociale, a journal he had edited since 
the turn of the century. When the regime prevented the Riforma Sociale 
from publishing in 1935, Einaudi founded the Rivista di storia economica 
and kept it open in implicit opposition from 1936 until he was forced to 
flee to Switzerland in 1943. During his Swiss exile, he focused on social 
policy and labor laws, writing the Lezioni di politica sociale. 
In 1945, Einaudi became Governor of the Bank of Italy and for the 
next ten years worked constantly at the highest levels of government. 
Elected to the Constituent Assembly and the first republican legislature, 
he directed Italy's economie policies (at one point simultaneously head 
of the centrai bank, minister of finance and budget, and deputy prime min-
ister) until 1948, when he was elected President of the RepubHc. 
Returning to private life as a scholar and journalist in 1955, he died in 
Rome in 1961 and was buried in the family cemetery he had designed at 
the foot of one of his vineyards in Dogliani. 
A handful of traits, some known, others less so, some even apparently 
contradictory, were key to this complex and highly productive life. 
The core of Luigi Einaudi's being was his love for his land and his 
books. Upon graduating from the university, he immediately applied his 
new training to Dogliani. Concluding that the great agricultural crises of 
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the Nineteenth Century (depressions and plagues like phylloxera) would 
not be repeated or could be corrected in the Twentieth Century, he 
decided that land, even land once farmed then abandoned, would make 
a good investment. This economie forecast he combined with a desire to 
recover old plots which misfortune had forced his forebears to sell. In 
1897, borrowing to the hilt, he bought San Giacomo, an 18th - century 
house and vineyard gone to ruin. By the time of his death, 64 years after 
that first purchase, he had built a model farm that validated his academic 
analyses, but which above ali satisfied his most intimate desires. 
His library, today moved from San Giacomo to Turin and used by 
thousands of scholars every year, is the product of a concept different from 
that of a collector of first editions and rare or beautifully illustrated books. 
He collected those, too, when fortune smiled. But the driving force was his 
iron will to trace the development of human thought in ali matters related 
to economie life. Searching out the changing expressions and interrelation-
ships among the social sciences, he used the materials so harvested to light-
en the efforts of research with the satisfaction of physical possession. 
Einaudi's deep Piedmontese roots led him as a young man not to ac-
cept a university chair in Geneva. Later he would reject ali attempts to in-
duce him to leave the University of Turin or even to participate in confer-
ences elsewhere in Italy or abroad (is it possible to imagine another Presi-
dent not leaving his country once during a seven-year term?). But this 
powerful sense of place did not -keep him from understanding that change 
is essential to the development of knowledge and of society. 
Of criticai importance was his intimacy with the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Por more then three decades he gave the readers of The Economist regular 
insights into Italy's development and its crises. In the 1920s and 30s, Ei-
naudi worked with Carnegie as the general editor of the Italian version 
of the Economie History of the First World War (to which he personally 
contributed two volumes). In that same period, Einaudi was the Rockefel-
ler Poundation's representative in Italy, enabling young scholars to leave to 
breathe the air of freedom in the America of Roosevelt even during the 
darkest years of fascism. 
Central to Einaudi's thought, in addition to the values of Iiberalism and 
free trade expressed throughout his writings, was his conviction that the 
sovereign state had become an anachronism. In 1918-19, Einaudi sharply 
criticized Woodrow Wilson's illusion that the League of Nations could 
succeed without being able to enforce decisions by force. In 1944, from 
his exile in Switzerland, he issued an impassioned proposai for a United 
States of Europe, capable of overcoming petty localisms with new suprana-
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tional institutions. In 1956, the published compilation of his presidential 
memoranda contained a "proposai for an eventual European army". 
Einaudi had a very personal commitment to research and teaching. 
Thousands of sheets covered with his minute handwriting stili provide mute 
testimony to years of hard archival labors. At the same time, he felt deeply 
the need to reach from the ivory tower to the man in the Street. Eight 800-
page volumes collect 1,320 of his newspaper articles between 1893 to 1925. 
And although that alone averages to an article a week for thirty years, Einau-
di claimed the compilation would have been more than twice that size had 
he not excluded purely factual articles or descriptive materials. 
On two fronts, the academic and the journalistic, his influence was great. 
Luigi Einaudi's economie writings between 1912 and 1940 are centrai to the 
Italian school of public finance on which Italy's reputation in the study of 
economics is largely based. The approach to journalism he expressed on 
the pages of La Stampa and the Corriere della Sera and 150 other periodicals 
is a notable example of Italian newspaper writing in this century. 
There remains finally the enigma of a man who lived most of his life as 
a resolute critic of partisan politics (he was appointed Senator in 1919 for 
academic merit), but who after the fall of fascism suddenly found himself 
in command of his country's economy and then, despite having earlier 
voted for retaining the monarchy, was chosen the first full-term President 
of the new Republic. 
For the years 1945 to 1948, the explanation lies in his conviction that 
his independence from the normal obligations of a politicai career, together 
with the assurances he obtained, gave him the opportunity to re-establish 
the economie stability essential in those criticai immediate post-war years. 
For 1948 to 1955, the explanation lies in his belief that the historic mo-
ment required him to set aside personal doubts so as to facilitate the tran-
sition from the monarchy to the new republic. 
Once elected, the application of the constitution he had sworn to de-
fend became his daily goal. Others in government understood this was not 
rhetoric. Private letters in the archives of the Luigi Einaudi Foundation in-
dicate that, on February 18, 1953, when it appeared that the constitution 
might be changed by a new legislative provision on the nomination of 
judges for the Constitutional Court, Luigi Einaudi informed the Prime 
Minister that should that happen, he would convene the two branches 
of parliament in joint session to elect a new president who would sign such 
a law, "something I do not intend to do, because my duty is to hand intact 
to my successor the powers established by the Constitution". 
Einaudi's defense of the new republic went beyond the juridical. At the 
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Quirinal palace in 1954, Einaudi formally received the father of the seven 
Cervi brothers, peasant farmers ali seven of whom had been executed by 
the Nazis in 1943. The cold war was at the height. The Cervis were known 
to have been members of the Communist Party. In a signed article for the 
press, the President of the Republic described the Cervis as national heroes 
and identified himself with their love of land and innovation. The indepen-
dent critic had never disappeared, and was calmly using ideas and values to 
transcend partisanship, advance civil society and consolidate the republic. 
In 1964, Luigi Einaudi's heirs moved his books and papers to Turin 
and donated them so as to ensure their continued life. At the Luigi Einaudi 
Foundation, new generations of scholars use them to promote international 
understanding grounded in the social sciences and in the best Piedmontese 
tradition. 
The archives of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi in Turin conserve Einau-
di's letters and manuscripts, that made possible the identification of the ar-
ticles for The Economist collected in these two volumes. What led him to 
write them was perhaps best expressed by Luigi Einaudi himself. In the 
prefatory note to Gli ideali di un economista, Firenze, La Voce, 1921, Ei-
naudi wrote: 
This is a collection of articles that are note strictly economie in nature, but are 
of a kind each of us feels driven from time to time to write at the margins of our 
particular field of knowledge, and then to set loose upon the world, almost as 
proof that we do not feel ourselves to be merely economists, or geologists, or che-
mists, but that we live also the life of others, and in particular that of our com-
munity. 
The collection is not complete so as not to unnecessarily increase its volume, 
but it is perhaps large enough to reveal what are... my obsessions: schools and edu-
cation, England, the formation of Italy understood through the history of Pied-
mont, the need for supranational government... There is also talk of war, with 
what I hope is a logie not at variance with my earlier predilections, with respect 
toward enemies and with the eye focused on the traditions of my country. 
Turin, at the end of 1920 
Written by Luigi R. Einaudi, drawing on recollections ofhis grandfather and on 
an essay by his father, Mario Einaudi (1904-1994), Luigi Einaudi's oldest son, who 
left Italy in 1933 for the freedom of the United States, then returned to create the 
Fondazione Luigi Einaudi. 
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FROM 1908 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 
1908-1918 

1 . 
ITALIAN FINANCE 
To the Editor of The Economist 
Sir, - The note on relief for Italian taxpayers which you publish in your 
issue of March 7 th is subject to some criticism. While it is correct to say that 
the large surpluses of recent years have been mainly devoted to public 
works, the increase of the salaries of civil servants, and to the cost of na-
tional defence, it is to be added that the money so applied has been in 
the main squandered to satisfy petty interests, and it is not correct to con-
sider as certain a reduction of taxation. As yet no definite scheme of tax 
reform has been made public by the Government, and it is highly probable 
that no such scheme will be this year seriously laid before the Parliament. 
Or if it is laid, that will be done only with a view to win the votes of the 
constituencies at the next general elections. The reason is not far to seek; 
the huge surpluses of the last years have been swallowed by the increased 
expenditure, so that nothing is left for the taxpayers. A statesman of high 
standing (probably Mr Sidney Sonnino, formerly Premier, who, it is to be 
observed, is not a regular opponent of the present Government) has pub-
lished in one of the last numbers of the Nuova Antologia, the leading Ita-
lian review, a criticai examination of the Italian budget, and has shown 
clearly that the surplus of which the Minister of the Treasury was so boast-
ful in his Esposizione finanziaria of November last, was a fictitious surplus. 
Some days ago Mr Rubini, the president of the Giunta generale del Bilancio 
(Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on Ways and Means) resigned, 
thinking it to be his duty to warn the Parliament and the public opinion 
as to the way the public accounts are manipulated. It will suffice to quote 
only one instance of this manipulation: the account of the State railways for 
the year 1906-07 is made to close with a surplus of 50 million lire; but this 
1. March 21, 1908, p. 617. The article, signed, was published in the section: "Letters to the 
Editor". 
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result is obtained by the device of putting some 10 million lire of ordinary 
expenses to the charge of a reserve fund, which should be devoted only to 
expenses of extraordinary character. From the residue, 40 million lire, 
other vast sums should be deducted if the accounts were regarded from 
the point of view of a joint-stock company and not made up with a view 
of deluding the taxpayers. But the Government think necessary to muster 
a surplus on State railways of 50 millions, as a minor sum would have 
brought too rudely to the mind of the public - firstly, the fact that the gen-
eral surplus is not so great as was said; secondly, the necessity of a severe 
administration, even by the State railway; thirdly, the fact that the State 
railway cost for interest and sinking fund of a part of the public debt a 
sum vastly greater than the so-called surplus. 
The Italian public finance and the economie development of Italy are 
to-day extremely interesting. But I fear that the correspondents of English 
journals do not convey a true idea of it to their readers. - Yours truly, 
LUIGI EINAUDI 
Turin, March 9, 1908. 
2. 
PARALYSIS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGES IN ITALY 
From a Turin Correspondent 
More than eight months have passed since the Stock Exchange crisis in 
Italy reached its highest point. This crisis, though not as violent as the 
American one, nor comparable to it in extent and consequences, was very 
serious in several cities, such as Turin, Milan, and Genoa, and was followed 
in certain industries by a sensible shrinkage of business. 
In Italy a wave of economie prosperity, increasing in volume since 
1902, had been accompanied by a steady rise in the quotations of our 
Stock Exchange securities. This rise, slow and graduai at first, was little 
2. July 25, 1908, pp. 167-168. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Foreign and 
Colonial Correspondence". It is the first of a series of three articles. Its attribution to Luigi Ei-
naudi is probable because: a) of the wording "From a Turin correspondent"; b) of a letter from 
the Editor The Economist, Francis Hirst, on July 20, 1908 (see appendix); c) the treatment of the 
argument bears strong similarities with an article published in II Corriere della Sera, November 
18, 1908, entitled "Dopo un anno". 
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by little intensified, until in 1905 and 1906 the pace became very rapid, 
and in some cases quite furious. The magnificent dividends paid by some 
fortunate undertakings, the colossal gains made by the holders of shares 
which had gone up in value, provoked a speculative movement, which 
spread from the professional stock jobbers to other classes of the popula-
tion, many of them entirely ignorant about investments. At Genoa, the 
people who spent the whole day in Piazza Banchi (the square where 
the Exchange is situated, near the harbour) had become a motley crowd 
of Exchange agents, commission agents, bankers, members of the liberal 
professions, tradesmen, employees, &c. The whole town was speculating 
on the Stock Exchange, even the men and women of the people, work-
men, porters from the harbour, maidservants. At Milan, at Turin, and 
even at Rome the halls of the Exchanges, usually quiet and used only 
by professional operators, overflowed with a throng drawn from ali 
classes of the population. 
It is no wonder that in the midst of this universal excitement shares 
should go up in price continually. In order to put English readers in a po-
sition to estimate the serious nature of the Italian crisis, it is useful to sum 
up the variations in the quotations of Italian shares in the Italian ex-
changes. The best index for this purpose is found in an abstract published 
every month by the Economista d'Italia (a financial paper published in 
Rome). From the data contained in these abstracts, have taken out a series 
of index numbers, equal to the relation between the nominai price* of the 
chief shares quoted in the Italian Exchanges at a certain date, and the ac-
tual current price of these same shares at the date indicated.** 
First of ali, then, let us examine the index numbers at the end of each 
year from 1899 to 1904: 
End of December, 1899 134 
1900 126-35 
1901 120-38 
1902 125-34 
1903 144-45 
1904 148-24 
As this shows, after the economie crisis of 1899-1900, which had its re-
bound in Italy and lowered the index number of the actual current prices 
* i.e., the price of issue. 
* * Suppose, e.g., the nominai price of shares to be 100, then if the actual price of these same 
shares on a given date is 134, we have an increase of 34 per cent, on the nominai price. 
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from 134 to 120.38, there was a continuous rise, which brought the actual 
price at the end of 1904 up to the high average of 148.24. 
In the years following 1905 the movement was more marked, so that it 
seemed advisable to follow the variations in prices month by month. But it 
should be noted that the statistics of the Economista d'Italia, on which we 
are working, do not refer to the same number of shares every year. Thus 
in 1905 178 shares are examined, in 1906 the shares under consideration 
increase to 241, in 1907 and in 1908 they rise to 243. The nominai value 
of these shares increases stili more in proportion, because not only are 
new companies formed, but existing ones increase their capital. The rise 
in the quotations of shares in the Exchange provoked, specially in 1905, 
the creation of new "società anonime", and the transformation of old pri-
vate enterprises and of companies under a collective name into "società 
anonime per azioni", or limited liability companies. We must note also 
that the shares under consideration are in ali cases either shares of "soci-
età anonime per azioni" (which may be explained at lenght in English as 
joint-stock companies with only one set of shareholders, ali with respon-
sibility limited to capital subscribed), or, on the other hand, of "società in 
acco-mandita per azioni" (joint-stock companies with two sets of share-
holders, the one with responsibility limited to capital subscribed and 
the other with unlimited responsibility, these latter being the managers 
and directors of the company). This means that the debentures, both of 
companies and of the State, of provinces and of towns, are excluded. 
With this preliminary caution, I proceed to give the results of a table I 
have drawn up showing the history of the quotations of shares from 
1906 on. 
The rise, which reached its first maximum in September, 1905, and its 
second in March, 1906, had, by the autumn of 1906, received a severe 
blow, which was succeeded, after an ephemeral attempt at recovery in Feb-
ruary, 1907, by a real collapse, in consequence of which the quotations had 
fallen at the end of October, 1907, when the North American crisis was 
also at its worst, down to the lowest point of 129.44. At this moment a 
large Italian joint-stock bank, with 50 million lire of capital, the Società 
Bancaria Italiana, was threatened with bankruptcy; at the same time the 
public and the newspapers were crying out against the "black band" of 
bears who made the shares go down day after day. A strong association, 
formed under the auspices of the Banca d'Italia, with the Banca Commer-
ciale Italiana and the Credito Italiano at its head, intervened partly to save 
the Società Bancaria, which was reorganised and provided with fresh capi-
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tal, and partly to prop up the price of shares, which threatened to fall to 
stili lower levels. But when this association of banks had attained its object, 
which was primarily to stop the run of depositors on the banks, and to sell 
some of the shares of which their safes were full, the artificial stimulus 
which had restored shares to an average of 137.07 in December was with-
drawn, and since then they have varied again between 126 and 132. The 
paralysis in the Italian Stock Exchanges is now complete; very little busi-
ness is done at Genoa, Milan, and Turin, which are the principal exchanges 
in Italy, and the public, unable to recover the losses they have suffered in 
the past, give vent to their feelings by demanding criminal proceedings and 
prison for the bears, and strict regulations for the Stock Exchanges. 
(To be continued) 
3. 
T H E I T A L I A N B O U R S E S . I I 
THE MOTOR CRASH 
From a Turin Correspondent 
It must be noted, that though the average loss in the current quotations 
of shares on the Stock Exchange is equal to the difference between 172.51 
(the maximum of March, 1906) and 130.30 (at the end of June, 1908), this 
loss is rather unequally divided among the different groups of industries. 
Below we publish a table in which we set side by side the nominai and 
the actual prices of the shares quoted on the Italian Stock Exchange at dif-
ferent times: At the end of January, 1905 (the beginning of the Stock Ex-
change boom), at the end of September, 1905 (the first maximum), at the 
end of March, 1906 (the second maximum), at the end of November, 1906 
(the first Stock Exchange crisis), at the end of October, 1907 (the second 
and more serious crisis on the Stock Exchange), and at the end of June, 
1908 (the close of the first six months of 1908, which were six months 
of liquidation). 
3. August 22, 1908, pp. 346-348. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) it is the continuation of the 
previous article of July 25, 1908; b) of the wording "From a Turin correspondent"; c) of a 
money-order from The Economist, dated September 4, 1908, covering Einaudi's contribution 
to the paper for August of that year. 
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Since then, at the July liquidation, there has been a further fall of values 
to 129.03, which is the lowest point touched since the year 1902. But I 
have already pointed out in my former article that the present fall is due 
to the stagnation which is to-day acute in the Italian exchanges, after they 
were abandoned by the powerful interests which had given an artificial sti-
mulus to the quotations at the close of 1907. So that we are justified in lim-
iting our observations to the first six months of the year, and neglecting the 
further fall in the month of July. 
Before coming to details we must state that the shares under considera-
tion in the following table are only the principal shares quoted on the Ita-
lian Stock Exchanges. We have not reckoned in the shares which are only 
quoted spasmodically, or have no importance; and, above ali, we have not 
included the shares issued by companies which did not ask for admission 
to the quotations on the Stock Exchange. These last shares are taken up 
privately or by the banks, and there are a great many of them, because nu-
merous prosperous companies, chiefly for fiscal reasons, do not care to 
have their shares quoted on the Stock Exchange. 
The companies under consideration are divided into various groups; 
these numbered 10 in 1905, and grew to 12 in 1906, by the accession of 
the group of companies producing motor cars, and also because the group 
of "companies dealing with immovable property", was taken out of the 
group of "various industries" on account of its special importance. (See ta-
bles at pp. 9, 10, 11). 
The story told by these tables varies from group to group. Alone and 
isolated stands the group of the 15 (afterwards 16) motor car works, which, 
at the end of March, 1906, had reached the actual price of 162,100,00 lire, 
or 678.95 per cent, of the nominai price of issue, which was altogether 
hardly 23,875,000 lire. The period from March, 1906, was that in which 
the motor car shares enjoyed the greatest favour, specially on the Turin 
Stock Exchange, and gave rise to unrestrained speculation. The impetus 
to the follies committed in this industry was given by the celebrated "Fab-
brica Italiana Automobili Torino", known ali over the world under the 
name of "Fiat". Founded in 1899 with a capital of 800,000 lire, in shares 
of 200 lire, it led for some years a hard life, so much so, indeed, that its 
shares could be bought for a little over 100 lire. In 1900 the company lost 
18,070 lire, in 1901 another 9,849 lire, in 1902 it began to gain 64,034 lire, 
in 1903 it gained 91,525 lire. Hitherto, it had not paid any dividend, but in 
1904, it paid a dividend of 6 per cent., and in 1905 the net profit rose to 
2,136,130 lire, and the dividend paid to 20 per cent. This great prosperity 
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1905 
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Lire Lire Lire 
Banks 17 493,374,000 687,776,162 139.40 766,568,390 155.37 
Railways, tramways, 
navigation 23 641,430,000 833,818,000 130 894,114,000 139.39 
Mines, foundries, iron 
and steel engineering 
works, &c 25 185,897,900 339,575,000 182.07 437,871,400 235.54 
Electric and other 
lighting (gas, &c.) 14 89,075,000 133,207,000 149.54 162,075,000 181.95 
Sugar industry 16 80,950,000 172,444,000 213.05 202,215,000 249.80 
Water supply 5 40,900,000 72,940,000 178.24 82,656,000 202.09 
Chemical products.... 11 53,350,000 85,979,500 161.16 109,479,500 205.21 
Weaving and spin-
ning (cotton, wool, 
waste, silk, &c.) 30 150,650,000 210,601,000 139.79 223,603,000 148.42 
Grinding of cereals, 
manufacture of ma-
catoni, &c 4 28,500,000 65,896,000 231.21 65,672,000 230.43 
Various industries 33 171,775,000 290,649,000 169.20 332,627,000 193.64 
Total 178 1,935,901,900 2,892,915,662 149.44 3,276,881,290 169.27 
induced the directors to commit some errors; first of ali, to divide the old 
shares of 200 lire into eight new shares of 25 lire. These new shares, thanks 
to the splendid dividends that had been paid, and to the stili higher divi-
dends that were hoped for in the future, began to rise uninterruptedly, so 
that at the end of December, 1905, they were worth 1,200 lire, at the end 
of January, 1906, 1,650 lire, at the end of February 1,700 lire, at the end of 
March, 1906, at least 2,000 lire. There were even days on which the price 
rose to 2,300 lire a share (92 times the nominai price of issue!), and many 
persons at Turin bought these shares in the hope that they would rise to 
3,000 lire and over. At this point the directors, thinking that a share of 
2,300 lire was too large for the medium and the small capitalist, proceeded 
to divide it a second time into two and a-half shares, each of 10 lire; to 
1906 
Name of 
Groups 
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Lire Lire Lire 
Banks 17 559,300,000 915,418,000 163.68 861,296,000 154 
Railways, &c 28 689,650,000 896,859,000 130.04 877,522,000 127.24 
Mines, &c 37 246,526,500 533,936,900 216.58 460,783,320 186.91 
Electric light, &c 21 116,950,000 262.351,000 224.33 236,759,000 211 
Sugar industry 18 108,200,000 253,770,000 234.54 206,429,000 190.7 
Water supply 6 57,900,000 103,708,000 179.11 98,892,000 170.8 
Chemicals 9 60,550,000 121,336,000 200.39 120,179,000 198 
Weaving, &c 36 178,150,000 270,251,000 151.75 274,657,000 153.7 
Cereals, &c 9 36,500,000 70,916,000 191.37 59,950,000 164.3 
Manufacture of motor 
cars 15 23,875,000 162,100,000 678.95 105,184,000 440.6 
Land companies 8 103,876,500 137,612,818 132.48 123,371,000 119 
Different industries... 37 156,325,000 304,552,000 194.82 291,935,000 186.3 
Total 241 2,337,803,000 4,032,840,718 172.51 3,716,957,320 159 
1907 
Name of Groups 
Number of 
joint-stock 
companies under 
consideration in 
1907 and 1908 
Nominai 
price of shares 
January 1, 1907 
Actual price of 
shares end of 
October, 1907 
Index number, or 
relation between 
actual price at end of 
Oct., 1907, and the 
nominai price 
on Jan. 1, '07 
Lire Lire 
Banks 17 589,300,000 728,961,000 123.70 
Railways, &c 28 695,650,000 806,000,000 115.86 
Mines, &c 39 281,206,500 402,021,820 142.96 
Electric light, &c 21 128,400,000 206,690,000 160.97 
Sugar industry 21 107,450,000 160,500,000 149.37 
Water supply 6 61,900,000 92,056,000 148.71 
Chemical products 11 70,450,000 107,540,000 152.65 
Weaving and spinning . 36 190,150,000 273,460,000 143.81 
Cereals, macaroni, &c. . 9 37,200,000 42,570,000 114.44 
Manufacture of motor 
cars 16 37,125,000 27,970,000 75.34 
Land companies 10 161,250,000 137,137,500 85.05 
Different industries 29 161,023,000 278,300,000 172.83 
Total 243 2,521,104,500 3,263,203,320 129.44 
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1908 
1908 
Index No. or 
Name of Groups Nominai price 
of shares on 
Jan. 1, 1908 
Actual price of 
shares at end of 
June, 1908 
relation between 
actual price at the 
end of June, 1908, 
and the nominai price 
on Jan, 1, '08 
Lire Lire 
Banks 646,500,250 817,200,000 126.44 
Railways, tramways, &c 739,650,000 840,000,000 113.57 
Mines, &c 291,956,000 409,732,740 140.34 
Electric and other lighting (gas, &c.) 134,150,000 236,200,000 176.07 
Sugar industry 116,450,000 183,100,000 157.23 
Water supply 61,900,000 87,243,000 140.94 
Chemical products 75,750,000 121,710,000 160.67 
Weaving and spinning 201,900,000 286,900,000 142.10 
Grinding of cereals (making of maca-
roni) 37,200,000 38,214,000 102.72 
Manufacture of motor cars 41,900,000 27,100,000 60.36 
Land companies 152,250,000 157,195,000 103.25 
Different industries 176,673,000 286,500,000 162.16 
Total 2,679,279,250 3,491,094,740 130.30 
these, however, they set the nominai value of 100 lire, stating that this 
was in reality the value of the company's property. Many persons predicted 
that the new shares would fly up rapidly; ali the more so, because at the 
end of 1906 the balance-sheet of the "Fiat" showed a net profit of 
5,287,083 lire, a colossal figure for a paid-up capital of 800,000 lire which 
had been inflated to 9,000,000 lire, and a dividend of 40 per cent, was paid 
on the new shares of 100 lire, which corresponded to 400 per cent, on the 
paid-up capital. But ruin was already waiting in the pathway of this flour-
ishing company. Its prosperity had provoked the formation of numbers of 
rivai companies; in our abstract we include only 15 which were constantly 
quoted on the Stock Exchange, but in reality there were as many as 66 
companies for the construction of motor cars proper, and 56 works for 
making the carriage part and other motor car accessories, with a nominai 
capital of 141,413,000 lire. 
Some of these companies were really formed in order to manufacture 
motors, and motor accessories, but many were launched with the sole ob-
ject of making their shares go up on the Stock Exchange, and of selling 
them to the voracious and ignorant public. 
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But the day of reckoning cound not be put off. Half way through 
1907 the manufactories were choked up with unsold motor cars; the 
Northern United States, great purchasers of motor cars of the "Fiat" 
and "Itala" make, hard hit by the crisis, abruptly stopped purchasing. 
The "Fiat" balance-sheet of 1907 showed a loss of 5,922,542 lire, in ad-
dition to the loss of considerable reserves accumulated in the past; and 
not only was the company unable to pay any dividend, but it was forced 
to confess that the 100 lire shares were now only worth 34.19 lire, and to 
cali on the share-holders to make them up to 100 lire again by paying up 
65.85 lire per share. 
The bubble was definitely pricked; the latest shares of 100 lire nom-
inally which in November, 1906, stood at 750 lire, had fallen in January, 
1907, to 505 lire, in May to 410 lire, in August to 200 lire, in October to 
80 lire, in Aprii, 1908, to 40 lire, in May to 34.50 lire, and in June (after 
the fresh payment of 65.85 lire per share) they stood at about 100 lire. 
The Turin Tribunal has begun penai proceedings against some of the di-
rectors of the "Fiat" for jobbing the shares (spreading fraudulent ru-
mours which make the shares go up), and for falsifying the balance-sheet 
of 1906, which, as we said above, showed a net profit of 5,287,083 lire. 
The rivai manufactories, which sprang up like mushrooms in the days of 
the Stock Exchange madness, are in no better plight. Any one who goes 
outside the town of Turin sees scattered about in the suburbs great fac-
tories which are deserted, though quite new. They are manufactories of 
motor cars which have had to close for want of work. 
We have given this Turin episode of the "Fiat" at some length, because 
of the world-wide fame of this make of motor car. But in ali the big Italian 
towns there were similar cases; at Milan, at Genoa, at Florence, at Rome. It 
is the story of ali crises which has always repeated itself, specially in coun-
tries which are industrially young. 
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4. 
T H E I T A L I A N B O U R S E S . ILI 
INDUSTRIALS AND BANKS 
From a Turin Correspondent 
Another very interesting group is composed of the sugar industry, of 
the grinding of cereals, and of mines, foundries, iron and steel, and engi-
neering works, &c. These three groups are, perhaps, the most conspicuous 
example in Italy of industries which are both protected and receive Gov-
ernmental favours. The most scandalous instance is, perhaps, the sugar 
works. In a preceding number of the Economist a regret was expressed that 
the Italian Government should keep up the price of salt to 40 centesimi 
(about 4d) per kilogramme. But what can be said about sugar, which is 
burdened with exorbitant taxes which do not go exclusively to the benefit 
of the State, but partly to the producers of sugar? These are the taxes with 
which sugar is burdened in Italy: 
Duty on Excise on Protection in Favour of 
Foreign Sugar Italian Sugar Italian Manufactures 
in Lire per Quintale in Lire per Quintale in Lire per Quintale 
Raw sugar 88 67-20 20-80 
Refined 99 70-15 28-85 
Even supposing that ali the protective duty does not go into the pock-
ets of the manufacturers, they own that they gain from 15 to 20 lire per 
quintale of sugar produced. With an average production of one million 
quintali this makes a tribute of 15 to 20 millions of lire per annum ex-
acted by the 32 manufactories of sugar existing in Italy from the Italian 
consumers. And because a clause in the Convention of Brussels would 
oblige the Government to reduce the protective duty to a maximum of 
5.50 and 6 lire per quintale as soon as Italy became an exporting nation, 
the 32 sugar manufactories have joined together into a Sugar Union, 
which is a genuine trust, with the object of limiting the production a little 
below the quantity required for internai consumption at the present 
4. August 29, 1908, pp. 394-396. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Being the continuation of the two previous articles of July 25 and August 22, 1908, 
its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of the reasons above (see no. 3). 
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prices. And hence the Italian consumer pays for sugar retail 1.50 lire the 
kilogramme, and consumes little more than 3 kilogrammes a head, less 
even than is consumed in Turkey. To return to our subject, the scanda-
lous protection enjoyed by the sugar industry, and the hight profits made 
by it caused the shares to rise on the Stock Exchange, and by the begin-
ning of 1905 for every 100 lire of nominai price the shares were worth 
213 lire, and in September they had got up to 249 lire. This was excessive 
capitalisation, given the possibility of the import duties being reduced, 
and with them the profits; and it was only naturai that the prices should 
fall again in June, 1908, to 157.23 lire for every nominai 100 lire (in July, 
1908, to 145.12 per cent.). 
The industry of grinding cereals is another case of unjust and scanda-
lous protection. Wheat from abroad pays an import duty of 7.50 lire the 
quintale on entering Italy. This is, anyhow, a very high duty which in-
creases the cost of living beyond measure for the benefit of land owners. 
But the harm done is stili greater, because foreign flour, which ought in 
proportion to be charged a duty of 10.15 lire, pays instead 12.30 lire. 
And thus the consumer of flour pays a protective duty of 10.15 lire per 
quintale to the owners of corn land, and another 2.15 lire to the millers. 
The protection granted to land owners keeps up the value of their corn 
land; the protection given to the millers made the price of the shares of 
joint stock companies for milling go up from 100, the nominai price, to 
231.21 in January, 1905, to 230.43 in September, and made it possible 
for the promoters to reap golden profits by selling the shares to the worthy 
public. Here, too, the precarious profits due to protection could not allow 
of such high capitalisation, and they were also reduced by the rivalry of 
new producers and by bad administration. Hence it is true that the actual 
price has at the end of June, 1908, come down to 102.72 per cent, of the 
nominai price (at the end of July to 98.06). 
In the group of mines, foundries, iron and steel engineering works, 
&c., the profits in the past and those gained to-day are due partly to pro-
tective import duties which are very high, partly to the supplying of iron-
plates, cannons, and ships for the army and the navy, and lastly to the 
pressing demands of the State Railway department, which was obliged 
after July 1, 1905 (the date when the railways passed over from the private 
companies to the State) to make large purchases of railway materials. These 
causes made the price of the shares go up from 100 lire nominally, to 
235.54 lire actually in September, 1905. But, after that, the drop was con-
tinuous, so that the shares on June 30, 1908, were no longer worth more 
than 140 lire for every nominai 100 lire (at the end of July 132.86). 
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It must be acknowledged that this drop was due to the campaign in-
itiated by Signor Ferri, editor of the socialist paper, the Avanti, of Rome, 
against the serious abuses in the administration of the military marine, 
which was paying, for example, exorbitant prices to the Steel Works Com-
pany of Terni, for iron plates for men of war. Signor Ferri made the mis-
take of giving a prominently socialistic character to his struggle against mal-
versation in the military marine, and of mixing up with his criticisms of the 
administration of the marine personal attacks on Admiral Bettolo, Minister 
of Marine at the time. Hence the Tribunal at Rome had to sentence him to 
prison, thought the Chamber of Deputies would not allow the sentence to 
be carried out. 
But the seed scattered by him fell on good ground. Parliament nomi-
nated a commission of enquiry, which revealed abuses and suggested the 
appropriate remedies; public opinion woke up, and the newspapers, with 
the great Conservative paper of Milan, the Corriere della Sera, at their head, 
insisted firmly on the necessity of carrying out the conclusions of the com-
mission of inquiry. To-day the Government pays more reasonable prices 
for its iron plates, and the profits of the companies who supply them, 
though smaller, are more likely to last. 
The other groups do not offer features of much interest. The price of 
the shares of companies dealing with immoveable property varies a good 
deal (132.48 per cent, in March, 1906, 85.05 per cent, in October, 1907, 
and 103.25 per cent, in June, 1908). This, after ali, is quite naturai, as 
the undertakings in question are risky with distant returns, and aim at rais-
ing the value of large, badly cultivated estates, and at building houses in big 
cities. The group of railways, tramways, and navigation stands rather low 
(it went down uninterruptedly from 139.39 per cent, in September, 
1905, to 113.57 per cent, in June, 1908). But this drop is easy to under-
stand, because, after 1905, the three large railway companies (the Mediter-
ranean, Adriatic and Sicilian), which used to work the railways now be-
longing to the State found themselves, so to speak, with an unoccupied ca-
pital of 460 million lire; and the two first, instead of contenting themselves 
with taking every year from the State treasury the stipulated annuities - a 
course which would have given the shares almost the character of deben-
tures guaranteed by the State - preferred to take part in private companies, 
specially in metal and machinery works. This decision, which was much 
criticised by certain people as only serving to keep the directors and em-
ployees in their present position, whereas, otherwise, they would have be-
come practically unnecessary, has undoubtedly contributed to give a char-
acter of uncertainty to their shares, and to reduce their value. This group is 
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also affected by the world-wide crisis from which maritime navigation is 
suffering, which has forced Italian companies to lower the fares for emi-
grants to and from America in order to meet the competition of the Ger-
man navigation companies. 
The shares, however, of the companies for spinning and weaving wool, 
cotton, hemp, silk waste, &c., keep at a fairly high level. The actual price, 
which was 139.79 per cent, of the nominai price in January, 1905, rose to 
154.17 per cent, in November, 1906, and now (June, 1908) it stands at 
142.10 per cent. There had been very little speculation in the shares, 
and so they did not fall sensibly. This is, indeed, a protected industry, 
and there are even export duties, as, for example, on silk waste, which 
are very hard on silk spinners. But it is necessary to acknowledge that in 
many instances the manufacturing spinners and weavers have made strik-
ing advances in technique, and that they could to-day, without difficulty, 
give up a large part of their protection without suffering sensibly. This is 
the reason why the actual prices of their shares seem, as a rule, fairly stable; 
another reason is that the promoters did not attempt to sell their shares to 
the public at high prices in order to buy them back afterwards at a low rate 
after the crisis. 
A last word on the banks. With the exception of the powerful and 
well-managed Banca d'Italia, which is the chief Italian joint-stock bank 
of issue (the two other banks of issue, the Banco di Napoli and the 
Banco di Sicilia, are public banks administered by delegates from the 
State and the Southern and Sicilian provinces), and the Istituto Italiano 
di Credito Fondiario, which is concerned exclusively with mortgages on 
lands and houses, the other banks included in this group are almost ali 
of the German as opposed to the English type. They are, that is to say, 
not only concerned with deposits, discounts, and anticipations, but they 
help manufacturers to set up in business, they underwrite shares in or-
der to place them at a premium among their clients, and they take an 
active part in speculations on the Stock Exchange. They are almost 
forced to do this by the keen competition they meet with in their 
search for good commercial paper to discount, from the savings banks 
and the popular banks. It must be remembered that there exists in 
Italy the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, which is really a great State bank, 
which receives by means of the Post Office Savings Banks about 
1,500,000,000 lire of deposits and lends it to the State railways, to pro-
vinces and to towns. In this way, the issue of debentures of provinces 
and towns is almost entirely taken away from the ordinary banks. The 
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savings banks which are autonomous (that is independent of the State) 
received at the end of 1906 1,957,579,047 lire of deposits, and to-day 
the deposits are close upon 2,200,000,000 lire. If we add to this the ca-
pital of the savings banks (the only savings bank of the Lombard pro-
vinces, perhaps the biggest in the world, has a capital of 100 milion lire 
in addition to 700 million lire of deposit), and also the capital, the re-
serves and the deposits of the popular banks, we see how it is that sav-
ings banks and popular banks are successful in competing with the or-
dinary joint-stock banks for discounting good commercial paper. These 
latter, therefore, in order to make high profits, have to engagé in risky 
operations of industriai credit and in speculations on the Stock Ex-
change, which is an important cause of the instability of their shares. 
This brief survey of the changes in the quotations of Italian shares has 
shown that the rise which appeared in 1905 and in 1906 was largely arti-
ficial. Nothing, therefore, was more naturai than that there should be a re-
action in 1907, and that this should continue into the first six months of 
1908. An improvement can only come when the inheritance of the past 
is swept away, and confidence can be felt in a naturai and lasting prosperity 
of industry and commerce. 
Not everybody in Italy is persuaded of this truth. Many speculatore 
on the Stock Exchange, accustomed to gain large sums easily by playing 
with the rise, and many imprudent and greedy capitalists who have seen 
the price of the shares they bought in their folly go down, cry out against 
the black band of bears, and cali for Government measures. The Govern-
ment has sent the police into the houses of certain well-known "bears", 
and has begun criminal proceedings for stockjobbing at Genoa, Milan 
and Turin. Further, it has presented to Parliament a Bill about Stock Ex-
changes containing most severe restrictive rules. It is probable that the 
criminal proceedings will not come to anything owing to the difficulty 
of proving offences of this nature, and, at most, they will serve to per-
suade the capitalists, who were foolish enough to let themselves be 
fleeced of their money, that the blame rests with the "bears", and not 
with their own blindness and greed. The effects, however, of the Stock 
Exchange Bill if approved by Parliament, will not be so innocent. Side 
by side with certain good proposals, notably those for reducing the taxes 
for Stock Exchanges contracts, it contains other proposals which will hin-
der and limit beyond measure the work of the operatore on the Stock Ex-
change, honest and dishonest alike. It seems a strange thing that the Ita-
lian Government should have set itself to ape the German legislator after 
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he had recognised the necessity of reforming his disastrous Stock Ex-
change law. But public opinion, which is made up by incompetent peo-
ple, called on the Government to do something, and it is no wonder that 
to satisfy the clamour of the market place it should be unable to find any-
thing better to propose to Parliament than prohibitions and inquisitions 
on a vast scale. 
5. 
THE ITALIAN BUDGET. I 
By an Italian Correspondent 
The terrible disaster which has befallen one of the most beautiful re-
gions of Italy has called forth the sympathy and assistance not only of Ita-
lians, but of foreigners. Large voluntary subscription funds have been 
raised, but they are not enough; and it seems probable that the Govern-
ment will devote to the most urgent cases some thirty million lire, part of 
the surplus realised in the last financial year (1907-8). But the sums 
needed are vastly larger than that figure, and as the current Budget 
and next year's will close (apart from the disastrous earthquake) with 
small surpluses, it is evident that Italy will have to take one of these three 
courses: retrenchment of expenses, new taxation, or debt. Any one of 
these courses would be readily accepted, as in these days of misfortune 
the patriotic feeling of the nation has been aroused to the highest point. 
It is a pity that the Italian Budget is no more in the brilliant situation 
which, from 1901 to 1907, would have permitted the application of thirty 
or forty millions of lire for several years to the aid of the desolated pro-
vinces. 
The Budget speech of the Minister of Finance and the publication of 
important Parliamentary documents make it possible to give a picture of 
Italian finance up to date. We are at a turning point in the financial history 
of our country, as will be seen from the following tables, which set out the 
Budget surplus or deficit for the last 18 years: 
5. January 9, 1909, pp. 56-57. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because of the galley proofs, sent by the 
editorial staff of The Economist on January 1, 1909, in the Einaudi archives. 
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Years of Deficit 
1890-91 
1891-92 
1892-93 
1893-94 
1894-95 
1895-96 
1896-97 
1898-99 
The years from 1890 to 1898 were among the worst in our national fi-
nance. The Abyssinian War, the banking crisis, the Protectionist tariff, the 
riots in Sicily, in the Southern Provinces, and in Milan exercised a sinister 
influence on the State Budget. The surpluses were few and small, and the 
deficits great. But the deficit taught our governing classes the beneficent 
lesson of parsimony and curtailment of expenses. The Opposition papers 
ridiculed the Cabinets, which courageously tried to reduce expenditure, 
with the nickmane of "compagnia della lesina" ("skin-flint company"), 
but their work proved beneficent. In the meantime, despite the Protection-
ist tariffs which surrounded us in foreign countries, and despite the na-
tional tariff, which drew our capital into unnatural channels, agriculture 
and industry made great progress in Italy; the banking crisis was overcome, 
the Italian Rentes were again quoted at 100 and over, and as the paper cir-
culation, not covered by metal reserve, was reduced, the agio insensibly 
dwindled. These facts reacted favourably on the State Budget, and the fol-
lowing were years of surpluses: 
Lire Italiane 
1898-99 + 15,094,086 
1899-0 +5,210,486 
1900-1 +41,234,451 
1901-2 +32,582,183 
1902-3 +69,713,119 
1903-4 +33,814,847 
1904-5 +47,798,285 
1905-6 +63,521,386 
1906-7 + 89,999,285 
1907-8 + 39,857,850 
The acme of prosperity was attained on June 29, 1906, when the Italian 
Parliament, amidst loud cheers, voted the conversion of the Rentes from 4 
per cent, to 33/4, and after five years to 3 V2 per cent. The conversion of this 
enormous debt of 8,000,000,000 lire was accomplished without difficulty, 
and, indeed, with such success that it enhanced the credit of the Italian 
State. 
Lire Italiane 
- 84,672,363 
-48,138,805 
+ 9,343,765 
-58,855,904 
+ 409,077 
- 1,633,150 
+ 126,931 
- 1,105,573 
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But the great surpluses were a clanger. Year after year the income of 
the State went on increasing, making it tempting to incur new expenses. 
The contemporaneous increase in private incomes and the progress in in-
dustry and commerce led to a crisis, which culminated last November, the 
full consequences of which have not yet been seen (see Economist, July 25 
and August 22 and 29, 1908, on "Italian Bourses"). In State finance we 
have not had a crisis, but undoubtedly the situation calls for great pru-
dence. The Budget for 1906-7 closed with a surplus of 89,999,285 lire. 
Some of this was not real, having been obtained by artificial devices, on 
which it would take too long to dwell. The fiscal year 1907-8 closed with 
a surplus of only 39,857,850 lire, from which sum must be deducted 
3,310,094 lire, representing the accounts remaining over from past years, 
so that the real surplus must be put at 36,547,757 lire. The first estimate 
of the Budget for the current year 1908-9 closed with a surplus of 
43,613,757 lire. Various subsequent Parliamentary votes introduced varia-
tions in income and expenditure, so that in the revised Budget the esti-
mated surplus is reduced to 16,092,632 lire, from which before the end 
of the year various items will have to be deducted, in consequence of Bills 
involving expenditure not yet voted by Parliament. The Minister of Fi-
nance is compelled, therefore, to estimate the real surplus at only 3 million 
lire. Probably the surplus would have been greater, as the figures of the 
items of income are calculated too low, but the extraordinary expenses 
and the reduction of income consequent on the ruin of Messina and Reggio 
Calabria render the surplus very doubtful. Nor are the estimates for 1909-
10 better, as it is calculated that the final surplus will not exceed the sum of 
5 million lire. 
The chief cause of the progressive dwindling of the surpluses is the 
continuous increase in public expenditure in the years after 1897-8. The 
actual expenditure, which had been reduced from 1,774,983,122 lire in 
1890-1 to 1,669,168,155 lire in 1898-9, went on increasing afterwards, till 
in 1907-8 the figure of 2,251,747,240 lire was attained. The all-important 
cause of this increase in expenditure has been the raising of the salaries of 
public servants. One after another, ali classes of public servants, from the 
highest State Councillors down to the humblest letter-carrier, have cla-
moured for a higher salary, to meet the enhanced cost of living. In the years 
1905-9 this cause alone has produced an increase of 115 million lire in pub-
lic expenditure. Another cause of increased expenditure has been the cla-
mour for public works. In the same years there were voted: 1) 31,975,100 
lire for land drainage and improvement in malarial regions, highways, &c.; 
2) 25,000,000 lire in State aid to the building schemes for transforming the 
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capital (Rome); 3) 137,043,000 lire to harbour works; 4) 15,000,000 lire to 
land and hydraulic works in Sardinia; 5) 28,500,000 lire in aid to regions 
damaged by earthquake in Calabria, by the eruption of Vesuvius &c.; 6) 
551,500,000 to new railways construction. 
Who can wonder that Mr Carcano, Minister of Finance, in his last 
Budget speech, dwelt at length on the urgent necessity of putting a stop 
to the increase of unnecessary expenditure? 
(To be continued) 
6. 
THE ITALIAN BUDGET. II 
From an Italian Correspondent 
A brief examination of the Italian Budget will help to give a clear 
idea of our finance. It is necessary to say that the Italian Budget is di-
vided into four sections (categorie). The first section (Categoria I.: En-
trate e spese effettive) comprises the actual income and expenditure; 
on the side of income are included the yeld of taxes and other revenue 
from State domain and public services, and in the expenditure ali the 
sums disbursed for the current public services. A surplus or a deficit 
in this section is, therefore, a real surplus or a real deficit. Ali the income 
is gross income save for a very few exceptions, of which the only impor-
tant one is that of the State railway administration, the income from 
which is put down as net in the general Budget. The second section (Ca-
tegoria IL: Costruzione di strade ferrate) includes in the item of income 
the sums which the State has borrowed for the construction of new rail-
ways, and in the item of expenditure the sums spent for the same pur-
pose. The surpluses and deficits of that section are not, therefore, real 
surpluses and deficits, for a surplus means that a large sum has been 
borrowed which has not been utilised for the construction of new rail-
ways, while a deficit means that some railways have been built (without 
incurring debt) with the surpluses of the first or the third section. It 
6. January 23, 1909, pp. 161-162. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Being the continuation of the previous article, its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is 
certain. 
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would have been clearer if this second section had been amalgamated with 
the third section (Categoria III.: Movimento di capitali), which in the item 
of income comprises the whole sum borrowed for capital expenses (such as 
harbours, canals, improvements of malarial land, and, in the last years, also 
railway construction not executed directly by the State, but by the special 
State railways administration, &c.), or for the repayment of old debts, and 
in the item of expenses the sum actually expended, as above said, on public 
works and on the repayment of old debts. A surplus or a deficit in this sec-
tion has the same meaning as in the second section. The fourth section (Ca-
tegoria IV.: Barrite di giro) comprises those items which appear twice in the 
Budget, for book-keeping and other purposes, in the same sum, as income 
and again as expenditure. It has no real importance, and will be omitted 
here. 
In the following table we have set out the public expenditure from the 
final accounts for the year ending June 30, 1908, and from the estimates for 
1908-9 and 1909-10. We have added the sum total of income for each sec-
tion, so as to bring out the special and the total deficits or surpluses. (See 
table at p. 23). 
It will be remarked at once that the final accounts for 1907-8 and the 
estimates for 1908-9 and 1909-10 close with surpluses of 61, 33, and 22 
millions respectively, whereas the surpluses are stated above in the article 
to be only 36, 3, and 5 millions for the same years. The difference is ac-
counted for by the effect of a device, by which a given sum appears two 
or three times over augmenting the surpluses, and of new Bills involving 
expenditure, which it has been impossibile to take into account in the esti-
mates. The true surpluses are, therefore, the last-mentioned ones of 36 (ac-
tual) 3, and 5 millions (estimated). 
Another observation may be made: the surpluses of the last and 
next years are obtained only by resorting largely to borrowing, as the 
income in sections II. and III. is income from loans. The same thing 
cannot be said with regard to the years immediately preceding July 1, 
1905, as in the years from 1897-8 to 1904-5 the new railways and other 
public works were mainly built by means of the surpluses of the first 
section. July 1, 1905, brought a new (it is doubtful whether it is a bet-
ter) spirit into Italian finance. The State took over the railway service, 
and inaugurated a period of huge debts for railways and other public 
works. The practice of resorting to debt for capital investments is fre-
quently necessary, and is not objectionable in itself, provided that the 
public works and railways are reproductive. Is that the case with the 
1,500,000,000 lire or thereabouts which have been and will be ex-
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Actual Revised First 
Expenditure Estimate Estimate 
for 1907-8 for 1908-9 for 1909-10 
Lire Lire Lire 
Section I. - Actual current expenditure 
Treasury (public debt, pensions, &c.) .... 612,612,301 710,640,286 715,891,211 
Revenue department 271,042,056 276,423,589 272,737,115 
Justice 48,470,181 51,263,722 52,760,962 
Foreign Affairs 21,453,275 19,130,445 18,981,114 
Public Instruction 85,822,209 93,132,110 89,375,465 
Interior 106,129,960 108,483 382 111,721,134 
Public Works 107,102,323 107,672,453 105,403,000 
Post and Telegraph 122,981,699 127,675,313 130,688,182 
War 384,913,429 299,345,810 301,489,000 
Marine 157,145,501 153,129,321 163,427,941 
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce .. 27,009,035 25,879,605 26,060,648 
Total expenditure 1,884,681,974 1,972,776,239 1,978,535,773 
Total income 1,946,424,711 2,005,807,827 2,020,458,119 
Surplus 61,742,736 33,031,588 41,922,345 
Section II. - Railway construction 
Expenditure 9,750,000 8,110,000 43,330,000 
Income - - 36,300,000 
Deficit 9,750,000 8,110,000 7,030,00 
Section III. - Capital account 
Expenditure 295,438,414 214,311,582 200,800,514 
Income 305,322,528 222,963,626 188,059,211 
Surplus 9,884,114 8,652,044 12,741,302 
General summary 
Income 2,251,747,240 2,228,771,454 2,244,817,330 
Expenditure 2,189,870,389 2,195,197,821 2,222,666,288 
Surplus 61,876,850 33,573,632 22,151,042 
pended on so-called reproductive purposes in Italy in the five years 
from 1905-6 to 1909-10? That is the question. And it is as yet too early 
to give any certain reply. The piling up of huge debts has been hitherto 
an easy thing, as the Government has had at its disposai the funds of 
the Deposit and Loan Bank (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti), a Governmental 
banking institution in which is centred the administration of the postai 
savings banks (with its 1,468,939,437 lire on June 30, 1908, of small de-
posits) and of numerous other public or semi-public funds. But the De-
posit and Loan Bank appears to have been too hard pressed by the 
Government's absorbing policy of debt; and as the locai authorities 
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(towns and provinces) are also calling urgently on the same bank for 
aid, it has been necessary to decide on the emission of a new State loan 
by the State. A Bill (of December 11, 1908) has already been voted by 
the Chamber of Deputies, and will shortly become law, which provides 
for a new loan at 3V2 per cent., redeemable in 50 years. The new loan 
will be offered for public subscription up to a maximum of 150 million 
lire per annum. As the 33/4 Perpetuai Rentes, which in 1912 will be re-
duced to 3V2, are 4 points above par, and as in Italy there is a relative 
dearth of gilded stocks (so that some capitalists are beginning to buy 
foreign stocks - Swiss, Prussians, and Spaniards), there is no doubt that 
the new 3V2, redeemable will be readily taken up. The question remains 
if the debt will in the end prove remunerative. A negative reply would 
be given if one looked only at the net revenue of the State railways. 
Prior to July 1, 1905, the net revenue oscillated between 70 and 96 mil-
lion lire. After the railway service was taken over by the State and heavy 
capital expenses net by loans, the net revenue has been reduced to 79 
million lire in 1905-6, 52 in 1906-7, 43 in 1907-8, and is estimated at 
37-7 and 40 millions in 1908-9 and 1909-10. A definite conclusion from 
these figures would, however, be unwarrantable, as many conditions are 
being changed in the meantime. That the epoch of great surpluses has 
come to an end is, indeed, certain, and it is certain also that our Gov-
ernors must exercise great caution if the delicate fabric of our national 
credit is not to be shaken. 
7. 
THE ITALIAN BOURSES 
The last year, writes our Italian correspondent, was a very bad one for 
ali the Bourses of Italy, and the present has not opened better. I give in the 
following table the résumé of the quotations of 243 amongst the foremost 
shares quoted in the Italian Bourses. The table follows those which were 
published in No. 3,391 of the Economist (August 22, 1908): 
7. February 13, 1909, p. 322. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on Busi-
ness and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of a payment letter sent 
by the secretarial staff of The Economist, dated March 8, 1909, for his February contribution. 
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Banks 14 645,500 823,920 801,040 789,000 127,44 123,89 122,04 
Railways, tramways, 
navigation 23 739,650 832,720 829,000 813,000 112,58 112,08 109,91 
Mines, foundries, 
iron and steel en-
gineering works, 
&c 39 291,956 437,224 362,000 352,000 149,75 123,99 120,55 
Electric and other 
lighting (gas, 
&c.) 21 134,150 243,084 231,000 230,000 181,20 172,19 171,45 
Sugar industry .... 21 116,450 181,200 171,000 165,000 156,03 146,84 142,55 
Water supply 6 60,900 92,938 88,628 88,056 152,59 145,53 144,59 
Chemical products 11 25,250 125,235 98,000 93,000 165,32 129,37 122,75 
Weaving and spin-
ning (cotton, 
wool, waste silk, 
&c.) 36 201,900 299,813 280,000 277,000 148,49 138,68 137,19 
Grinding of cer-
eals, manufac-
ture of macar-
oni, &c 9 37,200 41,824 35,142 33,692 112,43 94,47 90,57 
Manufacture of 
motor cars 16 44,900 38,312 23,500 23,000 85,32 52,34 51,22 
Land and building 
companies 10 152,250 153,792 164,005 163,750 101,01 107,72 107,55 
Various industries 29 176,673 295,193 270,000 267,000 167,08 152,82 151,12 
Total 213 2,679,279 3,570,765 3,353,275 3,295,498 133,27 125,15 122,99 
As will easily be seen, there has been a continuous fall in 1908 and 
in the first month of 1909, so that there has been reached a lower 
water-mark than in October, 1907 (American crisis). The causes of 
the stagnation of the Italian Bourses are many. The terrible earthquake 
exercised a certain influence in the first days of 1909, but by the end of 
January its influence had already spent itself. The chief cause of the de-
pression of to-day has been the exaggerations of the past. The severest 
fall from the high water-mark of March, 1906, to the lowest point of 
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January 31, 1909, has been experienced in the motor-car department; 
the fall has been 627 per cent, where the craze was the wildest; then 
come the grinding of cereals industry with a fall of 103 per cent, of 
the nominai value; the mines, foundries, iron and steel, engineering 
works with 96 per cent.; the sugar industry with 91 per cent.; the che-
mical products industry with 77 per cent. Ali these industries had been 
greatly over-capitalised, or are basing their fortunes on Protection and 
Governmental favours. The electric and other lighting shares, which 
for a time were over-priced, have lost 52 per cent, on the face value, 
in part also as a consequence of municipalisations. The loss upon bank 
shares has been less severe, 41 per cent. The water supply companies 
follow with 34 per cent., the land and building shares with 24 per cent., 
the railways, tramways, navigation shares with 20 per cent., the cotton, 
wool, and silk companies with 14 per cent. One may say that the fall 
and the depression are almost in exact proportion to the excitement 
of the past. But the stagnation is to-day almost complete, from the dis-
trust of the capitalist, who buys nothing but Italian Rente 33/4 per cent, 
and other gilt-edged stocks. These are the only securities for which 
there is a market in Italy at present. I may add that the Italian capitalists 
have begun to buy foreign Government securities, and have subscribed, 
from distrust of industriai and bank shares and dislike of the meagre 
interest on Italian Rente, a not indifferent sum to the Russian 4V2 
per cent. loan. 
8. 
THE FOREIGN TRADE O F ITALY IN 1908 
The statistics of Italy's foreign trade for the year 1908, which have been 
published recently, writes a Turin correspondent, disclose an increase in 
the total trade apart from the precious metals, a rise in the imports having 
more than counterbalanced a decrease in the exports: 
8. March 6, 1909, pp. 511-512. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) of the wording 
"writes a Turin correspondent"; b) the treatment of the argument bears strong similarities with 
an article published in II Corriere della Sera on February 23, 1909, entitled "Le illusioni dello 
sbilancio commerciale". 
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(OOO's Omitted Precious Metals not Considered) 
1905 1906 1907 1908 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
Imports 2,015,775 2,514,351 2,880,669 3,030,940 
Exports 1,705,317 1,905,949 1,948,868 1,858,257 
Total 3,721,092 4,420,301 4,829,537 4,889,198 
Excess of imports over export... 310,458 608,402 931,801 1,172,683 
These figures have excited great alarm in certain quarters, mainly pro-
tectionist, which predicted ruin to our country. But the alarms are injusti-
fied as, notwithstanding the great deficit in the commercial balance, there 
has been a continuous inflow of precious metals. In these, officiai statistics 
show a surplus of imports as follows: 
Lire 
190 5 161,318,000 
190 6 133,432,600 
190 7 162,332,600 
190 8 7,040,400 
It is clear that Italy has continued to have a surplus of imports with-
out losing a single lira of her monetary capital. The Bank of Italy has in 
recent years greatly added to her metallic reserves, and has gained a pro-
minent place among the European banks of issue. The surplus of imports 
has been paid for by remittances from Italian emigrants in the United 
States, Argentina, and elsewhere, and by the money spent by foreign 
tourists. In 1908 the American crisis reduced both the emigrants' remit-
tances and the number of foreign visitors. It may be added that the fig-
ures of the 1908 surplus of imports are misleading, as they are provisionai 
figures, while the 1905, 1906, and 1907 figures are ultimate. The 1908 
figures are, indeed, calculated on the 1907 values basis; whereas, in fact, 
1908 was a year of falling prices. A rough approximation gives 2,730 mil-
lions of imports and 1,800 millions of exports, a total trade of 4,530 mil-
lions, or a fall of 300 millions from the high level of 1907; and the surplus 
of imports shrinks to 930 million lire. If we analyse the import figures, we 
find that the greatest increase of the quantity entered has been in animals 
and animai products, which increased from 174 to 273 million lire, in 
minerals, metals, and machinery, from 655 to 676 million lire, in spirits, 
oils, and various drinks, from 50 to 65 millions. The greatest decreases in 
imports had been in railway and other cars, from 65 to 50 millions, in silk 
(mainly finished) from 249 to 238, and in cotton from 340 to 327 mil-
lions. The greatest decrease in our exports has been in flour, macaroni, 
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&c., from 294 to 260 millions, in silk from 673 to 644 millions, in cotton 
(textiles) from 143 to 121 millions. But the purchasing power of the 
masses has been unimpaired, as may be seen from the growing imports 
of alcohol, and, above ali, from the increasing meat consumption, for 
which the Italian agriculturist is unable to provide. Already some quantity 
of Australian and Argentine frozen meat has been imported at Genoa; 
and there is an increasing outlet for that industry in our country. I end 
with a table of our trade with the principal foreign countries in 1908 
(in lire, 000's omitted): 
Import from Exports to 
Germany 549,012 275,714 
Great Britain 534,825 134,244 
United States 407,022 223,456 
France 298,073 222,294 
Austria-Hungary 306,911 149,803 
Switzerland 89,528 339,120 
These figures are useful to indicate the relative position of various 
countries in the foreign trade of Italy; but they do not agree with the offi-
ciai foreign statistics for many reasons which would be too long to detail 
here. 
9. 
THE BANK OF ITALY REPORT FOR 1908 
From an Italian Correspondent 
This year at the meetings of the shareholders of joint-stock companies 
were heard from the presidents of the boards of directors speeches very 
different in character from those which were heard in the golden days of 
1906 and 1907. Dividends reduced and sometimes passed by, losses and 
reductions of capital, companies dissolved - that is the tale which the Ita-
lian shareholder was learning, much to his disappointment, in the last week 
of March and the first of Aprii. This is not, fortunately, the whole tale; the 
old-estabilished companies, with high reserves, have stood well against the 
9. Aprii 17, 1909, pp. 818-820. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of a letter sent from the editorial 
staff of The Economist, dated Aprii 7, 1909, enclosing proofs. 
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storm of falling prices and dwindling profits. But to new companies the 
year past has been fateful. 
The changed situation reflects itself in the reports of boards of direc-
tors of the leading banks in Italy. The Società Bancaria Italiana, which in 
November, 1907, was for a moment doomed to ruin, has been reorganised, 
and the reduced capital has gained a dividend of 5 per cent. The Banca di 
Liguria has reduced the dividend from 9 to 7 lire. Of the two foremost Ita-
lian private banks, the Banca Commerciale Italiana (105 millions lire capi-
tal and 35 millions reserves) has maintained the dividend at 45 lire (9 per 
cent.), while the Credito Italiano (75 millions lire capital and 9 millions re-
serve) has reduced it from 32.50 to 30 lire (6V2 to 6 per cent.). Time will 
show which action has been wiser. One wonders, however, that the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, after having, in its officiai report, very wisely advised 
the industriai companies to reduce their dividends in the present year of 
depression and of forced economy, should not have followed its own 
timely and wise advice. 
But the report which has aroused most attention in Italy, and which 
may truly be described as the most important financial document of the 
year, is the report of the director-general of the Banca d'Italia, Mr. Strin-
gher, to his shareholders. It is, in spite of the industriai and banking stagna-
tion of our country at the present moment, a highly gratifying document, as 
it definitely places the Bank of Italy among the leading banks of issue of the 
world, with its capital reconstituted with a sound circulation and a gold re-
serve which 15 years ago no one could have hoped for. Many of the readers 
of the Economist will remember the utter ruin of the Italian banks of issue 
prior to 1894. The building crisis was raging in Rome; the wine crisis had 
ruined the landed proprietors. The banks, to cover themselves, had to ac-
quire house property in Rome and other great cities, and enormous agricul-
tural domains. Last, but not least, it was discovered that the banks of issue 
were in the habit of lending sums not only to trade customers, but also to 
politicians of the worst kind. One of these banks, the Banca Romana, to 
conceal its misdoings, had gone so far as to emit a doublé series of notes; 
that is to say, to falsify the note circulation. It was in such circumstances 
that the Bank of Italy was born in 1894 to succeed the Banca Nazionale 
and the two Tuscan banks of emission, and to liquidate the rotten Banca 
Romana. How stupendous were the losses caused by the mismanagement 
of the past may be argued from the fact that the old assets of the Bank of 
Italy, which altogether amounted to 519,665,000 lire, some 200 million lire 
were considered as utterly lost, apart from the consequences of the liquida-
tion of the Banca Romana. The years 1894-1908 were years of patient re-
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construction, and to-day the work may be said to be accomplished. The 
shareholders had to consent to a reduction of the capital of the bank from 
210 millions to 150 millions, and to an augmentation of it to 180 millions 
lire by means of a cali of 100 lire per share. A yearly sum of 6 million lire, 
with interest, was taken from the annual profits to constitute a special re-
serve to compensate the losses prior to 1894, and another sum of 2 millions 
a year, with interest, was to compensate the losses of the liquidation of the 
Banca Romana. This last liquidation is to continue up to December 31, 
1913, but it appears that the accumulated reserve (which at December 
31, 1908, had risen to 40,333,170 lire) will be sufficient to compensate 
the probable losses. The main liquidation of the above said 519,665,000 
lire of "immobilizzazioni" has ended December 31, 1908, with a surplus 
already realised of 14,254,000 lire, which the director-general hopes to 
raise in due time to 32 million lire. The Bank's success has been achieved: 
(1) by the sacrifices of the shareholders, which we have mentioned; (2) by 
the patient and careful realisation of the assets of the bank. The realisation 
of these assets was made possible by the economie progress in Italy, which 
made saleable lands and houses which formerly were unsaleable. To-day ali 
the assets of the Bank are liquid; ad to the 180 millions of capital are to be 
added 48 millions of ordinary reserve and 12 millions of special reserve. 
With the progress of the internai reconstruction of the Bank, a similar 
advance took place in the services which the Bank was able to make to the 
community. In the following figures are summarised the great change 
which has taken place since December 31, 1894: 
(In Lire, 000's Omitted) 
December 31 
ASSETS 1894 1900 1908 
Gold reserve 292,701 300,847 932,146 
Silver reserve 67,859 46,191 110,279 
Inland bills 184,279 258,763 388,620 
Advances 27,744 35,098 77,483 
Securities 91,900 175,358 164,822 
Foreign bills 23,141 72,099 70,814 
Foreign securities 10,562 20,294 26,842 
LIABILITIES 
Note circulation 826,457 820,438 1,389,145 
Current accounts and deposits at notice 210,394 194,534 195,752 
Proportion of the reserve to the note cir-
culation 43.39% 48.27% 77.46% 
The change has been great indeed. The note circulation has risen from 
826 to 1,389 million lire, and at the same time the proportion of the reserve 
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has gone up from 43.39 per cent, to 77.46 per cent. In 1894 the note cir-
culation, though small, was not properly backed by gold or silver, but was 
issued largely against the baneful "immobilizzazioni", or houses, land, and 
doubtful credits. If the Bank had to change notes in gold, it would have 
had soon to admit its incapacity to do its duty. Therefore the notes circu-
lated by force of law, and were not admitted to change in gold. The "ag-
gio" was at its highest, and 100 lire gold exchanged for 111.08 lire paper 
notes (115.70 maximum, 106.37 minimum). 
Year by year the situation has improved. The current accounts and de-
posits at notice have diminished, as the Bank of Italy pays a minimum in-
terest on the deposits (0.50-0.75 per cent.), and depositors prefer therefore 
the savings and other banks, which pay from 2 to 4 per cent, on deposits. 
The note circulation has gone up not for the sake of loans to politicians or 
to landed or house proprietors, but for satisfying the real need of trade. To 
counterbalance the growing note and deposits liabilities the Bank has in-
creased its gold reserve from 300 to 932 million lire (from 12 to 37 million 
pounds), apart from the increment of silver reserve, while the inland bills 
progressed from 184 to 388 million lire, the advances on securities, silk, 
&c., from 27 to 77 millions. Meantime, the "aggio" on paper notes has dis-
appeared. 
If we look at the banking operations of the last year (1908) compared 
with 1907, we find the total discounts decreased from 1,618,561 in 1907 in 
number to 1,466,224 in 1908, for a sum of 2,043,287,772 lire in 1908, 
against 2,261,968,257 lire in 1907. The crisis has made itself felt; but as 
the mean lenght of the discount increased, the mean sum used in discount 
operations progressed from 368 to 372 million lire. In 1907 the normal or 
officiai rate of discount had been advanced from 5 to 5V2 per cent., and the 
Bank consented to apply a lower or special rate only to 26.16 per cent, of 
the bills discounted. In 1908 the normal rate was reduced in January to 5 
per cent., and later special rates of 472 and 4 per cent, were granted to 
high-class customers. The discount operations in 1908 may be classified 
as follow: 
Bills Number of Bills Sum Total Discounted in Lire 
To 100 Lire 202,382 14,304,320 
From 101 to 500 Lire 674,703 199,045,597 
501 to 1,000 Lire 345,144 240,750,825 
1,001 to 5,000 Lire 187,648 472,917,257 
>> 5,001 to 10,000 Lire 34,343 278,415,557 
10,001 to 20,000 Lire 10,711 165,528,767 
From 20,001 Lire upwards 11,293 675,325,449 
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The great majority of the bills discounted are therefore small bills, 
which is an index of the useful services of the Bank to a multitude of cus-
tomers. 
The advances on first-rate securities, on silk and other goods, in-
creased from 2,546 for a sum of 469,768,411 lire in 1907 to 2,941 
for a sum of 501,979,937 lire in 1908. This was the effect of the law 
of December 31, 1907, which diminished the tax on advances from 1 
cent, or a lira par day, and per 1,000 lire to V4 cent, for the advances 
on State Rentes and V2 cent, for ali other advances. The gross profits of 
the year amounted in 1908 to 37,826,108 lire against 35,645,269 lire in 
1907, an increase of 2,180,839 lire. The expenses were 25,265,063 lire, 
against 26,167,563 lire in 1907, or a diminution of 902,500 lire. The net 
profits were therefore 12,561,045 lire, to which were added the balance 
brought from 1907 of 268,127 lire. The sum total of 12,829,173 lire 
was divided as follow: - 1,215,834 to reserve fund, 11,400,000 to 
shareholders, and 213,338 lire brought forward. The dividend on 
the 300,000 shares was fixed at 38 lire per share (6.33 per cent.). In 
1907 the dividend was 30 lire, in 1906 only 20 lire, and previously 
18 lire. The shareholders may congratulate themselves on the increased 
dividend, and on the hope of further increment in future years as the 
work of reorganisation of the Bank of Italy is come finally to an end. 
The public Treasury will also benefit in future years from the increased 
profits of the Bank. 
The one black spot in the whole story is the effect which the an-
nouncement of an increased dividend (from 30 to 38 lire per share) 
by the Bank of Italy has had on the Italian Bourses. As the Bank of Italy 
share is undoubtedly the share most widely known by the capitalist, the 
Stock Exchange meneurs had a powerful argument for a rise in quota-
tions of the shares of other concerns. The movement is quite artificial 
and is doomed to failure; as no one among the capitalists will be per-
suaded to buy shares of other concerns, which may have distributed 
a dividend higher than the profits really obtained, merely because the 
Bank of Italy in the 15 years past has been extremely well managed, 
and has acquired a prominent position among the European banks of 
issue. 
— 32 — 
SEPTEMBER, 1909 
10. 
ITALIAN FINANCE AND THE NEW TAXES 
The new fiscal year in Italy has now opened, and amid many unfavour-
able omens. The fiscal year 1908-9 closed, it is true, with a surplus of some 
few millions lire; for, together with increasing expenditure, the State's prin-
cipal income also showed an increase as compared with the previous year: 
1907-8 1908-9 Inc. (+) or Dee. (-) 
Lire Lire Lire 
Customs, Excise, &c 506,577,273 560,359,060 +54,781,787 
Tobacco, salt, and lot-
teries 422,687,078 440,315,286 + 17,628,208 
Income taxes 434,578,661 456,245,909 +21,667,248 
Succession, duty, stamps, &c. 260,616,611 256,735,702 - 3,880,909 
The great increase in Customs is due to the yield of the wheat duty, 
which was considerable, in consequence of the bad 1908 crop. But this 
year the wheat crop has been fair; so that the imports of foreign wheat will 
be materially reduced. The yield of Income-taxes (land tax, house tax, and 
industriai, commercial, and professional income-tax) is bound to diminish 
also in 1909-10. In the month of July just past the yield of the industriai 
and commercial tax diminished by 212,045 lire. The effeets of the econom-
ie crisis of 1907 and 1908 will, indeed, appear in the new year in the yield 
of the industriai and commercial tax (imposta di ricchezza mobile), as the 
assessment of incomes in 1908 and 1909 was based on the balance-sheets 
of joint-stock companies for 1906 and 1907, which were years of high divi-
dends and prosperity, while the assessment for the 1910 tax will have to be 
based on the balance-sheets for 1908, which disclosed reduced dividends 
and great losses. These faets have induced Signor Carcano, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, to address a letter to his colleagues in the Cabinet, urging 
economies in the Budget scheme for 1910-11, which the various depart-
10. September 4, 1909, pp. 459-460. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of 
the newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treatment of the argu-
ment bears strong similarities with three articles published in II Corriere della Sera (August 7, 
August 14 and September 29, 1909), entitled respectively, "Come si fuma in Italia", "Nuove 
tasse 'simpatiche': la tassa di bollo per i titoli esteri", "Lotto di stato". Furthermore, in a letter 
from the editor of The Economist, Francis Hirst (July 20, 1909), there is a reference to a future 
article on taxes, which is most likely this one. 
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ments have to compile during the recess. But economy is easier to preach 
than to practise, and there has been much talk of new taxes. The present 
fiscal system, with its salt tax of 40 centesimi (4d) per kilo, with its wheat 
duty of 75 lire the ton of 1,000 kilos, with its sugar duty of 99 lire the quintal 
of 100 kilos, is to be left intact. Even the heavy taxation of sugar, which 
leaves a protection of 27.85 lire per quintal to the manufactures (27.85 lire 
is the difference between 99 lire duty on foreign sugar and 71.15 lire excise 
on internai sugar), is to continue undisturbed, as a reduction of the protec-
tion to the 6-lire level prescribed by the Brussels Convention (a reduction 
which would be of great benefit to the consumers and to the State Exche-
quer) would hurt the potent tariff nursed sugar trust. 
A match monopoly, in addition to those on tobacco and salt, is ser-
iously contemplated to reinforce the State income. As, however, a match 
monopoly is mainly a tax on the masses, the Government is to-day seeking 
some other tax which will fall primarily on the classes. To find it is by no 
means easy in a country in which the incomes are already taxed by the 
State, the provinces, and the communes, to the extent of 10 to 60-70 
per cent. To begin with, Parliament has approved in the last days of the 
session, almost without discussion, of a tax which apparently will not hurt 
the Italian taxpayers, but only the foreigner. 
In future no security is to be imported into Italy without being subject 
to a new stamp tax. The Rentes (Consols), bonds, and other securities is-
sued by any foreign State are to be subject to a stamp duty of 1 per cent, on 
the face (nominai) value. Any fraction of 100 lire is calculated as a whole, 
so that a security of a face value of 250 lire is to be taxed as one of 300. 
From the tax are exempt only the Exchequer bills issued by a foreign State 
falling due within five years. The shares, bonds, and other securities issued 
by cities and provinces of any foreign State or by joint-stock companies or 
by any corporation are to be subject to a stamp duty of 2 per cent, on the 
face value. Such securities as are not regularly stamped cannot be sold or 
be the object of any operation on the Stock Exchanges or by banks. No 
security can be created by any public or private document which is not 
stamped. A fine of twenty times the tax is imposed on the contraveners 
of the law. The fine is to be paid by buyer, seller, brokers, bankers, &c. 
The banker is liable to the fine even if he limits himself to the payment 
of coupons on non-stamped foreign securities. 
The new tax will undoubtedly prove an obstacle to the introduction of 
foreign securities into Italy. Of late years the Italian capitalist had com-
menced to interest himself in foreign Consols - Spanish, Russian, Argen-
tine, &c., - and the fear of taxation will send the small investor back to 
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the familiar Italian Consols. The difficulties which the Government en-
counters in the sale of the new 3.50 per cent, railway bonds (it was an-
nounced at the time of the issue that the amount offered for sale, 85 mil-
lions lire, was oversubscribed; but it appears now that a substantial portion 
was left to the underwriters) has perhaps inspired legislative action against 
foreign securities. But the great and even the small capitalist will always 
find a way to elude the new stamp duty, so that the foreign securities will 
preserve a less easy but an increasing market in Italy. 
lì. 
ITALY'S SHIPPING POLICY 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 12 
In a recent issue* the Economist criticised the Mercantile Marine Con-
vention Bill, which proposed to give 22 million lire of shipping subsidies, 
nearly ali to one company, named the Italian Lloyd. This Bill was defeated 
in July last, and the Government has now taken the bold step of dividing 
the services into three groups, one at Genoa, another at Palermo, and a 
third at Venice; and will invite biddings at a public auction on October 
23rd, on the basis of a subsidy of 9,193,100 lire for the first group, 
5,646,500 lire for the second group, and of 4,939,250 lire for the third 
group. The services will be allocated to the lowest bidders, after the ap-
provai of the Parliament to a new Bill embodying the results of the biddings. 
In November next the Chambers will have to give their vote to another 
Bill, which is to continue the evil system of shipping bounties to Italian 
shipyards and shipowners. It is also probable that on this occasion strenu-
ous efforts will be made by the interested circles to secure regulations 
11. October 16, 1909, pp. 756-757. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Foreign 
and Colonial Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) of the 
wording "From our correspondent" and "Turin, October 12"; b) of a letter from the editorial 
staff of The Economist (October 7, 1909) enclosing proofs; c) the treatment of the argument 
bears similarities with three of Einaudi's articles in 11 Corriere della Sera (October 5, 8 and 29, 
1909), entitled respectively, "I nuovi progetti di convenzione", " I premi alla marina mercantile", 
"I nuovi metodi di protezione alla marina mercantile. La nazionalizzazione del trasporto degli 
emigranti e del carbone". 
* The Economist, August 7, p. 284 
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which will shut off foreign competition in the transportation of Italian emi-
grants from and to Italian ports, and of coal, which is to-day carried almost 
wholly by English vessels to Italian ports, and which would be legally re-
served, in part at least, to the Italian flag. The subject is, as one may see 
at once, of real importance to British shipowners, and well deserves some 
comment. 
The shipping bounties had their origin in Italy in the law of December 
5, 1885, but as the bounties were not extremely high, they failed to pro-
mote a large activity in the shipyards. The new ships launched under that 
law amounted to 8,797 tons a year from 1886 to 1889, grew to 22,412 tons 
a year from 1890 to 1893 by virtue of a rise in the freight rates, and fell to 
7,097 tons from 1894 to 1896, when the freight rates again declined. As the 
boun ties had failed to give a stimulus to shipyards, the new law of July 23, 
1896, added a new bounty to navigation of 80 centimes per 1,000 miles, 
and per ton of gross gauge. The effects were truly marvellous. The new 
ships launched by Italian shipyards went on rising from 6,606 net tons 
in 1896 to 11,458 in 1897, 19,478 tons in 1898, 33,802 tons in 1899, 
and 51,476 in 1900. The expenditure by the Treasury rose rapidly and it 
was foreseen that in a few years it would touch the huge sum of 25 million 
lire a year. The bounties, which were ineffective when moderate, had be-
come a growing menace to the Treasury when fixed at a rate that effec-
tively encouraged shipbuilding. A new law of May 16, 1901 provided in 
great haste for a reduction of the bounties which had proved too potent. 
With a flagrant disregard for past promises (on the security of which the 
shipbuilder had invested considerable sums), the expenditure by the State 
Treasury was reduced to the maximum of 8 million lire a year; the naviga-
tion bounties granted by the 1896 law were suppressed for the new ships, 
and reserved to the ships registered before September 30, 1899, but were 
reduced from 80 cents to 45 cents for steamers, and 30 cents for sailing 
vessels. The old shipbuilding bounties were limited to a maximum of 
40,000 tons a year. 
From 1886 to 1908 the laws of 1885, 1896, and 1901 cost the Italian 
Exchequer a sum of 122,517,000 lire. That the results were practically 
nil may be seen from the fact that the mercantile fleet of Italy at Decem-
ber 31, 1908, numbered 4,701 sailing vessels of 453,324 net tons, and 
626 steamers of 566,738 tons. The value of this whole fleet may be 
put at not over 300 million lire, so that the Exchequer will have paid 
from 1886 to 1888 over 122 million lire in shipping bounties, and over 
420 million lire from 1862 to 1908 in subsidies to navigation companies, 
or 542 million lire in ali; and the net result was that on December 31st 
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Italy had a mercantile fleet of a million net tons, and of a value of 300 
million lire. 
It is fair to add that after 1900 the progress in the mercantile marine of 
Italy was by no means inconsiderable, as may be seen in the following 
table: 
Italian Mercantile Fleet Registered at the 
New Ships Launched End of Each Year 
by Italian Shipyards 
Steamers Sailing Vessels 
Net Value in KI Net. Net 
No- Tons. Lire N o' Tons. N a Tons. 
190 0 188 51,476 26,765,650 446 376,844 5,511 568,164 
190 1 154 44,543 29,770,790 471 424,711 5,337 575,207 
190 2 152 37,827 15,568,190 485 448,404 5,205 570,403 
190 3 246 44,453 16,937,330 501 460,535 5,153 584,223 
190 4 185 21,706 10,240,560 513 462,259 5,083 570,355 
190 5 191 35,702 19,966,770 514 484,432 5,020 541,171 
190 6 244 23,771 12,038,212 548 497,537 4,981 503,260 
190 7 286 36,433 34,330,230 589 526,586 4,874 468,624 
190 8 - - 626 566,738 4,701 453,324 
One must observe, however, that the progress is not due to the bounty 
policy, but to two entirely different causes. One is the rise in the freight 
rates, which began after 1900, and has given great impulse to shipbuilding 
in ali countries. The other is the extraordinary growth of Italian emigration 
to the United States, Argentina, and Brazil. The importance of this second 
and more potent cause may be gauged from the fact that the number of 
Italian emigrants to transoceanic countries had grown from 166,503 in 
1900 to 511,935 in 1906, and the number of Italian returning to their na-
tive country from 80,570 to 156,273 in the same time. This great traffic, 
which yields 100,120 million lire a year, has provided plenty of employ-
ment for Italian and foreign vessels, and has given to shipowners a great 
stimulus to order new and more rapid steamers. 
Hence, the Bill on shipping bounties which has been laid before Par-
liament is altogether unjustified. The Bill seeks to perpetuate the old boun-
ties to shipbuilding and to revive in a new name the navigation bounties 
abolished by the law of 1901. The bounties on shipbuilding are to be as 
follows: 1) A customs duty restitution of 38 lire per gross ton to the hulls 
of steamers and of 20 lire to the hulls of sailing ships. The restitution is re-
duced by 10 per cent, if less than two-thirds of Italian made materials have 
been employed in the construction of the hull; 2) a construction bounty of 
54 lire per gross ton to the metallic hulls of ships (not inferior to 400 gross 
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ton of gauge if steamers and to 100 tons if sailers) if launched in the five 
years after the passing of the law, of 49 lire if launched in the second five 
years' period, and of 44 lire if launched in the third five years' period; to 
the timber hulls is to be given a bounty of 10 lire per gross ton; 3) a bounty 
of 15 lire per horse power to the motor machines and auxiliary apparatus; 
4) a bounty of 12 lire per 100 kilograms to the boilers of motor machines; 
5) a bounty of 13.50 per 100 kilograms to the other board engines. These 
bounties and duty restitutions are limited to a maximum of 40,000 tons of 
gross gauge per year. 
The navigation bounties are to be as follows: 1) A yearly armament 
bounty of 4 lire per gross ton to steamers and 2 lire to sailing ships. To gain 
the bounty the ship will have to remain at sea for 300 days a year, and to 
navigate not less than 80 miles a day in the case of steamers and 30 miles in 
that of sailing vessels; 2) a yearly speed bounty for ships having a speed 
from 14 to 17 miles. The bounty gives 70 centimes per gross ton and 
per half knot above the 14 miles, and rises to 2 lire per half knot as the 
speed progresses up to 17 miles. The armament bounty and the speed 
bounty are reduced by 50 per cent, when a ship is ten years old and are 
to cease after the fifteenth year. 
The navigation bounties are apparently given to foster the mercantile 
marine, but in reality will be entirely transferred from shipowners to the 
shipyards in the shape of an increased price for ships launched in Italy. 
Owing to the protectionist system the bounties will have to be divided be-
tween the shipyards and the iron and steel manufacturers, machinery ma-
kers, and naval engineers, who furnish the highly protected materials for 
shipbuilding. Ali these interests have constituted a potent, tariff-nursed 
trust, generally known as the gruppo siderurgico, to which the principal 
shipyards have in the end become affiliated. The trust will practically ab-
sorb the whole of the 8 million lire yearly paid in bounties by the Treasury, 
and nothing will be left to the mercantile marine. This piece of corrupt leg-
islation the Italian Parliament is invited to approve, and probably will ap-
prove, as a means of fostering the national maritime industry! 
The powerful interests which will have the benefit of the 22 million lire 
of subsidies to postai and commercial lines, and of the above 8 million lire 
of bounties, have conceived another and more ambitious pian of obtaining 
a monopoly of the rich emigrant traffic and of coal transportation. The ex-
isting commercial treaties are an obstacle to immediate legislation, but a 
campaign has been started in the Press to force the government to accept 
the exclusive principle in future commercial treaties. In the meantime a 
strenuous effort is being made to obtain regulations which, by skilful de-
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vices, shall prevent the foreign flag from carrying Italian emigrants. It is al-
ways possible to enact regulations which, while respecting in principle the 
equality of flags, are directed only against foreign flags, and a long list of 
these regulations has been recommended in the report of the Royal Com-
mission on Maritime Services. As the emigrant traffic yields yearly some 
100-120 million lire, and as the foreign flag participated in this traffic in 
1907 to the extent of 47.9 per cent. (French flag 9.4 per cent., British 
17.8, German 18.4, Austro-Hungarian 0.6, Spanish 1.7 per cent.), it is evi-
dent that the national mercantile marine would gain some 50-60 million lire 
annually. Similarly a monopoly in the transportation of coal, of which in 
1908 Italy imported 8,452,320 tons (8,128,428 from Great Britain), would 
be a great boon to national shipowners. As the treaties of commerce stand 
in the way, it is proposed that the state Railway Administration, the Marine 
Department, and the other State Departments should in future carry ali the 
coal they need by means of the Italian flag. Such a policy would undoubt-
edly inflict a great loss on poor emigrants and on the Departments, which 
will have to pay higher freights to the privileged Italian shipowners. But the 
emigrants are poor people whom poverty banishes from the mother coun-
try, and for whom no one cares, not even the Socialist M.P., as their votes 
are lost in the politicai struggles; while the enhanced cost of State railway 
service, &c., will hurt only the humble taxpayer, whose voice is practically 
unheard by ali politicai parties. The democratic and Socialist Press is al-
ways clamouring for a great tax reform, which will never come, and mean-
while allows the present Protectionist system to continue undisturbed, and 
even to grow worse. 
12. 
ITALY'S FOREIGN TRADE AND GOLD EXPORTS 
Italy's foreign trade statistics for the first nine months of the year, 
now published, bear witness to a revival after the crisis of 1908. From 
12. November 27, 1909, p. 1093. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) of a letter from 
the editorial staff of The Economist (November 19, 1909) enclosing proofs; b) the treatment of 
the argument bears similarities with two of Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera (July 19 and 
December 13, 1909), entitled respectively, "Il movimento commerciale del 1908. Confronti in-
ternazionali" and "La ripresa del commercio internazionale". 
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1900 onwards the figures of imports and exports went on increasing, 
sometimes by leaps and bounds. The 1908 marks a break in the progres-
sive movement, as the following table, giving the foreign trade of the 
country for the first nine months of the year (precious metals excluded), 
shows: 
First Nine Imports Exports 
Months of Lire Lire 
1900 1,249,619,722 967,014,400 
1907 2,163,581,509 1,396,376,455 
190 8 2,096,999,237 1,256,662,004 
190 9 2,227,126,825 1,319,284,125 
The crisis of 1907 made itself severely felt in Italy, and the effect is 
seen in these statistics. But in the current year the movement is again re-
versed. The most remarkable variations in the imports were the following 
(in the first nine months of 1909, against the corresponding period in 
1908): 
INCREAESES £ DECREASES £ 
Cereals, flour, &c 121,783,012 
Animals and animai products.. 29,879,640 
Spirits, oils, &c 25,608,383 
Earthenware and glass 21,420,341 
Wood and timber 18,241,484 
Minerals, metals, &c 77,051,120 
Cars 17,215,247 
Chemical, drugs, dyes, and co-
lours 11,196,904 
Cotton 10,815,317 
The increases are in part due to the deficiency of home crops and to 
increasing consumption. The decreases may be attributed to the smaller 
number of new factories established and the enlargement of the old. The 
State railways have also reduced their purchases of locomotives and cars. 
In the exports these where the most notable changes: 
INCREAESES £ DECREASES £ 
Spirits and oils 19,265,375 
Animals and animai products 16,245,404 
Chemicals, drugs, dyes, and colours 6,201,077 
Silk 49,209,063 
Cotton (manufactured) 23,520,604 
Hemp, linen, jute, &c 14,890,380 
The textile industry, although put to a severe test by the crisis, gallantly 
held its own. The silk industry, which is the mainstay of Italy's foreign 
trade, sold increasing quantities of the products to the foreigner. The Pro-
tectionists will no doubt raise the cry of Italy's poverty, as this year there 
has been an excess of exports over imports of gold and other precious me-
tals, a consequence of the huge excess of imports over exports in other 
goods. The following table makes this clear: 
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First Nine 
Months of 
1902.. 
1903.. 
1904.. 
1905.. 
1906.. 
1907.. 
1908.. 
1909.. 
Excess of Imports over Excess of Imports 
Exports of Goods other over Exports of 
than Precious Metals Precious Metals 
Lire Lire 
239,238,532 2,209,600 
286,772,245 70,471,500 
255,343,282 27,731,300 
276,362,163 83,983,600 
450,293,889 47,519,600 
767,205,054 112,116,200 
840,337,233 4,518,700 
907,842,700 - 39,719,300 
From year to year, in spite of an increasing excess of imports over ex-
ports, Italy has imported a surplus of gold and other precious metals. In 
the year 1909, however, the excess of imports over exports of goods has 
grown to over 100 million lire per month, and, for the first time since 
1902, it has been necessary to export some 40 millions of specie in partial 
payment of the goods imported. The transaction is perfectly sound, but the 
Protectionists will certainly declare that Italy is being ruined by the export 
of her gold reserve. Our correspondent notes that the metal reserves of the 
Bank of Italy are to-day as high or higher than in any moment of her career, 
and further adds that, in spite of the alleged gold pauperisation, the officiai 
rate of discount of the same bank has been maintained, in the recent period 
of universal monetary tension, at 5 per cent., and the actual rate of discount 
for fist-rate firms has been raised only from 33/4 to 5 per cent. There is now 
no probability of further advances. 
13. 
THE ITALIAN MINISTRY AT WORK 
Signor Sonnino has announced his programme and obtained a vote 
of confidence from the Chamber, and his Ministry may now settle down 
13. February 19, 1910, p. 380. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain. We know, from a letter from 
the editorial staff of The Economist (Aprii 5, 1910), that Einaudi contributed to the newspaper 
during the period January-March, 1910. Furthermore, the treatment of the argument bears some 
similarities with two of Einaudi's articles in 11 Corriere della Sera (January 7 and February 14) 
about Sonnino's financial programme, entitled respectively, "Bilanci e debiti comunah" and 
"Le 'entrate' escogitate da Sonnino e la riforma dei tributi locali". 
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to deal with urgent problems of social and financial reform. Two sub-
jects are specially conspicuous, public instruction and the reform of locai 
taxation. More primary schools are to be established, and those now in 
existence are to receive more thorough inspection and increased finan-
cial aid. There is to be a new educational authority in each province, 
which will itself manage the schools in the smallest communes and 
supervise those at present directed by the municipalities; the teachers 
will be better paid, and the money needed for school buildings may 
be borrowed from the Government, the loans being repayable in 50 
years, and the total being fixed at 240,000,000 francs for the twelve 
years from 1910 to 1922. Locai taxation is to be extensively altered; 
the proceeds of the octroi duties are to go entirely to the locai authori-
ties, and Signor Sonnino in his speech intimated the desirability of get-
ting rid both of these and other burdensome locai taxes; on the other 
hand, the family or heart tax is to be given up by the locai authorities 
to the State, but the former gain considerably by the change. The edu-
cational reforms will require increased revenue, which will be provided 
by a revision of the tax on cigarettes and a slight increase of the Excise 
duty on sugar. Unfortunately there is no indication that the national 
taxes on food, especially on grain and flour, are likely to be reduced, 
though a reduction has been talked of for many years. Military service 
is to be reduced to two years; the reforms recommended by the recent 
Military Commission are to be carried out, and so also is the shipbuild-
ing programme. There are to be separate Ministries of Agriculture and 
of Communications, a Housing Bill, a Land and Labour Bank to assist 
co-operative societies and small holders, provision for reafforestation, 
and further aid to Reggio and Messina; and there are various minor 
items, one of them a measure permitting affiliation (recherche de la pater-
nità) hitherto forbidden in the Italian kingdom, as in France. The unfor-
tunate Shipping Conventions have been completely recast; the subsi-
dised services will be in the hands of a single combination of ship-
owners, though not the same as that contemplated by the late Ministry, 
and the term and the annual subsidy are considerably reduced. Unhap-
pily, the new arrangement is accompanied by a system of bounties in aid 
of shipbuilding and also of freight charges, the latter designed to encou-
rage particular imports and exports, which seems pregnant with possibi-
lities of waste and corruption. But the social side of the programme is 
the most important. The mere summary of the whole occupies more 
than eight columns of the leading Ministerial journal, the details of 
the educational part five more. Signor Sonnino, it is said, hopes to pass 
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it ali in five months; a leading Opposition paper suggests five years, or 
five times five, as a more suitable period. But one cannot help feeling 
that the Ministry is only existing on sufferance. Its supporters say that 
it has "made its majority", but the vote of confidence was carried by 
193 to 84, with ten formai abstentions and about 120 absentees. The 
number of absentees from the Italian Chamber always is unduly large, 
but the supporters of the late Ministry of Signor Giolitti voted for the 
resolution avowedly on the ground that they desired to give its successor 
the chance of getting to work. 
14. 
ITALY'S SILK AND COTTON TRADE 
From a Correspondent 
The Ministry of Finances, through the Board superintended by that 
competent statistician, Signor Luciolli, has recently issued the provisionai 
return of Italy's foreign trade in 1909; values are calculated on the basis 
of 1908. The general results are as follows: 
SPECIAL FOREIGN TRADE 
(Exclusive of Precious Metals) 
Lire 
3,079,113,112 
1,833,723,053 
Imports. 
Exports. 
As compared with those of 1908 these figures show an increase in im-
ports of 165 million lire, and in exports of 104 millions. If we take 1907 as 
term of comparison, there has been an increase in imports of 198 millions, 
but exports have sunk by 115 millions. Of the excess of imports in 1909, 
149 millions are due to wheat, flour, and other vegetable foodstuffs, which 
is a very strong argument against agricultural Protection (wheat-growing 
since 1894 is protected by a duty of lire 7.50 per 100 kilogs). Nor is indus-
triai Protection, to which Italian agriculture has been long sacrificed, more 
14. February 26, 1910, p. 438. The article, unsigned, is published in the first section of the news-
paper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain. We know, from a letter from the editorial 
staff of The Economist (Aprii 5, 1910), that Einaudi contributed to the newspaper during the 
period January-March, 1910. 
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supported by the moderate increase in exports, inasmuch the two Italian 
staple industries - silk and cotton - are not yet out of the trials of a long 
and severe crisis. 
As for silk, which in its principal branches of reeling and twisting, is a 
quite non-protected industry, exporting the large mass of its manufactures, 
it is hoped that a better period may ensue beginning with the new crop of 
cocoons, which will take place in next June. The last crop proved abnor-
mally bad, because later frosts in May, 1909, had seriously endangered 
the vegetation of the mulberry trees in North Italy, and especially in Pied-
mont, where farmers were obliged to reduce by almost a half their custom-
ary rearing of silkworms. In consequence of the resulting scarcity in the 
home crop of cocoons the Italian silk reelers were induced, for fear of 
being later unable to work their filatures, to indulge not a litte in their nat-
urai speculative buoyancy and to deal with too dear raw materials. Events 
proved that fear was utterly ungrounded, as the want in the home crop was 
soon set off by larger imports of foreign cocoons, particularly from the Le-
vant. On the other side, the exceptionally abundant silk produce of Japan 
in this year and the delay of the American consumers in resuming their 
purchases of raw silk at Milan, have maintained ali this season a very dull 
tone in the market, in spite of the fact that work in the silk weaving indus-
try at Lyons and other European centres has been unusually active. Raw 
silk and manufactures thereof exported from Italy in 1909 amounted to lire 
566,612,000, or fully 30 per cent, of our total exports, showing an increase 
of lire 38,346,000 over 1908. Silk imported in 1909, the bulk of which is 
in cocoons and in raw silk to be twisted and thrown in Italian mills, 
represents a total value of lire 222,029,000, or lire 27,124,000 more than 
in 1908. 
The case of cotton industry is a far worse one. This industry, as is well 
known, has been much developed since 1887 by the artificial inducements 
of Protection. The early years of high tariffs were a source of splendid prof-
its to the existing concerns; but afterwards the general enlarging of the 
plants and the starting off of new and big enterprises have carried the nor-
mal output of the national cotton factories far above the actual possibilities 
of home consumption. This consideration must not be overlooked in meet-
ing the usuai Protectionist boast grounded on the increased exports of cot-
ton yarn and cloth. The fact is undeniable, but it took place at the exclusive 
expense of the poor Italian consumers, who are heavily taxed in order that 
the happier Levantine or South American consumers may purchase 
cheaply the surplus produce of the Italian protected cotton factories. 
The figures for 1908 and 1909 are as follows: 
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RAW COTTON IMPORTED in to ITALY 
Lire 
190 8 275,719,004 
190 9 253,819,195 
COTTON MANUFACTURES EPORTED f r o m ITALY 
Lire 
190 8 106,900,130 
190 9 140,378,520 
I propose to examine in a subsequent article some other features of the 
Italian foreign trade. 
15. 
ITALY'S FOREIGN TRADE 
From a Correspondent 
A conspicuous feature in the external trade of Italy during the last 20 
years has been a Constant and increasing excess of the imports over ex-
ports, as the following figures show: 
Excess of Imports 
(Exclusive of Precious Metals) 
A v e r a g e Million Lire 
1890-99 184.6 
190 0 362.0 
190 1 344.0 
190 2 279.8 
190 3 320.4 
190 4 304.9 
190 5 310.5 
190 6 608.4 
190 7 931.8 
190 8 1,184.0 
190 9 1,245.4 
Italy, as the readers of the Economist are well aware, possesses a legai 
system of paper money à cours forcé. The Italian issue banks (Banca d'Ita-
15. May 14, 1910, pp. 1078-1079. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Foreign 
and Colonial Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain: it may be the ar-
ticle referred to in a letter from the editorial staff of The Economist (Aprii 26, 1910), enclosing 
proofs. 
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lia, Banco di Napoli, and Banco di Sicilia) have their chests filled up with 
gold and silver coin, but they are not bound to barter it against their notes; 
and, in fact, gold and silver take no visible part in the ordinary business 
transactions of the Italian traders. Notwithstanding this rather abnormal 
and unsound situation of the Italian system of currency, and notwithstand-
ing the increased "balance of trade" since 1902, the rates of exchange have 
scarcely reached the gold point, and have been for nearly the whole time 
not against but for Italy: 
RATE OF EXCHANGE ON PARIS. - YEARLY AVERAGE FOR 1 0 0 Francs 
Lire 
1 9 0 1 1 0 1 . 4 0 
1 9 0 2 9 8 . 9 9 
1 9 0 3 9 9 . 0 5 
1 9 0 4 9 9 . 8 8 
1 9 0 5 9 9 . 7 5 
1 9 0 6 9 9 . 7 5 
1907 9 9 . 6 5 
190 8 100.01 
1 9 1 0 (Aprii 2 5 ) 1 0 0 . 6 2 
During the decade 1900-9 the imports of gold (ingot and coin) and Sil-
ver (coin of the "Unione Latina" only) have exceeded the exports by 623.8 
million lire, according to the statistics below: 
SPECIAL TRADE 
Excess of 
Imports Exports 
Million Lire 
1 9 0 0 - 9 .3 
1 9 0 1 - 4 . 6 
1 9 0 2 2 4 . 8 
1 9 0 3 150 .2 
1 9 0 4 3 4 . 8 
1 9 0 5 161.3 
1 9 0 6 133 .4 
1 9 0 7 162 .3 
1 9 0 8 7 . 0 
1 9 0 9 - 3 6 . 1 
T o t a l 6 7 3 . 8 5 0 . 0 
Italian statisticians are not a little puzzled to give an explanation of 
these facts. Commercial theory cannot be called in question, and the 
"balance of trade", apart from the inevitable inaccuracies of statistics, 
must have been made good somehow or other. But it is not an easy 
— 46 — 
MAY, 1 9 1 0 
task to discover and discriminate between the different sources of rev-
enue, which have helped the Italian consumers to pay for their surplus 
of imported merchandise. There is, however, a general agreement that 
much importance must be attached to the remittances of Italian emi-
grants, particularly of those who have settled in South and North 
America. 
Italy is a country of high birthrate, and the naturai tendency of her 
people to emigration has been increased by her Protectionist policy, 
which has proved strongly against the interests of the great mass of agri-
culturists, and only profitable to a litte combined band of landlords and 
privileged manufacturers. These baneful effects of Protection have been 
the more sensible in the southern provinces, because of the crisis in the 
exporting trades and the heavy taxation of agricultural implements and 
staple manufactures, produced pretty exclusively by mills situated in 
Northern Italy. Besides, as the late Marquis di Rudinì clearly pointed 
out, the corn duty has reacted against any progress of agriculture from 
the dismemberment of the largest estates, and has enabled the proprie-
tors of these, thanks to the raised market value of cereal crops, to con-
tinue their unscientific and even uncivilised methods of farming. 
That agricultural Protection has been a complete failure is quite evi-
dent from the increased imports of vegetable and animai foodstuffs: 
IMPORTS i n t o ITALY 
Cereals, Meals, and Living Animals 
Other Vegetable and Products 
Foodstuffs Thereof* 
Million Lire 
1 9 0 0 2 1 0 . 3 1 1 9 . 6 
1 9 0 1 2 8 9 . 3 1 2 3 . 4 
1 9 0 2 2 9 7 . 2 131 .3 
1 9 0 3 3 2 1 . 3 1 3 6 . 8 
1 9 0 4 2 3 0 . 1 1 6 2 . 4 
1 9 0 5 2 9 1 . 2 1 5 7 . 1 
1 9 0 6 3 4 0 . 1 1 4 9 . 3 
1 9 0 7 2 5 9 . 7 1 7 4 . 8 
1 9 0 8 2 7 5 . 4 2 7 7 . 2 
1 9 0 9 4 2 4 . 5 2 9 2 . 4 
Excess in 1909 over 1900 2 1 4 . 2 1 7 2 . 8 
* Exclusive of wool, leather, and silk. 
So far from fulfilling its promises of more employment for the Italian 
agriculturists, Protection has swollen the flow of emigration: 
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TOTAL NUMBER o f EMIGRANTS from ITALY per ANNUM 
Average 1881-85 154.141 
1886-90 221.977 
1891-95 256.510 
1896-1900 310.430 
1901-05 554.050 
Year 1906 787.977 
1907 704.675 
A special Commission has been appointed by the Government to in-
quire into the causes of the apparent contradictions presented by the sta-
tistics of external trade. At the first meeting of this Commission, the pre-
sent Premier, Signor Luzzatti, expressed his opinion that the total amount 
of the yearly remittances from the Italian emigrants comes near a thousand 
millions of lire. In the course of his speech, he pointed out that it is calcu-
lated in a recent report presented to the U.S.A. Congress by the Commis-
sion on Immigration that 85 million dollars are yearly sent to their homes 
by Italians immigrated into the States. 
The fact is that, besides the millions of Italians who have settled perma-
nently in the two Americas, a large mass of labourers regularly every year 
abandon their native land in order to earn some money by harvesting in 
Argentina. There are in some provinces of Southern Italy many villages 
which at certain periods of the year are unpeopled of their whole effective 
male population, and are reduced to women, children, and feeble old men. 
Permanent and temporary emigration, then, has been, for the poorer 
classes of the population, a safety valve, as it were, for escape from the total 
ruin of Protection. 
The selfish and covetous policy of the agrarian magnates has carried 
with it its own punishment, and in the poorest provinces of the South, 
as in the Basilicata, rural wages have risen to limits which render quite im-
possible farming on the old non-competitive methods of culture. But the 
large landed proprietors, blinded by the spirit of monopoly, instead of 
yielding to the evidence of facts, turn piteously to Parliament, imploring 
that a further rise of wages may be prevented by means of some ill-con-
trived machinery for the legai hindrance of emigration. 
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16. 
ITALY'S CROPS AND THE PRESENT OUTLOOK 
From an Italian Correspondent 
The new office of agricultural statistics ably organised by Professor 
Ghino Valenti at the Ministry of Agriculture has estimated this year's 
wheat harvest at only 41,732,000 quintals (of 100 kilogrammes), against 
a crop of 51,699,000 quintals in 1909. Lurther, it is estimated that, apart 
from the probable reduction in consumption on account of the increased 
cost of bread, some 20 million quintals will have to be supplied by imports, 
as compared with 9,640,000 quintals in the year 1909-10. The price of 
wheat in Italy has not yet shown the full effect of these estimates, owing 
to the dulness which has prevailed for several weeks on the International 
market, allowing Italian millers to increase their supplies of foreign wheat 
to an unusual extent. During the past quarter (ending September 30th) 
2,849,470 quintals of foreign wheat have been imported into Italy as com-
pared with 1,231,880 quintals in the corresponding quarter of 1909. The 
time is approaching, however, when the medium and small Italian 
wheat-growers in want of money will be forced so sell the bulk of their 
stocks. A rise of prices is customary in years of bad crops, except in the 
case of an abnormally falling tendency of the world market. 
Thus the conditions of life are at present far from satisfactory; and the 
outlook especially for the winter is disquieting. The staple crops have been 
considerably under the average; the produce of the vintages is estimated at 
only 53,990,000 quintals of grapes against 98,299,000 quintals in 1909.* 
The crops of cocoons and of fruits have suffered seriously from a cold 
and rainy spring, and the musca olearia has continued to attack the olive 
trees. Moreover, many provinces in the South have been visited by the cho-
lera morbus, and this has caused a severe stagnation of trade. Northern 
16. October 29, 1910, p. 869. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Foreign and 
Colonial Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain. The treatment of the 
argument bears similarities with Einaudi's article in II Corriere della Sera (July 23, 1910), entided 
"L'Italia coltiva troppo grano? Una rivelazione della nuova statistica agraria". 
* The Giornale Vinicolo Italiano has published an estimate of the Italian vintage for 1910, 
showing it to have been the worst for the last decade. The total yield of the vineyards, it is said, 
will not be more than 26,870,000 hectolitres (or 591,398,624 gallons), that is to say, less than half 
the amount of wine produced in 1907, about half the crop of 1908, and not quite two-thirds of 
that of last year. The falling off is ascribed to the unfavourable atmospheric conditions, to the 
prevalence of diseases of the vine, and to carelessness on the part of the vine-growers. 
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Italy is suffering from a cotton crisis. The protected manufacturers have 
made the mistake of largely increasing the producing power of their plant 
without considering their poor position as exporters. The dearness of meat 
is less felt in Italy than in Germany and Austria-Hungary; but this is be-
cause for the most part of the year meat is a luxury to the poorer classes 
and working men of Italy. 
At present wheat fetches between 26 and 28 lire per quintal, the duty on 
imports being 7.50 lire. The committee of the Confederazione Generale del 
Lavoro have just decided to revive among the organised bodies of Italian la-
bour the agitation for the repeal of the wheat duty, with the immediate ob-
ject of obtaining the temporary suspension of the tax. It will be remembered 
that the present Premier, Signor Luzzatti, in a letter published in the Econ-
omist of September 19, 1908, repudiated the charge of being "a worshipper 
of the duty on corn", and declared himself to be "in fact, one the few Italian 
Statesmen who are fighting for its graduai diminution". Many years before, 
when in 1894, the Chamber of Deputies was discussing the increase of the 
wheat-duty from 5 to 7 lire per quintal, Signor Luzzatti frankly expressed his 
own opinion in these terms which he cannot have forgotten: "Do you believe 
that, amidst the sharp watchfulness of the economists, amidst so great an 
overflow of democracy, if bread were rising, if the price of corn were going 
upwards, there could be a Minister so powerful as to keep up the price of 
corn? He would be carried off like a chaff in the whirlwind". Signor Luzzatti 
is in actual and full control of the Government, and it remains to be seen 
whether he will show his statesmanship by putting into practice the views 
he formerly maintaines in vivid and unequivocal utterances. 
17. 
COTTON AND TARIFFS IN ITALY 
From an Italian Correspondent 
The crisis in the Italian cotton industry is a striking instance of the ul-
timate mischief of Protection to the economical development of Italy and 
17. February 4, 1911, pp. 211-212. The article, unsigned, was published in the section of the 
newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable. The treatment of the argument bears 
strong similarities with Einaudi's article in II Corriere della Sera (January 21, 1911), entided 
"Per la preparazione ai trattati di commercio. Le vere tendenze degli stati stranieri". 
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her trade. The cotton spinning, weaving, and printing industries were 
highly favoured by the "Tariff Reform" of 1887, and now enjoy high Pro-
tection. According to the calculations of the British Board of Trade (Fiscal 
Memorandum Cd. 2337), the average incidence ad valorem of the import 
duties levied in Italy on British cotton manufactures in 1902 was as follows: 
Per Cent. 
Piece goods 
Unbleached 34 
Bleached 33 
Printed 52 
Dyed, &c 29 
Cotton thread for sewing 18 
Cotton yarn 
Grey 14 
Bleached or dyed 19 
This is the measure of the protection as it affects the foreign exporter. 
From the point of view of the Italian consumer, Signor Giretti in his paper 
read before the International Free-trade Congress of 1908 in London esti-
mated the yearly tax imposed upon the Italian people, and especially upon 
the poorest, by the protection of the cotton industry at not less than 100 mil-
lion lire. The purpose of the "Tariff Reform" was, of course, to shut foreign 
manufacturers out of the Italian market, for the benefit of the Italian cotton 
manufacturer. In this object it has partly succeeded. The effect of the policy 
of high Protection upon imports is shown by the following figures: 
IMPORTS o f COTTON MANUFACTURES into ITALY 
, Metrical Quintals 
Yearly 
Average Yarn Piece Goods 
1875-79 107,750 111,779 
1880-84 89,618 120,751 
1885-89 51,613 114,690 
1890-94 18,476 38,444 
1895-99 9,667 23,882 
1900-04 8,612 17,975 
1905-09 11,659 21,385 
The figures for 1909 are: 
M. Quintals 
Yarn for weaving 5,242 
Thread for sewing 4,056 
Piece goods 22,704 
The artificial aid thus given by the State was for a time accompanied by 
a development of the manufacture of cotton goods in Italy. Capital was at-
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tracted into the industry by the prospect of inflated profits. Old plants 
were extended and improved. A great many new concerns were started, 
some well organised, some not. The total number of spindles rose from 
900,000 in 1880 to about 4,500,000; that of looms from 30,000 to 
120,000. These facts have been adduced by the Italian Protectionists as 
a triumphant proof of the success of their policy. It is doubtful how far 
the ultimate cause of the increase in production of manufactures was 
due to the tariff, and how far it was due to the abnormal growth in the ac-
cumulated capital of the country during recent years, which leads it to seek 
new outlets. But one thing is quite certain, the home consumption has not 
increased in proportion to increased production of yarn and piece goods, 
and the Italian cotton manufacturers are faced with the necessity of finding 
an outlet for their regular excess of production. 
During the years of good trade, in which the world's demand was in-
creasing, they succeded with relative ease in exporting a considerable 
quantity of yarn and piece goods. 
EXPORTS o f COTTON MANUFACTURES f rom ITALY 
Y r j Metrical Quintals 
Average Y a m P i e c e G o o d s 
1875-79 1,474 3,145 
1880-84 1,106 4,170 
1885-89 2,708 5,210 
1890-94 6,465 21,748 
1895-99 44,779 79,866 
1900-04 85,797 161,376 
1905-09 90,917 250,218 
These exports were mostly to the Levant and South America. The re-
cord looks good enough, but as a matter of fact, the export trade has been 
carried on at prices which do not cover the high cost of the protected pro-
duction. The alternative of going on short time would result, however, in 
even greater loss than dumping the exports. Italian manufacturers, more-
over, are determined, whatever else may happen, that the price in the home 
market shall never fall below the highest point of the monopoly price. Ex-
perience shows that this means that the Italian consumer has always to pay 
the Manchester prices plus transport, plus the full amount of the Italian 
import duties. 
Since the crisis which has prevailed during the last few years in the cot-
ton trade through the increased cost of the raw material, Italian exports of 
manufactures have become more and more unremunerative. It must be re-
membered that the swollen prices of raw cotton are the more resented by 
— 52 — 
FEBRUARY, 1910 
the Italian manufacturers, because they have been allured by Protection to 
specialise in the coarsest sorts of manufactures. An instructive proof of 
this fact is that the Italian spinning industry works at a yearly average 
of 44 kilos of raw cotton per spindle; roughly, a figure a little less than 
three times the average in the British industry with its growing specialisa-
tion in fine counts. Even extensive dumping abroad, in order to maintain 
prices in the home market, has not availed to keep the mills on full time. 
Authoritative calculations show that 1,200,000 spindles have been out of 
work for the whole of this year. Notwithstanding this enormous reduction 
of output, the situation of the Italian cotton industry remains very dis-
couraging. No improvement seems possible under present conditions, 
while the price of raw cotton continues at its present level, and under 
the existing fiscal regime. The opinion is gaining ground, however, and 
not only among consumers, that it is this regime which is the cause of 
the mischief, and that the best remedy for the crisis is in another and a 
real Tariff Reform. Protection has caused over-production, increased 
prices for Italians, reduced purchasing power, and a ruinous export trade 
at unprofitable rates. Free-trade would increase the purchasing power in 
the Italian consumers, and diministh the cost of production to Italian pro-
ducers. Protection has failed, it is said, let us go back to Free-trade. But 
the majority of Italian cotton manufacturers are not ready for this reform. 
Their only idea is to tread the beaten track of monopoly stili further, ap-
pealing to Government for a higher Protection stili, and stili greater facil-
ities for extortion from the Italian people. 
Meanwhile, the clamour against fiscal imposts grows ever stronger in 
other directions. Consumers' associations are active, but the retailers are 
more active stili. The Druggists' Society of Milan and Lombardy affords 
an example. It called a mass meeting on December 26th to protest against 
the import tax on sugars, and issued the following manifesto: 
The druggists of Milan and Lombardy, having held a special meeting on De-
cember 11, 1910, for the purpose of discussing the unjustifiable increase in the 
price of sugar, and of effecting a remedy for the same, give notice to ali the citizens 
that this increase has been promoted by the National Refineries, which have com-
bined together in a trust, which, not paying the protectionist tax of 30 lire per 
quintal, is in this way privileged. These refineries have raised the price of foreign 
refined sugars by another 10 lire per quintal, regulating their contracts in such 
form as to upset the whole of business. They, the druggists, are now deliberating 
as to means of reducing sugars to their proper value, and the nomination of a com-
mission for the purchase of foreign sugar. Meanwhile they thank ali the economie 
associations of Italy that are agitating for the same purpose, and appeal energeti-
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cally to the Government for the abolition of the existing Protectionist tax on su-
gar, which, if it was justified at a time when the Italian sugar industry was of early 
growth, is now so no longer, inasmuch as the industry is in a sufficiently flourish-
ing condition. 
This agitation against the tariff amongst retailers should be of special 
interest as a caution to those engaged in similar commercial occupations 
elsewhere. Italian retail traders do not often co-operate as a class; competi-
tion is too keen, and jealousies too bitter. But the oppression of tariffs is 
forcing them to unite against the common enemy. 
18. 
ITALY 
COAL TRANSPORT MONOPOLY BETWEEN ENGLISH AND ITALIAN PORTS -
STATE RAILWAYS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 10 
The Italian Government is endeavouring to find new means of protect-
ing the national shipowners against foreign competition, as the old meth-
ods of fixed subventions and navigation premiums are more or less discre-
dited. The old subventions and premiums are to be almost entirely main-
tained, and so the squandering of public money, which characterise any 
such protection to the merchant navy is to be increased stili further. A 
sum of 500,000 lire is to be spent for the inauguration of the "Credito Na-
vale". This institution will help to pay the interest due from shipowners to 
special banking institutions which encourage shipbuilding. The encourage-
ment of shipbuilding by State-aided credit is likely to provoke irrational 
building. Adventurers will be tempted by the low interest at which the ne-
cessary capital can be obtained at the taxpayers' expense. 
18. February 18, 1911, pp. 333-334. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Foreign 
and Colonial Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) of the 
wording: "From our correspondent, Turin, February 10"; b) the treatment of the argument bears 
strong similarities with Einaudi's article in 11 Corriere della Sera (September 1, 1912), entitled "La 
diserzione delle aste pei servizi marittimi". 
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The second new method of encouraging shipbuilding and navigation in 
Italy is to be a partial monopoly for the Italian flag in the coal transport 
between Great Britain and Italy. Our statistics give the following figures 
for coal imports into Italy: 
Tons 
1901 5,904,578 
1905 6,437,539 
190 6 7,673,435 
190 7 8,300,439 
190 8 8,452,230 
190 9 9,303,506 
1910 (11 months) 8,624,400 
As 95 per cent, of the coal imported into Italy is from Great Brit-
ain, the Government schemes relating to coal transport touch the Brit-
ish shipowners very closely. Already in 1885 a premium of 1 lira per 
ton carried had been promised to coal transports hearing the national 
flag; but, as no results followed, the premiums were abolished by a law 
of 1895. The present proposals will not touch general traffic, which 
will remain free to ali flags. The Italian coal vessels will have the privi-
lege of transporting a part of the coal necessary to State railways and to 
the Royal navy. The Government agree to contract exclusively with Ita-
lian companies the transport of 600,000 tons annually for the State rail-
ways and 100,000 tons for the Royal (war) navy. The contract will last 
ten years. The freight is fixed for the first five years at lire 8.50 (6s lOd) 
from any of the English ports of Cardiff, Penarth, Barry, Port Talbot, 
Newport (Alexandra Docks), to any of the Italian ports of Maddalena, 
Savona, Genova, Spezia, Livorno, Civitavecchia, Gaeta, Napoli, Torre 
Annunziata, Palermo, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, and Venezia. The 
freight for the second five years will be fixed on the basis of the mean 
freights resulting from Cardiff freights-bulletins and from the freights 
paid by the State railways administration for the transport of coal ex-
ceeding the 600,000 tons reserved to Italian carriers. 
The privileged companies are to be administered by Italian citizens; 
the ships are to carry the Italian flag, and to be inscribed in the Italian 
National Register. Eight steamships will have to be built in Italy after 
the passing of the law; their designs must be approved by the Marine 
Department, which will insure that the ships are adapted to the trans-
port of coal and naftatine. The building of these eight ships is to be re-
served to Italian shipbuilders, provided that the price tendered is not 
more than 7 per cent, over the mean price tendered by six first-rate 
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shipbuilding English firms, exclusive of the lowest and of the highest 
price. The ships are liable to requisition for the use of the navy in 
the State interest or for some public necessity; in this case an indemnity 
will be paid. As a compensation for their obligations the companies will 
receive, in addition to the freights as above determined, a sum of 
300,000 lire annually, to be distributed amongst them in proportion 
to the coal carried. 
A few observations will suffice. Any privilege of coal transport, 
however limited to transport on behalf of State railways and Royal 
Navy, is an infringement of the international treaties of navigation be-
tween Great Britain and Italy. The English Government should study 
the situation with great care, and make the necessary diplomatic repre-
sentations to the Italian Government. Should it succeed in its remon-
strances, the English Government will have saved a round sum of 
money for Italian taxpayers, and will have benefited the genuine interest 
of Italian industry. We Italians can gain nothing from fostering a com-
mercial fleet which will prosper only at the expense of the taxpayers, 
and will hasten the financial ruin of the State railways. The net profit 
of the railways is rapidly dwindling, and one of the main causes of this 
wreck is the high price they are forced to pay for ali their necessities. 
Cars, locomotives, rails are to be bought from Italian makers at prices 
greatly enhanced by privileges granted by law. At the beginning the 
contracts had to be granted to Italian makers provided that the price 
tendered did not exceed by more than 5 per cent, the lowest price ten-
dered by a foreign firm. Afterwards the comparison was made with the 
mean of foreign firms; recently in the making of the mean foreign price, 
the highest and lowest tenders were excluded. The interested circles are 
clamouring to have the limit raised from 5 to 7 per cent., and to ex-
clude ali foreign tenders which do not appear to be fair to bureaucracy. 
If we are to add to these protectionist measures the privilege of coal 
transport granted to Italian vessels, we shall foster an artificial industry 
which will from time to time clamour for the progressive raising of their 
fixed freights above the level of competitive rates. Advocates of State-
owned railways should pay a lengthy visit to Italy and watch the conse-
quences of State administration. Great cost, increasing confusion, utter 
indiscipline amongst the railway servants, and gigantic squandering of 
public money to car, locomotive, and rail makers. 
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19. 
MUNICIPAL TARIFFS IN ITALY 
From an Italian Correspondent 
Readers of the Economist may remember a letter from Turin, Italy, 
published a year ago, in which was described the rise of municipal protec-
tion incidental to the octroi, or municipal Customs tariff, levied in most Ita-
lian cities. The writer at that time only quoted the Turin case, as the pro-
blem, which was there discussed, ended in the victory of the municipal 
protectionists over the partisans of internai free-trade. But there remained 
the suspicion that the evil system was ruling in other towns also. The Rifor-
ma Sociale, a Turin Free-trade review, therefore, set on foot an inquiry, for 
ascertaining the facts. The results of the inquiry, which was conducted by 
Professor Giuseppe Prato, are published in the March-Aprii supplement of 
the review. 
Municipal protection appears to be widespread. The problem is of 
more than national interest, because the commercial treaties stipulated be-
tween Italy and foreign countries are, by these tariffs, set at defiance, and 
their value in not a few cases is practically reduced to nothing. A third of 
the Italian people live in walled towns, and it is the most wealthy portion of 
the population which consumes most foreign goods. 
What is the use, then, to Great Britain, Germany, France, and Switzer-
land of signing a commercial treaty with Italy if every one of the councils and 
mayors of Italian towns can exclude foreign goods by a supplementary duty 
levied for the purpose of protecting the internai industry against the rivalry 
of external Italian and foreign goods? The fundamental octroi law gives the 
right to cities and towns of assessing consumable goods so as to bring in a 
locai revenue. Locai consumption and the revenue were the ideas underlying 
the system. As time went on the municipal tariff was used to serve private 
interests. The tariff items were multiplied, as in the State tariffs of protec-
tionist countries. The Turin tariff, in schedule VI. and VII. (food and drink), 
contains 23 items of taxation, in schedule VII. (fuel) 10, in IX. (fodder) 4, in 
19. May 13, 1911, pp. 1008-1009. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. It summarizes an inquiry on municipal tariffs by Giuseppe Prato, published in La 
Riforma Sociale. At the beginning, the article refers to a letter "from Turin ... a year ago": this 
reference is incorrect because no such letter exists. The intended reference could be "The Italian 
wheat tax and the Turin octroi", March 14, 1908, by Edoardo Giretti, published in the section: 
"Letters to the Editor". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain: according to a letter from 
the editorial staff of The Economist (June 30, 1911), Einaudi contributed to the newspaper in the 
period April-June 1911. 
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X. (building materials) 5, in XII. (soap and fats) 4, in XI. and XIII. (furni-
ture and miscellaneous) 11. At Genoa, in the above schedules, the taxation 
items are 30, 10, 3, 26, 6, and 14 respectively; at Venice, 26, 5, 0, 9, 9, 7; at 
Florence, 69, 11, 5, 22, 17, and 30; at Bologna, 27, 5, 5, 9, 1, 9. 
This multiplication of tariff items is a sure index of protectionist purposes. 
Another sign is the high rate of duties. At Turin the tax on tapestry paper (car-
ta da parati) is 20 lire per quintale (1 quintale equals 220 lbs avoir.), on stearic 
candles 15 lire, on chocolate and sweatmeat 25 lire, on furniture 20 lire per 
quintale, on liquore 40 centesimi (4d) per bottle. At Genoa furniture is taxed 
from 10 to 25 lire per quintale, according to quality, looking-glasses at 25 lire, 
paper at 25 lire, perfumes and fine soaps at 50 lire, chocolate at 30 lire, stearic-
candles at 30 lire. Florence taxes the porcelain with a 6 lire duty per quintale, 
artistic furniture with 25 lire, earthenwares (terracotte ornamentali) by 1.50, 
and perfumes by 30 lire. Venice taxes artistic crystals and glasses with a duty 
of 30 lire per quintale, furniture with 40 lire, looking-glasses with 30 lire. Each 
town taxes preferably the goods which are produced by a locai internai indus-
try, so as to exclude from the internai market the extra-mcenia produced goods. 
In some cases the protectionist purpose is made clear by a comparison of the 
duties levied on raw materials and on manufactured articles. The following are 
the duties, in lire per quintale, on some peculiarly interesting tariff items: 
Marble Wood and Timber Iron and Steel 
Raw Sawed in Boards Finished Raw 
Semi-
manufactured Forniture Raw Manufactured 
Lire Lire Lire Lire Lire Lire Lire Lire 
Ancona .. 0.20 0.40 1 - - - - -
Bari .. 0.30 0.35 0.55-1 - 4 4-10 0.50-0.80 4-6 
Bologna .. 0.60 1.50 - - - - - 2 
Brescia .. 0.30 0.60 0.65 - - - - -
Catania .. 0.20 1 2-6 0.75 3 8-30 0.20-0.40 1.50-6 
Firenze _ 1.50 6 0.50 8 5-25 0.80-1.50 5 
Genova _ 1 3 1-4 10 10-25 - 4-6 
Livorno .. 0.40 - 2 - 1 4 0.35-0.80 1.50 
Mantova.... .. 0.10 - 4 - 1 4-8 0.70-1.20 1.20 
Milano .. 0.65 1.25 2 - - - - -
Modena .. 0.30 2 3 - - - 0.15 1-4 
Piacenza.... - - - - - - 0.60 1.60-3.20 
Roma .. 0.50* 0.75* 1.75* - 2-7.60 7-12 0.20-0.50 1-5 
Savona .. 0.25 1 3 - - - 1.50 2-3 
Torino .. 0.30 - 2 0.12 5 6-20 - 1.50-6 
Vercelli .. 0.20 - 0.80 - 1 2.80 0.50 1.20-3 
* Per cubie meter. 
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Clearly the municipal tariffs are so contrived as to admit free or tax 
lightly raw materials, and to increase the taxation of the article if more fin-
ished. The internai industry is thus permitted to introduce freely raw ma-
terials, and is protected by heavy duties against the external imports of 
semi-manufactured or wholly finished articles. The results of those Protec-
tionist duties are, for the purpose of taxation, exceedingly small. The total 
income from municipal Customs in Rome in the year 1908 was 19,128,253 
lire; but the protective duties contributed to this total only 1,369,028 lire, 
or a l-14 th part. At Naples the total income in 1908 was of 11,143,591 lire, 
toward which the protective duties contributed 592,504 lire, or a l-20th 
part. At Florence in 1909 the protective duties give to the municipal exche-
quer 500,146 lire, surely a small proportion of the total octroi income of 
7,390,333 lire. At Turin, in the year 1909, the income from protective du-
ties was of 665,943 lire on a total of 13,821,014 lire, and the city income 
from protective duties is further lowered by the drawbacks granted on 
the goods manufactured intra-mcenia when they are exported. In the year 
1909 the city of Florence had to pay the sum of 106,745 lire for drawbacks, 
and the city of Turin the comparatively large sum of 1,010,720 lire. The 
drawbacks are, in reality, true export premiums, which are intended to 
benefit the external consumers at the expense of internai taxpayers. At 
Florence raw marble pays nothing (as in the above table) when entering 
the walls of the city; yet obtains a so-called drawback of 1.50 lire per quin-
tale when exported sawn in boards, and of 6 lire if finished. In Turin iron 
and steel manufactures obtain, when exported, a drawback of 0.50, 1.50, 
and 5 lire, according to quality, notwithstanding that the raw metal paid 
nothing when entering into the city. 
Thus, in Italian cities there flourishes a petty Protection of the meanest 
type, which we owe to ignorance and intrigue. But a reaction is at last be-
ginning. The aldermen at Milan (which is the freest of ali the great Italian 
cities from the taint of municipal Protection) are meditating the abolition 
of one of the last remnants in that city of protective duties, the duty on li-
quor, which was so contrived as to bring yearly to liquor makers and liquor 
sellers a net revenue of 600.000 lire at the expense of the municipal exche-
quer. One may hope that the example will be followed by others. But the 
deliverance of Italian consumers from the grotesque municipal imitation of 
State Protection will be facilitated if the Foreign Offices of the countries 
which have signed commercial treaties with the kingdom of Italy cali the 
attention of the Italian Consulta (Foreign Office) to the infringements 
of international agreements which are perpetrated by our municipal 
legislators. 
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20. 
ITALY'S INSURANCE MONOPOLY 
With reference to our note on the subject last week, an Italian cor-
respondent writes: - A Bill now before Parliament, brought in by the 
Ministry of Signor Giolitti, with the object of enforcing a State mono-
poly of life insurance, is marked by a glaring and contemptuous chal-
lenge to ali the accepted principles of right. No indemnity is allowed 
to those whose property, goodwill, and means of life are seized on 
the pretext of a superior public interest. An article of the Bill expressly 
declares that the concerns to be expropriated will not be entitled to 
claim any compensation from the State. They will be bound to keep 
their present engagements, whereas their clients will be allowed either 
to keep or cancel their contracts. Once the Bill be passed into a law, 
no company or concern, either Italian or foreign, will be entitled to un-
derwrite a new policy of life insurance. The business will be managed 
by the State through the "Istituto Nazionale di Assicurazioni". Any Ita-
lian citizens who should attempt to elude the severe clauses of the new 
monopoly by insuring their lives through some foreign company will be 
liable to heavy pecuniary penalties, and, after a previous conviction, also 
to imprisonment. Ali this is conceived in the style of a rash and most 
violent socialism, and the Bill is a discredit to its author, the new Min-
ister for Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, Signor Nitti. We had 
expected far better statesmanship from the distinguished professor of 
the Naples University, who has been a brilliant Parliamentary critic of 
many Ministerial Bills in these last years. It is stili more disheartening 
to find that this strange and absurd attempt has not provoked an im-
mediate and open revolt in the Ministerial rank and file. It appears that 
Signor Giolitti expects to have the Bill passed into a law as soon as pos-
sible by his faithful majority in Parliament, his special object being to 
give his Socialist allies in Parliament and in the country some earnest 
of his intention to start a scheme of old-age pensions, to which, indeed, 
20. June 21, 1911, pp. 1356-1357. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: 1) the treatment of 
the argument bears strong similarities with several of Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera 
during 1911 and 1912; 2) according to a letter from the editorial staff of The Economist (June 
30, 1911), Einaudi contributed to the newspaper in the period April-June 1911. 
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he proposes to dedicate the prospective profits of the State life insur-
ance monopoly. But, apart from the grave mistake of confounding to-
gether two questions quite different and separate, it is by no way certain 
that the State will get any money at ali from the new monopoly. The 
calculations of Signor Nitti seem to be utterly ungrounded, and there 
is a legitimate fear that (as has been the case with the railways mono-
poly) the "Istituto Nazionale di Assicurazioni" will result in a bitter dis-
appointment for the taxpayer. In the meantime, this attempt to sup-
press the life insurance industry will involve the Government in some 
serious international misunderstandings. Many foreign companies are 
at present working throughout Italy in the life branches of insurance, 
and they have spent much money in order to secure the business of 
their Italian customers. Whether the letter of existing treaties be in-
fringed or not, undoubtedly the spirit of internationl equity is violated 
by this insurance monopoly Bill. 
21. 
AN ITALIAN EXPLANATION OF THE RAID ON TRIPOLI 
To the Editor of The Economist 
Sir, - 1 do not propose to criticise your analysis of the relations between 
Great Britain and Italy and your severe comments upon the action of my 
Government in the Tripolitan affair. As an Italian, I feel bound not to enter 
upon a ground so controversial. But you will find it, perhaps, interesting to 
take note of some aspects of Italian opinion, which, if adverse to blind 
Chauvinism, has been nevertheless somewhat incensed by the language 
of the foreign Press. Even among those who are positively adverse to the 
conquest of Tripoli, the accusations, of brigandage, piracy, violation of in-
ternational law, and buccaneering appear strange. What we are attempting 
in Tripoli, says this moderate section of public opinion, may be robbery, 
but if so, how does it differ from the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain, 
of Tunis by France, or of Bosnia Herzegovina by Austria? In ali these cases 
21. October 21, 1911, pp. 824-825. The article, signed Italicus, was published in the section: 
"Letters to the Editor". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because of a letter dated Jan-
uary 21, 1912 from Einaudi to Luigi Albertini, editor of II Corriere della Sera, in which he de-
clared he was Italicus (see appendix). 
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the forms have been better observed; perhaps better pretexts were in-
vented; but the substance of the robbery was identical. This is plain rob-
bery, while the others were more prudent and hypocritical. And it is much 
to be doubted whether Dr Jameson's Raid on the Transvaal was in any way 
better than ours in Tripoli; it must indeed have been worse; for the Boer 
Government was very much better than the Turkish administration in Tri-
poli. As during the Boer War Italy was in full sympathy with Great Britain, 
so we are - says this section of Italian opinion - at a loss to conceive why 
the British Press should be so severe toward us.* Why should we be so se-
verly criticised for having followed the examples set before us by the great 
colonisers of our age? The surprise may be excessive, but, as a matter of 
fact, Italian opinion is surprised at being criticised by those who have prof-
ited by crimes perhaps worse than ours. In this surprise, I admit, there is a 
want of discrimination, for the Press which has been adverse to piratical 
designs in their own country is perfectly right in opposing our Italian ex-
pedition. 
And now to the origin of the expedition. I will not make comments, 
but only elucidate facts. You said that the expedition was quietly 
planned by the Government, imposed upon the Italian public by the 
concocted news and distorted reports of some Italian journalists quar-
tered in Tripoli, and backed especially by Sicily. I know nothing of 
the secret affairs of the Italian Government; but the invasion of Tripoli 
by journalists of the Chauvinistic tendency was prior to the fall of Si-
gnor Luzzatti's Ministry, and the return to power of Signor Giolitti. That 
the Luzzatti Cabinet would have made the present expedition is higly 
improbable, and I would say inconceivable. Not as a friend of the 
Young Turks, but as a friend of international peace and an enemy of 
financial embarrassments, Signor Luzzatti would never have undertaken 
a war. A couple of Italian journalists were already in Luzzatti's time 
busy with Tripoli. Their pian was the old pian of the yellow Press of 
America and Europe - the manufacture of opinion in a grossly exagger-
ated manner, so as to provoke colonial fevers, war scares, &c. The Eng-
lish public is too familiar with these proceedings to be surprised by an 
Italian application of these new journalistic methods. Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica were pictured as enchanted countries, as an ignored Eldora-
* The point is well taken as regards those English writers who praised the Jameson Raid, 
which, however, was not a Government affair, whether approved by Mr. Chamberlain or not: 
Ed. Economist. 
— 62 — 
OCTOBER, 1911 
do, where raisins grew in abundance, whose olives date back to Roman 
times, where wheat yielded most prolifically. One correspondent, in the 
enthusiasm of the discovery, announced the existence of olive trees in a 
part of the country where he had seen some trees of a similar appear-
ance, which are, in fact, the trees of the wild juniper. Another corre-
spondent, speaking of Tunis and of the miraculous progress of this re-
gion under French rule, as an index to the future progress of Tripoli-
tania under our rule, declared that the yield of wheat in Tunis is already 
magnificent, and superior to that of Italian wheat lands. As evidence of 
this he gave some figures, from which anyone, by a simple rule of ele-
mentary arithmetic, could deduce that the yield of wheat in Tunisia was 
less than 4 quintals per hectare! Whereas the mean Italian yield is 
above 10 quintals, and is far from high. So gross was the agricultural, 
minerai, and commercial incompetence of the Chauvinistic journalists 
who forced the conquest of Tripoli on the Italian Government! 
A second factor in the affair has been the facility with which the Gov-
ernment was forced on a path to which it seemed little inclined. Signor 
Giolitti is a keen, cunning; clear-minded man. He is a strong man in 
the sense that he has personally made some 100 members of the Chamber 
out of 508; and these 100 members are his life guards. As no other man in 
the Italian Parliament has so strong a following (the other leaders have at 
most from 5 to 20 faithful followers apiece), he is easily master of Parlia-
ment. He is, moreover, a practical aministrator; he has ma de nearly ali the 
prefetti (heads of the 69 Provincie, or counties, who exert a great power 
over the elections); he has adopted since 1900 a sane Liberal policy to-
wards the masses and towards the movements for higher wages. And 
so he has become, and will for some time remain, the real master of Italy. 
But with ali these qualities, good and bad, he is not a great statesman. 
The only idea to which he steadfastly held has been the neutrality of 
the State in the labour question. Notwithstanding his own band of 100 
followers, he is desirous of avoiding too much opposition in the Cham-
ber. This desire has grown with age; and as he knows that out of the other 
400 members half will always follow the Government of the day for the 
sake of the great and petty favours which it can dispense, ali his aims are 
bent towards conciliating the most formidable or the most clamorous sec-
tion of the remainder. Of these, roughly, 100 are extremists (Radicals, Re-
publicans, and Socialists), and 100 are wild members or disbanded fol-
lowers of Signor Sonnino, Signor Luzzatti, &c. These are not, or were 
not up to quite recent times, very troublesome, for the temper of the lea-
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ders was easy-going and somewhat academic. The 100 extremists seemed, 
on the contrary, to be dangerous. Signor Giolitti is, however, not the man 
to be embarrassed by differences of opinion. To the Radicals he gave 
some places in the Cabinet, and as the Radicals are men without any 
ideas, save the idea that places are desirable, their group was quickly pa-
cified. To the Socialists he also offered a place, which was accepted by 
one of their leaders. The Socialist party, indeed, preferred to keep itself 
free from direct Governmental responsibility, but obtained, as a return 
for silence and support, the promise of universal suffrage, and of the 
monopoly of life assurance as a step to old-age pensions, to which the 
profit of the monopolisation of life assurance was to offer the initial finan-
cial means. The quiet of Cabinet life in the Chamber seemed to be thus 
assured, as the opposition was limited to the small group of Republicans 
and the non-combative followers of Signors Sonnino and Luzzatti. But I 
have already taken up a great deal of space, and I shall, with your permis-
sion, résumé this politicai analysis next week. 
I will here only add a few lines as to the effects of the enterprise upon 
the welfare of our country. I do not think that your observations, accurate 
as they are, are complete. If the alternative were really, as you say, be-
tween a) a loss of some hundred millions, perhaps of some milliards of 
lire in a costly expedition; and b) the possibility of useful internai reform 
on education, sanitation, afforestation, taxation, &c., the selection would 
easily be made by any reasonable man. We have in the southern provinces 
of Sicily and Sardinia too much social work to do to be able to surrender 
our scanty national resources in Tripoli. But the true problem is different. 
The ways which present themselves to Italian Statesmen are three, not 
two: a) To spend 500 millions or 1,000 million lire in Tripoli, at a heavy 
cost to the Italian taxpayers and to Italian credit, &c.; b) to spend the 
money on education, sanitation, tax relief, &c., to the great benefit of 
the masses and the taxpayers; c) to squander the same, or even larger 
sums, on increasing our armaments in competition with Austria, on the 
growing bureaucracy, on unremunerative increments of salaries of public 
servants, on gifts out of the public purse, to petty locai interests, to pro-
tected manufacturers, and to noisy groups of workers backed by Socia-
lists. - Yours, &c. 
I T A L I C U S 
Milan, October 17th. 
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22. 
AN ITALIAN EXPLANATION OF THE RAID ON TRIPOLI 
To the Editor of the Economist 
Sir, - I now continue my last week's letter, which stopped short in my 
politicai analysis of the motives which took us into war with Turkey. In the 
youngest section of the constitutional opposition there was growing up a 
sentiment of rebellion against the personal rule of Signor Giolitti, who 
was considered more of a cacique election maker or of a boss in the Amer-
ican sense than of a leader. These opponents were labelled by the old Gio-
littian guard with the nickname of Young Turks of Italy. As Cavourian 
Liberals they are opposed to the Socialistic measure of State nationalisation 
of life assurance, but are favourable to old-age pensions. Some of their little 
band also favour State intervention in shipping, and advocate imperialism 
and colonialism. Very few, indeed, perhaps not more than a dozen, are the 
true Liberals, and as they are scattered in the various personal groups, or 
are "wild" members, they are without the slightest influence in the Cham-
ber. These so-called Young Turks contemplated a struggle with the old 
chief (the dittatore, as Signor Giolitti is called by the Opposition) upon 
the life assurance nationalisation proposal. This proposai was an ill-judged 
confiscation of private property, as no compensation whatever was to be 
granted to national and foreign companies. It was a long step toward the 
enlargement of bureaucracy, the greatest perii now confronting Italy. 
The struggle lasted in the Chamber much too long for the Premier's taste, 
for the old Opposition joined the "Young Turks" in criticising the scheme, 
and the independent Press vehemently condemned it. The struggle ended 
in a partial victory of the Cabinet, as the Chamber sanctioned the principle 
of nationalisation of life assurance. But the detailed discussion of the Bill 
was suspended for the time, to be resumed in November. 
The unexpected vigour of the Liberal-Conservative-Young Turkish 
Opposition carne as a surprise to the chief. As he does not like struggles, 
the Tripoli campaign appeared as a means of conciliating ali sections of 
22. October 28, 1911, pp. 883-884. The article, signed Italicus, was published in the section: 
"Letters to the Editor". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain on the basis of a letter dated 
January 21, 1912 from Einaudi to Luigi Albertini, editor of II Corriere della Sera, in which he 
declared he was Italicus (see appendix A). 
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public opinion. He is not a man of strong convictions, and converted him-
self in five minutes from an opponent to an advocate of universal suffrage, 
when that seemed likely to procure the silence of the Socialists (in March, 
1911, the most noisy group in the Chamber). Similarly, during the recess, 
he converted himself to colonialism, which he had hitherto always despised 
and ignored. He hoped, by the conversion, to silence, if not to conciliate, 
the enemies of his personal chieftainship, who unexpectedly had grown nu-
merous and restless, and had selected the nationalisation of life assurance 
as a ground of offence. He hoped that in the enthusiasm of the conquest 
the few rebels against his life-tenure of office would be silenced. Signor 
Giolitti is as a white-haired man of seventy desirous of a quiet life, but is 
also very fond of power, and hates the idea of a successor. The King, also, 
is much attached to Socialists, and loves Signor Giolitti, the man best able, 
at the present time, to conciliate the extremists, and is said to have decided 
to grant only to him the right of dissolving the Chamber. This exclusive 
right assures in perpetuity to Signor Giolitti his own band of 100 followers 
and the passive acquiescence of other favour-seeking members. 
The calculation was cunning, and if the Tripoli expedition does not 
prove too difficult and costrly, may be successful. At the present time Si-
gnor Giolitti is enthusiastically acclaimed at home and in the streets, at Rome 
and at Turin, as a new Cavour and as a great statesman, by politicians, by 
the classes, and by the masses. The Socialists, indeed, opposed the Tripoli 
design before the Ultimatum, and the Labour Confederation proclaimed a 
day of general strike on September 27th. The Socialist members petitioned 
the President to cali together the Chamber. Some Radicals and a few Re-
publicans also profess opposition. But ali this is on the surface. The work-
ers did not go on strike. At the reopening of the Chamber the Socialists, 
after a show of opposition, will vote in favour of the Government for 
the sake of universal suffrage, and their dislike of the few Clericals in 
the Chamber and the "Young Turks" group. The constitutional Opposi-
tion, the "Young Turks" group, will swallow the universal suffrage and 
the life assurance nationalisation for fear of being accused of unpatriotic 
behaviour toward a Cabinet which has added a great Province to the coun-
try. The Radicals are mere place hunters; and the Republicans, left to them-
selves, are of no consequence. 
The comic side of the matter is that even the Clericals, notwithstanding 
the Roman question, show every sign of favouring the Tripoli expedition. 
One reason may be that the enimies are Turks, and therefore the hereditary 
foes of Christendom. The Catholic newspapers contain long accounts of 
Lepanto's victory, and bishops publish episdes in commendation of the 
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holy enterprise. The second reason is that the Catholic missions are promi-
nent in the little Italian colony of Tripoli. The third, and perhaps the most 
important, reason for the enthusiasm of the Catholic Press may be that the 
Banco di Roma for some time past has been active in Tripoli. The Banco 
possesses a small fleet, has erected a flour mill, and has acquired a large 
area of land from the natives. The operation of a fleet by a banking concern 
is a ludicrous enterprise. The flour mill was erected to grind Tripoli cereals, 
but it was afterwards found that there were none to grind, and at present it 
appears that the mill is busy chiefly with Russian wheat for re-export. The 
cultivation of the land does not appear to have been very successful, so that 
the work of the Banco di Roma was restricted to loans to the commercial 
and agricultural class. The Banco is itself a mystery. It has a capital of 150 
million lire (£ 6,000,000), which was increased in a few years from a small 
initial capital of the millions. For several years it has paid a regular dividend 
of 7 per cent. No one in Italian circles knows, however, how and where the 
Banco gains its dividends. Its work in the busy places of Milan, Turin, 
Genoa, is insignificant. The public know only that the Banco is connected 
with the Papal exchequer, and it appears that it is trustee for the Obolo di 
San Pietro, Saint Peter's pence - i.e., the sums which are paid voluntarily 
by Catholics to the Roman cathedral. As the Obolo di San Pietro has been 
several times since 1870 robbed by unfaithful trustees, one may hope that 
the Banco di Roma will prove a better servant of the Church. 
But, after ali, the Tripoli enterprise is not exclusively a politician's de-
vice to gain power. Signor Giolitti probably would have preferred some 
other means of silencing the little Liberal-Conservative-"Young Turk" op-
position. The enterprise was forced on him also by the Yellow Press, 
which, in its turn, has been profiting by a peculiar state of mind of the 
younger generation. The Tripoli movement is an intellectual movement. 
In the nineties young men turned to Socialism. The years from 1890 to 
1900 were the golden age of Socialism. Ali were Socialists, ali that was en-
thusiastic and ardent in Italy. After 1900 Signor Giolitti's politics trans-
formed Socialism. The great merit of this able politicians was to compre-
hend that repression of the working masses was a most mischievous policy. 
The murder of King Humbert took the courage from the old Conserva-
tives. The new King was in full sympathy with the new ideas and with Si-
gnor Giolitti. Socialism went into power; Socialist members were in high fa-
vour in Governmental circles. With favour carne some good things: impar-
tiality toward working men during the labour struggles, some new labour 
legislation, &c. With favour carne also corruption. The Socialist members 
are to-day as much favour-seeking, place-hunting men as the other mem-
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bers. They seek favours for their co-operatives, they drive the Government 
to support working men in the labour struggles. They are Protectionists 
when the supposed interest of the working classes is concerned. They vote 
the war and Navy Budget, which they denounced in past times. They are 
the bravest supporters of bureaucracy in ali the attempts of that pest to 
plunder the Italian Exchequer, and have preferred to increase the salaries 
of public servants - whose unions and federations are, almost ali, in full 
sympathy with the Socialist-Radical bloc - rather than diminish taxes which 
oppress the poor. 
The degeneration of Socialism left the new generation without ideals, 
without wrongs to be remedied, without a word to congregate around. Na-
tionalism arose in this wilderness. The old so-called Liberal-Conservative 
parties are cliques who follow personal chieftains, of whom the foremost 
is Signor Giolitti; the new parties, Radicals and Socialist alike, were discre-
dited. Enthusiasm found its development in the new creed of Nationalism. 
There is some good in the movement. The noblest preachers of the new 
gospel desired to revive the patriotic sentiments which have made Italian 
unity; they view with regret the millions of emigrants who enrich foreign 
lands by their unremitting labour, and transform themselves in a few gen-
erations into peaceful members of foreign politicai aggregates, speak for-
eign languages, and are lost to Italy for ever. The new Nationalism wants 
a greater Italy for the Italians of the future. 
One must add another aspect of Nationalism. The Adua defeat was 
economically speaking, a blessing for Italy. The defeat put an end, for a 
dozen years, to military extravagance, and caused the recovery of Italian 
finance and Italian economics. But the moral wound, as time passed, is 
more deeply felt. Ali the European Powers gained something in the univer-
sal scramble for colonies; Italy alone, with Spain, remained with clean 
hands. The mani nette (clean hands) politics became at last irritating. 
The last blow was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria. There 
was a great outcry of destroyed Adriatic equilibrium and other such non-
sense. At the bottom of the outcry was a sentiment of being despised as a 
small, contemptible country, defeated by Austria at Custoza, Lissa, and 
even at Adua by the hand of a negro king. When France and Germany be-
gan to discuss the Morocco question, the sentiment that some moral wrong 
was done to our country appeared to be well-nigh universal in the upper 
classes. Even the masses were affected. Nationalism saw that the hour of 
action had arrived; the Yellow Press worked up the movement. Even some 
old moderate newspapers, very prudent and respectable, joined in the re-
quest that something should be done. 
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There were not wanting courageous journalists, who, apart from party 
considerations, took the problem in hand, and tried to demonstrate the 
folly of selecting Tripoli as a colony four our emigrants. The figures and 
facts which the Economist has already enumerated were published also 
in Italy. La Voce, a little weekly Fiorentine newspaper, undertook a Press 
campaign against the Tripoli enterprise. But ali was in vain. The numerous 
factors, which I have endeavoured to expose, were too powerful to be 
overcome. 
You have referred to the economie cost of the war. There is also the 
cost of armaments. The sums squandered, from 1900 onward, would 
have permitted the abolition of the salt tax, a great reduction in the corn 
duty, an improvement of the whole tax system, and, in addition, the ac-
complishment of great educational and sanitary reforms. Something has 
been done. It is only fair to remark that the death rate has decreased from 
30 per thousand in 1880 to 20 in 1910, and that the illiteracy diminished 
from 68.77 per 100 inhabitants over six years old in 1871 to 48.49 in 
1901. The education budget of the State, Provinces and Communes 
has been greatly increased. The petroleum tax was reduced from 48 to 
16 lire per quintal. Much more, however, might have been done if we 
had not squandered the magnificent surpluses in the years after 1900 
on increased armaments and on a multitude of petty favours to the most 
clamorous classes. The student is bound to conclude that the greatest 
misfortunes of Italy have recently been her Budget surpluses. They 
caused a scramble of ali the bad appetites rooted in the nation. The ex-
penditure on public servants alone increased by some 300 millions in ten 
years, and there is no end to the increase. If Italy had not been fighting in 
Tripoli, sanitation, education, tax reforms would not have been im-
proved. The sectional groups, which are too powerful to be overcome 
by a personal Government such as that of Signor Giolitti would have con-
tinued paramount. The Tripoli enterprise may perhaps be a remedy, a 
somewhat circuitous and very bad remedy, but stili a remedy for the si-
tuation. How can a Government conceivably propose the construction 
of roads in Tripoli if roads are lacking in Sicily and Basilicata? How 
can the Government propose to build water reservoirs in Tripoli if water 
reservoirs are not built in Sicily and in ali the Italian Provinces where they 
would produce magnificent results? How can the worst grievances of the 
Arabs grumbling under the taxation system of the Turks be remedied, if 
similar reforms are not yet accomplished in Italy? In the same way, some-
thing must be done in Italy if similar things have to be done in Tripoli, 
and less will remain to be plundered by petty interests. 
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The Budget surpluses will dwindle. That will be an achievement worth 
the whole trouble. When the hordes of Italian plunderers of the public ex-
chequer find nothing to plunder, there will be an end to public robbery in 
Italy. Vacuus cantat coram latrone viator, as was the Gladstone motto. The 
Socialist party, which is to-day a mere machine for the use of a small sec-
tion of the higher-paid working men in protected industries, will perhaps 
recover some of its ancient vigour. 
Will the Italian 3 V2 per cent. Rentes sink below par in consequence of 
a war loan? Perhaps they will sink, but then we shall not be worse off. 
What is the use of keeping the price of the 3V2 per cent. Rente above 
par, if the Government is obliged to sell its railway stock below par, 
and the public will not take it, so that the Savings Banks are overstocked 
with unsaleable paper? What is the use of having a 3 V2 per cent. Rente 
keenly required by a saving public, which knows of nothing different, 
if industries are obliged to pay 472-572-6 per cent for the debenture ca-
pital which they require? The State is pumping the greater part of the 
saving of the nation by means of the saving postai system, and by pressure 
on the independent Savings Banks, so as to dispose of the said capital for 
various State enterprises and for growing municipal needs. The rate of 
interest is low in Italy for State loans, State guaranteed loans, and high 
for the private enterprise. A public war loan of 500 million lire may pos-
sibly not be floated at par. If so, the responsibility for the fact will not He 
upon Tripoli. 
By ali sorts of contrivances (selling of unsaleable railway bonds to sav-
ings banks, pressure on independent savings banks to buy, constitution of 
syndicates for sustaining the quotations, syndicates headed by the Bank of 
Italy, &c.), our small loans can be made at a low rate of interest; and so 
Italy can continue to boast of its 372 per cent, above par. If a Tripoli 
war loan, coming on the market ali at a time, had the virtue of restoring 
the market to its naturai condition. I say so much the better. The higher 
rate of interest will act as a deterrent to new debt expenditure for other 
purposes. The timid capitalist will be frightened out of State Rentes, and 
will return to industriai investments. 
New taxes will be necessary. And I say that new taxes are not an un-
mixed evil, for the taxes will have to be laid on the classes, as the masses 
will not consent to pay more. When the Bill is presented to Parliament, the 
classes, which are loud in protests of patriotism, will begin to think better 
of the marvellous virtues of colonialism. 
I T A L I C U S 
Milan, October 20th, 1911. 
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23. 
PRESENT CONDITION OF THE 
ITALIAN STATE RAILWAYS. I 
From an Italian Correspondent 
On July 1, 1905, the principal Italian Railways began to be worked by 
the State. Before that date there existed a so-called "mixed" system, under 
which the Railways were operated by companies, who leased them from 
the State in return for a royalty upon the gross and net working receipts. 
This arrangement had the evident defects of placing the companies, who 
owned the concessions, under the sinister influence of politics, and making 
them lose interest in improving the working, through fear of increasing the 
royalties payable upon the gross traffic receipts. It was established by the 
Conventions of 1885, and consisted of three railway systems run by three 
companies - the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Sicilian. The contin-
uous and troublesome interference of the Government, and the small 
amount of concern which it showed to fulfil its obligations towards the 
companies, added gready to the unsatisfactoriness of this absurd arrange-
ment. Moreover, the commercial crisis caused by the imposition of Protec-
tion, and the tearing up of the Treaty of Commerce with France in 1888, 
had entirely falsified the optimistic anticipations upon which the compa-
nies had based their agreement to alleviate the pressing needs of the Italian 
Treasury. Consequently, the companies were for their part not particularly 
concerned to maintain the conventions which required renewal in 1905. 
For some years past, fortified by the large number of actions which were 
pending against the State for breach of the most solemn engagements, they 
had begun to neglect the regular maintenance of the lines and equipment, 
thus provoking general complaints from the public. The advocates of State 
intervention, therefore, worked upon exceptionally favourable ground. 
The campaign for nationalisation was conducted by Conservatives and So-
cialists, allied for the occasion with the same financial groups which con-
trolied the railway companies. It was strongly supported by the bureau-
cracy, which is ever on the watch to increase the number of administrative 
23. November 4 1911 pp. 931-932. The article, unsigned, was pubHshed in the first section of 
the newspaper. Its attnbution to Luigi Einaudi is probable: the treatment bears strong similari-
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posts. Further, the repeated strikes of the railway staffs, which the Govern-
ment had to bring to a close by paying for a rise of wages granted by the 
companies, had spread abroad a feeling that the railway service would be 
much better assured if it was directly controlied by the State, and if ali the 
men employed were called "public officers". These were the circumstances 
which led to the passing of the law of Aprii 22, 1905, which directed the 
transfer to State management of the railways, which were already public 
property. The change was to take place as from July ls t of the same year. 
Shortly afterwards the Southern Railway was repurchased, and the State 
became at once the owner and the manager of most of the railways in Italy 
and Sicily. 
When comparing the results of direct operation by the State and by the 
leaseholding companies, two things must be remembered: 1) That the 
management, even before 1905, was largely effected by the same inconve-
niences and defects which characterise the industriai enterprises of the 
State or of large public bodies; 2) that Italy, in taking over the management 
of the Railways in 1905, had to provide for insufficiencies of equipment 
and maintenance, which were mainly due, however, to her own lack of vig-
ilance and control. 
From the point of view of communication itself it must be admitted 
that the railway service has shown considerable improvement during the 
last few years, especially since the muddle of the first two years of State 
management. Travelling on the Italian Railways is less bad, and, on the 
main routes giving through communication with foreign railways, pas-
sengers have few complaints to make. Even on the secondary lines 
the number of trains has increased and the passenger service has been 
separated from the goods service, making it possible to avoid the Con-
stant delay caused by the obstruction of the stations, and shunting on 
tracks which are usually single, and inadequately provided with sidings. 
After these admissions the question arises whether the improvements 
have been in proportion to the expenditure by the State and the sacri-
fices demanded from the Italian taxpayers, many of whom are in too 
wretched a condition to profit by the advantages offered by State Rail-
ways. The answer to this question is an absolute negative. 
To begin with the financial results, facts have confounded in a striking 
manner the expectation of those who regarded State management as an in-
exhaustible source of public revenue. After deducting taxes (which weigh 
upon State management as upon that of the companies, and cannot be 
counted as a revenue drawn from the railways), we find that the compa-
nies, before 1905, paid to the State about 65 millions of lire annually from 
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their receipts, which, under the same conditions but with an increased traf-
fic, would now have risen to at least 80 millions of lire. The following table 
shows the actual net revenues which have been paid into the Treasury by 
the State Railways, omitting the abnormal year 1905-6: 
These figures are deceptive, and the growth which they show between 
the two last years is caused by a manipulation of the accounts adopted for 
the doublé purpose of hiding from the taxpayers the financial disaster of 
working the railways, and maintaining the illusion of a more or less arti-
ficial increase in the State budget. The way in which it was done was to 
pass a law in 1909 relieving the Administration of the Railways of several 
big items of expense. Signor Ancona, a deputy and a very competent en-
gineer, has reckoned that the relief afforded by the Act of 1909 amounted 
to a total of 24 millions of lire, so that the net revenue paid by the Admin-
istration of the Railways to the Treasury in 1909-10 was really only 
13,000,000 lire. But, as Signor Ancona pointed out, this correction is 
not yet sufficient. Another lightening of expenditure must be taken into 
account, amounting to from eight to ten millions of lire, due to the reduc-
tion of the charges for renewals from 4 per cent., upon the gross receipts, 
to 2V2 per cent. A total deduction, therefore, of from 32 to 34 millions of 
lire must be made from the net revenue of the State railways for the year 
1909-10, and the same will have to be done for the year 1910-11, the ac-
tual results of which are not yet published. In addition to this, fast year 
has seen a new State service between the Italian mainland, Sicily and Sar-
dinia, which will yield a further deficit of several millions of lire. The most 
manifest and certain result of the exploitation of the railways be the State, 
therefore, is that in a period of live years the State has lost its income from 
the capital of 5,000,000,000 lire spent on the construction, purchase and 
equipment of the railways. 
To this sum, which may be considered as the share capital of the rail-
ways, about 1,000,000,000 lire must be added for advances made by the 
Treasury to the Administration of the Railways. The latter has hitherto paid 
the interest and sinking fund upon the advances, just as if the money had 
been borrowed in the form of debentures by an ordinary joint-stock com-
pany. But the tendency is for the Administration of the Railways to relieve 
Fiscal 
Year 
1906-7.. 
1907-8.. 
1908-9.. 
1909-10 
Millions 
of Lire 
43 
37 
20 
37 
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itself of the charge, while, at the same time, getting further free advances 
from the Treasury. It has already demanded 30,000,000 lire per annum 
in this form to doublé the most important tracks. 
24. 
ITALY 
THE COST OF THE WAR 
To the Editor of the Economist 
Sir, - My letters on the causes of the Italian expedition to Tripoli have 
been misconstrued by some Italian newspapers, and were denounced as 
an act of treachery in time of war. As, in common with ali Italians, now 
that the expedition has been decided, and is carried on by our Govern-
ment, I wish for victory to our Army and Navy, and say that ali Italians 
must be prepared to every sacrifice of blood and money, for the sake of 
avoiding a termination similar to the peace with the Abyssinian negro 
King, so I can disregard such criticisms of treachery. As a student, I 
had only drawn an objective picture of the various forces which have 
led to the expedition. These forces are, at the present, undiminished, 
and, so to say, merged in a general wave of patriotism, which urges the 
Government to go on to the end, and triumph over the Turkish and Ara-
bian troops. The extraordinary levy of the classes of 1888 and 1889 has 
been easily accomplished; subscriptions for the wounded soldiers at Tri-
poli are pouring in to the leading newspasper. The public is indignant at 
the misrepresentations in the foreign Press of the alleged murder of Ara-
bians by the Italian soldiery. Our war correspondents, some of whom are 
of the highest standing and are veterans in the war field, deny the butch-
ery, and reduce the fact to a naturai reaction against the rebels of the Tri-
poli oasis, during which some women may have been shot by error, or as 
a consequence of their having been surprised firing at our soldiers. The 
fact certain is that our soldiers are not bloody veterans, but conscripts 
of from 20 to 23 years, and of a good and mild character, trained to pa-
24. November 18, 1911, p. 1051. The article, signed Italicus, was published in the section: "Let-
ters to the Editor". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain on the basis of a letter dated January 
21, 1912 from Einaudi to Luigi Albertini, editor of II Corriere della Sera, in which he declared he 
was Italicus (see appendix). 
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tience in our country in ali cases of riots and strikes, who must have been 
driven by desperation to revenge. 
It is also certain that the difficulties of the expedition, however un-
foreseen by most people, are exciting the public opinion to more vig-
orous action. Now, what as to the social and financial effects of a pro-
longed colonial war? In the last issue of the Economist you predict fail-
ures, fall of the Italian credit, banking difficulties, unemployment, and 
a terrible reaction. As I do not know the future, I may say that much 
will depend on the cost in men and money of the war. The estimates of 
the money cost are varying. The first estimate of the Government was 
100 million lire; later the figures were changed, by a newspaper in-
spired by the Premier, to 40-45 million lire per month (£ 1,600,000 
to £ 1,800,000 sterling). The Government denied, on the basis of the 
above figures, that a loan is necessary, even if the war had to be con-
tinued for a year. The Italian Treasury possess at present a liquid fund 
of about 300 million lire, can oblige the banks of issue to issue 125 mil-
lion lire of paper currency, and can, without having recourse to Parlia-
mentary sanction, issue Exchequer bills up to 300 million lire, of which 
only 80 million lire are at present outstanding. If the Government 
think it convenient to having recourse to these means, the issue of a 
loan may be postponed for a long time. One may observe that the issue 
of 125 million lire paper currency is a perilous measure with the 
change at 101, that the Exchequer bills are disguised loans, and that 
the Treasury fund of 300 million lire cannot be completely depleted, 
as some monetary fund is necessary for the financial administration 
of a great State. It appears, however, that if the total cost of the war 
will not exceed some 500 million lire, the Government can well dis-
pense for the moment with a public loan. The loans will be made in 
after-time, when it will be possible to float at a convenient price. 
The price will be probably lower than par, but, as I said in my last let-
ter, the effects will not be bad. The loan can be floated also in France, 
which is well disposed towards us, and the taxpayers will not feel 
greatly the pinch of the war, especially if the workmen and peasants 
can be spared from taxes. Some classes will be crying, those classes 
which feed on the Budget, and find that ali the spare sums go at pre-
sent to Tripoli. A curious incident has been prominent in the Milanese 
Press of the last week - a protest against the lamentations of a profes-
sor in the secondary schools, who was grieved at the prospect of an in-
definite postponement of a rise in the salaries of professors, owing to 
war expenditure. Public opinion and the greatest part of the professors 
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themselves declared that ali were ready to renounee advances for the 
sake of the country. 
I do not know if the cost of the war will rise above 500 million lire, or 
like sum, and I am unable to say if the present enthusiasm will survive so 
great a burden. Then the consequences will be more serious; then, per-
haps, the Italian Rentes would fall more than a few lire. But the hypothesis 
is, at present, somewhat distant. 
ITALICUS 
Milan, November 13th, 1911. 
25. 
PRESENT CONDITION OF THE 
ITALIAN STATE RAILWAYS. II 
From an Italian Correspondent 
One of the most serious complaints brought against the State Admin-
istration is the slowness with which alterations are made to meet the 
growth of commerce. The traffic on the Italian railways has increased 
very largely since the transfer of the service to the State. The total gross 
receipts, which averaged 327 millions of lire between 1902 and 1904, un-
der the old management, amounted to 481 millions in 1909-10. The 
equipment, which was already very insufficient in 1902-4 in respect of 
fixed appliances, has not by any means increased as fast as the traffic. 
Signor Sacchi, the present Minister of Public Works, admitted last June, 
in the Chamber of Deputies, that there was urgent necessity for doubling 
the track over 1,600 kilometres of lines with traffic of from 25 to 45 trains 
per day. This, he said, would require 450 millions of lire, as soon as pos-
sible, but the State would not be able to assign more than the very modest 
sum of 15 millions of lire annually. A large part of the advances made by 
the Treasury to the Administration of the Railways has been spent on im-
proving the rolling-stock. In this the Administration has not considered 
exclusively the real exigencies of the service. It has had, more or less with 
its consent, to obey the same politicai influences which, at the time of the 
Nationalisation Act, succeeded in obtaining a legislative preference for 
25. December 23, 1911, pp. 1320-1321. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section 
of the newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable: it is the continuation of the article 
of November 4. 
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national industry, in addition to that of the existing high tariff. In the 
scramble for contracts many new works sprang up for constructing roll-
ing-stock, and ever since then they have incessantly importuned Members 
of Parliament and Ministers to give them orders, using as an additional 
inducement the phantom threat of industriai unemployment. The roll-
ing-stock of the railways has therefore grown out of ali proportions, 
not only to the necessities of traffic, but also to the development of sid-
ings. While the old companies possessed, in 1899, on an average, 62 
metres of sidings for each empty wagon, 50 metres being considered ne-
cessary, in 1909-10 the proportion had been reduced to 25.10 metres for 
each of the 90,000 wagons forming the actual reserve of the State Rail-
ways. In spite of the fact that many wagons were forced to remain unused 
in reserve sheds, the late President of the Council, Signor Luzzatti, again 
yielded to the clamours of the vested interests, and promised the con-
struction of 8,000 more wagons above the usuai number, which is about 
5,000 per annum. This new construction was, subsequently, owing to the 
objection of the General Committee on the Budget, reduced to 4,000 wa-
gons, at an estimated cost of 29,000,000 lire, which might have been 
saved, according to the opinion of competent experts, by more efficient 
circulation of the existing wagons and better maintenance. About 15 per 
cent, of the wagons are always under repair, and the figure for passenger 
coaches is 33 per cent. I shall skim over the mistakes committed by the 
Administration of the State Railways (which are extremely amusing, ex-
cept for the taxpayers), and shall confine myself to certain instances 
which have been constantly repeated in Parliament without meeting with 
any officiai denial. There are cases of old locomotives being newly 
painted and bought as new; 112 rail motors condemned one after another 
as useless, and converted into stoves; sleepers of concrete which broke 
when a train passed over, and others of soft deal, bought by hundreds 
of thousands, useless attempts to strenghten them being made by inject-
ing creosote; the purchase of 15,000 kilogrammes of gum arabic, 200 
kilometres of red velvet, a million file handles, and so on. 
It has now been discovered that ali these occurrences are the inevita-
ble consequences of the excessive centralisation set up in the State Ad-
ministration. A new law recently passed by Parliament has just made a 
radicai change in the system set up in 1905, and remodelled several times 
since that date. Having destroyed with a fury, comparable to that of At-
tila, ali the organs of the old leaseholding companies, the Government 
now believes that it has made a mistake. In the new law, therefore, the 
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Administration is trying to retrace its steps by modelling the State railway 
service, as far as possible, upon the old system, followed with very good 
results by the Adriatic Company. I believe, however, that the problem is 
not merely to decentralise the heavy and cumbrous machinery of the pre-
sent State Administration. It is chiefly to discover whether the new orga-
nisation elaborated by the Minister of Public Works, Signor Sacchi, will 
succeed better than the present one in defending itself against the Protec-
tionist and politicai forces which have hitherto been dominant, and are 
undoubtedly the principal cause of the bad administration of the railways 
and the shameless squandering of public money. It is no unreasonable es-
timate that the annual expense for maintenance of the Railways, for the 
replacing of the fixed equipment and rolling-stock has been increased 
by one-third in consequence of the preference given to national industry. 
To the open Protection resulting from Customs tariffs and the increase of 
prices established by law it is necessary, in many cases, to add fines for 
late delivery pardoned by the Government for politicai or electoral pur-
poses. Moreover, the law has expressly recognised the principle that the 
Railways exist to give work to steel manufactories and Italian construc-
tion yards, and that the orders should be equally divided among the dif-
ferent producers of the same product. Combination of manufacturers 
and State contractors, which is forbidden by the law, is thus authorised 
and encouraged by the Aministration of the State Railways. These factors 
add an enormous load of dead weight to the cost of materials and the 
working expenses of the Railways, but there are other considerations, 
on the revenue side, which teli in the same direction. Too many people 
travel free on the Italian Railways, and it often happens that ali the 
first-class carriages are occupied by people who have not paid for their 
ticket, whether because they are employees, or on account of some other 
privilege. Free passes upon the State railways are distributed with aston-
ishing liberality, and have become one of the most frequent methods of 
politicai corruption in the hands of the Government. There are passes 
of several kinds and every colour; for State employees, for high and 
low functionaries, civil and military; a special kind is reserved for journal-
ists and friends of Ministers, who find no difficulty in posing as journal-
ists. Deputies and Senators not only do not pay for their tickets by reason 
of their office, which, after ali, would be reasonable, as they receive no 
pay, but they receive every year 18 free tickets, 12 of which are sent with-
out asking, and this is quite unreasonable. 
In the goods service the same disorder and disregard for business 
principles prevails. Ali organised politicai interests have succeeded in ob-
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taining reduced rates. As many as 776 special tariffs and 1,569 items have 
been counted as in existence for the benefit of particular firms. The only 
rule which the Administration of the Railways has enforced upon the 
powerful interests which are combined against it has been to diminish 
the responsibilities fixed upon it by law. Every delay, every loss, and ali 
damage to merchandise, are invariably considered by the Administration 
of the Railways as the result of force majeure, for which the Administra-
tion cannot be held responsible. When the excessive formalities which 
complaints have to go through do not suffice to tire the patience of the 
complainants, the judicial procedure, with its eternai delays and heavy 
charges, supervenes. On principle the Legai Bureau of the State Railways 
never gives way until after the most insistent proceedings, as it knows that 
it can fight longer than most of its opponents. 
I may conclude this necessarily condensed article by saying a few words 
about the personnel. The position of the Railway employees has consider-
ably improved ever since the rise of wages, for which the State agreed to 
pay before it took over the control. By the recent law new increases have 
been granted, especially to the lower and less well paid grades, to the 
amount of 21 millions of lire per annum. These increases were very fair 
and inevitable, since the small wages paid for 15 or 20 years past have be-
come starvation wages, on account of the general rise in the cost of living. 
Even with the increases, most of the railway employees have not much 
cause to consider themselves privileged, in comparison with what they 
could get in the open industriai market. One problem to be solved was 
how to prevent the increased wages from diminishing the profits of the 
Railways. There were two alternatives. Either large economies could be 
made in other expenses, or the work done by each workman could be in-
creased by improved organisation of work. A big industry under intelligent 
private enterprise would undoubtedly have solved the problem to its own 
profit and to the benefit of the public. Italy has failed piteously. She has 
only succeeded in increasing the total number of railway employees, who 
numbered 104,833 on an average between 1902-4, to 143,910 in 1909-
10, the last year for which the exact returns exist. It is useless to retort that 
the increase has been mainly in the relatively unproductive centrai bodies 
of organisation and control, which usually fail completely to fulfil their 
function. 
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26. 
DEAR MONEY AND STOCK QUOTATIONS IN ITALY 
From an Italian Correspondent 
Accommodation for traders and entrepreneurs is scarce; the officiai 
Bank rate is 6 per cent., and the market rate rules from 5 per cent, for 
the very best firms up to 7, 8, and 10 per cent, for second-rate firms, 
or even first-class companies which happen to be deeply indebted to 
banks. But the capitalists who buy Rentes and Exchequer Bills have no 
taste for trading investments, so that one may feel sure that the 400 mil-
lions issue, referred to in one of your "Business Notes" last week,* will be 
a success. It cannot be said, however, that this and the previous issues will 
be without influence on securities hearing a fixed interest, for it is impos-
sible to ask the market for vast sums for the accommodation of the Gov-
ernment, cities, railway companies, &c., without exerting a sensible pres-
sure on the fund from which ali savings come. As one may see in the last 
Budget speech of Signor Tedesco, the deposits (ordinary and saving de-
posits) in the banks of issue, ordinary banks, people's banks, savings 
banks, post office banks, and rural banks increased from 6,200 million 
lire on December 31, 1909, to 6,490 millions on June 30, 1910, to 
6,702 millions on December 31, and to 6,934 millions on June 30, 
1911. Truly a remarkable record. But the increase after June 30, 1911, 
is diminishing; on December 31, 1911, the deposits had increased only 
to 6,997 millions, and six months later, June 30, 1912, the total amounted 
to 7,051 millions. What the total was on December 31, 1912, one cannot 
say. In some directions the deposits appear to be diminished, for the Sav-
ings Bank of Lombardy, which is the leading Italian savings bank, and 
one of the very first in the world, has published the following provisionai 
statement of the operations in the year 1912: 
26. February 15, 1913, pp. 331-332. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of 
the newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable: the treatment of the argument bears 
strong similarities with Einaudi's article of January 9 in II Corriere della Sera, entitled "Il mo-
mento attuale dei mercati finanziari e le previsioni per il 1913". 
* "Italy's Issue of Exchequer Bills", February 8, 1913, pp. 285-286. 
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Lire 
Deposits at January 1, 1912 812,096,705.05 
Deduct -
Surplus of reimbursement over Lire 
deposits 25,712,922.73 
Interests accrued 22,384,079.14 
Net decrease of deposits 3,328 893 59 
Deposits at year-end 808,767,901.46 
The decrease of 3,328,893 lire upon a total deposit of 812 million lire is 
a small thing, but points to the pressure which a succession of public issues 
exercises on the savings of the nation. 
Up to date one cannot say that the new issues of 4 per cent. Government 
notes have had an influence on the old 372 per cent. Rentes, but their effect 
on other bonds will be seen in the following table, in which, for the sake of 
comparison, ali values are reduced to the same basis (par = 100 lire): 
Dee. 31 June 30 Dee. 31 Jan. 31 
1911 1912 1912 1913 
Italian Rentes, 3V2% net 100.45 97.25 98.10 99 00 
Rail. State bds. 3 % (2-31% net) 71.00 67.00 68.00 66.60 
Railway State bonds, 3 % net 89.00 84.40 83.20 82.80 
Real estate bonds (Credito Fondiario Italia-
no), 3V2% net 96.80 95.60 92.40 92.40 
Ditto of the Savings Bank of Lombady, 
3 ' 6 % net 99.00 96.50 94.80 94.80 
The Italian Rentes have maintained their high quotation in a wonderful 
manner, but other bonds of the same high standing had to give way before 
the competition of the new 4 per cent. Exchequer Bills; railway State bonds 
3 per cent, net have sunk from 89 to 82.80, a price which should be much 
more attractive to the capitalist than the 99 of 3 72 per cent. Rentes, espe-
cially when one takes account of the fact that the railway State bonds are 
redeemed at par by yearly drawing. Notwithstanding that, the railway State 
bonds are almost unsaleable at the current prices, while the 3 72 per cent. 
Rentes are very easy to realise. Some say that the difference between these 
two identical State securities is a proof of the factitious character of the 
high price of Rentes. Others observe, with justification, that the 3 per cent, 
railway State bonds are apt to be outclassed by the competition of new 
higher interest-bearing securities. The public does not like them, and the 
same public prefers the 372 per cent. Rentes, which are so easy to buy 
and sell, and which can be registered or passed to bearer as desired. 
The share market during 1912 has fluctuated irregularly, and it is dif-
ficult to say whether the high rate of interest and the competition of the 
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new 4 per cent. State securities have had a depressing influence on the di-
vidend stocks. I have selected a few among the securities mostly quoted in 
Italian bourses, and give below the price at different dates, the last divi-
dend, and present yield: 
Dee. 31, 
1911 
Price 
Dee. 31, 
1912 
Jan. 31, 
1913 
Last 
Dividend 
Yield at 
the Price 
of Jan. 31 
Bank of Italy 1,442 1,462 1,466 45 3.35 
Commercial Italian 
Bank 872 862 868 45 5.20 
Italian Credit Bank.... 580 562 572 30 5.25 
Meridional Railway of 
Italy 616 585 570 29 5.05 
Roman Houses Insti-
tute 318 298 298 14 4.70 
Electricity of Lombar-
dy Co 1,090 1,000 1,000 55 5.50 
Rossi Wollens Co 1,570 1,474 1,474 80 5.40 
Italian Printed Weav-
ing Co 178 138 138 12.50 8.95 
Eridania (sugar) Com-
pany 730 750 740 55 7.45 
Elba (mines and iron) 
Company 230 206 188 - -
Savona (iron) Com-
pany 270 235 215 - -
Terni Steel Co 1,470 1,615 1,620 80 4.95 
Fiat 144 148 138 8 5.80 
Italian Paper Co. (Car-
tiera Italiana) 1,156 1,160 1,180 57.50 4.90 
The banking shares are somewhat lower in comparison with December 
31, 1911, but the yields are not excessive. The Bank of Italy shares are re-
garded as gilt-edged security with some chance of increase in dividend, and 
so the very low yield of 3-35 per cent, can be justified. The 1912 dividend, 
which will be paid in Aprii, will be increased to 46 lire. The Meridional of Italy 
shares ares lower, owing, in part, to lengthy litigations with the State. The de-
crease in the price of the shares of the Roman Houses' Institute istituto Ro-
mano di Beni Stabilì) is only apparent, being due to a new issue of shares, with 
a substantial profit to shareholders. The company is splendidly managed, and 
the next dividend will be increased to 14-50 lire. The Electricity of Lombardy 
Company (Società Lombarda Energia Elettrica) is depressed by the crisis in the 
Italian cotton industry, to which the company sell their electric power. This 
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crisis, to which the fall in the shares of the Italian Printed Weaving Company 
(.Società Italiana Tessuti Stampati) is due, is a typically financial affair. In the 
boom times of 1900-7 many cotton companies were formed with insufficient 
capital, and to-day are loaded with debts. The cotton companies, which pur-
sued a sound financial policy, had quite a good year in 1912, and are declaring 
better dividends. The sugar companies, of which Eridania is a conspicuous 
example, give a high yield, owing to uncertainty as to fiscal policy. The sugar 
protection will have to be withdrawn some day, and artificial profits are 
bound to diminish. Bad finance, uncertainty as to the future fiscal regime, 
and the prospective exhaustion of Elba iron ore mines, explain the absence 
of dividends and fall in the iron companies, Elba and Savona. The abundant 
State orders for the naval programme explain the increase of quotations and 
low yield of Terni Steel Company. The Fiat Company are the world-famous 
motor producers, and the recent fall in shares is of a special character. The 
company, after the boom of 1906 and subsequent crisis, was entirely reorga-
nised. The last shares quoted in the above list are of a first-class paper-making 
company, whose quotations have never been touched, even in the worst days 
of the 1907 crisis, in the first months of the Tripoli War, and in the black days 
of the outbreak of the Balkan War. Prudent management and good financial 
methods explain the progressive advance of this share as well as others which 
could be mentioned. One may add that good shares do not come frequendy 
on the market. The Bourses are languid, as the public do not take the rubbish 
which is floated and manipulated by professional operators, while the Gov-
ernment is absorbing the best part of the nation's savings, and the industriai 
and banking shares are left to shift for themselves. 
27. 
RATE OF EXCHANGE, BUDGET AND 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN ITALY 
To the Editor of the Economist 
Sir, - As I am the editor of the Riforma Sociale, of whose annual sup-
plement by Professor Bachi, entitled "L'Italia Economica nel 1912", you 
27. September 27, 1913, pp. 606-608. The article, signed, was published in the section: "Lettere 
to the Editor". 
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published a lengthy review in your issue of August 30th, I think you will 
consent to a few comments on some of your reviewer's observations. 
First, as to the rate of exchange. Your reviewer, quoting Professor 
Flora, writes that the present high rate of exchange, due in part to the issue 
of £ 5,000,000 (125 million lire) in Treasury bills, is equal to an additional 
tax of 82 million lire on 3,604 million lire of imports, or to a tax of 
1,250,000 lire on the 60 million lire paid by the Exchequer on the Public 
Debt. 
As a matter of fact, the £ 5,000,000 were not Treasury bills, but gold 
transferred from the Cassa dei Depositi e Prestiti, where they lay as a guar-
antee against the State notes, to the Treasury, and thence to the Bank of 
Italy's reserve, to be used eventually as a guarantee against a corresponding 
issue of £ 5,000,000 of additional bank-notes. Moreover, the five million 
additional bank-notes were not issued, and could not, therefore, cause 
the rise of the exchange. 
I do not think that the high rate of exchange, which rose from 100.50 
in the year 1911 to 102.80 in the first months of 1913, to decline recendy, 
in August last and in the present month of September, to 101.40, is equal 
to a tax of, say, 3 per cent, on the 3,500 million lire of imports. If the price 
of imports is raised the price of exports is correspondingly raised; and as 
the exports, visible and invisible, amount to the net figure of 3,500 million 
lire, the gain is theoretically equal to the loss. The high rate of exchange is 
pernicious, as economie theory shows, not because it is high, but because it 
fluctuates, first rising and the declining. As ali prices do not fluctuate at the 
same rate, some producers and consumers and creditore are bound to suf-
fer, while other producers and consumers and debtors gain; and it happens 
that the greatest number will suffer, while the relatively few gain. 
As to the causes of the recent fluctuations of the rate of exchange, opi-
nions differ widely in Italy. Some eminent writers - and their opinion is 
corroborated by the high autority of Signor Stringher, the director-general 
of the Bank of Italy, and of Signor Tedesco, the Treasury Minister - ascribe 
the rise to unrest in European money markets, accumulations, and perhaps 
to some decline in the invisible exports - i.e., in the credits for remittances 
of foreign visitors in Italy and Italian emigrants abroad. These writers as-
sume that the mischief will in the end mend itself, the money markets will 
be again normal and the currents of invisible exports will again flow to-
wards Italy; and they point to recent experience - the last decline from 
102.80 to 101.40 - as a proof of their thesis. Another group of writers, 
to which I belong, think that the greatest part of the rise of the exchange 
rate is due to over-issue of bank-notes between December, 1910, and De-
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cember, 1912. Previous to the £ 5,000,000 operation - to which your re-
viewer alluded - the total bank and State note issue increased from 
2,468 to 2,678 million lire. 
The increase was probably in part the consequence of a decrease on the 
credit side of the Government current account with the Bank of Italy. The 
Bank of Italy is the banker of the Government; and the Government de-
posits are high or low according to the state of the Treasury, as is the case 
in Great Britain as between the Treasury and the Bank of England. Up to 
1911 the credit balances in favour of the Government were sometimes very 
high, up to 300 million lire; in 1912 they fell below 100 million lire. To re-
imburse the public deposits, the Bank of Italy was compelled to issue 
notes, and so the note circulation rose. It is true that these notes were en-
tirely covered by gold and silver; but we contend that a note issue which is 
not exchangeable at par can be excessive, even when fully covered. 
The debate, which has been carried on in scientific reviews like the 
Giornale degli Economisti and the Riforma Sociale, and in daily newspa-
pers, such as the Corriere della Sera, Giornale d'Italia, Tribuna, Stampa, 
Economista d'Italia, was highly interesting, and many of the arguments 
used were akin to those which were current in Great Britain in the first 
and second decades of the last century. I hope that the practical result 
of the controversy will be satisfactory. The opposing groups have main-
tained their originai views; but the director-general of the Bank of Italy 
has emphatically asserted its intention of limiting the existing issue till 
the rate of exchange falls below the gold point. 
Second, as to Budget manipulation. Your reviewer unfortunately 
confuses the careful and prudent observations of Professor Bachi with 
the comments thereon, couched in strong and technically incorrect jour-
nalistic language, of the Critica Sociale. The truth is that our Italian Bud-
get methods are somewhat too refined and scientific. Our national Bud-
get is divided into four sections: I. Effective income and expenditure; II. 
Railway building; III. Capital accounts; and IV. Sums which appear alike 
on the credit and debit side of the Budget. Leaving out of account the 
fourth section, which is purely figurative, one may easily perceive that 
the nature of the first section is entirely different from the second and 
third section. The first section comprehends the effective income by di-
rect and indirect taxes and the effective annual expenditure. The second 
and third sections relate to expenditure on capital account, which can be 
rightly offset by issue of debts. If you build a railway which costs 100 
million lire you can rightly incur a debt of 100 million lire, as the railway 
will not consume itself in a year. In practice, the railway and other capital 
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expenditure in past years were partly offset by excess of income over ex-
penditure in the first section, and partly by issue of debts. The real sur-
plus in Italy cannot be gauged without considering ali the sections of the 
Budget. 
There are, moreover, several separate accounts, which do not enter into 
the Budget, e.g., the Budget of the State railways, the Budget of the Com-
missioner of Emigration, of the Religions Fund, and the all-important 
Treasury account. Expenditure on the war in Lybia was first charged to 
the Treasury account, to be amortised in successive years by appropriation 
of the Budget surpluses. Over 200 million lire have been thus amortised up 
to date. 
I admit that these Budgetary methods are somewhat complicated; and 
some eminent Parliamentarians have criticised the present Government on 
that account for concealing from the public the true cost of the war. But 
even in Great Britain some expenditure has in the past been charged to 
separate accounts, if not without expostulation; and I suppose that the 
German and Austrian and Russian Budgets are much more difficult to ana-
lyse than our Italian Budget. It might, I think, be made more clear to the 
general public; it is clear enough to those who understand the principles on 
which it is based. To the initiated it seems a not over-difficult task to un-
ravel the mysteries of the various capital and current accounts contained in 
our Budget and in the annexed accounts. 
The gist of Signor Bachi's argument is that the Budgets after 1910-11 
are not comparable with the Budgets of a decade ago, as the contents of 
the various sections were changed in the meantime by laws and regulations; 
so that a surplus in 1912-13 is a different thing from a surplus in 1900-
1901. Several competent men have in and out of Parliament advocated a 
return to previous rules, which they consider more clear, and have opposed 
the new methods, by which an actual expenditure is spread over a number 
of future years, or the gross amount of public debt increased in various 
ways not clearly perceptible by the general public, as by subsidies to rail-
way companies, &c. There are many men in Italy who think that our Bud-
getary methods, however theoretically perfect, may be usefully amended; 
but it is incorrect to describe - as does the Critica Sociale, which your re-
viewer quotes - a Budget as false which is technically made up according to 
existing laws and regulations. 
Lasdy, as to the present condition of Italian industry and commerce. As 
I write from the country I am not in possession of the statistics which 
would enable me to give an exact review of actual conditions. I am not, 
therefore, able to gauge the accuracy of your figure of 800,000 probable 
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emigrants from Italy this year. The figure seems exaggerated; but, were it 
correct, I would point out that the rise of emigration in 1913 is common to 
other European lands - in the first eight months of 1913 the emigrants 
from the ports of Hamburg and Bremen were 306,879, against 193,108 
in the same period of 1912 - and may be in part explained by the more 
attractive economie outlook in the immigration countries. 
I would summarise the conclusions of Bachi's Annual and of subse-
quent faets as follows: 
1. Italy is going through an economie period requiring the greatest 
care and wisdom on the part of the leaders of commerce and industry. 
After some years of prosperity the world is faced by the possibility of a cri-
sis. Italy cannot escape the common fate of ali other countries, if that fate is 
to be realised. 
2. Greater caution is needed in Italy than in France, in Great Brit-
ain, or in Germany, but not greater than in Austria-Hungary, because of 
the depressed situation of some great industries, e.g., cotton, iron and steel, 
silk, &c. The root of the evil for these branches of industry lies in the over-
production which commenced after 1900, and culminated in 1905 and 
1906, which were years of feverish activity. 
3. The Lybian and Balkan wars, by their pressure on the money 
market, have aggravated the depression by which these industries were ai-
ready afflicted; but the depression originated in over-investiment, over-ca-
pitalisation, an excess of floating debts. The industries which were not ai-
ready in a bad way from internai causes have not felt as yet serious losses in 
consequence of the war. 
4. Much will depend on the present agricultural outlook. As the 
1913 wheat crop was good and reports of a good wine crop are coming 
in, I hope that the agricultural section of the population, which is the back-
bone of Italian economics, will be flourishing. As an index of the condi-
tions of the agricultural community, one may quote the figure of the 
new deposits in the postai savings banks, which are mostly agricultural sav-
ings, and which are in the first seven months of the present year 37,833,282 
lire higher than in the corresponding months of 1912. 
5. The savings of the urban section of the population seem also not 
to have diminished. The 400 million lire of new Exchequer five-years 4 per 
cent, bonds have been entirely absorbed, and during 1913 capitalists have 
been buying no inconsiderable quantities of foreign bonds and rentes. No 
one can guage the sum of Italian investments in foreign securities, but, as a 
guess, I will quote a figure of from 50 to 100 million lire yearly, which may 
be a very small sum for Great Britain, but is a great sum for us, but now 
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emerged from the list of debtor countries. Italy is not as yet a creditor 
country, but the interest and dividend item is bound to be in future years 
a not indifferent item on the credit side of our international balance of 
payments. 
The cruciai economie problem of the moment seems to be the 
elimination of the consequences of past over investment, and the free-
dom to be given to labour and capital to invest in industries naturai to 
our country. Two different methods are advocated to that end. The old 
Protectionist method, which claims State aid to suffering industries, and 
higher and more "scientific" protection to promising branches of indus-
try and agriculture; and the new Free Trade method - which is a revival 
of the older Cavourian system - which insists on the necessity of freeing 
the numerous branches of Italian industry and agriculture, whose pro-
ductivity is high and is naturally rising, and which are capable of utilis-
ing the great capabilities of our intelligent, able, skilful working people, 
from the chains of high prices of raw materials and food. A movement 
is being organised by the Lega Antiprotezionista, which already has ra-
mifications in Rome, Turin, Milan, Florence, &c., for bringing the 
truths of Free-trade before the public. 
Much more could be said on the various aspects of Italian finance 
and economy, but I fear I have already trespassed on your valuable space. 
- I am, Sir, yours truly, 
LUIGI EINAUDI 
(Professor of Finance at the Turin University, 
Editor of La Riforma Sociale) 
Celle Ligure, September 9th, 1913. 
28. 
THE ITALIAN TREASURY BOND ISSUE 
A Turin correspondent informs us that the recent issue by the Italian 
Government of 200 million lire of Treasury bonds has been a great 
28. January 31, 1914, pp. 228-229. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". It is an editorial summary, probably based on the correspondence of 
Luigi Einaudi because it says "A Turin correspondent informs us that". 
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success. The denominations of the bills were 2,000, 5,000, 10,000, 
20,000, and 50,000 lire, payments to be made in four instalments, of 
25 per cent, each, on January 31st, Aprii ls t , May 30 th, and July ls t . 
The issue was undertaken by a syndicate of the foremost banks of Italy, 
and the subscriptions were to be open to the public up to January 25 
But on January 21st the stock offered was completely exhausted, and 
the register had to be closed. The issue price to the public was at 
par, the interest offered 4 per cent., and the bonds are redeemable 
in five years. 
The price paid by the underwriters appears to have been, like that 
paid on preceding issues, between 97 and 98. This is the third issue of 
five-year 4 per cent. Treasury bonds in Italy. The first, of 330 million lire, 
was made in 1912, the second of 400 millions in 1913; adding the present 
issue of 290 millions, the total of 1,020 million lire is reached. As there 
are, in addition, outstanding between 250 and 300 million lire of ordinary 
exchequer bills at three months up to twelve months date for the current 
needs of the Treasury, the total of five-year bonds and ordinary bills may 
be taken at 1,300 million lire (52 million pounds circa). About a fourth 
part of the 1,020 million lire five-year bonds have been issued to finance 
the Libyan war; the rest was required, first, for the State railways, and, 
second, for other public works and extraordinary expenditure. The suc-
cess of the present issue was mainly due, as Professor Pantaleoni pointed 
out in the Economista di Firenze, to the savings of the southern portion of 
Italy. Southern Italy is almost a purely agricultural country, and in the last 
two years has enjoyed good crops and good prices. To the emigrants who 
formerly deposited their savings in the banks at 2.64 per cent, interest, 
the offers of State bonds at 4 per cent, proved attractive. In the North 
of Italy the fall in prices of shares, even those of the old Mediterranean 
Railway, has frightened capitalists, large and small, out of the share mar-
ket. The fall of Mediterranean shares, due to various internai and techni-
cal causes, has also affected shares of very sound companies. The North-
ern Italian capitalist of to-day is determined to buy only bonds and rentes 
at fixed interest. According to the annual review of the Genoese bank of 
Deslex frères, in the past year upward of 100 million lire have been in-
vested by Italian capitalists in Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Chinese, and 
South-American bonds. 
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29. 
POLITICS AND FINANCE IN ITALY 
From a Turin Correspondent 
There has been much talk in the last few days of a pian said to have 
been formed by M. Sonnino, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
for a regrouping, with Italy, of the Balkan States, or those which are stili 
neutral - Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. The scheme is reported to be 
regarded with favour by Russia, which would do its best to persuade Servia 
and Montenegro to join such a Balkan League. A Petrograd telegram states 
that Prince Troubetzkoi, the new Russian Minister in Servia, has gone 
thither, clothed with ampie powers, to work for an understanding between 
Bulgaria and Servia. This suggests that there is some kind of formai under-
standing between the Italian and Russian Governments, and that the pro-
jected League may become a reality. The constitution of such a League, by 
eliminating the danger of a possible alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey, 
and settling the internai differences between the Balkan States, would, even 
if it involved the abandonment by Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as well 
as by Italy, of their neutral attitude, constitute a great gain for the Allies. 
Italy, as the sponsor of the League, would have a very important róle to fili. 
The League might be expected to exercise a most valuable influence in a 
future Peace Conference, which would be especially directed to secure 
the maintenance of the principle of nationality and respect for international 
law. It is, of course, not impossible that the League might at a given mo-
ment, by armed intervention, afford the Allies such assistance as would ef-
fectively hasten the termination of the war. The adhesion of Servia and 
Montenegro would give the League full justification for such intervention 
in order to compel Austria-Hungary to cease hostilities against these two 
members, leaving it to the future Peace Conference to decide the originai 
question of the ultimatum to Servia. In the same way Italy, having reached 
an agreement with the other States of the League on Adriatic questions, 
would leave to the Peace Congress the settlement of its nationalistic claims 
to the Trentino and Istria, subject to the principle that ali such questions 
29. December 5, 1914, pp. 990-991. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of 
the newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of the wording "From a 
Turin correspondent". 
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can only be properly settled by the application to the populations con-
cerned of a plebiscite under European guarantee. 
On October 20th the wheat duty was reduced from 7f 50c to 3f per 
metric quintal (100 kilos). The monthly statistical bulletin of the Interna-
tional Institute of Agriculture shows the steady rise of wheat prices at 
Genoa since war began. The figures are as under: 
National Wheat. No. 2 Hard Winter 
Northern Italy (at departure). (on board, in bond). 
Per Quintal Per Quintal 
Francs Francs 
July 17, 1914 26.00 
" 24, 1914 26.50 
" 31 ,1914 26.75 
August 7, 1914 30.50 
" 14, 1914 29.75 
" 21, 1914 29.00 21.00 
" 28, 1914 
September 4, 1914 28.25 20.12 
11, 1914 28.25 
18, 1914 29.50 
25, 1914 30.25 
October 2, 1914 30.50 
" 9, 1914 
" 16, 1914 32.75 
" 23, 1914 32.75 29.25 
" 30, 1914 32.75 29.25 
November 6, 1914 32.75 30.50 
13, 1914 32.75 31.12 
Statistics are now available of the import of wheat into Italy for internai 
consumption during the two first months of the war. They are as under: 
1913 1914 Average 1908-13 
Quintals Quintals Quintals 
August 722,100 669,130 814,100 
September 794,100 242,760 888,556 
Total 1,516,200 911,890 1,702,656 
As the last crop of wheat in italy has been valued at 46,115,000 quin-
tals against 58,352,000 in 1913, and 46,574,441 in the average from 1908-
9 to 1912-13, the figures show a shortage which amply justifies the up-
ward tendency of prices, which have continued to rise during the last 
weeks, although a Royal Decree of November 14th prohibited the re-ex-
port of cereals and of foodstuffs generally unless specifically addressed to 
a foreign consignee. The practical importance of this Decree is that, 
whilst Italy declines the responsibility of suppressing the transit trade 
with Germany and Austria-Hungary, she ensures her own supplies of 
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wheat and foodstuffs in general against the application of the British con-
traband rules, and in particular against seizure as conditional contraband 
on board a vessel bound for a neutral port, if the goods are consigned "to 
order", or if the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee of the 
goods, or if they show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging 
to or occupied by the enemy. The following figures clearly show the im-
portance of the re-export of grain now prevented by the Italian Decree 
and the British contraband rules, as the only cereals on which it is possi-
ble to rely are those imported through the Straits of Gibraltar under the 
control of the British Naval authorities: 
WAGONS LOADED with CEREALS f rom GENOA to 
Switzerland Italy 
1913 1914 1913 1914 
August 897 497 2,683 1,193 
September 522 717 2,495 467 
October 868 925 2,442 340 
November (1-8) 99 759 570 107 
Total number 2,386 2,895 8,190 2,107 
No doubt, by the suppression of the transit through Italy and Switzer-
land, Germany and Austria will be hard hit in their food supplies. A ques-
tion which, of course, Italy and Great Britain will have to resolve in quite 
friendly spirit is that of allowing neutral Switzerland to import freely ali the 
cereals and other foodstuffs which she may require in order to supplement 
the normal deficiency of the home crops. Even at this late date the total 
suspension of the import duty on corn till the next crop would be a prac-
tical measure of encouragement to the supply of foreign wheat. 
The "Movimento Commerciale del Regno d'Italia nell'anno 1913", 
now available, gives the following figures for the special trade between Italy 
and the United Kingdom during the last five years: 
Imports into Italy Exports to United Kingdom 
(Exclusive of Precious Metals) 
Million Lire Million Lire 
190 9 490.64 167 93 
191 0 476.27 210.36 
191 1 509.83 222.80 
191 2 577.13 264.41 
191 3 591.78 260.50 
Anglo-Italian trade for the year 1913 compares as follows with the 
other principal Italian imports and exports: 
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Imports into Italy Exports from Italy 
Million Lire Million Lire 
Germany 612.69 343.45 
United Kingdom 591.78 260.50 
United States 522.72 267.89 
France 283.36 231.48 
Austria-Hungary 264.66 221.15 
R u s s i a 237.37 60 93 
Argentina 166.62 185.56 
British India and Ceylon 146.04 49.46 
Roumania 100.72 14^64 
Switzerland 86.85 249 16 
Belgium 77.05 5 7 7 9 
Japan 60.78 4 60 
c h m a 56.05 5 92 
B r a z i l 55.31 47.65 
Total (with other countries) 3,645.64 2 511.64 
Coal is far the most important import into Italy from the United King-
dom. The figures for the last five years are: 
Million Lire 
190 9 247.55 
191 0 227.56 
191 1 254.25 
191 2 310.94 
191 3 324.20 
After coal, the more valuable imports from the United Kingdom into 
Italy were in 1913: 
Million Lire 
Machines and parts of machines 23.17 
Wollen and worsted manufactures 21.75 
Sulphates 20.78 
Ships 17 99 
Cotton manufactures 12.65 
Pig-iron 11.26 
Fixed oils for industry 11.50 
Wool, dyed, combed, &c 9.77 
Wool, raw, washed, &c 9.55 
The principal exports from Italy to the United Kingdom, according to 
the Italian statistics, were in 1913: 
Million Lire 
Silk goods and other silk manufactures 51.34 
Eggs 15.34 
Hides and skins 13.55 
Fruits and vegetables, prepared 13.08 
Cheese H.00 
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Oranges and lemons 9.88 
Hemp 9.80 
Raw silk 9.15 
Motor-cars 8.27 
Rubber, wrought 6.24 
Skin-gloves 5.46 
Marble alabaster, wrought 5.19 
The growing feeling of antipathy which now prevails in the Italian peo-
ple against Germany and Austria-Hungary offers a rare opportunity to 
British exporters for developing their trade relations with the Italian mar-
ket, in order to substitute British goods for many products which Italy lar-
gely imported from the Central Empires. The attention of British readers 
may be called particularly to the following items of German imports into 
Italy in 1913: 
Million Lire 
Cotton goods and other cotton manufactures 23.76 
Woollen and worsted manufactures 28.59 
Works of iron and steel 31.20 
Machines and parts of machines 64.85 
Scientific and electrical instruments 46.26 
Works and jewels of gold and silver 23.89 
Works of rubber ....). 16.62 
Mercery, common and fine 20.19 
Dyeing matters 17.86 
Skins prepared 31.32 
Of 264.66 million lire of merchandise imported in 1913 by Italy from 
Austro-Hungary, 101.08 million lire represented the value of one item, raw 
and sawn wood, for which a British colony, Canada, would not find it dif-
ficult to enter into competition in the Italian market. 
30. 
THE ITALIAN BUDGET AND THE LOAN 
From an Italian Correspondent 
The revised estimates of the Italian Budget for the year July, 1914-15, 
have just been issued. These show an estimated aggregate increase in ex-
30. January 9, 1915, pp. 56-57. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treatment of 
the argument, widely discussed by Einaudi, bears strong similarities with the articles in II Corriere 
della Sera in the same period. 
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penditure of 1,159V2 million lire; an estimated aggregate decline in in-
come of 123 V4 million lire - i.e., a net estimated deficit of l,2823/4 mil-
lion lire. By far the largest item on the expenditure side is the Army vote, 
which has risen from 609 million lire in 1913-14 to an estimated 1,244'/ 
millions - a rise of 63572 millions. The Navy vote has risen by 793/4 mil-
lions. The table shows the expenditure of these two departments for the 
last 10 years: 
Million Lire (Spese effettive) 
Fiscal Years Army Navy Total 
1905-6 296.77 128.3 8 425.15 
1906- 7 305.98 153.93 459.91 
1907-8 324.91 157.15 482.06 
1908- 9 356.16 174.70 530.86 
1909-1 0 394.23 168.40 562.63 
1910-1 1 427.70 219.05 646.75 
1911-12 * 537.82 307.12 844.94 
1912-13 * 694.57 375.94 1,070.51 
1913-1 4 609.10 309.09 918.19 
1914-15 (estimate) 1,244.68 589.06 1,833.74 
* Libyan War. 
The extraordinary calls made on the Treasury for military preparations 
after the outbreak of the war strikingly contradict the officiai repeated 
boast of the former Cabinet of Signor Giolitti that the Libyan War had in-
creased, and in no way infeebled, the power of the Italian Army and Navy. 
By a right sentiment of national and patriotic duty, none of the few Depu-
ties who spoke in the recent Parliamentary debates insisted on the much-
discussed question of the real state of the Italian armaments at the moment 
the big European conflict broke out. The question, however, remains open 
for future exhaustive debates, and the present Premier, Signor Salandra, 
deserves most sincere approbation for his solemn pledge to communicate 
in proper time to Parliament ali the necessary documents to clear up the 
responsibility of his own and of the previous Cabinets. Of course, the re-
vised estimate of Signor Carcano, closing with a deficit of 1,282.91 million 
lire at the end of the present fiscal year (June 30, 1915), is founded upon 
the supposed maintenance of the Italian neutrality till the cessation of 
the war. 
In the eventuality, ever more probable, of an armed intervention of 
Italy against the Central Empires in the months of next spring, we shall 
have to face a further rise in expenditure, and a simultaneous falling in 
the principal items of the revenue, which in the revised estimate of Signor 
Carcano has been in part made good by the imposition of new taxes. 
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The effect of the war on Italian national finance is reflected in a decline 
in total revenue for the four months July-October of 38.7 million lire. The 
revenue, which amounted to 702.5 million lire for the corresponding per-
iod of 1913, is down to 663.8 million lire. The heaviest declines are in Cus-
toms ( -30 .2 million lire) and Excise ( - 13.6 million lire); though the reven-
ue from certain State monopolies actually increased - e.g., tobacco, by 9.4 
million lire. But the net decline in taxes on consumption amounted to no 
less than 33.6 million lire. Income-tax, succession duties, stamps, &c., fell 
by only 2.4 millions. On December l l t h a Government Bill was passed by 
the Chamber by 260 votes to 45 increasing the taxes on income and capital 
by 10 per cent. This increase is additional to the 3 per cent, rise in ali duties 
on income, stamps, &c., passed on June 26 th. The Government has done 
well in not attempting to increase the already crushing burden of indirect 
taxation; but the income-tax is heavier than the British war tax. The table 
shows how the increase will affect the various classes of taxpayer: 
Rates Actual Rates 
Previous to After the 
July, 1914 New Increases 
Schedule A (from the ownership of 
lands) 
Schedule B (from the ownership of 
buildings) 
Schedule C (from Government pro-
vinces, boroughs and cities, and from 
State-guaranteed securities) 
Schedule D (from interest on loans and 
bonds) 
Schedule E (from business, corporate di-
vidends, &c.) 
Schedule F (from professions, private 
salaries, &c.) 
Schedule G (salaries of Government, 
provinces, and cities and boroughs' 
officials) 
Graduated exemptions under Schedules E, F, G are granted in respect 
of incomes not above 1,500, 1,600, and 2,000 lire. Incomes under Sche-
dules A and B are subject, as those under D, E, F, and G are not, to pro-
vincial and communal super-tax, which is generally so high as to treble the 
income-tax in respect of these Schedules. 
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JANUARY, 1915 
For the moment the Treasury has met the exceptional strain of the 
extraordinary military expenditure by means of a floating debt, consist-
ing principally of an elarged circulation of notes, both of the State and 
of the three banks of issue (Banca d'Italia, Banco di Napoli, Banco di 
Sicilia). 
Further, the issue of a loan has been arranged, with the approbation of 
Parliament, for 1,000 million lire in redeemable obligations at 4.50 per 
cent, net yearly interest, issued at 97 lire per 100. The public subscription 
of this loan, patronised by a consortium of banks, under the leadership of 
Signor Stringher, the director-general of the Banca d'Italia, will take place 
early in January. 
The success of the operation seems yet solidly ensured, and it is fa-
cilitated by the convenient terms offered to the subscribers, among the 
others the possibility of getting from the banks of issue throughout next 
year an advance of 95 lire for every nominai 100 lire of stock deposited, 
interest at 4.50 per cent, yearly; and the exemption from the morator-
ium, now extended till March 31, 1915, off ali sums withdrawn from 
the ordinary banks in order to subscribe to the new loan. The shares 
will be non-convertible and non-redeemable for 10 years, till January 
1, 1925; during the subsequent 15 years the Treasury will provide the 
funds necessary for their extinction, which will be effectuated either 
by direct purchase of the stock, or by the means of a special sinking 
fund under the aministration of the "Cassa Depositi e Prestiti". It is 
probable that the new loan will find favour with the Italian agricultural 
classes, in which the number of persons having some money at the sav-
ings banks or in the proverbiai wollen stocking has grown considerably 
in recent years. 
31. 
ITALIAN LOAN AND REVENUE 
The Italian loan (writes a Turin correspondent) for 1,000 million lire (40 
million pounds sterling) at 97, 4.50 per cent, interest, was floated between 
31. January 23, 1915, p. 146. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on Busi-
ness and Finance". It is an editorial summary, probably based on the correspondence of Luigi 
Einaudi because of the wording "writes a Turin Correspondent". 
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January 4th and l l t h . The subscription offices (banks, savings banks &c.) 
were crowded, especially by many small subscribers; many subscriptions 
were from 100 to 1,000 lire. The best results give 880 million lire sub-
scribed in the kingdom and colonies by private subscribers, to which must 
be added the 500 million lire subscribed by the banking syndicate of guar-
antee; total, 1,380 million lire. As the private subscriptions will be allotted 
ali the amount subscribed, to the banking syndicate will be allotted only 
120 million lire out of their 500 millions. The issue was undoubtedly a suc-
cess, the more so as many capitalists feared to subscribe today, in the ex-
pectation of the possible war and of new debt flotations. The Minister of 
the Treasury is deserving of credit for having first imposed taxes to pay the 
interest of the coming debt, and, secondly, of having, by the issue of the 
1,000 million 25 -year bonds, relieved the Treasury, whose situation was 
not over easy, owing to the policy of their predecessors of postponing 
the indispensable debt issues. The earthquake, which has made so many 
victims in a most beautiful region of Italy, the Abruzzi, is adding a new 
burden to the Italian treasury, in a moment in which the expenses for de-
fence preparations grow by leaps and bounds. Statistics lately pubHshed 
give for November an increase in the international trade (in million Hre): 
Imports Exports 
1913 1914 1913 1914 
July 236.3 254.4 + 18.2 182.8 190.8 +7 .9 
August 237.3 167.2 - 7 0 . 1 197.9 86.9 - 1 1 1 . 0 
September 264.4 102.3 - 1 6 2 . 1 196.7 123.2 - 7 3 . 5 
October 299.5 142.5 - 1 5 7 . 0 237.1 173.9 - 6 3 . 2 
November 331.9 166.6 - 1 6 5 . 2 233.3 182.8 - 5 0 . 5 
The exports are graduaUy rising, but they are stili much lower than in 
the years past. The first six months of the financial year 1914-15 (July-De-
cember, 1914) give (in million Hre) the foHowing results. The figures are 
relating to special commerce only, exclusive of transit trade. 
Second Quarter of 
1913 1914 
Income-tax 267.6 279.4 + 11.8 
Succession duties 23.6 23.5 - 0 . 1 
Stamps and other taxes on 
wealth 118.7 112.2 - 6 . 5 
Total taxes on incomes 
and wealth 409.9 415.1 + 5.2 
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Excise 107.0 90.6 -16 .4 
Customs 161.8 102.1 -59 .7 
Internai duties on com-
modities 42.0 41.1 - 0 . 9 
Tobacco, gold, and lottery 
monopolies 275.0 291.1 + 16.1 
Total taxes on commod-
ities 585.8 524.9 - 6 0 . 9 
Post 64.9 59.6 - 5 . 2 
Telegraph 13.9 16.3 + 2.4 
Telephone 8.2 8.3 + 0.1 
Public service 87.0 84.2 - 2 . 7 
General total 1,082.7 1,024.2 -58 .5 
The groups which have withstood best the war storm are the taxes on 
incomes and on wealth, and the public services products. The taxes on 
commodities lost heavily, and the shrinkage was highest in Customs duties. 
Out of the 59.7 million lire decrease, 25.3 are due to the reduction of 
wheat duties. Here is seen one of the gravest defects of protective duties, 
which, in war times, are to be reduced or give decreasing results as the in-
ternational trade is shattered. 
32. 
CONGESTION AT GENOA 
Now that the great ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, Trieste, and 
Fiume are practically closed to traffic, the Italian port of Genoa has 
gained a position of unprecedented importance as an entrepòt. Before 
the war Genoa was the principal port for the North of Italy, but its im-
ports for other countries were comparatively small. Just enough cotton 
was imported for the Italian mills, but practically none for the mills of 
other countries. According to the Neue Zùrcher Zeitung, however, this 
trade has now swelled enormously, so that out of 483,100 bales of cotton 
lying at the port on March 5th well over two-thirds was destined for for-
eign consumption - that is to say, mainly for Austria and Germany. The 
32. Aprii 3, 1915, p. 669. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on Business 
and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treatment of the argument 
bears strong similarieties with two of Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera (March, 15 and 
18) entided respectively: "La crisi odierna del porto di Genova" and "Le cause dell'ingombro del 
porto di Genova". 
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cotton imports of Genoa have increased as indicated below over the level 
of a year ago: 
1913-14 1914-15 
Bales Bales 
December 94,730 196,348 
January 87,712 248,518 
February 63,498 228,232 
Total 245,940 673,098 
Speculation is said to be very active, and cotton is sold at very high 
prices. Trade, however, is greatly handicapped by inadequate railway 
and harbour facilities. Goods wagons are being kept back in Austria and 
Germany, while there is a great scarcity of tarpaulin covers, some 6,000 
of which had to be withdrawn from the railways after the recent earth-
quake to provide shelter for the inhabitants of Avezzano and district. 
The absence of tarpaulins has been the more severely felt owing to abnor-
mal rainfall. There is also a serious congestion of traffic in the sidings at the 
port, and at the frontier stations of Chiasso, Luino, and Ala, leading to the 
Gotthard, Simplon, and Brenner lines through Switzerland and Austria. 
The Customs officials cannot cope with the work thrust upon them by nu-
merous Ministerial orders, embargoes, and regulations against the export 
of contraband. There has been a breakdown of the electric power in the 
Givio tunnel. At Genoa itself there is a lack of electric cranes, of mechan-
ical contrivances for loading, and automatic weighing machines, while the 
organisation of labour is stated to be very defective. It appears that recently 
5,000 bales of cotton, worth £ 40,000, were destroyed by incendiaries. 
33. 
ITALIAN BANKING AND EXCHANGES 
From an Italian Correspondent 
The report read by Signor Stringher, director-general of the Bank of 
Italy, at the shareholders' meeting on March 31, 1915, covers one of the 
33. Aprii 17, 1915, pp. 750-751. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. It is a comment on the Annual Report of the Banca d'Italia. Its attribution to Luigi 
Einaudi, who regularly wrote this comment in The Economist in the years following, is probable 
because the treatment of the argument bears strong similarities with Einaudi's articles in II Cor-
riere della Sera. 
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most momentous years in the history of the bank. As Signor Stringher says, 
the war compellecl the Government to authorise the banks of issue - of 
which, as is well known, there are three in Italy, the Bank of Italy, the Bank 
of Naples, and the Bank of Sicily - to exceed the statutory limits to the is-
sue of notes. By legislative Decrees of August 4th and 13' and November 
23, 1914, these limits were on each occasion enlarged by a third, or from 
660 to 1,320 millions lire for the Bank of Italy, from 200 to 400 for the 
Bank of Naples, from 48 to 96 for the Bank of Sicily. These amounts were 
to be covered by a metallic reserve of 40 per cent. Further, by a Decree of 
September 19, 1914, the limit of the advances (anticipazione) which the 
banks of issue must make to the State Exchequer were raised from 115 
to 230 million lire for the Bank of Italy, from 30 to 60 for the Bank of Na-
ples, from 10 to 20 for the Bank of Sicily. The banks are authorised to issue 
corresponding quantities of notes for the purpose of advancing them to the 
State, these issues to be covered by a reserve of a third. 
By a Decree of August 18, 1914, the banks were obliged to advance to 
the State a sum now exceeding 300 millions lire for advances to savings 
banks and Monti di pietà (public pawn offices). These notes were to be 
guaranteed by deposit of Government stock, or guaranteed by State stocks 
or land mortgage credit debentures. A new legislative Decree of November 
23, 1914, ordered that, of the said 300 millions, 50 were to be advanced to 
railway builders. Decrees of September 22nd and November 23, 1914, en-
acted that the banks of issue must issue 100 million lire for advances to 
provinces and municipalities for the execution of public works, in relief 
to unemployed, and 400 million lire for advances to Cassa Depositi e Pre-
stiti (a State Bank which administers the postai saving banks and various 
other public credit institutes). These issues to be guaranteed by credit cer-
tificates against the borrowers. 
When we add that the Exchequer was authorised to increase its own 
State notes (ten and five lire) from 525 to 700 millions, and to issue a 
wholly new series of one and two lire notes (Buoni di Cassa), we get a total 
authorised increase in the issue of notes of various denominations of 1,803 
million lire for the banks, plus some 200 millions for the direct State issue. 
The effect has proved less perilous than might have been anticipated. The 
State has, indeed, increased the issue of small notes of five and ten lire from 
525 to 700 millions; but the one and two lire notes were printed, but not 
issued, as the panie among small people soon subsided, and the silver one 
and two lire pieces returned to circulations. 
The banks contrived to avoid realising the authorisation of the De-
crees. The total note issue, 2,199 million lire at June 30, 1914, including 
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normal circulation, covered by 40 per cent, reserve and the additional cir-
culation convered in full by gold, had by December 31, 1914, risen only 
to 2,936 million lire - i.e., an increase of but 737 million lire, well below 
the authorised 1,862 millions. The prudence with which the directors of 
our three banks of issue availed themselves of the authorisation to print 
new notes is highly creditable. The increase of 737 million lire in the note 
issue was, in substance, made wholly for the purpose of making advances 
to the State Exchequer. Discounts of private bills and advances rose, in-
deed; but debts at sight and deposits rose also by a corresponding sum, 
so that the three banks were enabled to increase by these means their dis-
counts and advances (in million lire): 
June 30, 
1914 
Discounts 669 
Advances 140 
Total 809 
Debts at sight 207 
Deposits 100 
Total 307 
The fact was that the public took alarm in August and the following 
months, and, as far as the moratorium for banking deposits permitted, de-
creased their deposits in the ordinary banks and transferred them to the 
banks of issue, although the interest allowed by banks of issue was only 
2 per cent, and afterwards 1.50 per cent. - i.e., below that allowed by other 
banks. The reason of the transfer was that the issue banks' deposits were 
not liable to the moratorium, and continued even after August l s t to be 
callable at sight. 
The foreign exchanges fluctuated considerably, especially in August, 
and but for the prudence of Signor Stringher and his colleagues, who re-
frained from the exorbitant overissues urged in various quarters, the note 
depreciation would certainly have been greater. From June the fluctuations 
of the rate of exchange on Paris have been as follows: 
Mean Maximum Minimum 
June 100.33 100.45 100.23 
July 100.93 106.75 100.32 
August Not legally known 
September 105.44 106.81 104.19 
October 103.85 104.87 102.83 
November 104.87 105.35 103.73 
December 103.31 105.20 102.34 
Dee. 31, 
1 9 1 4 Increase 
995 326 
209 69 
1,204 395 
320 113 
391 291 
711 404 
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January February March 
103.91 106.75 109.56 
26.21 26.89 27.83 
5.38 5.58 5.79 
117.26 117.96 118.83 
92.12 91.51 88.60 
And in the first quarter of 1915 the mean rate of the exchange was as 
follows: 
London 
New York 
Berlin 
Wien 
Italy is thus a loser against Paris, London, and New York, and a gainer 
toward Berlin and Vienna. 
The dislocation of international trade seems to be the foremost cause of 
the dislocation of exchanges. The last five months of 1914 compare thus 
with the first seven (in million lire): 
January-July August-December 
Imports 2,097.2 784.8 
Exports 1,464.6 753.2 
Excess of imports 632.6 31.6 
The international balance of payments was readjusted in the first seven 
months by the sums sent by emigrants and those spent by foreigners in 
Italy. In the last five months these sources of Italian credit against foreign 
bonds failed totally, and as our invisible imports (interest on debt held in 
foreign lands, freights, &c.) remained stationary, or even increased, the ex-
cess of payments to be made raised the exchanges against us in France, 
England (coal imports), and the United States (cereals and other imports). 
In the first quarter of 1915 the rate of exchanges was further raised against 
us, because of the high payments which Italy had to make for goods (espe-
cially cereals, horses, and various metals) imported from foreign lands (in 
million lire): 
Imports Exports 
1914 1915 1914 1915 
January 260.9 169.3 179.3 180.1 
February 297.6 245.8 197.8 192.4 
The exports have suffered less than the imports; but the import figures 
remain at a higher level than exports. 
Trade with the principal foreign countries was as follows in the first 
two months of the year (000's omitted, in lire). (See table at p. 104) 
The rise in imports from Argentina and the United States is due to cer-
eal imports. The exports to the belligerent countries have increased more 
or less. A glance at the detailed tables shows that increases were principally 
in cotton yarn and tissues, in vegetables, oranges and lemons, motor-cars, 
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&c. The cotton and motor-car industries have been gainers from the war, 
while silk has suffered, though somewhat less in the last months. 
Imports Exports 
First Two First Two 
Months of Months of 
1914 1915 1914 1915 
Austria Hungary 36,665 15,879 36,610 38,160 
France 45,991 19,324 43,220 47,583 
Germany 92,746 51,435 45,591 74,296 
Great Britain 86,293 59,051 47,986 53,886 
Switzerland 11,210 9,318 39,645 34,223 
Argentina 8,091 22,769 25,300 12,996 
United States 82,819 140,313 37,426 41,077 
34. 
THE ITALIAN WAR LOAN 
To the Editor of the Economist 
Sir, - The results of the public loan issued in Italy by the Govern-
ment towards defraying the war expenses have just been telegraphed. 
The amount is 1,117.5 million lire, including the subscriptions of the 
banks. This does not include sums subscribed by Italians living in the 
colonies and abroad, for which the subscription lists will not be closed 
till August 31st. 
If a comparison is made with the huge war loans of Great Britain 
and of Germany, our 1,117V2 millions may seem a small figure; but 
when one takes into account ali the circumstances of the case, the suc-
cess must be pronounced a genuine one. Our wealth is smaller than 
yours; your national annual in come is valued at £ 2,000 to £ 2,200 mil-
lions; ours can be valued at only £ 500 to £ 600 millions (12,000 to 
15,000 million lire); our mean income per head is valued by some sta-
tisticians at £ 16; yours at £ 48. That in a country like this the second 
34. July 31, 1915, pp. 181-182. The article, signed, was published in the section: "Letters to the 
Editor". 
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war loan has reached the sum of 1,11772 million lire, after the first Jan-
uary war loan of 1,000 millions, is a proof of our economie growth, and 
of the popularity of the present and last war of independence. In the 
year 1866 our economie structure was so weak that the Government 
thought it necessary to have recourse to a forced loan (prestito forzato) 
of 350 million lire. To-day the Government has raised in a year volun-
tarily a sum sevenfold greater! To understand the nature of the success, 
it is useful to note that the subscriptions are real, genuine, not sham 
subscriptions. The 1,117V2 million lire, subscribed have been paid in 
hard money, truly saved, without Darlehenkassen and similar fictitious 
machines for swelling figures. In the January first war loan the totality 
of the public subscriptions was paid before maturing of the monthly in-
stalments. This will happen in the present loan. 
The truth is that the present war is truly popular; its necessity is 
more and more keenly felt by the population. Our people rejoice in 
the manly conduct of our brave troops, and are determined to make 
ali efforts towards the goal of the union of Italian lands under the Aus-
trian yoke to the Kingdom of Italy. For the sake of attaining so great an 
end, I am sure the Italian people will give the last penny. - Yours faith-
fully, 
LUIGI EINAUDI 
La Riforma Sociale, Turin, July 22nd, 1915 
35. 
CONDITIONS IN ITALY 
The Italian soldiers are, already experiencing some of the horrors of 
winter warfare, writes a North Italian correspondent on August 22nd, 
since much of their fighting is done at 2,500-3,000 metres above the 
sea. One of the more serious problems of the present moment is the 
dearth of wool on our market. A wide appeal is being daily made by 
our newspapers for socks and other knitted garments for our soldiers, 
35. August 28, 1915, p. 324. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on Busi-
ness and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treatment of the ar-
gument bears some similarities with Einaudi's article in II Corriere della sera (August 13, 1915) 
entitled: "E problema della lana e le importazioni dall'Inghilterra". 
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but, for a large number of people, the wool has risen to an almost pro-
hibitive price. Good Borgosesia wool, which is the best quality for knit-
ting, has gone up to 17-18 per kilo, and is stili going up every day. 
Among the chief causes of this increase is, of course, foremost the sup-
pression (for the world market) of important manufacturing centres, 
like Antwerp and the North of France, but to this must be added 
the peculiar conditions of production. At ordinary times our manufac-
turers find more convenient getting from abroad tops rather than nat-
urai (raw) wool, at least, for half of the total amount. Carded thread 
is needed for the fabrication of grey-green cloth for the army. Lacking 
this, one might use tops. We have in Italy 12,000 looms capable of pro-
ducing per month from 5 to 6 million metres cloth, but our carding fac-
tories are not sufficient to supply the necessary quantity in carded wool, 
nor can the gap be filled up with tops, as we can only produce from 7 
to 8 million quintals of the 15 needed. During the first five months of 
1914 the total amount imported from France, Germany, and Belgium 
was 16,998 quintals of tops; in 1915 (corresponding period) not one 
single kilo was imported from those three countries. Great Britain, 
who in 1914 had sent over 6,178 quintals, sent in 1915 but 885 quin-
tals. Wine prospects are poor. The vines had had a fine blooming, 
but later, owing partly to the lack of sufficient attendance, due to the 
cali to arms of peasants, the new grapes withered and disappeared. 
The hay crop has been very good, owing to the frequent rains. Wheat 
has been less abundant than one was led to expect. Notwithstanding 
the larger cultivation (300,000 hectares more were sown), the product 
has been valued under the normal, i.e., 47,800,000 against 49,273,000, 
as has been the average in the last six years. The Office of Agricultural 
Statistics states that the reserves from last year's crop can be valued 
to 10 million quintals. If we deduce the 6V2 millions necessary to the 
sowing, the country can count for the present year on 50 million quintals. 
As the necessary amount was fixed at 52,7 millions (they will barely 
suffice, given the number of returning emigrants), importation must 
provide the rest, but it will need to be no larger than the average one 
from 1908-9 to 1912-13, i.e., 15,261,440 quintals yearly. Corn has 
done well up to now, but will almost certainly suffer if this rainy 
weather continues. 
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36. 
THE COST OF THE WAR IN ITALY 
From an Italian Correspondent 
Turin, November 20 
As far as can be argued from the Treasury returns, the latest of which, 
up to September 30th, was pubHshed some days ago, war expenditure in 
Italy may be summarised as foHows (in lireV 
(000's omitted) 
War Office Admiralty 
Total 1915 
Expenditure 
Excess of 1915 
Expenditure over 
1913 
Total 1915 
Expenditure 
Excess of 1915 
Expenditure over 
1913 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
June, 1915 
July, 1915 
August, 1915 
September, 1915 
396.654 
460,174 
405,389 
439,035 
335,464 
380,937 
379,748 
386,849 
67,171 
50,392 
80,334 
53,005 
30,266 
32,468 
54,316 
28,222 
War expenditure in the strict sense, that is to say, the excess of the ex-
penditure in the war months of 1915 over the corresponding months of the 
last complete year of peace, may be estimated at about 420 million Hre 
monthly. The daily figure works out at 1V2 milHon Hre, or £ 560,000 ster-
ling (at 25 Hre to the £). It must, however, be added that this is the current 
daily expenditure from June l s t up to September 30 th only. In the last two 
months, October and November, these figures may have been exceeded. 
Other items of war expenditure are charged to various other departments, 
such as the Home Office and the Colonial Office, and a great sum was 
spent previous to the declaration of war against Austria. 
The sum total of the Budget expenditure in the financial year from July 
1, 1914, to June 30, 1915, and of the months of July, August, and Septem-
ber, 1915, was as foHows: 
36. November 27, 1915, pp. 892-893. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of 
the newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of the wording "From an 
Italian Correspondent" and "Turin, November 20". 
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Expenditure in the financial year Lire Lire 
1914-15 5,630,626,417 
Do 1913-14 3,150,101,059 
Increase 2,480,525,358 2,480,525,358 
Expenditure in July, August and Septem-
ber, 1915 2,088,591,261 
Do 1914 904,739,862 
Increase 1,183,851,398 1,183,851,398 
Total increase 3,664,376,756 
Of this total increase of 3,664 million lire, one may say that some 3,500 
million lire are the effect of the war, under the head either of war prepara-
tions from August, 1914, to May, 1915 (about 2,000 million lire), or of the 
conduct of the war from June to September, 1915. This is, indeed, a truly 
stupendous figure for our country. If we add to this total increase other or-
dinary and extraordinary expenditure, civil and military, including also ex-
penditure on capital account, such as railway building or reimbursements 
to post-office banks depositors and various other items, we get a total issue 
from the Exchequer in the 15 months between July 1, 1914, and Septem-
ber 30, 1915, of 7,587 million lire; that is, about 300 millions sterling (not 
allowing for the present rate of exchange). This is the heaviest financial 
charge borne in Italian history. How it is being met may be judged from 
the following table: 
Lire 
Taxes and other effective income 3,108,072,105 
Decrease in the cash balance of the Public Exchequer 67,151,072 
Exchequer cheques running 127,849,096 
Loans and debts at home 1,946,790,423 
Lire 
For railway building 26,119,876 
Exchequer ordinary bills 78,462,000 
National War Loans 1,842,208,546 
1,946,790,423 
External loans: Special Treasury Bills 439 ^^g 35^ 
Note issues 1,902,500',000 
7386,931,052 
The only dubious item in this table is the figure of the new note issue. I 
must add that in the first period of the war it would have been impossible to 
meet the growing expenses without recurring to note issues. But whereas in 
the 12 months from July 1, 1914, to June 30, 1915, the monthly average of 
the note issue was 129 million lire, the average for the three last months 
from July 1 to September 30, 1915, decreased to 118 million lire. But for 
— 108 — 
DECEMBER, 1915 
the highly praiseworthy resistance of the Treasury Minister, Signor Carcano, 
and of the Director-General of the Bank of Italy, Signor Stringher, the note 
issue would have been increased well above the present level, and the for-
eign exchanges, which are already high, would have jumped stili higher. 
The financial policy of Italy at the present moment may be said to turn 
upon the necessity of new loans, economy, and new taxes. The Govern-
ment is alive to the urgent character of these problems. As to new loans, 
I think that the time will soon come when an appeal will be made for a 
new national loan; and when such appeal is made subscribers will come 
in even larger numbers than in July last; for they know: 
1) That the Government is bent on the utmost economy. A Decree 
of November 18th has suspended ali new appointments of public servants, 
has ordained that the number of non-commissioned or extraordinay public 
servants is to be reduced by one-fifth from July 1, 1916, by another fifth 
part from July 1, 1917; has reduced from 10 to 20 per cent, office expen-
diture (stationery, lighting, &c.), fees, and other extra remuneration of 
public employees. 
2) That the Government is devoting the proceeds of new taxes as 
they are levied to the interest and amortisation service of new debts. I think 
that the various new taxes imposed after January 1, 1915, will yield about 
120 million lire per annum, and new taxes are in store which will increase, 
before the end of the year, the said 120 millions to about 300 million lire. 
This is an honest and straightforward programme, which is reassuring to 
the State creditors. And the Italian people pay the new taxes without mur-
muring, as they know that the burden is necessary to out unity. 
37. 
ITALIAN WAR TAXATION 
The Italian Chamber has voted by 313 votes to 46 the Government's de-
mand for funds covering the expenses for six months. An Italian correspon-
dent, writing on December 12th, has sent us the following particulars of the 
37. December 25, 1915, pp. 1054-1055. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: 
"Notes on Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treat-
ment of the argument bears strong similarities with two of Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della 
Sera (September 22 and November 27, 1915) entided respectively: "I problemi tecnici dei nuovi 
provvedimenti tributari. La necessità di nuovi tributi" e "Il congegno dell'imposta sui profitti di 
guerra". 
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new taxation imposed in accordance with the Royal decree of October 15, 
1914; the Bill passed in December, 1914, and the Legislative decrees of Sep-
tember 15A, October 12th, and November 2 l s t of the current year. These fall 
under two heads. First, levies that may become permanent, and, second, 
taxes of a provisionai character. Under this first head the new taxation on 
income and on business transaction, estimated to produce 100 million lire; 
military tax, 15 million lire; tax on managers of limited liability companies, 
3 million lire; the "war farthing tax", 58 million lire; modifications in taxes 
on business transactions, transfers, &c., 43 million lire; modifications of the 
registration tax, 4 million lire. Estimated total under A, 223 million lire: 
B) New contributions on postai services 11 
C) " " on "superfluos" commodities 
Increase on tobacco 20 
" on spirits 7 
" on beer 4 
" on petrol (benzine) and minerai oils 6 
D) New taxation on primary necessaries 
Increase on salt 20 
" on matches 3.5 
" on sugar 10 
" on bicycles 2.4 
36 
The total estimated yield of taxes under (I), i.e., taxes that may become 
permanent, is thus 307 million lire. The second-class consists of levies pro-
visionai in character: 
Million Lire 
Tax on war profits 54 
Abolition of privileges in regard to registra-
tion taxes 27 
Import embargoes, &c 14 
Total 95 
The gross total is thus 402 milhon lire, of which 307 millions may be 
regarded as permanent resources to meet the permanent expenditure to 
be faced after the war, and since this 307 millions has been obtained to 
the extent of nine-tenths by taxes on luxuries, and so almost without the 
imposition on the taxpayer of any sensible burden, there is a considerable 
margin left for fresh taxation. Nor does it exhaust the expected revenue. 
M. Carcano estimates that suspension of new appointments and reduction 
of office expenditure will produce 40 million lire. Since the cost of the war 
up to October 31st was 4,000 million lire in round figures, even if the 
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monthly average has now risen to 800 million lire, the total to the end of 
February will be some 7,000 million lire. The revenue from new taxation 
(350 million hre) equals the interest on seven milliards of public debt at 
5 per cent., i.e., the new taxes have so far covered interest on public debt 
up to the end of February. A point in which reform is much needed, and 
the opportunity favourable, is the assessment of income to taxation. 
38. 
EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF WAR PRICES 
ON THE ITALIAN STOCK EXCHANGES 
From a Correspondent 
North Italy, January 11 
Although public attention is focussed on the new war loan, which, with 
interest at 5 per cent, and issued at 97.50, gives a net yield of 5.20 per cent., 
the market is by no means fiat. The bourses, indeed, are closed, but at pri-
vate meetings stocks and shares are freely dealt in. For several months past 
dealings have been very active, and prices keep up wonderfully well. Some 
sample quotations may be given. The first table refers to State issues: 
July 31, Dee. 31, Dee. 31 Jan. 10, 
1914 1914 1915 1916 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
3V2 per Cent. Rente 93-35 86-25 84-45 82-20 
ex 1-25 
Treasury Bonds, due 1917 100 97 V2 99 99-10 
Do 1918 100 96V2 927„ 97-90 
Do 1919 957, 96-40 96-60 
War Loans, 4'/2% - Jan., 1915 - 91-00 91-50 
Do July, 1915 - 94-15 94-30 
The fall of the 3V2 per cent. Rente was perhaps naturai, as the rate of 
capitalisation in the market was raised by the issue of the two 4.50 per cent, 
war loans and of the new 5 per cent. At the present price the 3.50 per cent. 
Rente yield about 4.25 per cent., which is explained by the very good classe-
38. January 22,1916, p. 130. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the news-
paper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain. The treatment of the argument bears some 
similarities with Einaudi's article in II Corriere della Sera (January, 7 1916) entided "Il nuovo 
decreto per il prestito al 5%" . 
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ment of the 8 billions lire of nominai capital, of which over 4 billions are in-
scribed to the name of the creditors, and the rest is in possession of public 
saving institutions, and of several hundred thousands of bearers. The 4V2 per 
cent, war loans are below the issue price, owing to the pressure of the new 5 
per cent, at 97.50; but the first (January) loan can be converted in the new 5 
per cent, with the payment of 5 lire, and the second (July) also with a pay-
ment of 2.50 lire. The principal banking shares were priced as follows: 
July 31, Dee. 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, 
1914 1914 1915 1916 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
Bank of Italy 1,276 1,216 1,300 1,317 
Commercial Bank 678 485 626 643 
Italian Credit Bank 504 376 518 520 
Bank of Rome 88 54 35 41 
The recent rise of banking shares, after the first war slump, is very re-
markable. The Bank of Italy shares are higher than on the days immediately 
preceding the war, which is easy to explain, owing to the large profits made 
by the banks of issue with an enlarged note circulation. Of the profits over 
6 per cent, on the capital 50 per cent, will go, as usuai, to the Treasury, and 
the remaining 50 per cent, will be severely hit by the new progressive ex-
cess profit tax. The Bank of Rome shares are low, owing to a capital reduc-
tion, which is, however, unconnected with the present war. 
A group which has largely benefited by the war is that of sugar, naviga-
tion, iron and steel, motor-car companies. Here are a few specimen prices: 
July 31, Dee. 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, 
1914 1914 1915 1916 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
Italian General Navigation Co 382 358 416 424 
Ligurian Lombard Sugar Refinery 288 288 314 316 
Eridania (sugar and miscellaneous company) 
Terni (armaments) 460 492 497 505 
Ansaldo (ditto) 1,110 910 1,180 1,200 
Savona (iron and steel) 211 173 231 232 
Elba (ditto) 139 125 211 232 
Ferriere italiane (ditto) 200 184 253 259 
Metallurgica (ditto) 91 76 153 168 
Fiat (motor car) 101 92 131 135 
Itala (ditto) 90 115 340 340 
Spa (ditto) 40 90 64 64 
25 30 60 56 
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A most remarkable rise happened in the Fiat shares. The Fiat Com-
pany, which is directed by men of conspicuous ability, are the world-wide 
producers of motor-cars. They converted themselves into manufacturers 
of aircraft, war munitions, &c., and provide the Italian Government, in 
addition to motor-cars, with many other necessities for the conduct of 
the war. 
I will quote also some other figures, in which the effects of the war 
were indifferently felt: 
July 31, Dee. 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, 
1914 1914 1915 1916 
Lire Lire Lire Lire 
Beni Stabili 282 256 249 250 
Imprese Fondiarie 87 70 63 -
Meridional of Italy Railways 483 430 432 432 
Union of Genoese Tramways 698 640 630 630 
Genoese Electric Co 390 355 330 330 
Aqueduct of the Pouille 310 280 328 -
The Beni Stabili and the Imprese Fondiarie are two house-building 
and house-holding companies in Rome. The Meridional of Italy Railways 
is to-day, after the nationalisation of railways, a holding company; the two 
Genoese companies are representatives of public utility enterprises; the 
Acqueduct of the Pouille is a non-dividend-paying company, which will 
have a future when the great acqueduct in the Pouille region has been 
completed. Ali these companies' shares felt, in a greater or less degree, 
the pressure of the highest capitalisation rate. But it is easy to see from 
the quotation given above the market situation is to-day far healthier than 
when the war broke out. The Stock Exchange carry-over is notably di-
minished; and the Stock Exchanges could be reopened without any price 
disturbance. 
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39. 
ITALIAN CURRENCY, EXCHANGES, AND TRADE BALANCE 
From a Correspondent 
Turin, Aprii 2 
The report read by Signor Stringher, director-general of the Bank of 
Italy, to the ordinary annual shareholders' meeting is, as usuai, very inter-
esting, and a few figures may be extracted from it. The note issue since the 
European War is as follows (in million lire): 
Bank of Issue Notes 
Issued for the Issued for the 
Benefit of Trade Benefit of the State 
State Notes Total 
July 31, 1914 2,265.1 - 499.1 2,764.2 
December 31, 1914 2,201.1 734.9 657.2 3,593.2 
May 31, 1915 2,476.2 1,296.2 697.5 4,469.9 
December 31, 1915 1,898.6 2,069.5 1,082.1 5,050.2 
February 29, 1916 1,666.8 2,167.4 1,096.5 4,930.7 
Signor Stringher did not commit himself to any definite theory as to the 
cause of the rise of the foreign exchanges, which, from 25.31 lire to a pound 
sterling in July, 1914, have risen to over 30 and even 32 lire, as is shown in 
the table, which traces how the Italian exchange has depreciated during the 
war from its par values: 
Parof End of July, End of Year, End of May, And of Year, Aprii 7, 
Exchange 1914 1914 1915 1915 1916 
Italian Lire 25.20% nom 25.87% 27.75 31.45 31.47 
But he did furnish some valuable facts, which may be useful in ex-
plaining the rise. Firstly, the actual rise in the sum issued, which, however, 
has been limited to the absolute necessities of the State, is inferior to that 
attained in most other belligerant States. Notes for trade purposes-viz., 
notes issued against bills and advances - increased up to May 31, 1915, 
the date of the war declaration against Austria, and was afterwards dimin-
ishing. This decrease was due to the decrease of the pre-war bills dis-
39. Aprii 22, 1916, pp. 739-740. The article, unsigned, was published in the first section of the 
newspaper. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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counted by the ordinary banks. The pre-war bills are being regularly paid; 
and new bills are not forthcoming in the same measure, as cash payment 
methods are more usuai than before the war. This means also that a part 
of the increase in the total issues, from 2,764.2 to 4,930.7 million lire, is 
not a real increase, but is due to a greater use of notes as against bills and 
other means of payment. A part of the new notes was also hoarded. Of 
the extent of hoarding an interesting proof was given in the fact that a 
great part of the subscriptions to the new 5 per cent, war loan - which, 
by the way, Signor Stringher announced will go up to 3,000 million lire, 
when the colonial and emigrants' subscriptions will be closed, a truly no-
teworthy achievement - were paid cash down, without diminishing the 
bankers' deposits in a corresponding measure. The Bank of Italy has re-
ceived, for example, subscriptions to the new war loan for the sum of 900 
million Hre, of which the greater portion must have been paid cash down; 
but its deposits and other debts at sight diminished only from 718.7 to 
618.5 million lire from December 31, 1915, to March 10, 1916. The ex-
perience of the other banks was much the same, so that one is obliged to 
draw the inference that a part of the subscriptions to the war loan was 
made in hoarded notes. Several hundred million lire must, therefore, be 
subtracted from the gross figure of 4,930.7 million lire to arrive at a true 
active circulating note issue. 
Another point of great interest is the increase in the adverse balance of 
our foreign trade. These are the figures (in million lire) of the Italian for-
eign trade (goods, exclusive of bullion) for the last three years: 
1913 1914 1915 
Inc. (+) or Dee. ( - ) in 1915 
Against 1913 Against 1914 
IMPORTS 
Tanuary-May 1.536.0 1,522.8 1,326.0 - 2 1 0 . 0 - 1 9 6 . 8 
June December ! ^ 1 0 * 6 L4005 ^ 0 0 5 3 -104 .1 + 605.0 
3,645.6 2,923.3 3,331.5 -314 .1 +408.2 
EXPORTS 
January-May 990.1 1,040.1 1,085.3 + 95.2 + 45.2 
June-December 1,521.5 1,170.3 1,131.1 -390 .4 - 3 9 . 2 
2,511.6 2,210.4 2,216.4 - 295.2 + 6.0 
Adverse balance 1,134.0 712.9 1,115.1 +402.2 - 1 8 . 9 
The real deficit was, however, greater than it would appear from the 
above figures. The 1915 figures are calculated on the basis of the 1914 
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prices. They will be corrected in due time; but at the present they are 
hardly representative of the real facts. As in 1915, the prices have gready 
increased, and as the import prices are c.i.f., while export prices are 
f.o.b., and our merchant marine is unable to provide for ali our outward, 
as well as to ali our homeward, freights, the conclusion is that the adverse 
balance will probably exceed 1,115 million lire. The previous deficits were 
compensated, to upward of 1,000 million lire, by the remittances of Italian 
emigrants and foreign visitors. These two sources had, in a great measure, 
vanished in 1915; so that Italy had to provide for an increasing mass of im-
ports at increased prices with diminished resources. The problem was 
solved by foreign loans. The Bank of Italy alone has sold, apart from State 
payments for war munitions and other public foreign purchases, upward of 
750 million lire of foreign exchanges to the trade during 1915. Italy cannot 
use, for the sake of regulating foreign exchanges, the French and British 
device of selling foreign securities, for in recent years we have repurchased 
our Italian securities which foreign investors had bought in the period from 
1861 to 1890; and our foreign investments were very small indeed, and 
mostly of enemy securities, which are at present unsaleable. The only 
means of redressing the international balance of payment are 1) foreign 
loans, which should be forthcoming during the continuance of the war, 
and 2) restriction of consumption of foreign and internai goods. The rise 
of prices and the uncertainty of the future economie situation have done 
much to restrict consumption of luxuries, the imports of which are dwind-
ling, but should be reduced to zero. Economy should be taught in Italy, as 
in England, to the classes which are profiting by the war. 
40. 
ITALY. 
STOCK EXCHANGE VALUES 
Turin, July 12 
The quotations of public stocks (State Rentes and bonds, railway guar-
anteed debentures, and land mortgages or Credit Foncier bonds) on the 
40. July 22, 1916, pp. 147-148. This is part of a correspondence from Italy, unsigned, entided: 
"Italy. War finance. The pope and the peace congress. Stock exchange values". Written by cor-
respondents in Verona and Turin, it is published in the section: "Foreign and Colonial corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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Stock Exchanges and of other stocks and shares at the private meetings 
have undergone several interesting alterations during the past half-year. 
The following table refers to State issues: 
3 7 , % Rente 
Treasury Bonds 
4%, due 1917 
Do 1918 
Do 1919 
War Loans 
47,%, Jan., 1915. 
Do July, 1915 
5%, Jan., 1915..., 
July 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, July 10, 
1914 1914 1916 1916 
93.35 86.25 82.20 83.80 
100 977, 99.10 99.35 
100 967, 97.90 97.50 
- 957, 96.60 96.00 
91.50 90.40 
_ _ 94.30 92.75 
_ _ _ 95.80 
The recent 4V2 per cent. War Loans have lost some points, owing to 
the competition of the last 5 per cent.; but the 3 7 2 per cent. Rente has 
gained 1.60 per cent., and the short-dated Treasury bonds are firm. The 
Treasury is issuing Exchequer bills, six to 12 months, payable to bearer, 
at 3, 4V4, and 472 per cent, interest, and Treasury bonds, three and five 
years, at 5 per cent, interest, following the example of the British and 
French Governments. The issue is unlimited, as the Treasury sells from 
day to day the bills at the counters of banks and other public offices. 
The success is remarkable, as in the first ten days from June 20th the Fi-
nance Minister, Signor Carcano, was able to announce to the Senate that 
the amount sold was upward of 500 million lire. 
The principal banking shares were priced as follow: 
July 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, July 10, 
1914 1914 1916 1916 
Bank of Italy 1,276 1,216 1,317 1,330 
Commercial Bank 678 485 645 658 
Italian Credit Bank 504 376 520 555 
Bank of Rome 88 54 41 37 
Italian Bank of Discount - - [507] 490 
The last-named bank is a new institution, of which the president is Se-
nator Marconi, and which is the result of the fusion of two older banks (So-
cietà Bancaria Italiana and Società di Credito Provinciale). The price be-
tween brackets refers to February 12, 1916. The rise, though moderate, 
is continuing in most cases. 
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The rise was accentuateci in the sugar, navigation, iron and steel, rao-
tor-car companies; 
July 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, July 10, 
1914 1914 1916 1916 
Italian General Navigation Co 382 358 424 538 
Ligurian - Lombard Sugar Refinery 288 288 316 323 
Eridania (sugar and miscellaneous Co.) 460 497 505 554 
Terni (armaments) 1,100 910 1,200 1,425 
Ansaldo (armaments) 211 173 232 338 
Savona (iron and steel) 139 125 232 338 
Elba (iron and steel) 200 184 259 298 
Ferriere Italiane (iron and steel) 91 76 168 217 
Metallurgica (iron, steel, and copper) 101 97 135 146 
Fiat (motor car) 90 115 340 480 
Itala (motor car) 40 90 64 80 
Spa (motor car) 29 30 56 85 
This is the group most favoured by the war. The sensational rise of Fiat 
shares has given rise to much speculation at Turin. The movement was not 
checked by the tax on surplus profits, which is progressive, and runs up-
wards of 40 per cent. 
The following are various other miscellaneous shares; 
July 31, Dee. 31, Jan. 10, July 10, 
1914 1914 1916 1916 
HOUSE AND LAND 
Beni Stabili 282 256 250 252 
Imprese Fondiarie 87 70 - 72 
Beni rustici 135 120 - 140 
EX-RAILWAYS 
Meridional of Italy R 483 430 432 453 
Mediterranean 212 - - 197 
ELECTRIC 
Union of Genoese Tramways 698 640 630 605 
Genoese Electric Co 390 355 330 325 
Edison 436 400 - 547 
Vizzola 776 - - 802 
TEXTILES 
Lanifìcio Rossi (wool) 1,380 - - 1,370 
Cantoni (cotton) 399 - - 460 
Tessuti Stampati (cotton printing) 98 - - 217 
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The textiles companies, which were overloaded with debts and over-
stocked with goods difficult to sell, have experienced a favourable time 
during the war, much in the same fashion as the Savona, Elba, and Ferriere 
iron and steel group. Generally, the joint-stock companies will face the dis-
location of the return to peace with reserves much higher than those pos-
sessed at July 31, 1914. 
41. 
NEW TAXES IN ITALY 
Italy, like Great Britain, is determined to provide a considerable por-
tion of the cost of the war out of revenue, and a scheme of new or revised 
taxation, estimated to produce 100 million lire annually, was instituted last 
week by decree. Its most interesting feature is the institution, at a date to 
be fixed hereafter, of a Government monopoly of the sale of matches, 
which is defended on the ground that increased taxation has made the con-
sumer pay a higher price for a worse article. The manufacturers will now 
sell only to the Government, and it will regulate the prices; but if prices 
are to be reduced, it is hard to see how the monopoly can be very remu-
nerative. The export trade is unaffected. Another feature is the upward re-
vision of the sliding scale tax on war profits, except as regards agricultural 
produce. This latter, it is said, is taxed already as much as it can bear; but 
one cannot help reflecting that the agricultural interest is very strong, and 
that even the agricultural labourers, through their unions, are a power in 
the land. More novel imposts are stamp taxes on consignments by railway, 
or by tramway, from one commune to another, and on boxes of securities 
or valuables deposited with a bank, which, it is pointed out, may easily be 
so transferred as to evade the death duties. The tax is adjusted to the value 
of the contents, and payable annually, and may be doubled if the deposit is 
made in the names of several persons and one of them dies. The tax on bills 
of exchange is revised, and that on alcoholic beverages is increased by 75 
per cent. - which, it is said, will not raise the price of wine, owing to the 
41. September 9, 1916, p. 442. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because the treatment of 
the argument bears strong similarities with two of Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera (Sep-
tember 25 and October 6, 1916) entitled respectively: "Restrizioni dei consumi, imposte e azioni 
di governo" and "La limitazione dei profitti di guerra". 
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abundant vintage of 1916. Precautions, moreover, are taken against adul-
teration. The communes, too, are encouraged to make better provision 
for the service of their own loans by being permitted to increase their 
own indirect taxation, especially on wine, and are allowed to institute a 
special surtax on their direct taxpayers, ranging from 5 per cent, on a total 
payment in direct taxes of 10 to 25 francs to 30 per cent, on payments ex-
ceeding 2,000 francs. This is to be applied to poor relief during the war 
and immediately after its close. Dependents of soldiers are to be exempted 
if they are receiving assistance, and subscriptions to any relief fund are to 
be taken as a set-off against the tax. The scheme is cordially welcomed by 
the eminent economist and ex-Minister, Signor Luzzatti, and the fact that 
its introduction is practicable is a satisfactory indication of the soundness 
of Italian finance. 
42. 
LIMITATION OF DIVIDENDS IN ITALY 
An interesting experiment has been made in Italy - writes a Turin cor-
respondent - in the compulsory limitation of dividends distributed to 
shareholders and partners in joint-stock companies, limited companies, 
and other trade societies. A decree of February 7, 1916, put a limit of 8 
per cent, per annum of the paid-up capital on the dividend which compa-
nies and trade societies could distribute among their shareholders and 
partners until further notice. The 8 per cent, dividend could be exceeded 
only in the case of companies which in the last two peace years had distrib-
uted a higher dividend; but in this case the dividend could not be higher 
than the mean peace dividend. The aim of the decree was to increase com-
pulsorily the reserves of joint stock and other industriai and commercial 
companies, so that, at the return of peace, they might be able to meet 
the problems that will then arise. A slight relaxation in the interpretation 
of the decree was made when the Minister of Trade consented that the 
tied-up profits could be used for increasing the paid-up capital. Some com-
panies have distributed among the shareholders a bonus in wholly paid 
42. September 16, 1916, p. 481. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Notes on 
Business and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because of the wording 
"writes a Turin correspondent". 
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shares, the payment being made with the profits exceeding the statutory 8 
per cent. But a recent startling case of evasion of the decree has attracted 
the attention of public opinion. The Società di Navigazione Alta Italia 
(North Italian Shipping Company), domiciled in Turin, which perhaps 
was the shipping company which had benefited most by the war (the prof-
its for 1915 were 15 million lire on a capital of 3V2 millions, and it had ai-
ready distributed, before the decree of February 7th, an interim dividend of 
40 per cent.), finding itself thwarted in the distribution of its profits, had 
recourse to a most ingenious device. The shareholders' meeting dissolved 
the company, and put it into liquidation. The aim was to sell the ships 
and other assets of the company, and distribute the proceeds, and, with 
them, the big profits earned. The resolution led to much talk in business 
circles, and to violent denunciations in the daily Press. The Government 
felt obliged to intervene. A new Royal decree of September 3, 1916, put 
the companies which, by means of dissolution or of other expedients, seek 
to elude the statutory limitation of dividends, under an officiai receiver. 
The receiver will put the case before the Court; and the Court, if the dis-
solution is in fraude legis, will declare it void. The directors in charge at the 
moment of the dissolution, and those who were in charge for the 18 
months previous to dissolution, will be personally and jointly responsible 
for the payment of the income and excess-profits tax due by the company. 
There the matter stands for the present. The attempt at evasion of the de-
cree has been repressed, but the necessity of a more equitable formulation 
of the law is keenly felt in commercial and industriai circles. The business 
world feels also - and the recent stock exchange quotations reflect this feel-
ing - that an authoritative assurance is needed that the profits put to re-
serve will not in future be absorbed by retrospective taxation. Business 
men are willing to pay the income and excess profits tax, but desire that 
the amount shall be known and certain, so that the remainder of their prof-
its can be put to some use. The past Minister of Trade, Signor Cavasola, 
had given public assurance that the sole intention of the Government, 
when they issued the decree for the dividend limitation, was to benefit 
companies by increasing their reserves. But a section of the public Press 
is every day clamouring for a complete confiscation of the excess profits, 
and the clamour, though raised only in the extremist or socialist newspa-
pers, frightens the companies and business men. It would be in the public 
interest if some means could be devised to give security to industry, for 
nothing checks enterprise so effectively as uncertainty concerning fiscal 
measures. 
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43. 
I T A L Y 
T H E LIMITATION OF DIVIDENDS AND TAXATION OF W A R PROFITS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 15 
I have already describe the legislation for the limitation of dividends 
(decrees of February 7 and September 3, 1916). Since I wrote the matter 
has become somewhat involved by new issues. A section of the Press in-
itiated a compaign against the "war profiteers", proposing that the extra-
ordinary reserve of war profits should be wholly confiscated by taxation at 
100 per cent. The decree of February 7th stated that the limitation of divi-
dends was imposed in the interest of joint stock and other companies to 
ensure for them the financial means for the after-war crisis. The Socialist 
papers urged that no one should grow richer by the war, and that, as ali 
excess profits were made at the expense of the State, they should revert 
to the State. The campaign was highly disturbing, as ali companies which 
had made profits which they could not distribute to shareholders were left 
in the dark about the future. They could not say whether the reserves 
should be in cash or invested in buildings, machinery, structures, and im-
plements for the production of munitions of war. Some directorates in-
creased the share capital, and without distributing a dividend in cash gave 
to the shareholders a bonus in fully paid shares. Against this entirely legit-
imate proceeding, by which the company retained the profits and could in-
vest the same in the interest of the production was raised a great outcry, as 
the distribution of a share bonus was considered equivalent to the distribu-
tion of a cash dividend. The industriai world was frightened, and expected 
new legislative regulations. Two new decrees were published to-day to reg-
niate the matter. Firstly, the taxation of the war profits was raised. The 
rates of the taxation are at present as follows: 
43. November 25, 1916, p. 1000. This is part of a correspondence from Italy, unsigned, entitled: 
"Italy. The Limitation of Dividends and Taxation of War Profits. War Pensions. Crops". Writ-
ten by correspondents in Verona and Turin, it is published in the section: "Notes on Business 
and Finance". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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For the War Profit Produced 
Between Aug. 1, 1914, Between Jan. 1, 1916, 
and Dee. 31, 1915 and June 30, 1918 
% 0/ /0 
On the section of the profit higher 
than 8 per cent, up to 10 per 
cent, upon the capital invested . 12 20 
On the section between 10 and 15 
per cent, upon the same in-
vested capital 18 30 
On the section between 15 and 20 
per cent 24 40 
On the section of the profits high-
er than 20 per cent 35 60 
In addition, the income-tax was raised to 16 per cent, on the whole 
profits; so that on the first section the taxation is raised to 26 per cent, 
of the war profits. 
After paying the war profits tax the profits can be distributed to share-
holders, in accordance with the decree of February 7th, only up to 8 per 
cent, of the paid capital (or the mean of the best peace dividends) for 
the old companies, and up to 10 per cent, of the paid capital for the 
new companies, viz., companies born after the war. 
A third part will be compulsorily invested in public funds (Italian 
Rentes, war loans, Treasury bonds, and Exchequer bills). Two-thirds 
will be left to the discretion of the directorates. The directors may 
put the two-thirds to special reserve, and in that case they may invest 
the same as they please in public and private stocks, buildings, machin-
ery, goods in stock, &c. The only limitation is that they cannot distri-
bute the same. They can also increase the paid capital of the company, 
distributing to shareholders a corresponding bonus in wholly paid 
shares. They cannot, however, convert the two-thirds of reserved profits 
in new paid capital if they do not prove, to the satisfaction of the civil 
tribunal (the locai judicial court), that they have invested the corre-
sponding sum in the improvement of their industriai enterprises (new 
machinery, new buildings, or amplification of existing buildings). Up 
to the end of the war, however, only the holdings corresponding to 
sums effectively paid by shareholders can obtain dividends up to 8 or 
10 per cent, as above said. The bonus shares will remain without divi-
dends. Ali these regulations and ali limitation of dividends will cease at 
the end of the year following the year in which the peace is made. The 
previous decrees did not put a term to the dividends limitation. Perhaps 
the fixing of the date at which ali limitation will cease will be greeted by 
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companies with most satisfaction. It is well to prevent the dissipation of 
profits; but an indefinite limitation threatened stagnation in the indus-
triai world. 
44. 
ITALY 
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES AND THE FOURTH WAR LOAN 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 20 
One object of the new Italian War Loan in 5 per cent. Consols is to 
redress the unfavourable balance of international exchanges. The pound 
sterling at 34-35 lire, the French frane at 125 per cent., the Swiss frane 
at 145 per cent., the American dollar at 7.30 lire, the Argentine peso at 
3.15 lire are eloquent of the need, and every effort is required to counteract 
the downward tendency of the value of the lira. 
The best method of stabilising the currency is to decrease the circula-
tion of paper; but in the present war the Treasury Ministers must consider 
themselves very fortunate if they succeed in restricting to small dimensions 
the increase of the paper issues. In this task Signor Carcano, aided by Si-
gnor Stringher, director-general of the Bank of Italy, has a good record. On 
a total of 16,060 million lire of new debts created between August 1, 1914, 
and December 31, 1916, the Bank and State notes debt reaches 3,272 mil-
lion lire. The rest was raised by long-dated bonds and short-dated bonds 
and Exchequer bills, issued at home and abroad. As the pre-war paper is-
sues reached 2,700 millions, the increase was noteworthy, but inferior to 
the increase of most other belligerents. 
The exchange crisis was aggravated by the great decrease of remit-
tances by Italian emigrants abroad to their families and by foreign travellers 
in Italy. In peace times the surplus of imports (1913, 3,645 million lire) 
over exports (1913, 2,511 million lire) was roughly balanced by these re-
44. March 10, 1917, pp. 473-474. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) it is dated Turin, b) the 
treatment of the argument bears strong similarities with Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera 
in the period February-March 1917. 
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mittances. In 1914 and the following years the balance of trade worked as 
follows (in million lire): 
1914 1915 1916 
(First 10 Months) 
Imports 2,923 4,703 4,652 
Exports 2,210 2,533 1,911 
Balance of imports 713 2,170 2,741 
The advances of the British Government, and some small loans in the 
United States, have aided the balancing of our international indebtedness, 
but the difficulties of making the two ends meet are undoubtedly great. 
The issue of our fourth loan has offered to the Government the oppor-
tunity of inviting the capitalist to give to the Treasury the foreign securities 
and the gold which they happen to possess. The scheme works as follows: 
1. Certain foreign securities are accetpted in payment of the new Consols; 
thus following the English and French policy. The quantity held in Italy is 
gready inferior to that held in both these countries. Years ago Signor Strin-
gher guessed at 24 million lire the sum received by Italians as yearly dividends 
of foreign securities in 1909. To-day the sum is indoubtedly increased, and it 
is probable that the value of foreign securities held by Italians is well over 900 
million lire, and perhaps reaches 1,000 million lire. Unfortunately, a notable 
part are Austrian, German, and Turkish bonds and shares, which are unsale-
able. But there remains several hundred million lire of French, Spanish, Swiss, 
and especially Argentine, Uruguayan, and other South American securities, in 
which our former emigrants had invested their savings. 
The list published by the Government specifies 19 sterling securities. 
2. Gold is accepted in payment of the new Consols, at the fixed rate of 
130 lire for every lOOf, 32.70 lire for every pound sterling, and 6.70 lire for 
every U.S. dollar. There is not much gold privately held in Italy, but an ef-
fort is made to obtain it for the benefit of the gold reserves of the banks. 
The Minister of Finance has power to vary the rate of exchange at which 
gold is to be accepted in payment of the Consols. 
3. The subscriber to the Consols can declare that it is his wish to obtain 
reimbursement of the gold given in payment of the new Consols after six 
months of the peace. In this case the gold is valued at his par value, viz., 
100 hre for every lOOf, 29.15 for every pound sterling, and 5.15 for every 
dollar; but the giver has the right, on presentation of a receipt, to obtain 
reimbursement, after the said six months, of the gold if he will pay the cor-
responding sum in paper currency. 
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4. Up to the present the banks of issue had not the right to receive gold 
deposits. They received, in current accounts, deposits in paper money at 
the interest of 1.50 per cent, per annum. In future the banks of issue will 
be authorised to receive gold in a special deposit account, with the yearly 
interest of 3V2 per cent. It is hoped that the privately hoarded gold will be 
sent to the banks of issue, as the depositors are assured of their right of 
reimbursement of the pure gold at cali. The experiment is, at any rate, well 
worth making. 
45. 
ITALY 
BANK OF ITALY REPORT - T H E NEW LOAN - MONEY MARKET 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, Aprii 4 
The report of Signor Stringher, director-general of the Bank of Italy, to 
his shareholders contains much interesting matter. The most important fi-
nancial operations of the Bank of Italy were, of course, for State account. 
After the War loan of January, 1916, which gave 2,100 millions lire of fresh 
money, comprising 300 millions subscribed by the banking corporations of 
issue, the bank issued in June and October Treasury bonds for 3 and 5 
years, at 5 per cent., which produced 1,700 millions lire. The Treasury bills 
increased during the year by over 2,700 millions lire, and the paper notes 
increased also by 700 millions lire. The total banking and State note issue 
increased from 2,682 millions lire on July 20, 1914, to 6,330 millions lire on 
December 30, 1916. 
The last War loan, in 5 per cent. Consols, issued at 90, had given, up to 
to-day, over 3,610 millions lire, entirely sold to the public, the banking cor-
poration of issue having also disposed to the public of ali the guaranteed 
sum. Of the said 3,610 millions, 2,490 millions were of fresh money, 104 
millions of Exchequer bills, 427 millions of five-years 4 per cent, bonds, 
396 millions of three and five years 5 per cent, bonds, and 79 millions 
45. Aprii 14, 1917, p. 658. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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of foreign State and railway securities (rentes and bonds). Foreign securi-
ties in possession of Italian capitalists were of not very great amount - Si-
gnor Stringher values them at a maximum figure of 800 millions lire, com-
prising the securities of enemy States. The subscription list for the War 
loan will remain open in the Erytrean and Benedir colonies and in the for-
eign countries oversea up to May 31. Up to date the foreign and colonial 
subscriptions have given 63 millions lire, which have to be added to the 
said 3,610 millions hre. 
The gold held by the three banks of issue - Bank of Italy, Bank of Na-
ples, and Bank of Sicily - and by the State Exchequer decreased between 
May, 1915, and February, 1917, by 490 millions hre. 
An interesting feature of the money market in Italy has been the 
abundance of money for day-to-day loans, short bills, and Stock Ex-
change loans. Good commercial paper was scarce, and the discount op-
erations of the Bank of Italy decreased in number from 1,880,301 in 1915 
to 737,561 in 1916, and in amount from 3,296 to 1,817 millions hre. 
While the officiai bank rate was 5 72 and afterwards 5 per cent., the Bank 
of Italy was obhged to diminish the rate to 4.50 per cent, in the 29.69 per 
cent., and to 4 per cent, in the 5.29 per cent, of the discount operations. 
Ordinary banks did go even lower, as the dominant rate in the free mar-
ket was 47 2 and 4 per cent. Signor Stringher explains the scarcity of good 
bills offered to the banks for discount by the decrease of the purely pri-
vate transactions and the increase of the war transactions of the State, 
which pays cash in paper notes. The increased paper circulation floods 
the market and forces the rate for short bills to a low figure. The Bank 
of Italy has made a vigorous effort to popularise the use of cheques with 
a view to restricting the note issue. The cheques issued by the bank dur-
ing the past year were 3,002,938 in number, for a sum of 16,920 millions 
lire, with an increase of 4,368 millions lire over the year 1915. The mean 
circulation of the bank cheques was 3,326 millions lire, with a mean life 
of seven days. 
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46. 
ITALY 
W A R DEBT - BANKING - SHIPPING 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 8 
During the period from July, 1914, to October, 1917, the Italian mar-
ket has absorbed readily a mass of State securities which in time of peace 
would have seemed impossible. Here is the summary of ali issues during 
the said period (in millions of lire): 
July, 1914 to 
June, 1915 
July, 1915, to 
June, 1916 
July, 1916 to 
June, 1917 
July to 
October, 1917 
War Loans 1,000 3,628.8 3,985.5 2.3 
Treasury Five-years Bonds, 4 % 130.9 19.0 - -
Do 5 % - 365.9 1,141.6 497.4 
Do Three-years, 5 % - 102.2 270.0 236.3 
Exchequer Bills from 3 to 12 
months 3-5% 21.2 384.1 3,439.4 1,779.9 
The war loans totalled 8,616.6 millions, the Treasury bonds of the var-
ious denominations 2,754.3, the Exchequer bills 5,604.6 million lire, with a 
general total of 16,975.5 million lire. To this there are to be added 7,531.6 
million gold lire of foreign (British and American) loans, which were 
equivalent to 9,791.9 million paper lire. Meanwhile the increase in note is-
sues was as follows: 
Notes issued by issue banks and loaned to Government 2,665.9 
State notes of 5 and 10 Lire directly issued by the Treasury 1,141.5 
Million Lire 3,807.4 
If we add to 16,975.5 millions of internai loans 9,791.9 millions of for-
eign loans and 3,807.4 of notes issued, we get at the grand total of 30,574.8 
million lire, which represent the real new indebtedness of Italy during the 
European War. 
46. January 26, 1918, p. 120. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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One of the greatest economie forces of Italy is its net of small saving 
and popular banks, which are diffused ali over the country, and draw from 
locai sources their funds, which are mainly devoted to financing agricul-
ture, commerce, and industry. Some figures on the deposits of ali species 
of banking institutions in Italy will be interesting (in million lire): 
July 30 
1910 1914 1915 1916 1917 
Banks of issue 99.3 100.0 649.6 504.7 412.7 
Banks (ordinary) 869.7 1,044.6 664.8 907.7 1,355.4 
Popular banks 699.7 703.5 583.4 707.9 880.4 
Co-operative banks 444.3 507.8 427.4 531.7 669.2 
Savings banks 2,460.1 2,800.0 2,552.4 2,905.1 2,432.7 
Postai savings fund 1,657.1 3,121.3 1,861.7 1,987.6 2,352.9 
Savings foundations (Monti di 
Pietà) 187.9 214.5 220.0 245.4 284.6 
Rural banks 72.6 103.7 96.8 112.3 150.9 
Total 6,490.7 7,595.4 7,056.1 7,902.4 9,538.8 
Somewhat belated statistics have been recently published on, shipping 
movements in ali the ports of Italy. 
1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 
Steam vessels 
Number (000's omitted) 164.2 169.3 171.8 123.6 91.4 
Millions of tons of merchandise carried 
outwards and inwards 25.7 25.5 23.3 22.7 21.4 
Passengers (in millions) 2.9 3.2 2.8 2.0 1.5 
Sailors, men, and officers (in millions) 4.4 4.6 4.6 3.1 2.1 
Sailing vessels 
Number (000's omitted) 189.0 184.8 173.1 138.9 116.1 
Millions of tons of merchandise carried 6.3 6.3 5.8 4.9 3.7 
Sailors, men, and officers (in millions) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 
Totals 
Number (000's omitted) 353.3 354.1 344.9 262.5 207.6 
Millions of tons of merchandise carried 32.0 31.8 29.1 27.6 25.1 
Sailors, men, and officers (in millions) 5.3 5.5 5.4 3.7 2.6 
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47. 
I T A L Y 
BANK OF ITALY - PAPER ISSUES - FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, March 29 
Signor Stringher read yesterday to the shareholders of the Bank of Italy 
his usuai report, which is probably the most important financial document 
of the year in our country. The balance-sheet closes in a way highly satis-
factory to the shareholders and to the Government, which participates in 
the net profits of the banks of issue. The gross profits were 112,000,000 
lire, against 79,100,000 lire in 1916; the expenses were 56,900,000 lire, 
against 39,200,000 lire. The net profits amounted to 55,100,000 Hre 
(1916, 43,900,000 lire), which are reduced to 51,600,000 lire after various 
statutory deductions. Of the said sum 14,400,000 Hre were aUotted to 
shareholders (8 per cent, on the paid capital), 15,900,000 Hre to the extra-
ordinary reserve, and 21,000,000 Hre to the State. 
The high profits of the year 1917 were in part due to the increased is-
sue of bank notes, which averaged 4,659 miHion Hre during 1917, against 
3,294 milHons during 1916. But the increment was higher if we compare 
the end of 1917 with the end of 1915 and with July, 1914, and if we include 
the issues of the other two banks of issue and of the State notes. The fig-
ures work out as foUow: 
Banking Issues 
July 31, 1914 Dee. 31, 1916 Dee. 31, 1917 
Mill. Lire Mill. Lire Milk Lire 
Bank of Italy 1,730.1 3,876.7 6,539.2 
Bank of Naples 428.2 945.7 1,575.4 
Bank of Sicily 106.8 189.9 310.4 
2,265.1 5,012.3 8,425.0 
State issues 499.1 1,317.3 1,748.8 
Total 2,764.2 6,329.6 10,173.8 
While the note issues increased the gold reserve decreased; the gold 
47. Aprii 13, 1918, p. 602. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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held in the Bank of Italy vaults decreased from 1,118,200,000 lire at the 
end of 1914 to 835,900,000 lire at the end of 1917; the silver from 
107,900,000 lire to 87,400,000 lire. The certificates of credit upon foreign 
places increased, however, from 23,600,000 lire to 447,700,000 lire. Italy 
was, previously to war, a paper currency country, and gold was not seen 
in circulation. It is gratifying to know that the Bank of Italy has only re-
duced its gold stock from 1,118,200,000 lire to 835,900,000 lire ( -
282,300,000 lire), while sending presumably over 400 millions gold to for-
eign allied places, and thus aiding the financing of the war. 
The controversy as to the causes of the fall of the lira has subsided of 
late. It is acknowledged by ali leading authorities, including Signor Strin-
gher, that the principal cause has been the unavoidable increase of the pa-
per issues. The price to be paid in Italian lire for the most important for-
eign exchanges were as follows (average of the month): 
100 French 100 Swiss £1 $1 
Francs Francs 
july 31 1914 101 100.80 25.40 5.25 
December, 1915 112.23 123.56 30.97 6.57 
December, 1916 117.20 135.18 32.59 6.85 
June, 1917 124.41 143.47 33.95 7.13 
December, 1917 144.87 189.90 39.56 8.29 
March, 1918 151.25 198.90 41.10 8.63 
If the fall of the lira is due mainly to the abundance of new paper 
money issued during the war, the prevalent impression is that its fluctua-
tions - which were most violent between October, 1917, and February, 
1918 - were due to speculation and irregularity in the balancing of inter-
national payments. Signor Stringher publishes a very interesting table on 
the Italian foreign trade, in which the 1917 figures were adjusted so as 
to correspond to increased prices of goods: 
In Million Lire 
Exports Deficit 
2,210.4 712.9 
2,533.4 2,170.1 
3,093.8 5,291.9 
3,316.4 8,035.7 
How the gigantic deficit was liquidated is not wholly clear. In an inter-
esting table published by Signor Nitti, Minister of the Treasury, the loans 
of the Allies were given as of 1,270 million paper lire in 1915 and 2,900 
million paper lire in 1916. Signor Stringher adds the further figure of 
5,400 million gold lire as the total sum of loans by Allies in 1917, corre-
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191 4 2,923.3 
191 5 4,703.5 
191 6 8,385.7 
191 7 11,352.1 
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sponding perhaps to 8,000 million paper lire. It would appear that in 1917 
the deficit was nearly covered by Allies' loans. 
48. 
ITALY 
T H E RISE IN PRICES AND THE FALL OF THE LIRA 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 5 
Professor Bachi has from the beginning of the war compiled an index 
number of prices on the lines of that of the Economist's Index Number. 
The basis is 1901-1905, and the commodities selected are 40 in number, 
representing the most important markets. Subjoined is a comparison be-
tween Bachi's and Economist's index numbers: 
January, January, January, January, May, 
1915 1916 1917 1918 1918 
Cereals and Meat 
ItaHan 142-9 179-9 210-4 326-0 374-9 
British 157-2 189-3 262-0 244-4 249-4 
Other Food Products 
ItaHan 116-0 177-9 219-6 285-1 333-8 
British 137-7 155-0 187-0 228-7 259-2 
Textiles 
ItaHan 103-5 189-1 301-3 513-8 578-3 
British 107-0 156-5 227-4 343-9 354-7 
Minerals and Metals 
ItaHan 167-0 434-3 507-1 869-4 950-8 
British 130-2 190-4 206-4 207-2 212-4 
Miscellaneous 
ItaHan 126-4 2 1 2 0 247-6 388-1 454-3 
Bridsh 149-6 176-9 223-9 265-8 273-8 
General 
ItaHan 132-7 232-3 290-0 462-3 523-0 
British 136-5 174-5 225-1 262-9 273-4 
48. July 27, 1918, p. 111. The article, unsigned, was pubHshed in the section: "Overseas Corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is also 
dated Turin. 
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For the sake of comparison, the Economist'% Index Number has been 
reduced to a percentage change, the 1901-1905 level being taken as 100. 
The difference between Italian and British index numbers is largely ex-
plained by the depreciation of the lira: 
Jan., Jan., Jan., Jan., May, 
1915 1916 1917 1918 1918 
Excess of Italian over British number 
index - 3 - 8 + 57-8 + 64-9 + 199-4 + 249-6 
Of which the depreciation of the Lira 
explains + 5-3 + 4 6 0 + 72-3 + 162-3 + 194-6 
Other causes - 9 - 1 + 11-8 - 7 - 4 + 371-1 + 55-1 
Apart from minor fluctuations, the prices were, during the first 
three years of the war, higher in Italy by about the amount of deprecia-
tion of the lira. In 1918 they are higher than would be explained by this 
depreciation. The fall of the exchange value of the lira continues, how-
ever, to explain by far the largest part of the difference between the rise 
of prices in Italy and the rise in Great Britain and other Allied coun-
tries. This explains the widespread desire that something should be 
done towards fixing the exchange between the lira and the pound ster-
ling, or dollar or frane, at a level more favourable to Italy. The Rome 
Exchange Institute has not been very successful in its endeavours to 
that end. Public opinion in Italy has greeted with favour the announce-
ment that the United States Government countenances the idea of reg-
ulating the exchange between dollars and lira; and similar agreements 
with Great Britain and France will be welcomed. The graduai apprecia-
tion of the lira would be a great factor in the moral endurance of Italy 
during the war. 
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FROM POST-WAR CRISIS TO THE FIRST PERIOD 
OF FASCISM IN POWER, 
1919-1924 

49. 
ITALY IN WAR TIME 
SAVINGS DEPOSITS - NOTE ISSUES - W A R COST AND DEBT -
DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 11 
As in other countries, deposits in State Saving Post Bank decreased in 
the first year of the war. The number of accounts, which was 6,330,283 at 
June 30, 1914, decreased to 6,295,797 at June 30, 1915, and the deposits 
from 2,121,280,945 to 1,861,737,720 lire between the same dates. Soon 
after the declaration of war by Italy against Austria the tide turned; at June 
30, 1916, the number of accounts open was again 6,382,945 and the depos-
its 1,987,639,997. The increase went on, as below: 
Number of Deposits 
Accounts Open Lire 
June 30, 1917 6,608,899 2,352,916,019 
June 30, 1918 6,750,472 2,919,370,390 
October 31, 1918 - 3,193,126,929 
The increase in savings was not limited to the State Post Bank. If we 
sum ali the deposits in ali the banks - of issue, ordinary, savings, and pop-
ular banks - we obtain the following results (in millions of lire): 
June 30, 1914 June 30, 1915 June 30, 1918 
Current accounts (subject to withdrawal 
by cheque) 1,491.2 1,724.2 2,941.6 
Savings deposits 6,104.2 5,332.1 9,290.2 
7,595.4 7,056.3 12,231.8 
The increase in the current accounts subject to withdrawal by cheque 
49. February 1, 1919, pp. 135-137. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. 
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on June 30, 1915, when saving deposits were decreasing, is explained by 
the moratorium, which induced depositors to withdraw deposits from sav-
ings deposits, subject to limitation, and transfer to the banks of issue, 
whose current accounts were exempt from moratorium. Afterwards ali fear 
desappeared, and, with the help of an expanding circulation, the banking 
deposits increased with a velocity truly astounding to those which remem-
ber the more slow pace of peace times. 
The following figures are interesting as showing the increase in the sum 
of notes issued by the three banks of issue (Banca d'Italia, Banca di Napoli, 
and Banca di Sicilia) and by the State (in million lire): 
Notes Issued by the Banks 
Banking Notes Furnished 
Issue to the State 
of Issue 
Total 
State 
Issue Total 
December 31,1913 2,283.5 _ 2,283.5 499.1 2,782.6 
July 31, 1914 2,265.2 - 2,265.2 499.1 2,764.3 
August 31, 1914 2,612.0 133.0 2,745.0 524.1 3,269.1 
December 31, 1914 2,201.1 734.9 2,936.0 657.2 3593.2 
June 30, 1915 2,242.5 1,613.5 3,856.0 765.8 4,621.8 
December 31, 1915 1,898.7 2,069.3 3,968.0 1,082.1 5,050.1 
June 30, 1916 2,158.2 2,157.6 4,315.8 1,135.0 5,450.8 
December 31, 1916 2,458.2 2,554.2 5,012.4 1,317.3 6,329.7 
June 30, 1917 2,521.0 3,294.7 5,815.7 1,459.9 7,275.6 
December 31, 1917 2592.0 5,833.0 8,425.0 1,748.8 10,173.8 
June 30, 1918 3,589.6 6,481.4 10,071.0 2,112.5 12,183.5 
September 30, 1918 .... 4,000.7 6,882.5 10,883.2 2,197.8 13,081.0 
The total issue increased from 100 on July 30, 1914, to 473 on Septem-
ber 30, 1918. The greatest increase was in the State direct issue, viz., of 
notes for 5 and 10 lire (about 4 or 8 shillings at the par of exchange), which 
are utilised for retail transactions. The silver coins of 1 and 2 lire are almost 
gone out of circulation, and were substituted by equivalent paper, Buoni di 
Cassa, which are included in the above figures. Of the notes issued by the 
banks of issue the maximum increase was in those furnished by the banks 
to the State Exchequer. The remaining part, entitled "Banking Issues", 
which has its counterpart in "Loans and Advances", positively decreased 
in the first years of war, as the custom of cash payments for a time pre-
vailed. The recent increase in banking issues appears to be partly due to 
the arrears in payments by Government Departments to the trade, which 
force the industriai concerns to resort to banks for advances and also to 
payments in Treasury bills, which are discounted by recipients at the 
banks. Great as has been the increase in note issues, the Treasury claims 
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that the increase was relatively lower than in France and Great Britain, not 
to say Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. 
Many calculations were made during the war of the war expenditure in 
Italy. The following is, however, the first officiai estimate. The period con-
sidered is from August 1, 1914, to October 31, 1918, and the figures are in 
million Hre: 
August 1, 1914, to June 30, 1915 3,039.2 
July 1, 1915, to June 30, 1916 8,351.5 
July 1, 1916, to June 30, 1917 14,132.2 
July 1, 1917, to June 30, 1918 19,734.6 
July 1, 1918, to October 31, 1918 6,725.6 
51,983.1 
Various deductions 984.6 
Payments by War, Munitions, Marine, Transport and Pensions Departments 50,998.5 
A d d -
Payments to be made in foreign countries for goods and services received 8,000.0 
Interests paid upon war debts by the Treasury 3,620.5 
Total payments relating to war 62,619.0 
Deduct -
Military expenditure, which would have been made, if peace prevailed dur-
ing the period considered 3,545.7 
Net war expenditure 59,073.3 
The absolute sum is lower than that of other belligerent great Powers. 
But if the sum spent is compared to the private wealth of Italy prior to the 
war, which was estimated at 80,000 million lire, and can, at the utmost, be 
stretched to 110,000 million lire, it is easy to conclude that Italy is, of ali the 
Allies, the country which has sustained the most crushing financial effort, 
relatively to her previous wealth. 
The following are the figures relating to the State debts in Italy at the 
date of October 31, 1918 (in millions of Lire). (See table at p. 140). 
That the sum of war debts is of 49,457 million lire, while the total war 
expenditure was of 59,073 million Hre, may be explained by the fact that 
the figure of 49,457 millions of war debts is the nominai figure, represent-
ing the sum that the State is obliged to repay to its creditors. That sum may 
be higher or lower than the real sum which the Exchequer has received. It 
is higher in the case of National War Loans, which, having been issued at 
various prices below par, had given to the Exchequer the sum of 10,084.5 
mi l l i on Hre only, instead of the nominai sum of 14,737. The sum registered 
is lower than the sum received in the case of foreign loans, as in addition to 
13,851 milHons Hre nominai debt at the par of exchange with sterlings, dol-
lars, and francs, the Government received 7,800 miHions lire, owing to the 
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1. Old debts, previous to the present war 13,636 
2. War debts 49,457 
National War Loans 
First, second, and third loans 4,628 
Fourth loan 3,986 
Fifth loan 6,123 
14,737 
Treasury Bonds, 5 % (three and five years) 3,052 
Exchequer Bills, from three to twelve months 9,240 
Treasury Bonds discounted by Allied (British and 
American) Governments and other credits opened 
by the same Governments 13,851 
Notes issued by the banks of issue for Government 
account 6536 
Notes directly issued by the Government (not in-
cluding the Buoni di Cassa fot 1 and 2 lire) 2,041 
Total war debts 49,457 
General total 63,093 
greater number of lire in which sterlings, dollars, &c., were exchanged. 
Other items of expenditure included in the 59,073 millions have yet to 
be liquidated, and a sum of 4,791 millions lire was obtained by war taxes. 
An index of the industriai progress of Italy during the war is furn-
ished by the statistics of joint-stock companies. A few figures may be in-
teresting: 
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1916 173 96 + 77 410.0 178.2 + 231.8 
1917 287 87 + 200 1,362.7 77.3 + 1,285.4 
First quarter of 1918. 237 39 + 198 1,151.6 30.1 + 1,121.5 
Third quarter of 1918 160 30 + 130 1,174.2 25.4 + 1,148.8 
The most striking increases were in the iron and steel companies -
286.8 millions in 1917, 316.5 in the first quarter of 1918, and 586.5 in 
the third quarter of 1918. The increase was partly of a permanent charac-
ter, and partly due to the financing of war enterprises. A not indifferent 
cause of increases of capital was the limitation of dividends, which was im-
posed by the Government in 1916. The joint-stock companies, which, not-
withstanding the war profit tax graded to 60 per cent, and the ordinary 
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income-tax of 16 per cent., could not infrequendy distribute a dividend 
greater than the legai maximum (10 per cent, for new companies, 8 per 
cent, or the mean of three previous dividends for the old companies), 
and which are fearing a retrospective increase of war taxes, endeavoured 
to elude the legai limitations. The first attempts to increase the capital, 
on which a dividend may be paid, by a distribution of bonus shares, given 
gratuitously to shareholders by conversions of reserves, was made vain by a 
new decree, which declared that such bonus shares should remain divi-
dendless till after the peace. Numerous companies resolved then to in-
crease the capital proper. As the new shares are sold at par to the old 
shareholders - the issue at a price above par is practically impossible, since, 
by a technicality of our income-tax law, the premium above par would be 
deemed "income", and subjected to the income-tax, recendy increased in 
most cases from 16 to 24 per cent. - the result is thus obtained of distri-
buting a greater mass of dividends than would be legally possible without 
the increase of capital. This is truly a most unfortunate result of the legisla-
tion for the limitation of dividends, as none can say whether in the after-
war period ali such capital artificially increased will find employment. An-
other unfortunate result of the same legislation was that ali companies, even 
those which would have spared a part of their profit, endeavoured by ali 
means to reach the limit of 8 per cent., for fear lest the Government should 
in after times absorb the undistributed profits. And thus it is very difficult 
to say wheter the results of the limitation of dividends policy were in the 
main beneficiai or hurtful to the common good and to the industry. 
50. 
ITALY 
T H E NEW GENERAL TARIFF PROPOSALS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 27 
With the general elections pending, ali the Parliamentary Commissions 
have suspended work. The Chamber of Deputies Commission, which 
50. November 15, 1919, pp. 903-904. This is part of a correspondence from Italy, unsigned, en-
titled: "Italy. The new general tariff proposals. Public finance". Written by correspondents in 
Verona and Turin, it is published in the section: "Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution 
to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is also dated Turin. 
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ought to report on the new general tariff, had to leave its work unfinished. 
The Government took the opportunity for sending the new tariff for exam-
ination to the most important manufacturing and trading associations, ask-
ing for their advice. What will be the response of the trade world is uncer-
tain. But it is highly probable that in manufacturing circles the proposals 
will create a clamour for greater protection, and that the voices requesting 
a lowering of the highest duties will be few, mostly from the agricultural 
interest. The new tariff ought, indeed, to alarm consumers and maritime 
and trading interests. The tariffs are really two: 1) the first is to apply pro-
visionally only to goods imported from ex-enemy countries. The existing 
general tariff is to be increased by a supplement, which goes from 20 to 
400 per cent. - in one case to 1,000 per cent. - of the existing duty. This 
tariff will necessarily have a short life. 2) The second, or new general tariff, 
is much more important, as it will take the place automatically of ali the 
existing tariffs with the countries with which the present commercial trea-
ties will not be renewed. The trend of the new tariff is distinctly Protection-
ist. Take the example of machinery. I give below a comparison between the 
old (existing) general tariff and the new tariff proposals: 
(In Lire, per Quintal) 
Old Tariff New Tariff 
Steam machinery 12 19-112 
Hydraulic machinery 10 19-57 
Locomotives 14 36-43 
Locomobiles 12 31 
Sea steam machinery 12 19-112 
Agricultural machinery 
Reapers and mowers 4 16-20 
Others 9 17-22 
Grinding machinery 10 19-23 
Weaving machinery 10 19-23 
Electric machinery 
Of a weight greater than 1 ton 30 35-45 
Of a weight of 1 ton and less 30 50-135 
Sewing machinery 25-30 39-55 
Mill (flour) machinery 10 23 
Paper-making machinery 10 20 
Typographical and lithographical 
machinery 10 22-46 
Other machinery 10 20-48 
Next to the great ali-round increase in the duties the most interesting 
feature is the minute discrimination in the qualities of the goods dutiable. 
For instance, the present tariff groups ali the spinning machinery under the 
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same number, which is dutiable at 10 lire per quintal. Under the new tariff 
the spinning machinery will be divided into three classes: 
Duty per Quintal 
Over 30 quintals weight 19 
Over 10 quintals up to 30 quintals.... 21 
Of 10 quintals and less 23 
The less the weight, the greater the duty per unit of weight. 
The tariff aims at counterbalancing the increased cost of production: 
increases of wages, of coal, of transport, of taxes are the reasons which 
the compilers of the tariff quote in justification of the increases which 
tende to put a wall around the Italian borders. But, if the increase of cost 
is general, of what avail will be the tariff? So far, however, the public, ab-
sorbed in politicai and national contests, have paid but little attention to 
fiscal matters. They are much more interested in the plans for a levy on 
old and new capital, which are elaborated by Governmental Commissions. 
The few Free-traders and some agricultural organisations have not wholly 
lost the hope that the new Parliament will put an end to the efforts made to 
charge on industry and trade a tariff tax more onerous than a capital levy 
and an income-tax combined. 
51. 
ITALY 
BANKING DEPOSITS AND INFLATION 
Turin, January 6 
The statistical appendices to the last Budget speech of the Finance 
Minister, lately published, contain some interesting figures on the econom-
ie condition of Italy. Banking deposits have risen continuously during the 
war, as is shown in the following table (in 100,000's of lire, 00,000 
omitted): 
51. January 24, 1920, pp. 144-145. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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Banks of issue 
Ordinary banks 
Popular banks 
Co-operative banks 
Savings banks 
Postai savings office 
Public pawning houses 
Rural banks 
June 30, June 30, June 30, June 30, June 30, June 30, 
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 
100,0 649,6 504,7 412,7 703,7 774,5 
1,044,6 664,8 907,7 1,335,4 2,188,5 3,447,7 
703,5 583,4 707,9 880,4 1,037,7 1,423,7 
507,8 427,4 531,7 669,2 817,0 1,237,3 
2,800,0 2552,4 2,905,1 3,432,7 4,034,7 5,589,2 
2,121,3 1,861,7 1,987,6 2,352,9 2,919,4 4,223,7 
214,5 220,0 245,4 284,6 337,4 457,4 
103,7 96,8 112,3 150,9 193,4 282,0 
7595,4 7,056,3 7,902,4 9538,8 12,231,8 17,435,5 
Public pawning houses (Monti di Pietà) are included, because they 
have separate departments, which accept deposits, and are in ali respects 
true savings banks. After a decrease in 1915, in the first year of the war, 
and having remained stationary during 1916 and 1917, the deposits be-
gan to increase, with an accelerated pace as time went on. After June 
30, 1919, the rise continued, for it is highly probable that a December 
31, 1919, the deposits will not be far short of 20,000 million lire. In 
the first year of the war the decrease was almost general, only the Monti 
di Pietà and the banks of issue escaping the general fate; the first because 
of their public character, the last because they were exempted from the 
moratorium, and so people began to patronise them, notwithstanding 
the very low rate of interest allowed. The figures show the great hold 
public (saving banks, Postai Savings Office, and Monti di Pietà) and 
co-operative (popular, co-operative and rural) institutions have on the de-
positing Italian public; less than a fourth part of the deposits are in the 
hands of ordinary banks and banks of issue. To-day, however, popular, 
co-operative, savings and rural banks are true banks in the ordinary 
sense; they discount bills and transact ali sorts of ordinary banking opera-
tions, principally in a small way, for the benefit of small traders and agri-
culturists. 
Increases in the capital of joint-stock companies are traced in the fol-
lowing table (in 100,000 of lire, 00,000 omitted). (See table to p. 145). 
Monetary inflation has much to do with the extraordinary increases of 
the share capital of joint-stock companies. The same capital will not to-day 
do the same work as in old times, but a residue of genuine increase is evi-
dent. Old private firms and companies are busy transforming themselves 
into joint-stock companies. 
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1916 1917 
First Six Months 
l y l g of 1919 
Share capital issued in new companies 176,4 494,3 804,5 472,3 
Ditto old companies 233,5 868,4 2,216,3 1,086,4 
Total new capital 409,9 1,362,7 3,020,8 1,558,7 
Decrease in the share capital 
For winding up of old companies 59,9 44,5 51,7 48,0 
For writing down of the nominai value of 
shares 118,3 32,9 14,4 31,1 
Total decrease 178,2 77,4 66,1 79,1 
New increases of share capital 231,7 1,285,3 2,954,6 1,479,6 
New debentures issued 33,0 113,4 7,0 -
52. 
ITALY 
PRODUCTION, CREDIT, AND PRICES - T H E NEW LOAN 
From our Correspondent 
Rome, February 1 
Italian statistics are greatly in arrear, and it is possible only with the 
greatest diffieulty to discover figures relating to the economie development 
of Italy during the war. That production has been, on the whole, shrinking, 
may be judged from the following comparison between agricultural pro-
duction in 1913 and 1918: 
1913 1918 
Wheat Tons 5,845,200 4,988,500 
Maize " 2,753,200 1,940,000 
Rice (raw) " 543,200 523,500 
Potatoes " 1,789,200 1,409,900 
Beet " 2,730,000 1,146,000 
Leaves of mulberry " 889,400 1,073,000 
Lemons and oranges " 876,500 700,000 
Wine Hectolitres 5,224,000 3,500,000 
Olive oil " 174,200 270,000 
Greater variations up and down are shown in the figures for mining 
and manufacturing industries: 
52. February 14, 1920, p. 320. The article, unsigned but dated "Rome, February 1", was pub-
lished in the section: "Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable 
because the author is evidently the same as the previous article. 
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(00's omitted) 
MINERAL INDUSTRIES 
Iron ore Tons 
Iron pyrites 
Copper 
Spelter 
Lead 
Lignite and other fossil combustibles 
Sulphur (raw) 
Marble 
IRON AND STEEL 
Pig iron. 
Steel 
VARIOUS INDUSTRIES 
Raw silk.. 
Cotton.... 
Jute 
Hemp 
Flax 
Raw material used in 
manufacture 
Sugar 
Pure alcohol Hectolitre 
Impure alcohol 
Electrical power produced 
Millions of E.W. hour 
Illuminating gas Cubie metres 
New water-power plants H.P. 
1913 1917 
603.1 993.8 
317.3 500.8 
89.5 86.8 
158.3 79.4 
44.6 39.1 
701.1 1,722.1 
386.3 211.8 
509.3 134.2 
426.7 471.2 
846.1 1,331.6 
4.7 2.7 
194.6 133.9 
41.4 10.0 
44.0 52.5 
5.4 2.4 
1,913.14 1,917.18 
305.6 92.6 
37.2 29.9 
14.3 6.1 
23,119.3 33,915.9 
591,109.0 797,991.7 
18.2 29.9 
Except in the cases where the difficulty of procuring materials was 
overwhelming, ItaHan industry has made a great and in several instances 
a successful effort toward increasing production and meeting the war 
needs. 
The increase in values was far greater than the decrease of output. The 
substitution of water-power for coal has been the cause of great capital in-
vestments, and of the various increases in minerai and steel industries. In a 
previous letter (.Economist, January 24th) I gave figures on the increases of 
the share capital of the joint-stock companies. The increases, which in the 
years previous to war totaUed from 100 to 200 million Hre yearly, reached 
1,285 millions in 1917 and 2,954 milHon Hre in 1918. A recent calculation 
gives the figures of a total of 4,414 joint-stock companies existing in Italy at 
December 31, 1918. The total share capital - practically in Italy ali the share 
capital is ordinary capital - amounted at that date to 11,782,905,381 
Hre. 
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The financing of public companies and private firms has caused large 
increases in the figures of loans and discounts by the banks. Here is a com-
parison for the three issues banks (Bank of Italy, Bank of Naples, Bank of 
Sicily) (in millions of lire): T , . . , - „ , , 
Discounts Loans (with Collaterals) 
1913 3,899.9 1,200.4 
191 8 5,867.9 6,813.3 
1919 (first nine months) 2,660.8 3,085.8 
The four great ordinary banks (Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Ita-
liano, Banca Italiana di Sconto, and Banco di Roma) show the following 
movements in the principal items of their balance-sheets (in millions of lire): 
Dee. 31, 1913 Dee. 31, 1918 Sept. 30, 1919 
Capital and reserves 647.0 774.0 1,084.1 
Deposits 702.1 1,973.1 2,563.0 
Correspondents (creditore) 971.5 5,514.0 7,757.4 
Cash 129.2 518.4 646.6 
Discounts 1,035.2 4500.9 6,773.9 
Advances 220.6 5875 536.6 
Investiments 1695 220.0 294.4 
Correspondents (debtors) 750.7 2,795.6 3,805.3 
Monetary and credit inflation is responsible for much of the great rise 
in prices. According to Professor Bachi's Index Number, the rise was as 
follows in 1919. The basis is, as in the Economisfs Index Number, 
1901-5, 100. The classes are the same as in your indexes. 
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Basis (average 1901-1905).... 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average 1913 120.2 146.1 •120.6 121.0 117.9 126.0 
" 1914 1225 122.6 116.1 121.0 113.4 119.8 
" 1915 159.6 136.4 139.1 249.2 157.8 167.2 
" 1916 188.3 195.5 219.4 459.4 224.9 251.6 
" 1917 252.4 249.9 393.9 721.1 370.8 385.9 
" 1918 374.9 334.0 572.6 908.7 460.8 515.5 
January, 1919 365.5 438.7 398.4 370.0 496.9 412.7 
Aprii, 1919 353.4 482.1 407.7 434.2 411.4 415.7 
July, 1919 401.8 484.9 483.2 508.6 403.7 452.7 
October, 1919 391.7 531.3 601.9 562.1 402.0 487.0 
November, 1919 394.8 539.0 764.0 699.1 414.1 547.1 
As prices increased between 1914 and November, 1919, from 119.8 to 
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547.1, or, say, 356 per cent., whereas the total production of goods has prob-
ably remained the same, or even diminished, while the note issue (banking 
and State) increased from 2,800 to 18,000 million lire (in round figures), or 
540 per cent., it is reasonable to fear that the upward movement of prices 
has not spent itself. Public opinion and Governmental circles have fortu-
nately been aroused at last to a recognition of the gravity of the situation. 
The sixth national loan is meeting with a remarkable success. At the end 
of January the sum subscribed was already over 12 billion lire, or the doublé 
of the fiffh loan, which had won the Italian record with a figure of 6 billions. 
The Treasury Minister, Signor Schanzer, has repeatedly stated that the pro-
ceeds of the loan will be devoted only to reduce the amount outstanding of 
Treasury bills and of notes issued. If a permanent check is put to new note 
issues, one may hope to see the end of the rise in prices. 
53. 
I T A L Y 
T H E CAPITAL TAX 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 7 
The Gazzetta Ufficiale of May 1, 1920, contains a new edition (dated 
Aprii 22, 1920) of the legislative orders relating to the extraordinary capital 
tax, tax on increments of capital owing to war, and to the extraordinary tax 
on dividends of shares and other bearer securities. The history of variations 
of the Italian capital tax is an interesting instance of the difficulties which 
are necessarily incurred by Governments desirous to transform into a rea-
lity the general idea of a levy on capital. There were three stages in the Ita-
lian experience on this subject. In July last the Nitti Cabinet, shortly after 
coming to power, decided to create an extraordinary tax on capital, with a 
discrimination against fortunes made by war. This decision was probably 
ali that the Government had thought on the matter. A Departmental Com-
mission was nominated, from which, after some very general debates, a 
53. May 15, 1920, pp. 1004-1005. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
— 148 — 
MAY, 1920 
small Committee was selected, composed of Professors Cablati, Einaudi, 
Gini, Griziotti, and of Dr. Benettini and D'Aroma, of the Department of 
Finance. This Committee set to work, and in the last days of September, 
1919, produced a project, which was afterwards called, in the public Press, 
the specialists' project. Passing over the very detailed sections relating to 
valuation, payments, penalities against offenders of the law, the gist of 
the project was as follows: - Ali men and women - politicai persons, ex-
cluding juridical persons, such as public bodies, joint stock companies, 
and the like, which are to be taxed through the shareholders, &c., - pos-
sessed of a capital of at least 20,000 lire (£ 800 at the par of exchanges) 
are to be subjected to an extraordinary forced loan. The loan to be of 5 
per cent, of a capital of 20,000 lire, 9.96 per cent, on 100,000 lire, 13.09 
per cent, on 200,000 lire, 20.69 per cent, on 1,000,000 lire (£ 40,000), 
31,01 per cent, on 10,000,000 lire, and 40 per cent, on 100,000,000 and 
over (£ 4,000,000 and over). The payment of the forced loan was to be dis-
tributed over eight years if three-fourths of the capital consist of land and 
houses, over six years if land and houses constitute from a fourth to three-
fourths parts of the capital, and four years if land and houses are less than a 
fourth part of the total capital. The years are always four and the tax always 
40 per cent, for the bearer securities (Consols and other public debts, secu-
rities, shares, debentures, &c.) which are not registered or inscribed, some-
what in the fashion of English securities, in a term of six months. 
Notwithstanding the name of forced loan, the tax was, in truth, a capital 
levy, because the taxpayer had the right to reduce the payment to two-
thirds of the published rate when he declared his intention of renouncing 
to the bonds of the forced loan. As the loan was to give a dividend of only 1 
per cent, and to be redeemed in 70 years from January 1, 1930, the full 
payment of the tax, with the bonus of a 70-years 1 per cent, bond, was 
equivalent to a two-thirds payment without the bonus of the bond. 
The project was received with mixed feelings by the public opinion. 
Great was the apprehension 1) of landed and housing interests, which 
feared that payment in so short a time as eight years may lead to general 
selling and lowering of values; 2) of banking men, who doubted a run 
on deposits; 3) of joint stock companies, which said that so high a tax as 
40 per cent, on ali bearer securities may cause a severe crisis on the 
bourses. In a country like Italy, in which inscribed or registered stocks 
and shares are little known (perhaps only five billions on a total of 80 bil-
lions of public debt and other securities), the problem of bearer securities 
is overwhelming, and is destined to baffle ali attempts to a progressive tax 
on capital and income. What certainty is there of taxing in proportion to 
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the real fortune if the bearer securities are escaping? The device of taxing 
these securities at the maximum rate, or 40 per cent., was imagined to force 
possessors to inscribe them. 
As a matter of fact, the Government delayed legislation till after general 
elections - and the delay was one of the causes of the Socialists' great suc-
cess, as it gave them a popular platform against the selfishness of the prop-
ertied class, which, after enriching themselves by the war, refused to pay an 
overdue tribute toward restoration of public finances; and on November 
24, 1919, published a decree for a so-called extraordinary capital tax, pay-
able in 30 years. The tax was to be 0.167 per cent, per annum on men pos-
sessed of a capital of 20,000 lire, gently rising to 0.833 per cent, per annum 
on fortunes of 100,000,000 Hre and over. 
The new decree of Aprii 22, 1920, is a recognition by the Government 
that the critics were right in some of their strictures. The lower taxable limit 
is to be raised from 20,000 to 50,000 Hre (£ 2,000 at the par of exchanges). 
The rate of the tax is put at 4.50 per cent, for fortunes of 50,000 Hre, at 9.61 
per cent, for 100,000 Hre, at 11.62 per cent, for 1,000,000 Hre, at 24.11 per 
cent, for 10,000,000 Hre, at 40,14 per cent, for 50,000,000 Hre, and at 50 
per cent, for fortunes of 100,000,000 Hre and over. The tax to be payable 
in 20 years if the fortune consist of 40 per cent, or over of land and houses, 
and in 10 years if the proportion of land and houses to total fortune is less 
than 40 per cent. The taxpayer has the right to redeem at any moment the 
payments yet to be made, with a discount of 6 per cent, per annum. The 
special tax on dividends of private bearer securities {i.e., excluding always 
the State Consols, bonds, biUs, &c.) is raised from 9 to 15 per cent.; 
and, as it does not exempt to possessor from the HabiHty to the capital levy, 
it is hoped that many wiH inscribe their stocks. 
The capital levy is accompanied, as it was, indeed, in aU the stages, by 
an extraordinary tax on fortunes made during the war. The tax goes from 
10 per cent, on 9 to 10 per cent, increases on pre-war fortunes to 80 per 
cent, on over 70 per cent, increases. The tax is very drastic; but it has to 
be remembered that the definition of "increases of fortune owing to 
war" is a special one. An increase of fortune has the same meaning as 
"war profit". And so the war profits - i.e., the profits reaHsed from August 
1, 1914, to December 31, 1919, by traders and industriai and trading com-
panies, which had already been taxed with a war profit tax from 10 to 60 
per cent., according to the proportional excess over pre-war profit stan-
dard - are to be newly taxed on the remaining portion with the new tax 
on war fortunes. In some cases the two taxes wiH amount together to a rate 
of 91 per cent., which is truly not a smaH tax. 
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54. 
ITALY 
NOTE ISSUES AND PRICES - TRADE BALANCE - T H E EXCHANGE OUTLOOK 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 21 
Signor Bonaldo Stringher, general manager of the Bank of Italy, has 
published a second edition of his "Notes on the Position of Circulation 
and the Money Market During and After the War", which had proved 
so interesting to students of public finance in Italy. This second edition 
is even more useful, as it brings up to date figures and facts which it is very 
difficult to gather elsewhere. He gives the following figures of issues of pa-
per money in millions of lire: 
Issued to 
the Trade 
Bank Notes 
Issued to the 
State Exchequer Total 
State Notes 
(Lire 5 and 
10 Notes) 
Tot. 1 Bank 
and State 
Notes 
Buoni and Cassa 
(Lire 1 and 2 
Notes) 
July 31, 1914 2,265.2 _ 2,265.2 499.1 2,764.3 _ 
December 31, 1915.. 1,898.7 2,068.3 3,968.0 1,082.1 5,050.1 -
" 1916.. 2,498.2 2,554.2 5,012.4 1,317.3 6,329.7 -
" 1917.. 2,592.0 5,833.0 8,425.0 1,748.8 10,173.8 92.0 
" 1918.. 4,584.7 7,165.9 11,750.2 5,154.1 13,874.3 213.0 
" 1919.. 5,551.6 10,659.7 16,281.3 2,271.3 18,552.6 262.4 
February 29,1920.. - - - 2,271.31 17,870.3 262.4 
March 20, " . - - 15,608.0 _ J -
So far as I am aware, this is the only authoritative and complete state-
ment of the various note issues in Italy. A few words may be useful to ex-
plain it. The bank notes are divided in two sections - notes issued for ac-
count of trade (loans on collaterals and discount of trade bills), and notes 
directly issued to the exchequer. This second section corresponds roughly 
to British ways and means advances; these are notes which the three banks 
54. May 29,1920, pp. 1203-1204. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. The argument of note issues is widely discussed in II Corriere della Sera by Ei-
naudi in the same period and in the same terms. 
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of issue hand over to the exchequer at a nominai rate of interest (from 0.10 
to 0.25 per cent.), so that the exchequer may be able to make current pay-
ments. It is financing the war by paper issues. 
The first section of notes - "trade notes" - are covered by gold and 
silver, and equivalent reserves, or issued against trade bills or loans on col-
laterals. It is highly probable that, if during the years from 1915 to 1917 the 
whole of this section were genuine trade issues, during 1918 and 1919 the 
figures were swollen by causes not connected with trade, but with war. 
The situation between trade and State issues is not to-day so clear as it was 
formerly. 
The State notes, corresponding to British lOs and £ 1 "Bradburys", 
went on increasing as prices rose. The same allegations are heard in Italy 
as in Great Britain from Treasury circles that not a single note has been 
issued beyond the requirements of trade necessity, and the same replies 
come from the economists, namely that the continued issues are the causes 
of the increases of prices, and of the increased clamour of commerce for 
more and more notes. The figures in the last column relate to the small 
notes for one and two lire (10 or 20 pence at the par of exchange), which 
were issued after September, 1917, to provide a substitute for silver coins, 
which were fast disappearing from active circulation. At December 31, 
1920, against the 262.4 millions lire of little notes existed a reserve of 
175.6 millions lire of silver coins. At the high price of silver the wisdom 
of not selling this silver stock is questionable. 
As the total paper issues increased prices went up. The index number 
of Professor Bachi (basis 100 on the mean of 1901-05, as in the Economist 
index) was 119.8 for 1914 (mean of monthly index numbers), 167.2 for 
1915, 251.6 for 1916, 381.9 for 1917, and 515.5 for 1918. The mean index 
number for 1919 is as yet not calculated, but the figure was 572.8 at De-
cember 31, 1919. The prices upon which Professor Bachi makes his calcu-
lations are wholesale prices. The increase in the cost of life for working and 
middle classes is less than 472.8 per cent.; perhaps 300 per cent. But it is 
sufficient to explain the unrest among the masses. 
Space forbids me to point out the reasons which causes me to hope 
that the worst point has been surpassed. Owing to the brilliant success 
of the last (sixth) National loan - 20 billions lire, a truly astounding figure 
for Italy, of which, however, 13 billions were paid in exchequer bills and 
other short-dated State debt certificates, and only 7 billions in cash - a stop 
has been put to new increases in notes issued. The figures for February 
29th and March 20th point to some reduction. If the stop is to be final, bet-
ter times are ahead of us. 
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The figures of our international trade are also promising. I give the 
figures for January and February, 1920, the latest available (in millions 
of lire): 
Y Excess of Imports Imports Exports rv T? E Over Exports 
191 9 2,430.7 467.7 1,963.0 
192 0 1,997.9 966.3 1,031.6 
- 4 3 2 . 8 + 498.6 - 931.4 
The prices for both years are those of 1919, so that the figures are sig-
nificant for quantities and not for values. But the trend of the movement is 
unmistakable. The balance of trade is redressing, and as the movement 
dates from July, 1919, we may hope that at last the lira will appreciate 
in the International markets, provided that the check to new note issues 
is severely maintained. 
55. 
ITALY 
FALLING FOREIGN EXCHANGES AND SECURITIES -
GERMAN INDEMNITY AND FOREIGN D E B T 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 4 
Price movements in the Italian Stock Exchanges - of which there are 
five, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Roma, and Florence, quoted in their order of 
importance - are viewed by the public with mixed feelings. People rejoice 
when they see the foreign exchanges crumble. The £, instead of 100-105 
lire at Aprii 10th, is to-day quoted 66-67 lire, the dollar 17 lire instead of 
25 lire, Swiss frane 3.10 instead of 4.70, French frane 1.33 instead of 
1.60. The fall in imports and the rise in exports has contributed to this re-
sult. The banks, also, had persuaded their customers to buy foreign bills 
needed to pay for imports; and this counsel of wisdom, if it sent up the 
exchanges in Aprii, when ali importers were covering themselves for the 
55. June 12, 1920, pp. 1296-1297. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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fulfilment of old an new engagements, has eventually modified the course 
of foreign exchanges in our favour. 
But, together with foreign exchanges, the prices of bonds and shares 
are crumbling also; for instance, the shares of the Bank of Italy, which were 
quoted 1,525 on Aprii 10th, are to-day at 1,440; the Banca Commerciale 
shares have fallen from 1,300 to 1,175, the Credito Italiano from 860 to 
745, the Banca Italiana di Sconto from 620 to 580, the Navigazione Ge-
nerale Italiana from, 850 to 835 after touching 950, Acciaierie Terni (Steel-
works) from 1,160 to 950, Fiat (motor-car) from 390 to 340, Ansaldo from 
210 to 185, Beni Stabili (house proprietary company of Rome) from 375 to 
310, Fondi Rustici (land company) from 295 to 275. The reaction has sev-
eral causes. The rise of the officiai rate of discount from 5 to 6 per cent., 
followed by a rise from 5 to 7 and 8 per cent, for bourse prolongations, has 
compelled many bulls to realise. The fall of the foreign exchanges, it is 
hoped, will bring at last a fall in prices and of profits, so that the present 
market valuation of shares of joint-stock companies may prove too high. 
Not a few people are realising stocks and shares, so that they may not in-
clude them in the affidavit for capital tax, which should have been made at 
May 31, 1920, which date has been at the last moment changed to June 
10' . Many fear that the Government may abolish ali bearer certificates 
for bonds and shares, and oblige ali possessors to inscribe them with their 
names; and for this reason they are selling securities for cash, which may be 
hidden from the tax gatherers. 
There has been much talk in newspapers and financial circles on the 
fixing of the German indemnity discussed at Hythe between the British 
and French Premiers. The news that 55 per cent, of the indemnity will 
go to France and 25 per cent, to Great Britain, leaving only 20 per cent, 
to Italy, Belgium, and Serbia together, has come as a surprise, if not to a 
few insiders, to the great mass of public opinion. 
The old pro-German party are raising their heads, and, with the assent 
of many sincere patriots, they point: 1) to territorial aims of Italy which 
have not been fulfilled. On which point I will remark only that the greatest 
need of Italy at the present moment is a true peace, with territorial bound-
aries precisely defined; 2) to the crushing load of internai (perhaps 60 bil-
lions hre) and external (21 billions lire at the par of exchange) debts. Leav-
ing out of account the internai debt which we may manage to solve our-
selves, there remain the external debts towards Great Britain and United 
States. As you have so truly remarked, and as Mr. Keynes has admirably 
put in his book [Economie Consequences of the Peace], the external debt 
will be a source of great embarrassment for the Italian Budget, for our for-
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eign balance of payment, and a source of lasting friction between Italy and 
her allies. Italians are an honourable people, and they will honour their 
signature, if obliged to do so. But many hoped in Italy that our allies 
would have accepted a cession of our right to German indemnity in pay-
ment of their claims. The news that Italy will have the right only to a part 
of 20 per cent, of the indemnity has meant a sheer disappointment to ali 
who worked for a lasting alliance between Italy and the Anglo-Saxon 
world; and has given a new life to pro-Germans and Bolshevists, who 
point to the "Anglo-American-French octopus" in possession of Gibral-
tar, Suez, Constantinople, of coal and iron and wheat, and cotton and 
wool, and in a position to strangle Italy if she cannot pay the interest of 
21 billions of foreign debt. Of what use has been the victory if victory 
has left us crushed by a charge greater than the worst indemnity that 
would have been exacted from us by a victorious Germany? Many who 
have steadfastly worked for the permanent co-operation of Western na-
tions had hoped that a pool would have been made of ali expenditure in-
curred during the war for a common cause, and the strongest nations 
(United States and United Kingdom) would have assisted the weakest 
(France and Italy) in supporting the common load. If their hopes are shat-
tered, they will have a difficult task when trying to persuade an angry pub-
lic opinion to abide by the cause which Italy had so courageously 
espoused in 1915. 
56. 
ITALY 
BUDGET DEFICIT AND THE BREAD SUBSIDY 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 19 
The great event of recent days has been the fall of the Nitti Cabinet and 
the return to power of Signor Giolitti. Signor Nitti fell in an honest, even if 
ill-conceived, attempt to stop the fearful gap in the Budget originated by 
56. June 26, 1920, pp. 1395-1396. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. The issue of bread subsidy is widely discussed in some articles of II Corriere 
della Sera in the period May-September 1920 and in the same terms. 
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the bread subsidy. As in most belligerent countries, the Government en-
deavoured during the war to give bread at a fixed price to consumers. 
The price was eventually raised from 60 to 85 centesimi (from about 6 
to 8 pence) per kilogram; but this last price was well below the cost of 
production. The situation may be briefly stated thus. Against the total 
cost of 7,000 million lire the Government may reckon, as things are 
to-day, only on a selling price of 65 lire per metric quintal - i.e., on a 
total receipt of 2,600 million lire. The difference, 4,400 million lire, is 
the expenditure which the bread subsidy throws on the 1920-21 Budget. 
It is an appalling loss, which has gone on increasing as the exchanges de-
preciated. The bread subsidy has cost the Italian Treasury about 10,000 
million lire from 1915 to end of 1919; to-day the loss is estimated nearly 
at half that amount for a year only. The problem was rendered difficult 
to tackle by an unfortunate resolution of the Legislative Chamber, which 
said that the price could not be increased at the expense of the working 
classes. Nitti's Cabinet endeavoured to round off the corner by increas-
ing the Government selling price of wheat from 65 to 115 lire per metric 
quintal, and consequently the bread price from 85 centesimi to 1.50 lire 
per kilogram, and at the same time putting an obligation on ali employers 
of increasing salaries and wages by 25 centesimi daily for every person 
dependent upon workers. The system was clumsy, as it obliged every 
firm to have a list of their men, with particulars as to family, dependents, 
&c. Frauds were obviously possible. A further complication and a source 
of discontent was the proposai of a bread tax on ali who had an income 
of more than 12,000 lire per annum. The tax was to be 300 or 500 lire, 
according as the taxpayer had less or more than 20,000 lire yearly in-
come. 
The proposai, in the face of a well-nigh general opposition, was given 
up. Soon after, the Cabinet resigned, and in their place Signor Giolitti has 
formed a Cabinet. But the bread subsidy problem remains as acute as be-
fore. The gravity has even increased, as recently the season has been very 
adverse to the crop, and the wheat production threatens to be only 40 mil-
lion quintals instead of 48 millions. If so, we should be obliged to import 
another 8 millions, which would cost the Government 2,000 million lire, 
and would be sold at 520 millions. The charge is unbearable indeed. 
The ordinary ItaHan Budget for 1920-21 closes with a deficit of 2 to 27 2 
billion Hre. This figure, though displeasing, is not appaHing; as the revenues 
are increasing. New taxes are already in being, which in due time wiH bai-
ance the Budget. The true problem, is how to manage the extraordinary 
Budget, which for 1920-21 can be summed up: 
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1) Past Budget expenses to be liquidated, 1,000 million lire. 
2) Bread subsidy loss, 4,000 to 6,000 million lire. 
3) Public employees' cost of living subsidy, 600 to 1,000 million lire. 
4) War expenses liquidation, 2,000 million lire. 
5) Compensation for war losses in Venetian provinces, yearly instal-
ment 1,500 million lire. 
6) Loss on railways, 500 million lire. 
7) Loss on maritime State navigation, coal, &c., 1,000 million lire. 
This extraordinary Budget of about 16,000 million lire is a big stone 
around the neck of Italy, and a great task awaits the new Treasury Minister, 
Signor Meda. With a firm hand suppressing ali unnecessary expenses, put-
ting an end to bread subsidy, and finally liquidating ali expenses connected 
with the war, we might hope in a few years to be rid of this extraordinary 
Budget. But the task is truly formidable, and the Cabinet and Minister who 
will perform it will merit great praise. 
57. 
I T A L Y 
INCREASED TAXES - ABOLITION OF BEARER SECURITIES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 5 
As the first act of his Government, Signor Giolitti has laid on the 
table of the Chamber of Deputies several Bills purporting to put Italian 
finances in a sound condition. As I stated in a previous letter, the situa-
tion is grave. The Finance Minister has announced for the financial year 
1920-21 an ordinary revenue of 9,000 million lire, and an extraordinary 
one of 1,500 millions from sale of war materials, &c., a total of 10,500 
millions, against which the ordinary expenditure amounts to 11,545 mil-
lion lire. This deficit would by itself not be very serious, as we can rea-
sonably hope for a continuous growth of the new taxes, which in the 
57. July 10 1920, p. 53. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is also 
dated Turin. Articles on the same argument, similarly treated, were written by Einaudi in II Cor-
riere della Sera in the period May-June 1920. 
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present year will not give their highest product. To the ordinary Budget 
one must, however, add the extraordinary, 5,500 million lire for bread 
subsidy; 2,850 millions for expenses connected with War Department, 
the fleet, and the colonies (liquidation of war expenses); 2,000 millions 
for damages to be repaired in the provinces occupied by the enemy in 
1917 and 1918; 1,300 millions for losses on maritime transport; 300 
millions for relief to disabled men, &c.; 650 millions for high cost of 
living subsidy to State employees; 600 millions deficit of the State rail-
way Budget. The extraordinary Budget thus reaches 13,200 million lire. 
As Signor Giolitti has hitherto said nothing concerning the bread sub-
sidy his promises of economy are somewhat vague. As a means of coun-
teracting the huge deficit he has laid more weight on new or increased 
taxes. The taxes on motor-cars will be greatly increased, especially on 
private motor-cars. The tax will be composed of two parts: one fixed, 
which rises from 310 lire yearly for motor-cars of not more than 9 
h.p. to 2,500 lire for cars from 40 to 50 h.p. To the fixed tax is added 
a proportional tax, which is 10 lire per h.p. if the entire force is not 
higher than 12 h.p., 30 lire from 12 to 16 h.p., 90 from 16 to 24 
h.p., 100 from 24 to 35 h.p., 150 from 35 to 50 h.p. Cars of 50 h.p. 
and more are put in a special class, which is taxed at the lump sum 
of 15,000 lire yearly. This tax will be well-nigh prohibitive, except for 
the very richest men. 
The succession tax has been already increased four times in the pre-
sent century; if this fifth increase be passed into law, the tax will weigh 
heavily on great fortunes. It would take too long to summarise the pro-
posai in detail, as the rates of the tax vary in proportion to the degree 
of relationship between the deceased and the heir or legatee, to the 
amount of the inherited portion and to the estate of the heir or legatee. 
For instance, in the case of succession from father to son, the tariff of 
Aprii 21, 1918, was of 1 per cent, if the inherited portion did not ex-
ceed 1,000 lire, and 1.50 per cent, if not 5,000, reaching 7 per cent, if 
the portion reached 1,000,000 lire, 8 per cent, up to 2,000,000, and 9 
per cent if the portion of the heir or legatee exceeded 2,000,000 lire. A 
decree of November 24, 1919, had introduced new rates for inherited 
portions of more than 2,000,000 reaching 12 per cent, on inherited por-
tions of 20,000,000 lire and more. The new tariff now proposed leaves 
untouched the rates up to 100,000 lire, for which it remains from 1 to 4 
per cent. At 250,000 the rate is increased from 5 to 6 per cent, for 
500,000 lire from 6 to 9 per cent., for 1,000,000 from 7 to 12 per cent., 
for 2,000,000 lire from 8 to 13 per cent., for 5,000,000 from 9 to 15 per 
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cent., for 10,000,000 from 10 to 18 per cent., for 20,000,000 from 12 to 
20 per cent., and for inherited portions upwards of 20,000,000 lire the 
rate is increased from 12 to 25 per cent. In addition, if the son was, 
previously to his inheritance, personally possessed of an estate of 
200,000 lire or more, to the succession tax is added an additional tax 
of 10 per cent, on his hereditary portion, provided that this tax is 
not higher than a third part of the difference between 200,000 lire 
and the previous estate of the heir or legatee. The taxes on other rela-
tives are construed on the same lines. As I cannot go into too many de-
tails, I will say only that the tax for successions between relatives on the 
sixth grade or more, or between non-relatives, rises from 18 (portions 
up to 1,000 lire) to 70 per cent, (portions of more than 20,000,000 lire), 
to which is to be added the additional tax of 10 per cent, if the pre-
vious estate of the heir or legatee was higher than 200,000 lire. 
Another highly significant Bill is one by which ali war profits from 
August 1, 1914, to December 31, 1919, are forfeited to the public 
Treasury. Italy had a war profit tax which from the originai 1911 max-
imum rate of 40 per cent, was already in 1916 put up to 60 per cent., 
superimposed to the ordinary income-tax. By a Royal decree of Novem-
ber 24, 1919, to the war profit tax was superimposed an increment of 
wealth tax, which absorbed from 5 to 80 per cent, of the remainder. If 
the Bill of Signor Giolitti becomes law, as is highly probable, ali the old 
taxes will be merged in a general confiscation of 100 per cent. This ap-
plies to war profits, as defined by the law, viz., profits above 8 per cent, 
on capital or above income taxed in 1912-13, of industries, trade, com-
merce, and intermediation. The confiscation aims at social pacification; 
but it is doubtful if the ruin or embarrassment of many enterprises 
which, with a little capital, have obtained great success, will be followed 
by a real pacification of the masses. They will always point to many ex-
amples of people getting rich, from whom the wealth acquired during 
the war has not been confiscated owing to difficulty of assessment. This 
confiscation is an ominous precedent in the case of future wars. Who 
will risk capital and labour with a prospect of confiscation? The Bill ap-
plies to foreigners, who during the war have obtained in Italy profits 
which may be legally termed war profits. The last momentous Bill ob-
liges ali possessors of securities to register them in their name. The Bill 
puts an end to bearer securities, which were until to-day almost the only 
form known to Italian investors. Ali securities, from the State Rentes 
and municipality debentures to joint stock company shares and deben-
tures, will cease to be bearer securities, and will have to be registered in 
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the name of the possessors. The precedent most frequently quoted in 
favour of this far-reaching reform is the English one. The Government 
aims by means of compulsory registration of ali securities at knowing 
exactly the capital and income of ali taxpayers. When taxes were prin-
cipally raised by a uniform or Constant rate of taxation, it was a matter 
of indifference to know the names of possessors of securities. But to-
day, when income-tax, capital tax, and succession tax are made more 
and more progressive, it is very important to know who are the true 
possessors of securities. Bearer securities are able to be passed over 
by taxpayers when they make their returns for assessment. When the 
scale of graduation is very steep, the temptation to fiscal fraud is great 
indeed. The bourses have been very depressed in consequence of the 
announcement of the Bill. Almost ali securities suffered a fall. Experi-
ence will show if registered securities will be marketable as well as 
bearer securities, and if savings will continue to be invested in public 
and private securities. 
58. 
ITALY 
PRICE MOVEMENTS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 16 
The course of prices in Italy may be studied in the series of number 
indexes published every month by Professor Bachi, exactly after the meth-
od of the Economist's Number Index. Professor Bachi, in a recent number 
of L'Economista, has published the whole series of his number index from 
1913 to May, 1920, to which I am able to add, thanks to the kindness of 
the author, the number index for June. The basis 100 is the average price 
of 1901-5, as for your number index. The Italian indexes are ali percentage 
numbers. 
58. July 24, 1920, p. 146. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is also 
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Date Cereals and Meat 
Other Food 
Products Textiles 
Minerals 
and Metals Miscellaneous Total 
Economist' 
Number Indi 
1913 (average) 120-2 146-1 120-6 121-0 117-9 126-0 _ 
1914 - June 115-9 132-7 115-6 111-7 107-7 117-0 115-9 
December.... 136.0 119-8 102-2 142-1 113-6 119-7 127-3 
1915 -June 149-5 124-6 126-3 260-3 154-5 161-3 147-7 
December.... 178-2 166-2 170-3 371-1 206-2 214-8 165-1 
1916 - June 184-8 194-7 194-1 459-7 232-8 242-8 191-5 
December.... 205-7 198-7 278-8 594-2 243-7 294-6 223-0 
1917 -June 229-8 249-4 371-0 722-5 297-1 362-9 256-6 
December.... 322-9 276-5 515-5 870-7 384-0 459-3 265-7 
1918 - June 335-5 326-0 589-8 975-1 468-1 523-5 277-5 
December.... 365-0 418-4 584-3 520-9 509-5 468-9 277-0 
1919 - June 396-6 501-8 455-9 506-6 396-0 451-0 281-3 
December.... 420-4 544-9 793-5 706-4 477-1 576-2 334-7 
1920 - January 436-5 578-1 937-4 811-9 492-3 634-7 353-1 
February 438-6 582-2 1013-2 1036-7 522-7 701-0 370-9 
March 458-5 610-4 1159-6 1205-2 576-0 780-0 379-6 
Aprii 475-2 712-6 1283-9 1302-5 630-8 855-7 374-2 
May 530-2 728-4 1012-8 1317-8 619-4 830-3 372-7 
June 535-0 741-1 895-3 1109-9 628-4 773-5 256-7 
The general trend of prices is the same in Italy as in foreign countries, 
but the rise was eightfold, when in England it was not nearly fourfold. The 
difference between the rise in Italy and the rise in England may be partly 
explained by the rise in foreign exchanges, i.e., the depreciation of the Ita-
lian paper currency. The exchange on London, which in June, 1914, was 
almost at par, was at 122.9 per cent, in December, 1915, 129.3 per cent, 
in December, 1916, 156.6 per cent, in December, 1917, 120.2 per cent, 
in December, 1918, 198.7 per cent, in December 1919, and 260 per cent, 
in June, 1920. If we reduced Italian prices in the same proportion as the 
lira is depreciated, we could see that the rise (in British £) of Italian prices 
is less than the rise of British prices. Fortunately, the rise in wholesale 
prices, on which Professors Bachi's index is based, is not wholly reflected 
in retail prices. Many prices are controlied, and others, as house rent, are 
fixed by law. If the cost of life had risen eightfold the social discountent 
would have been even more full of danger. 
The set-back in prices has manifested itself in Italy somewhat later than 
in Great Britain, the high water mark being reached in Aprii instead of in 
March. The decrease is limited to textiles and minerals and metals, i.e., to 
foreign imported goods, on the price of which the influence of decreasing 
maritime freights and of decreasing exchanges was the greatest. The rise 
was less in cereals and meat, other food and miscellaneous which are native 
goods. 
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59. 
I T A L Y 
THE ASSAULT ON BANKS AND A BANKING W E E K 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 31 
This week may be called the banking week. Parliament has been busy 
with banking discussions, and newspapers were overflowing with banking 
articles. Nine-tenths of speeches and articles were mere rubbish, as may be 
easily expected from the technicalities of the matter and the widespread 
incompetence of speakers and leader-writers. The gist of the problem is 
this: the Italian banking evolution has been somewhat different from Eng-
lish and German ones; we have not banks of the pure classical species as 
you have in England, but also the banks of the German type are by no 
means exclusively dominant. At June 30, 1919, the sum total of deposits 
(saving and current account deposits) was 17,435 million lire, which were 
thus distributed among the various types of banking institutions: 
As you see, the distribution of deposits is very various and whole-
some. The ordinary banks, of which the foremost are the Banca Commer-
ciale, the Credito Italiano, the Banca Italiana di Sconto, and the Banco di 
Roma, do not absorb more than a fifth of the Italian deposits. The other 
four-fifths are distributed between co-operative banks (popular and 
59. August 7, 1920, pp. 227-228. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because: a) it is dated Turin; b) the 
argument was widely discussed in the same terms by Einaudi in II Corriere della Sera in the per-
iod July-August 1920. 
Lire 
Issue banks (Bank of Italy, of Naples, and of Sicily) 
Ordinary banks (in the English sense) 
Popular banks 
Other co operative banks 
Savings banks 
Postai savings banks 
Banks annexed to pawn-offices (Monti di Pietà) 
Rural banks 
774,6 
3.447.6 
1.423.7 
1,237,3 
5,589,2 
4,223,7 
457,4 
281,9 
17,435,5 
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others), which cater for the medium-sized and little traders, enterprisers 
and agriculturists, rural banks which have their customers in the world of 
little farmers, savings banks (among whom may be counted powerful in-
stitutions with deposits amounting to hundreds of millions), which are 
public locai institutions and make loans to public bodies and discount 
commercial paper of very high standing, and give loans on collaterals. 
There are finally the postai savings banks, which are opened by the State 
in every town - one may say in every hamlet - in Italy, and whose deposits 
are managed by the biggest Italian banking institution, very little known 
to the public, the Cassa di Depositi e Prestiti. The Cassa is a State bank, 
which is a sort of trustee of saving banks deposits and of the funds of 
other public institutions, and makes loans to provinces, municipalities, 
and public bodies, besides investing large sums in State Rentes and Ex-
chequer bills. 
The banking world in Italy is thus varied, and one may have very 
little fear that a good customer, whether private or public, may find 
himself cramped by a refusai of credit in consequence of a combination 
of banks. The co-operative and public banks are so predominant that 
even if the four big ordinary banks were united in a banking trust, cred-
it could not be wanting to honest, independent men. The peculiar dis-
tribution of deposits has had another consequence: that the ordinary 
banks, and especially the big four, whose names I have above quoted, 
have had a keen competition to face in the discount of good mercantile 
papers and in loans for collaterals. The more so as in Italy lives, and 
vigorously lives, a number of private banks, which do not publish their 
accounts, and which have a well-tried clientèle. Especially in Turin, the 
private banks have a well-earned and time-honoured standing. The big 
four were, almost by force, insensibly coerced to seek means for em-
ploying the funds they had at hand in operations different from the 
classical discount of commercial paper and loans on collaterals. They 
ventured on buying shares and debentures of joint-stock companies; 
they made loans for a long series of years to industriai and commercial 
companies and firms, giving thus fixed, and not only circulating, capital; 
they were underwriters to public and private issues. As in Germany, 
though not to the same extent, industry became intermixed with bank-
ing; and on the board of numerous industriai companies were sitting 
banking men. At the head of the big four are some of the very ablest 
business men of Italy; and they soon exercised an effective control over 
some of the biggest industriai Italian companies. This was an evolution 
which may have seemed naturai, and would hardly have been noticed if 
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it were not for a counter-evolution which set in during the war. The 
banks controlied some industries; and the industriai leading men began 
to desire to control banks. Signori Perrone, the heads of a great engi-
neering firm, after having acquired a preponderating interest in the 
Banca Italiana di Sconto, desired to interest themselves in the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, and in a short time bought 200,000 shares out 
of a total of 520,000 shares issued. This event made other great captains 
of industry fear that, little by little, Signori Perrone may extend their 
control from the Banca Italiana di Sconto to other ordinary banks, 
and so monopolise the greatest part of the three billions and upward 
of deposits. A counter-move was made by Signor Agnelli, head of the 
Fiat, the well-known motor-car company, and by Signor Gualino, which 
sought to acquire control of Credito Italiano. The menaced boards of 
the two banks, Commerciale and Credito, took alarm, and after a long 
race in acquiring a majority of shares, they endeavoured by issue of new 
shares to assure to themselves and to their friends the independence 
from too big customers desiring to acquire control of the banks. At last 
a compromise was effected. Signori Perrone sold their shares, and two 
trusts were created, which are holding the majority of the shares of the 
two banks. The trustees are friends of the boards of the banks, and it is 
hoped that they will exercise their right of vote in the interest of the 
independence of the banks from their customers. This compromise 
was arrived at in March last, Premier Nitti and Minister of Industry 
Ferraris aiding to reach the result, which, to sum up, must be deemed 
useful to the wholesomeness and independence of the banking func-
tions. 
This almost forgotten story was revived with un unheard-of violence of 
language and of politicai passion in the past and present week. The Socia-
list papers took up the matter of the assault on banks as a means of discre-
diting ali bourgeois institutions. Partisans of the present Premier, Signor 
Giolitti, see in the topic an excellent weapon for discrediting ex-Premier 
Nitti. Accusations of ali sorts were made of bribery, corruption, German 
intrusions, hundreds of millions lire extorted during the various buying 
processes and issues of shares to little shareholders, &c. Amid a great con-
fusion of words and looseness of ideas, the Chamber of Deputies voted the 
principle of an exhaustive inquiry into bank management and banking 
shares manipulations. We shall see if some good will come out of this 
so-called scandal. 
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60. 
I T A L Y 
FIGURES OF CAPITAL LEVY DECLARATIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, August 14 
The first figures are available of the number of tax-payers who have 
made the declaration of estate possessed at December 31, 1919, for the 
purpose of assessment of the extraordinary capital levy imposed by decrees 
of November 24, 1919, and Aprii 22, 1920. The statistics relate only, as yet, 
to the number of the declarations filed by taxpayers and not to their 
amount. But they are interesting enough: 
Number of Declarations Filed 
Region 
Proportion of 
Declarations Filed In the Capital City In Total Territory of the 
of Each Region Region (No. 2 included) (No. 3) to 100 Inhabitants 
Liguria 11,394 20,483 1-79 
Lombardy 27,282 25,730 1-54 
Latium 14,953 19,073 1-45 
Piedmont 18,100 49,490 1-41 
Aemilia 6,905 33,711 1-23 
Campania 13,594 37,429 1-09 
Tuscany 8,896 25,933 0-94 
Venetia 3,334 32,754 0-87 
Marche 1,103 7,908 0-69 
Apulia 1,693 14,698 0-67 
Umbria 1,221 4,483 0-62 
Sardinia 1,452 5,385 0-62 
Sicilia 4,478 19,694 0-51 
Calabria 676 6,930 0-45 
Basilicata 230 2,068 0-42 
Aprutium 379 5,311 0-33 
Totals 115,650 361,080 1-00 
The declarations are evenly distributed over ali Italy. At the head of the 
list (the scale is descending according to column 4) are the great manufac-
60. August 21,1920, pp. 300-301. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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turing and trading regions of Liguria, Lombardy, and Piedmont. Latium is 
third because of the great concentration of rich men in the capital, Rome. 
Aemilia occupies a high position as one of the most progressive agricultural 
regions. At the bottom are the poor regions of the South of Italy, and the 
two islands of Sicilia and Sardinia, with little or no industry. The wealth in 
Italy is not concentrated in one single city, as is seen by the column 2, 
which gives the figures for the capital cities of each region: Genoa (Ligur-
ia), Milan (Lombardy) Turin (Piedmont), Bonania (Aemilia), Naples (Cam-
pania), Florence (Tuscany), &c. In Latium, however, Rome absorbs nearly 
ali the declarations. If you add to the 115,650 declarations of the capital 
cities of the regions another 66,000 declarations of other cities head of pro-
vincia (corresponding to French departments or English counties), you 
have a total of 181,650 urban against 179,430 rural declarations. 
The number of declarations which ought to be made to the capital levy 
is by no means complete. The House of Deputies, in passing the Bill for the 
compulsory inscription of ali stocks and shares and debentures - of which I 
will have more to say when it is passed by the Senate - has inserted in the 
Bill a clause in virtue of which an extension of time shall be given to tax-
payers for filing a complete declaration as to bearer securities not pre-
viously declared. This is a sort of bill of indemnity given to reticent tax-
payers to make up for their past reticence. The Government will have to 
fix the new date for new declarations. A great number of new declarations 
will also have to be made when the land has been valued at its true value at 
December 31, 1919. At present the valuation is made on an empirical basis, 
by multiplying by 325 the land tax paid to the Exchequer in 1916; with the 
consequence that many proprietors fell by this system under the exemption 
limit of 50,000 lire, and have not made any declaration at ali. The land va-
luation will be a truly gigantic task, so that it may be justly said that the so-
called capital levy will not be made at ali at a given moment - say, Decem-
ber 31, 1919 - but will go on for many years to come. 
Up to date nothing is known of declarations made in foreign States by 
Italians and foreigners liable to the levy. The foreigners are liable only for 
the part of their capital which is legally domiciled in Italy; while Italians are 
liable also for a part of the wealth acquired in foreign countries after Au-
gust 1, 1914. But the difficulties of assessment will be even greater than for 
the wealth existing in Italy. 
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61. 
ITALY 
THE INVASION OF METAL AND ENGINEERING WORKS AND AN EXPERIMENT 
IN COMMUNISM 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 12 
On Wednesday, September lst, the metal and engeneering workers oc-
cupied the workshops in which they were employed and started an experi-
ment in Sovietism which will be perhaps of the utmost consequences to our 
country. This was not the first time that workshops were occupied by the 
men; early in the year the cotton mills of Mazzonis Brothers, Turin and 
Pralafera (Pinerolo), were similarly occupied, but a Government Commis-
sary instantly stepped in, and the works were eventually returned to the 
proprietors. To-day we have not a single case; the whole of the metal 
and engineering industry of Italy has seen its works occupied; it is said that 
the workers implied in the strife are 500,000 or more. Another precedent 
may be found in the occupations of land, which were frequent in the past 
autumn ali over "Campagna Romana" - the territory around Rome - in 
Sicily and in the south provinces. The land occupations were legalised 
by a decree, which prescribed the conditions under which the prefect 
(head of the province) can concede, even against the will of the land-own-
er, the land to labourer co-operatives. In principle, the land must be un-
tilled or badly farmed; in fact, the labourers wish to have the best lands, 
or, at any rate, lands which can give good crops. 
In the metal and engineering industry the question was primarily one 
of wages. In July last negotiations began, consequent upon a request by 
the F.I.O.M. (Italian Federation of Metal Workers) that the scale of 
wages, of promotions and kindred questions should be revised. The 
F.I.O.M. alleged that the increase of wages since 1914, said to be 250 
per cent., had not kept pace with the increase in the cost of living, which 
61. September 18, 1920, pp. 438-439. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. Articles on the same argument, similarly treated, were written by Einaudi 
in II Corriere della Sera in the period September-October 1920. 
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the municipal statistical labour offices of Milan, Turin, and Rome esti-
mated to be 350 per cent. Wages in other industries were said to be high-
er than in the metal shops. The A.M.M.A. (Federation of Metal and En-
gineering Employers) replied that the increase of wages was abundantly 
equal to the increase of the cost of living; that the examples of higher 
wages quoted by the employees' federation were misleading, as they re-
lated to exceptionally qualified workers, and, by a review of facts and fig-
ures, endeavoured to prove that the industry was not in a condition to 
grant even the smallest concession, as that would speli ruin to most of 
the federated employers, who had to face the current prices of world 
competitors. 
Upon this reply the negotiations were interrupted. The men did not 
go on strike; instead of striking the F.I.O.M. proclaimed ostruzionismo, 
that is "ca'canny". Usually obstructionism is a practice of individuai 
workers. In Italy "ca'canny" had already been used by public employees 
in State railways, post, telegraphs and telephone, and several tax depart-
ments, and was legally justified by the employees, as they claimed to ob-
serve exactly regulations which are enacted for general guidance, but 
cannot be always observed too literally without undue loss of time. In 
private industry this was the first time that "canny" was officially pro-
claimed by unions as an industriai weapon. After 15 days the results 
were disastrous; the productivity of men sank to 50, to 25 and less 
per cent. Continuous bickerings resulted between men, foremen, and 
employers. On September l s t the director of Romeo Works ((Milan) re-
quested that shops should be protected by public force, and dismissed 
some men. The F.I.O.M. instantly replied ordering the men to occupy 
the metal shops ali over Italy. As the public force, excepting in the Ro-
meo case and in two or three other cases, was absent, the invasion was 
peaceful, and the workers found themselves masters in the works. Truth 
is not easily found as to proportion of the employed which took part in 
the invasion. But it is probable that the great majority of the workers 
and a small minority of the foremen and administrative staff were 
among the invaders. 
At this point the issue ceased to be one only of wages. The leaders of 
the F.I.O.M. apparently conceived the "ca'canny" practice, and the sub-
sequent invasion, only as tactical moves towards attaining the end of 
higher wages; but the workers set to themselves higher aims. At Turin 
the F.I.A.T. motor-car shops were newly styled Fiat-Soviet. A Communist 
government of production, after the Russian fashion, is being attempted. 
In every shop a consiglio di fabbrica, a works soviet, is instituted, and the 
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workers claim to work for themselves only. A difficult task indeed. In 
vain they endeavoured to attract foremen and administrative staff; a small 
minority responded. A few members of the higher technical staff were 
captured, but after a few days they were obliged to release them. Another 
difficulty instantly presented itself in the supply of coal, oil, iron and 
steel, and other raw materials. The problem is being solved by the inva-
sion of other shops, which produce goods necessary for production in the 
invaded ones. With the aid of State railway servants cars full of raw ma-
terials are being introduced in the workshops. But the end of the experi-
ment is not distant. Already part of the shops work at a very low pressure; 
in others the end of raw materials is in sight. The problem of wages is also 
insoluble. Employers have not left in their offices any money, and natu-
rally have refused to pay wages for the period during which they are ex-
pelled from their property. A few hot-heads among the invaders talk of 
invading banks. But the Government, it is hoped, will interfere, and 
put a stop to an adventure which is an open defiance of the laws of 
the land. The crisis will be hard to solve, as the A.M.M.A. proclaim its 
resolve not to recommence negotiations if the workers do not first leave 
the occupied shops. The workers are full of hope of the advent of univer-
sal Communism. They have entrenched themselves in the works. Instead 
of producing the usuai products of industry they are forging arms and 
ammunition, and a Red guard has been formed to defend the works 
against the possible inroads of public force. The workers are subjected 
to military discipline, and every day they are called to military exercises 
in the shop yards. Civil war seems impending. In the meantime the Gov-
ernment seems absent. It has proclaimed its neutrality between the two 
belligerents, but this profession is hardly compatible with toleration of as-
sault on private and public property, organisation of armed forces, &c. 
Perhaps ali this tumult will end in a compromise or in a farce, and Signor 
Giolitti will gain new laurels as a skilful Fabius Cunctator. But the matter 
is too inflammable; the officiai Socialist party (156 members out of a total 
of 508 Deputies of the Lower House) has always been bent against the 
war in years past, and is the only organised Socialist party in Europe 
which is to-day uncompromisingly for Russia and Communism; the old 
guard of Socialism are discredited in face of young enthusiasts, and do 
not dare to oppose a strong stand against dangerous experiments. It is 
not, however, probable that the Communist experiment will be made this 
time. Italians are not apt to stretch things to their extremes. They are a 
compromising folk, somewhat after the manner of Britishers, though only 
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after a shower of high words and extravagant menaces. Above ali, we are 
a nation of small land-owners, in which the propertied classes outnumber 
the true proletariat. They need only a strong Government, strong in ideas 
and leadership to put matters right. 
62. 
ITALY 
FOREIGN EXCHANGES AND FOREIGN TRADE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 8 
At the time of writing foreign exchanges are soaring up, so that they 
have already reached the highest monthly average hitherto touched. I give 
below, for the sake of comparison, a statement of the said monthly 
averages, as calculated in the preface to a new French edition of the 
well-known study by Mr. Stringher, director-general of the Bank of Italy, 
on "Note Issues and Money Market in Italy": 
Switzerland Paris London New York 
1914, July 100.76 100.93 25.31 5.17 
December 101.60 103.31 25.88 5.30 
1915, " 123.56 112.23 30.97 6.57 
1916, " 135.18 117.20 32.50 6.85 
1917, " 189.90 144.87 39.56 8.29 
1918, " 130.00 116.25 30.37 6.34 
1919, " 241.67 121.92 50.08 13.07 
1920, January 251.34 120.51 51.60 13.99 
February 296.14 128.89 61.71 18.21 
" March 321.24 136.21 70.55 19.03 
" Aprii 410.46 142.40 90.42 22.94 
" May 351.59 133.65 76.99 19.76 
June 308.98 133.64 67.14 16.89 
" July 305.50 141.12 67.30 18.17 
October 2 387.50 161.50 84.15 24.25 
October 7 400.00 170.00 89.00 25.00 
62. October 16, 1920, pp. 590-591. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because of a section of the auto-
graphed manuscript, without tide and dated October 8, 1920, is in the Einaudi archives. The 
published article is also dated Turin. 
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As the highest level was touched in Aprii, 1920, it is easily seen that 
October threatens to break ali records. Speculations are rife as to the 
causes of the great rise; and in banking and trade circles it is said that 
the politicai occurrences, mainly the fear that the last dispute in the iron 
and steel industry, with the forced surrender of employers, will be only 
the first of a series of bitter disputes, which may end in the overthrow 
of the present industriai system. It is also said that foreign banks and trad-
ing firms are reducing or closing credits opened to Italian customers; so 
that it is increasingly difficult for our industry to pay debts which are falling 
due, and it will be increasingly difficult to obtain new credits for purchas-
ing coal, wool, cotton, iron, and other raw materials of industry. 
Time alone will show if these fears are justified, or if the good sense of 
the Italian people will not prevail. The latest available figures of foreign 
trade are those for the first six months, of 1920, and they compare favour-
ably with previous periods: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Imports Exports 
1918, first six months 7,907.2 1,931.9 
" second " 8,131.4 1,412.8 
1919, first " 8,841.7 1,796.0 
" second " 7,674.9 3,392.6 
1920, first " 8,413.8 3,889.6 
The figures are not exactly comparable, as those for 1918 and 1919 are 
at 1918 values, while those for 1920 are at 1919 values; but it is clear that 
imports are stationary, while exports are increasing. If we examine details 
of imports we see that the greatest decreases in the first half of 1920 against 
the same period in 1919 are in animals and animai products, from 1,329.1 
to 554.3 millions lire (-774.8) , and minerals, metals, and metal products, 
from 1,335.5 to 1,015.9 millions lire (-319.6). The first fact is reassuring, 
as it may be explained by the graduai increase of domestic animai stock, 
which during the war was greatly depleted. The second fact is perhaps at-
tributable to decreased activity of war industries. Against these principal 
decreases we may note increases from 333.2 to 498.2 (+ 165.0) in olive 
and other edible oils and alcohols, from 352.5 to 593.4 (+240.9) in wool 
and woollens, from 51.4 to 168.8 (+117.4) in timber, from 153.2 to 
249.3 (+96.1) in silk, from 713.7 to 785.6 (+71.9) in coal, earthenware, 
&c., from 461.0 to 521.2 (+60.2) in hides, from 44.8 to 101.9 (+57.1) 
in dyes and colouring and tanning materials, from 70.6 to 108.0 (+37.4) 
in hemp, flax, jute, from 44.1 to 107.7 (+63.6) in cars, motor-cars, &c. 
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Among the exports there are no decreases worthy of notice. The principal 
increases are as follows: from 369.2 to 828.5 (+ 459.3) in silk; from 158.8 to 
428.8 (+ 270) in hemp, flax, jute, and their worked products; from 324.7 to 
503.0 (+ 178.3) in macaroni, vegetables, &c.; from 413.9 to 581.9 (+ 168) 
in cotton goods; from 85.4 to 227.9 (+ 142.5) in chemical products; from 
12.7 to 141.0 (+ 128.3) in motor-cars and other vehicles; from 58.9 to 
164.2 (+105.2) in metals and metal products. The increases in exports 
are general, and in some cases remarkable. If only we could have a year 
of continuous work, the balance of international commerce might return 
to a normal condition, and, so far as the depreciation, or, rather, the un-
stable value, of the lira depends on excess of imports over exports, the for-
eign exchanges would be stabilised. 
63. 
ITALY 
INDUSTRIAL UNCERTAINTY - A POSSIBLE SOCIALIST SPLIT - YIELD OF TAXES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 22 
The first effects of the occupation of works are making themselves felt. 
The Director-General of Combustibles - a new officiai, born during the 
war - has recently sent a notice to newspapers to the effect that a part 
of his coal stocks will be put at the disposai of industry. The notice was 
partly prompted by the British embargo following the miners' strike, but 
was also caused by the decline in the trade imports of coal. In the two 
weeks ending October 17th only 8,000 tons of coal were imported into Italy 
on account of industry; of the 350,000 tons which Italy used to import 
monthly from Great Britain over half was on account of trade, and half 
on Government account; during the month of October private traders will 
import only 30,000 tons. A feeling of uncertainty as to the future of indus-
try is spreading among employers, and they dare not import raw materials 
63. October 30, 1920, p. 782. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. The treatment of the argument bears strong similarities with an article pub-
lished in II Corriere della Sera (October 27, 1920) entided "Controllo operaio ed organizzazione 
della dittatura sindacale". 
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from foreign countries when the exchange outlook is uncertain, and the ex-
act purport of workers' control over industry is not known. Signor Giolitti 
has, indeed, said to a foreign correspondent that "control" has not the 
same meaning in Italian as in the English language. Control is not predo-
minance of workers over employers, but simply "verification" of the results 
of the balance-sheets, somewhat on the line of "auditing" the books and 
accounts at the end of the year. But the workers' leaders are not of the 
same mind, and aim much higher; they tend towards a true "control", as 
a first step of a proximate nationalisation of industry. Their position is, 
however, somewhat contradictory; for when Signor Agnelli tendered his 
resignation of the post of chairman and general manager of the Fiat works, 
and advanced proposals for the transformation of this gigantic enterprise 
into a working men's co-operative society, the men's leaders recoiled and 
took time to reply. They say they fear the men are unprepared for such 
a task; they fear not being able to obtain credit and preserve useful trade 
connections. But if they fear failure in a single case, what of nationalisation 
of the whole industry? 
The social and politicai movement may be said to have as its pivot 
the future attitude of the Confederation of Labour and of the Socialist 
party. The evolutionist section of the Socialist party held its meetings 
at Reggio Emilia last week. They were strong in their determination 
not to sacrifice to Lenin's orders the old guard of the party; so that a 
split of Socialism into two or three sections - communist after the Mos-
cow fashion, centrist, and moderate - may be foretold for the end of the 
year, when the Socialist party will have their annual session. The best 
men of the labour world, the leaders of the Labour Confederation, are 
reduced to impotence by the contradiction between the sane, business-
like, progressive line of action they would follow in the interest of the 
working classes, and the extravagant politics of continuous strikes and 
agitation to which they commit themselves from fear of the extremist de-
nunciations in the party Press. 
That industry may again be put on her legs is in the direct interest of 
the State, for the recovery of the newly imposed taxes. These new taxes are 
giving good results. The capital tax, of which the first instalment was due 
on October 18th - in Italy ali direct taxes are paid in six instalments distrib-
uted evenly over the whole year - is giving 354 million lire a year on the 
provisionai assessment. When the assessment becomes definitve, the pro-
duct will reach 700 million, and perhaps 1,000 million lire a year for a per-
iod of 10-20 years, according as the wealth of the taxpayer is mainly com-
posed of stocks and shares or of land and houses. But what of the taxes on 
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industry - income-tax and excess profits tax, which Parliament decided 
should go to 100 per cent, of war profits - if industry is reduced to a stand-
stili by labour troubles? War profits were mostly invested in new machin-
ery and plants. Taxpayers cannot pay to the Exchequer taxes in kind, they 
must give money; and money will not be forth-coming if employers cannot 
set themselves calmly to work. 
64. 
ITALY 
RISING PRICES AND EXCHANGES: FALLING SHARE QUOTATIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 5 
Professor Bachi publishes in the Economista his interesting index num-
bers for commodity prices and share quotations at the end of September. 
As the basis 100 of your and Bachi's number indexes is the same, viz., 
1904-1905, I place in the last column the Economist percentage figure 
for comparison: 
General Index 
Cereals and Other Food Textiles Minerals and Miscellaneous Meat Product Metals Italian British 
March, 1920 458.5 610.4 1156.6 1205.2 576.0 780.0 379.6 
May 530.2 728.2 1012.8 1317.3 619.4 830.3 372.7 
June 535.0 746.7 895.3 1109.9 628.4 774.7 356.7 
July 521.9 742.7 915.4 1093.0 639.5 772.4 358.0 
August 534.8 745.6 957.3 1157.9 637.0 795.9 352.0 
September 551.7 759.7 1009.0 1257.8 637.9 832.2 347.5 
Italian prices again rose in September, and surpassed the May re-
cord. Ali the groups contribue to the rise, but minerals and metals 
are at the top of the ladder; textiles are good seconds. An explanation 
64. November 13, 1920, pp. 866-867. The article, unsigned, is published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. The treatment of the argument bears similarities with two of Einaudi's ar-
ticles in II Corriere della Sera (November 11 and 13, 1920) entided respectively "Mezza misura 
inaccettabile" and "Finanza debole ed empirica. I nuovi provvedimenti tributari". 
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may partly be found in the following figures of circulation and foreign 
exchanges: 
Percentage Exchanges 
Total Circulation o n 
(Commercial, State 
and State Notes) Switzerland London 
Millions Lire 
June, 1914 2.698 106.6 100.1 
December, 1919 18.552 242.4 198.7 
March, 1920 18.465 321.2 279.7 
Aprii, 1920 18.964 410.5 358.4 
May, 1920 19.397 352.8 304.9 
June, 1920 20.087 302.2 261.8 
July, 1920 - 319.4 277.8 
August, 1920 20.225 356.8 306.1 
September, 1920 20.225 385.8 332.5 
The rise in prices appears to follow, at a certain distance of time, 
the fluctuations of the exchanges. As in October these continued to 
rise, we may expect a new corresponding rise in the October index 
of commodity prices. The note circulation keeps on increasing. The fig-
ure for December, 1919, divided in 12,901 millions lire for State ac-
count and 5,651 for commerce accounts, while the corresponding fig-
ures for September, 1920, are 12,794 and note circulation keeps on in-
creasing. The figure for the increase of the note issues was not the Sta-
te's but commerce's requirements. The statement is, however, somewhat 
misleading, as under the cover of commercial circulation are put loans 
on 5 per Cent. Consols and discounts of Treasury bills. Loans and dis-
counts are made to private parties, but substantially are of the same nat-
ure as your banking credits for subscriptions to State loans. Part of the 
subscriptions to the last State loan and to Exchequer bills are thus fi-
nanced by creation of paper. 
In Germany, as the exchanges go up, so the prices of shares and stocks 
also rise, shares of industriai concerns being capitalised not on the basis of 
dividens, but on the valuation of assets and goodwill in a depreciating cur-
rency. The same phenomenon should hold good in Italy, whereas, in fact, 
the opposite has happened. As the foreign exchanges went up and the lira 
was depreciating, shares, instead of rising, began to tumble. Between 
March and September the lira, as expressed by the London exchange, lost 
from 35 to 30 per cent, of its nominai value. The course of quotations of 
113 leading shares was as follows: 
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March June September 
104.26 91.09 88.94 
Railways 103.85 94.37 74.04 
Land Transports 102.95 95.41 81.40 
Navigation 110.88 98.49 80.45 
Cotton 137.67 129.47 112.52 
Jute 161.00 158.40 132.00 
Wool 118.86 116.00 99.14 
Hemp 134.00 137.17 112.76 
Silk 128.37 127.00 114.47 
Mines 113.56 100.51 74.43 
Iron and Steel 105.51 86.50 59.48 
Engineering 101.98 86.71 68.09 
Motor ears 111.07 91.31 65.03 
Electricity 106.37 93.81 83.48 
Chemical 106.39 103.79 83.63 
Sugar 119.55 111.92 88.45 
Various food 104.85 98.90 82.59 
Waterworks 98.91 96.81 87.52 
Building and house coals 105.78 130.30 93.98 
Miscellaneous 126.88 117.92 119.87 
General index 106.97 94.07 80.33 
As the basis 100 in this table was the quotation of December, 1919, 
it is clear that these leading shares had lost in nine months nearly 20 per 
cent, of their value at the end of 1919. Textiles alone are quoted higher. 
The causes of the bad conditions of the Italian bourses are many: 1) The 
fear of the coming compulsory inscription of ali bearer stocks and 
shares; 2) the general impression that inscribed shares will be much 
more difficult to sell and to give as collaterals for loans; 3) the selling 
by possessors who did not include some bearer share or stock in their 
declaration for the capital tax; 4) the uncertainty concerning the solu-
tion of frequent momentout problems - the huge deficit in the State 
budget, unwillingness to put an end to the bread subsidy, the advent 
of workers' control on industry; 5) confiscation of war profits and the 
enormous payments to be made in cash at a moment when companies 
have not the liquid means to pay, and the banks are restricting credit. 
Ali these factors are pointing to liquidation, restriction of the spirit of 
enterprise, and inaction of speculators. Quotations are therefore dwind-
ling, even in the face of a depreciating lira. 
NOVEMBER, 1920 
65. 
ITALY 
EXCHANGES IMPROVED - THE PEACE OF RAPALLO - MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS -
T H E BREAD SUBSIDY 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 19 
The foreign exchanges, which had boomed to 100.50 for London, 175 
for Paris, 450 for Switzerland, 30'/4 for the American dollar, have under-
gone a favourable change, and close to-day respectively at 92.50 for Lon-
don, 162 for Paris, 410 for Switzerland, and 263/4 for New York. 
The signature of the Treaty of Rapallo has greatly cleared the politicai 
horizon. The Government has obtained an overwhelming vote of confi-
dence from the House of Deputies. The last municipal elections have 
not gone so well for the Communist party as they anticipated. Their pro-
gress was great from the last pre-war elections, for, instead of 200 muni-
cipal and four provincial councils, they are the masters in 2,000 and 25 
councils respectively. But their boasted note of capturing 5,000 municipal 
councils out of 8,500 was upset by the electorate. They hold the mandate 
for 27 per cent, of municipalities, which is a small but significant regres-
sion from the high-water mark of 30.7 per cent, seats conquered at the 
politicai elections of November, 1919. Specially notable was the fact that, 
of the great cities, only Milan and Bologna, which they possessed from 
1914, fell to their lot. Ali the other great cities, Rome, Naples, Palermo, 
Venice, Llorence, Genoa, were held by constitutional parties. Even Tu-
rin, the stronghold of Italian extreme Leninism, was saved from their 
domination. 
The Government has at last introduced a Bill for the reduction of 
bread subsidy. According to Government declarations, the consumption 
of wheat and other cereals will in the agricultural year 1920-1921 be 40 
million quintals - excluding the producing population, who feed them-
selves on their own products. Of these, 12 millions will be obtained at 
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home by requisitions at a mean price of 110 lire per quintal, and a total 
expenditure of 1,320 million lire. The other 28 million quintals we shall 
be obliged to import from foreign countries at a total cost of 7.980 mil-
lion lire, assuming a price of 10.80 dollars per quintal at origin and a dol-
lar exchange of 28 lire. The total cost to the Government will thus be 
9,300 million lire. The selling price of wheat has hitherto been 62 lire 
per quintal, involving a total sum amounting only to 2,480 million lire, 
so that a net loss to the Exchequer of 6,820 million lire is in prospect. 
The Government do not propose to wipe off at a single stroke this stu-
pendous loss. They content themselves with raising the selling price to 
the level of the requisition price. The Government will sell the wheat 
at the same price at which they take it compulsorily from Italian cereal 
producers. 
The following table describes the change: 
Average Price of Requisition and Average 
Proposed Selling Price in the 
Present Price 1" Quarter 1921 2nd Quarter 1921 
Soft wheat 60 110 137-50 
Hard wheat 70 126-50 159-50 
Rye 60 88 104-50 
Barley 53 88 104-50 
Maize 60 88 94-50 
They hope to be able to sell bread, on this basis, in the first part of 
1921 at a price varying from 1.30 to 1.40 lire per kilogram, instead of 
the present average price of 1 lira. The rise in the selling price will yield 
2,726 million lire, and so reduce the loss from 6,820 to 4,096 million lire. 
The problem is only touched - not solved, and the expediency of exasper-
ating - in words and in propaganda - the Socialist for a one-third solution 
is doubtful. The Government pretend, it is true, to cover another 1,920 
million lire of the bread loss by means of several new and increased taxes. 
But the pretence is not to the point, as ali the yield of new taxes will be 
necessary to cover the ordinary deficit in the Budget. Even if the bread 
did not cost a farthing to the Exchequer, the ordinary revenue is not at 
a level with ordinary expenditure. Some of the new taxes are very bad 
and unequally distributed. However, the step taken by Government is in 
a right direction and we can stili hope that Parliament will better the Gov-
ernment pian. 
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66. 
ITALY 
T H E SOCIALIST CONGRESS - DEFEAT OF THE COMMUNISTS -
LABOUR AND EMIGRATION LIGURES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 22 
The debates at the Socialist Congress of Leghorn were watched with 
the greatest attention by ali parties. The debates closed with a vote on 
the motion for the adhesion to the Third (Moscow) Communist Interna-
tional and to the Lenin's 21 points. Notwithstanding two empassioned 
speeches by Mr Kabakrieff, the Moscow delegate, the Communists were 
defeated. The result of the debate will be that the 116 Socialist M.P.'s will 
split into two parties, of which the extreme Communists will number 20 
members at the utmost, with Bombacci as the leader in Parliament and 
the Turinese group of young men in the Ordine Nuovo as writers and pro-
pagandists. They will try to conquer in the coming months the Labour Un-
ions, and gain a footing in the General Confederation of Labour. But the 
fulfilment of their ambitions is not easy. 
Professor Giorgio Mortara has published a volume of Prospettive eco-
nomiche, 1921, a book somewhat on the line of Business Prospects and Bab-
son Lorecasts. But Mortara's book is much more guarded and scientific; a 
very useful volume on past conditions of Italy before and during the war, 
with a review of future possibilities. The book, after a general introduction, 
reviews wheat, wine, fruit, olive oil, silk, cotton, hemp, wool, coal, iron in-
dustries and trade, labour, emigration, transport, taxes, public finance, and 
money. Some figures from labour and emigration chapters will be interest-
ing at a moment in which, thanks to the Socialist Congress, labour pro-
blems are to the fore. The number of casualties owing to the war and dur-
ing demobilisation was 650,000; the extra deaths caused by epidemics of 
1918-1919 were from 200,000 to 300,000. Invalids and disabled may be 
calculated at 300,000 or 400,000 men. Even deducting from these 
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1,250,000 losses, some 150,000 which would have been lost in the normal 
ways, there remains a net loss in man-power of over one million men. But 
the loss was partly offset by emigrants repatriated from 1914 to 1919, and 
by the great decrease of emigration during the same period; and it should 
be added that the young generations, born from 1900 to 1905, have not 
suffered any loss from war and emigration, and their contingent is there-
fore greater than usuai. Summing up ali these circumstances, Italy pos-
sesses to-day, perhaps, a working population greater than in 1914. It will 
be somewhat difficult to employ ali this man-power in the country, and 
some doubts may be entertained upon the probability that the emigration 
currents may be resumed at an early date. Before the war, in the five-year 
period 1909-1913, emigrants numbered 650,000 yearly, from which, de-
ducting 500,000 returned, a loss resulted of 150,000. But as the annual 
net increase of population (births, less deaths) was 430,000, the net in-
crease was 280,000. The following table gives the number of emigrants 
from 1909 to 1920 (in thousands): 
To European or To Trans-Oceanic 
Mediterranean Countries Countries lotal 
190 9 226 399 625 
191 0 249 403 652 
191 1 27 1 263 534 
191 2 308 403 711 
191 3 313 560 873 
191 4 246 233 479 
1915 79 67 146 
191 6 68 74 142 
191 7 33 13 46 
191 8 24 4 28 
191 9 136 94 230 
1920 (first nine months) 159 3 05 464 
While the Central Empires and Switzerland absorbed two-thirds of 
European emigration, after the war the percentage was reduced to 3 per 
cent, for the former and to 14 per cent, for the latter country. The greatest 
number of European emigrants (22 per cent.) goes to-day to France; of the 
transoceanic emigrants 80 per cent, goes to the United States and Canada, 
14 per cent, to Argentina, and 5 per cent, to Brazil. 
FEBRUARY, 1920 
67. 
I T A L Y 
WORKMEN'S CONTROL OF INDUSTRY AND THE 
GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT REPORT 
From our Correspondent 
Rome, Lebruary 5 
The debate on the bread subsidy draws slowly to an end in the 
Chamber of Deputies. There are rumours that a compromise has been 
arrived at between the Socialist party and the Government to put an 
end to the obstructionist manceuvres which have hampered until now 
the passing of the Bill. In the meantime, the attention of trade and in-
dustry and of the labour world had been attracted by the draft of the 
Bill on labour control prepared by Signor Giolitti and submitted to in-
dustry and labour councils. It will be recalled that at the end of the re-
volutionary movement for the occupation of shops in September last, 
Signor Giolitti gave his promise that the Government would lay on 
the table a Bill for giving to workers a sort of control over industry. 
As time passed the promise was forgotten by many employers, so that 
they were struck with surprise when on Jannary 22nd the Government 
submitted the draft of the Bill on control to the Council of Industry. 
The draft read as follows: Lor every class of industry, excepting 
State-owned enterprises, new enterprises for the first four years, and en-
terprises with less than 60 men employed, there is created a workmen's 
control. The control has for its aim 1) to make the men acquainted with 
industriai conditions; 2) to better the technical education and the moral 
and economie conditions of men; 3) to ensure the execution of social 
laws; 4) to improve the methods of production and to make production 
more economical; 5) to attain social piece between employers and em-
ployed. 
The means suggested of attaining these desirable ends are the creation 
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of a centrai control committee of nine members, of which six are to be 
elected, by national proportional representation, by the workmen, and 
three by overseers, clerks, and technical staff employed in a given class 
of industriai enterprises. There will be many control committees, but only 
one for each class of industriai enterprises. Presumably ali committees will 
sit at Rome. Each committee will delegate its control functions to two or 
more workmen in each workshop. These locai delegates will have the right 
to require employers to make known to them 1) the methods of buying and 
the price of raw materials of industry; 2) the costs of production; 3) admin-
istrative methods; 4) production methods, excepting only industriai se-
crets; 5) workmen's wages; 6) the subscribed and paid-up capital of the 
firm or company; 7) industriai profits; 8) the manner in which social laws 
and by-laws are carried out, and details as to methods of recruting and dis-
missing workmen. When the Central Control Committee debates upon the 
reports of their locai delegates, two delegates of the employers and one de-
legate of the High Council of Labour have the right to attend but not to 
vote. The employers will have the right to elect a committee of nine mem-
bers, to which the Control Committee will make proposals for enforcing 
regulations deemed necessary to ensure the achievement of the aims de-
scribed above. When necessary, a joint meeting of Control Committee 
and Employers Committee will be convened, under the presidency of a de-
legate of the High Council of Labour. 
The draft was somewhat loosely worded. The Council of Industry, to 
which the draft was first submitted, criticised severely numbers 2, 3 and 
4 of the catalogue of information which the locai delegates had the right 
to demand. These points appeared to give to workmen the right to inves-
tigate the most secret affairs of the firm. Employers objected to the possi-
bility that a new employee, without attachment to or interest in the enter-
prise, might acquire information which would be very interesting to com-
petitors. 
The High Council of Labour, which is composed equally of employers 
and employed, and is the officiai adviser of Government and Parliament in 
matters of social legislation, was then given the opportunity of advising on 
the control draft. After a lengthy debate, the Council ended by changing 
the Government proposals in many respects. 
The control committees are to be instituted in the first instance only in 
the steel and iron, textiles, chemicals, electrical industry, land transporta-
tion, navigation and mines. Other industries may be successively subjected 
to control by royal decree, upon the advice of the High Council of Labour. 
Thus an experimental system is introduced. 
— 182 — 
FEBRUARY, 1920 
The centrai control committees will be elected, not by ali workmen and 
employed, but by the workshops committees which exist already, and have 
duties relating to labour, hours, wages, and other differences arising be-
tween employers and employed. The Central Committee will then delegate 
in each workshop two or more men upon a list of six members presented 
by workshops committees. These locai delegates will not have the right to 
know ali the things enumerated in the Government draft, but only to re-
quire, from time to time, those data which the Central Committee may de-
sire to know on administrative and technical methods, total production in 
the country, costs of production, capital employed, profits obtained, and 
execution of social laws. The delegates will make the requests for the data, 
and the employers must give them. The data to be given will relate, in the 
main, only to past years. They are to be kept secret. The Central Commit-
tee will make yearly reports on trade and industriai conditions, on the 
workmen's status, on raw material statistics, and make proposals for better-
ing industry and workmen's conditions. 
The employers will elect an industriai council of nine members, which 
will give advice on the proposals of the Control Committee. A joint council 
composed of the nine members of the Control Committee, the nine mem-
bers of the Industriai Council, and of five umpires nominated by the High 
Council of Labour, the Central Co-operative Committee, and the Union of 
the Chambers of Commerce, will take resolutions on the advice of the two 
parties. 
Even as amended, the draft Bill is apt to give the workmen a right 
to put hindrances in the way of free conduct of industriai enterprises. 
The High Council of Labour has done good work in eliminating much 
of the power of espionage which the Government Bill gave to casual 
delegates. There remains only a power of obtaining statistics and var-
ious interesting information. So far, so good. It will be very interesting 
to know what use the workmen will make of the right of inquiry thus 
given them. 
— 183 — 
FROM POST-WAR CRISIS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF FASCISM IN POWER, 1919-1924 
68. 
ITALY 
BREAD SUBSIDY - RENT RESTRICTIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Rome, February 20 
The lengthy debate on the bread subsidy is drawing to its end. Tuesday 
next, February 22nd, the last sections of the Bill will pass the Lower House, 
and then the Bill will be dealt with immediately in the Upper Chamber, so 
that the Bill will probably become law before March. On the basis of the 
sections already voted, and which cannot be modified by remaining sec-
tions, the bread subsidy is not abolished, but only gready limited in its 
bad effects on the State budget. From Aprii 1, 1921, the State will sell cer-
eals to locai consortiums, which are the intermediary agents between the 
State and the bread-sellers, on the basis of the internai price which the 
State pays for the same cereals to producers. The difference between the 
present and the future situation is, in short, as follows: at present the State 
buys home-produced wheat at about 130 lire per metric quintal, and will 
pay about 160 lire from August 1, 1921, and sells the very same wheat at 60 
lire to locai consortiums. In addition, as the home-produced wheat is not 
sufficient, the Government is buying some 35 million quintals of foreign 
wheat at a price from 300 lire in past months and about 220 lire at present, 
which is sold at the same ridiculous price of 60 Hre to locai consortiums. 
In future the selling price to consortiums wiH not be fixed, but wiH be 
variable and always equal to the price at which the State buys the wheat or 
other cereals from home producers, about 130 Hre from Aprii l s t to August 
1, 1921, and 160 Hre from August lstonwards. The loss to the State Exche-
quer will be greatly reduced, and wiH be equal only to the difference be-
tween 160 Hre and the buying price of the 35 milHon quintals of imported 
foreign wheat. If the foreign price should remain at 220 Hre per quintal, the 
loss wiH be about 2,000 million Hre instead of 6,000 milHon Hre, as at pre-
sent, and the loss wiH even disappear if foreign exchange should improve. 
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If the American dollar should decline from 28 lire to 18 lire or 20 lire, the 
price of foreign wheat would also be reduced by a third and the bread sub-
sidy will disappear. This is the hope of the Government, and surely the dis-
appearance of this huge State loss will tend towards improving foreign ex-
changes, if other counter-balancing influences do not interfere. 
The Socialist obstructionism has had, however, an important effect: the 
bread is to be sold at a mean price sufficient to cover the price paid to inter-
nai cereal producers, but ali bread is not to be sold at the same price. There 
will be two shapes of loaf: a big and a little loaf. The big loaf will be sold at a 
lower rate than the little loaf, and the weighted mean of the two prices will 
cover the cost of the internai produced wheat. This will be a somewhat com-
plicated affair, which will be even more complicated by the fact that the re-
lations between two prices will vary in every city and town and village, so that 
the profit obtained in the locality where the use of the little loaf predomi-
nates may cover the loss suffered in the localities where the population fa-
vours the big loaf. The members for Southern constituencies have been ap-
peased only with this complicated arrangement. 
The passing of the Bill is surely a great step in the right direction; but 
we must hope that an improvement of foreign exchanges will permit the 
last vestiges of governmental interference to be abolished. 
While the House of Deputies is occupied in the bread subsidy question, 
the Senate is debating the problem of rent restriction. During the war various 
legai enactments have interfered in Italy, as in ali other countries, with the free-
dom of fixing house rents. The State originally prohibited ali increase of rents 
until two months after the peace. But as the legai day of the peace was an un-
certain date, and was not fixed until the middle of 1920, a royal decree of Aprii 
18,1920, introduced new regulations. Houses or parts of houses were divided 
into four classes: 1) Houses of an annual rent higher than 6,000 lire at Rome 
and 4,000 lire in other great cities of over 200,000 inhabitants, &c.; 2) rents 
from 3,000 lire to 6,000 lire at Rome, and from 2,400 lire to 4,000 lire in other 
cities; 3 ) rents from 1,500 lire to 3,000 lire at Rome and from 1,000 lire to 2,400 
lire in other cities; and 4) ali lower rented houses. Rises of 40,25, 15, and 10 
per cent, on the rent level at Aprii 18,1920, were respectively allowed for the 
four classes for the period from November 1,1920, to June 30,1921. At July 1, 
1921, the first class was to be freed from regulation. For the second and third 
class the date of freedom was July 1,1922, and for the fourth class July 1,1923. 
When the royal decree was laid on the table of the Senate house occupiers pro-
tested against the freedom of house proprietors of raising rents inordinately 
after the named dates. They urged that new houses were not built, and that 
the cost of building was fivefold that of pre-war times; that the rents, when 
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made free, will rise so much that great discontent will spread ali over Italy. The 
Bill as amended by the Senate has therefore fixed July 1,1924, as the uniform 
date for giving complete freedom to ali classes of houses, excepting houses 
rented for industriai, commercial, and professional purposes. The proprietors 
will be compensated for the prolongation of the period of restriction as re-
gards premises used for industriai, commercial, or professional purposes; 
rents, instead of at July 1, 1921, will be made free at July 1, 1922; and for 
the intervening year tribunals will be set up in every locality to fix the just rent 
between proprietor and occupier. New houses built after March 28,1919, are 
not subject to any rent restriction. This is an inducement to build new houses. 
69. 
I T A L Y 
SEVEN MONTHS' REVENUE - T H E CHIEF TAXES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, March 12 
The revenue results of the first seven months of the financial year (from 
July 1, 1920, to January 31, 1921) are gratifying, as the following figures (in 
millions of lire) show: 
1919-20 1920-21 Increase 
Direct income taxes 1,123-3 1,692-0 + 568-7 
Stamp duties 377-1 733-7 + 356-6 
Registration & succession duties 373-6 446-6 + 73-0 
Excise, customs, and other consumption 
taxes 642-3 1,009-8 + 367-5 
Industriai monopolies (tobacco, salt, &c.) 980-1 1,552-5 + 572-4 
56-6 77-5 + 20-9 
Commercial monopolies (coffee, ivory)... 180-5 261-4 + 80-9 
3,733.5 5,773.5 + 2,040.0 
Apart from the income-taxes, the increase is the highest in the industriai 
monopolies. Tobacco has risen from 837.9 to 1,364.0 millions lire, and the 
matches monopoly from 63.8 to 99.3 millions lire. Notwithstanding heavy 
increases of prices, the returned soldier has not abandoned the smoking ha-
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bit contraeteci in the trenches. The increased receipts from stamp duties is 
the proof of the continuance during the period considered of a great com-
mercial activity. Perhaps the coming months will not be so fruitful for the 
public exchequer. In the Excise and Customs duties the net increase is 
the combined result of a great increase in the Excise duties (+ 174.0), and 
the new tax on wine (+ 263.0), and of various decreases. 
The most interesting item of public revenue, and one which is under-
going the most thorough transformation, is the first direct income-taxes. A 
special publication of the Director of Taxes gives some useful details, refer-
ring to the years 1919 and 1920. The total yield of ali taxes on income in 
the last pre-war year was 540 millions lire. In 1919 there was inscribed in 
the tax-payers' rolls a sum of 1,801.5 millions; in 1920, 3,406.1 millions, 
exclusive of some hundred millions lire which are not entered in the rolls, 
but are paid directly into the exchequer; as, for instance, the income-tax on 
salaries of public servants. 
This huge sum of3,406.1 millions lire, which is between six and sevenfold 
the pre-war figure, may be said to fall into two classes, the extraordinary and 
the ordinary taxes. Among the extraordinary taxes class we must include the 
following: 1) Thewarprofittax,withayieldof944.7 millions lire in 1919, and 
1,413.4 in 1920. Owing to the nature of the case, as the taxing period was 
closed at June 30,1920, the yield will rapidly fall when the arrears are made 
up. 2) The war increase of capital tax, simply an addition to the war profit tax. 
The yield was nil in 1919, and 545.2 in 1920, the first year of her application. 
The taxing period closes at June 30,1920. The yield in this case will probably 
increase in 1921 and 1922.3 ) The capital or wealth extraordinary tax: This is 
the much-talked-of capital levy. It is in principle a one-time tax, on wealth 
possessed at January 1, 1920, but for convenience it was made payable in 
20 or 10 instalments, according as land and houses were entered for more 
or less than 40 per cent, in the total wealth. The capital tax was inscribed 
in the 1920 rolls for a sum of354.6 millions lire, but only 225,009 out of a total 
of 361,080 taxpayers' returns were entered, and many other returns, new or 
supplementary, are expected when the law compelling inscription of bearer 
shares, stocks, and bonds begins to bear fruit. For at least the first ten years 
the capital tax will certainly yield some 1,000 millions lire a year. 4) Among 
the minor extraordinary taxes may be mentioned the tax on incomes above 
10,000 lire, which in 1921 will be doubled; the tax on dividends of bearer se-
curities, which is 15 per cent, on the annual dividends, and will cease to op-
erate when ali securities are inscribed, the special tax on joint-stock, limited 
and other commercial and industriai companies' directors and managers, &c. 
To the ordinary taxes group belong the three old taxes on the land, houses, 
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and other incomes. The land income-tax yielded 127.8 millions lire in 1920, 
against 127.9 in 1919. One must remember, however, that land income is the 
favourite object of taxation of provinces and municipalities, which in 1920 
taxed it to the extent of 323.1 millions lire. Notwithstanding the existence 
of these burdens, land is capable of giving much more to the national exche-
quer. The house income-tax yielded 168.7 millions lire in 1919, and 177.7 
millions in 1920. The product of this tax will also increase when the present 
rent-fixing legislation ceases. The receipts from the "other income" tax in-
creased from 464.2 millions lire in 1919 to 622.7 in 1920. 
70. 
ITALY 
FOREIGN EXCHANGES - FOREIGN TRADE - PRICES 
From our Correspondent 
Rome, March 24 
The feature of the week has been the rapid variations of the lira. The 
pound sterling, which had closed at Rome at 106.10 on March 12th, gradu-
ally improved to 95 on the 19th, but on the 21st was higher at 97.50, only to 
rise further to 101.75 on the 22nd, and to drop to 98.75 on the 23rd. Many 
speculations are aroused by these vagaries of the lira, but the soberest opi-
nion, while recognising that the economie and financial situation is improv-
ing, does not expect an abrupt fall in the quotations. The slower the bet-
terment the more solid it will be. 
The figures of the foreign trade for 1920 have been recently published 
(millions of lire): 
Excess of Imports Per Cent, of Exports 
Imports Exports o v e r Ex p o r t s o n Imports 
1913 3,645-2 2,511-6 1,134-0 68-9 
1914 2,923-3 2,210-4 712-9 75-6 
191 5 4,703-5 2,533-5 2,170-1 53-8 
191 6 8,390-2 3,088-2 5,302-0 36-8 
191 7 13,991-2 3,308-5 10,682-7 23-6 
191 8 16,039-3 3,344-7 12,694-6 20-8 
191 9 16,623-3 6,065-7 10,557-5 36-4 
192 0 15,862-1 7,803-7 8,058-3 49-6 
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The figures for 1920 are calculated on the prices of 1919, so that the 
variations from 1919 to 1920 are variations of quantities, not of values. 
From 1913 to 1920 the real value of the lira has been divided by four, 
so that the figures are only apparently magnified. The excess of imports 
over exports, although less than in 1917-1919, is very menacing, and it 
seems impossible that the expenditure of foreign travellers and the remit-
tances of Italian emigrants on which we relied mainly to adjust the com-
mercial balance will be sufficient to-day to achieve this end. But the situa-
tion is improving, as is shown by the increasing percentage of the exports 
on the value of imports. 
Even more interesting are the figures for the classes into which the for-
eign trade is divided: 
Imports Exports 
1919 1920 1919 1920 
Raw material 5,598 5,014 712 989 
Semi-manufactured goods 3.076 3,249 1,742 2,269 
Finished goods 2,522 3,364 1,985 3,292 
Animals and food products 5,318 4,233 746 1,252 
An ominous feature has been the decrease in the imports of raw mate-
rials. The imports of food are also decreasing, while exports are increasing, 
facts which point to a return to old conditions. Imports and exports of fin-
ished products are also increasing. 
The price index number published by Professor Bachi in the Econo-
mista is falling. The new index of Professor Bachi takes as its basis the year 
1920, and is divided into eight classes, and so is no longer comparable with 
the Economist index number, but the trend is the same: 
November December January February 
1920 1920 1921 1921 
Vegetable products 107-7 106-9 106-7 103-9 
Animals 124-1 126-4 120-7 119-5 
Chemicals 107-7 102-8 98-1 86-3 
Textiles 94-0 81-9 77-4 65-4 
Minerals and metals 101-4 92-7 88-2 79-5 
Building materials 112-6 112-6 113-3 117-0 
Various vegetables 108-7 121-8 123-4 127-3 
Miscellaneous 105-2 106-8 107-1 106-7 
General index 107-33 104-97 102-89 97-93 
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High-water mark was reached in November, 1920; in February we 
could show a fall of about 10 points. If we make the comparison with 
1901-05, the general index number, which is the only one calculated by Pro-
fessor Bachi on this basis, had reached 844.41 in November, 1920, and had 
fallen to 770.45 in February, 1921. A fall of 74 points is noteworthy, but 
prices remain at a level very high in comparison with 1901-05. The fall of 
prices is more accentuated in products such as chemicals, textiles, minerals, 
and metals, in which foreign competition is more especially felt. 
71. 
ITALY 
BANK OF ITALY - GENERAL ELECTIONS -
T H E PASSING OF THE COMMUNIST PERIL 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, Aprii 10 
Signor Stringher has read to the shareholders of the Bank of Italy his 
usuai annual report, full of figures and of interesting remarks upon econom-
ie and financial conditions in 1920. A point considered more fully than in 
past years is the policy of the officiai Bank rate. The rate was, at the begin-
ning of 1920, 5 per cent., was raised to 5V2 per cent, at Aprii 6th, and finally 
to 6 per cent, on May l l t h , following the example of the Bank of France, 
which maintained, after Aprii 8, 1920, the rate of 6 per cent., rather than 
that of the Bank of England, whose rate was put up to 7 per cent, at Aprii 
15, 1920. Two reasons are given by Signor Stringher to explain the disincli-
nation of the Bank of Italy to more drastic rises in the Bank rate. 1) In coun-
tries with superabundant paper money highly depreciated, a rise in Bank 
rate is bound to react much less effectively on foreign exchanges, and on 
the demand for discounts, than in countries with paper money circulating 
at a parity with gold, or at a little discount to gold. 2) While the quantity 
of the paper issue would not have undergone any relevant decrease, the rise 
in the Bank rate would have seriously increased the interest paid by the 
State, other public bodies, industriai companies, and ali debtors in general 
76. June 25,1921, pp. 1370-1371. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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upon the new debt created after the rise in the Bank rate. The State alone 
would have suffered a serious loss, for the huge deficit in his budget which, 
until 1921, was not less than 14 billions lire, has been covered in the first 
half of 1920 by 5 per cent. Consols and in the second half by the issue 
of Exchequer bills and bonds. A differente of 1 per cent, would have meant 
to the taxpayers an additional burden of 140 millions a year. 
On the course of foreign exchanges, which up to a month ago was 
highly unfavourable to Italy, rising gradually from 51.90 lire to the £ in 
January, 1920, to 102.28 at December 31, ending in a stabilisation about 
106-107 in the first two and a-half months of 1921, Signor Stringher has 
more weighty admissions. While in previous reports he enlarged upon the 
influence of the unfavourable balance of commerce, this year he observes 
that the excess of imports over exports was reduced from 10V2 in 1919 to 
8 billions in 1920, which excess is partly covered by the money sent by 
Italian emigrants, by foreigners travelling and spending in Italy, and by 
the credits privately opened to Italian importers by foreign banks and ex-
porters. The increase of 3V2 billion lire from January l s t to December 31, 
1920, in the note issue affords, therefore, a fairly clear explanation in the 
rise of foreign exchanges and of prices, while the subsequent decrease in 
the note issue which took place from the highwater mark of 19.718 mil-
lion lire touched in December 31st - exclusive of 5 and 10 lire State notes 
- is not the least important cause of the recent betterment in the foreign 
exchanges, when the price of the pound sterling was reduced under the 
90 lire level. The social and politicai atmosphere is clearing, and while 
much merit is attributed by his followers to the skilful handling of the 
old chief, Signor Giolitti, ali impartial observers are bound to admit that 
the excesses and vulgarity of Communist and Socialist politicians, the tyr-
anny exercised by petty locai chiefs on the masses, could not fail to excite 
a rapid reaction in a people so quick as Italian are. When the worst hap-
pened, in September last, and the occupation of factories by armed work-
ers and the institution of Soviets in factories seemed to point to an immi-
nent Communist revolution in Italy, and the Government declared its in-
potence to use the armed force for the enforcement of the law, a sudden 
revolution took place. Youths of the middle class, returned men and of-
ficers, in indignation grouped themselves into "fasci". In recent months, 
and even to-day, newspapers are full of reports of encounters and fights 
between "fascists" and "communists". The communists are everywhere 
defeated; public opinion is rising against the idols of November, 1919. 
Premier Giolitti, described as the staunchest opponent of the war, has 
written a letter to the King proposing the dissolution of the unworkable 
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Chamber elected at the general election of November, 1919, and hopes 
that the next elections will disclose a united Italy for the first time since 
the fall of the Roman Empire. This renewed feeling of hope in the future 
of our country is not the least important cause of the better tone in for-
eign exchanges. A while ago Italy seemed likely to be the first country to 
fall a prey to Moscovite communism and barbarism; to-day the nightmare 
is gone and gone for ever. 
72. 
ITALY 
BANKING FIGURES - TREASURY BILL NEW ISSUES -
STATE COFFEE MONOPOLY ENDED 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, Aprii 23 
The following interesting figures have been compiled, illustrating the 
position of the four big Italian banks - Banca Commerciale Italiana, Banca 
Italiana di Sconto, Credito Italiano, and Banco di Roma (millions of lire): 
July 31, 1920 Sept. 30, 1920 Dee. 31, 1920 
864-3 942-0 1,277-5 
Italian bills 6,860-8 7,231-1 9,033-7 
Advances on securities 1,501-2 1,486-9 1,560-4 
Debtors 6,561-7 6,914-7 5,944-7 
Deposits 2,873-6 2,969-5 3,229-4 
Creditors 11,257-4 11,854-8 12,581-0 
Cheques outstanding 1,057-4 1,136-3 1,140-8 
Securities 355-2 382-8 490-2 
Investments 506-9 517-7 445-8 
The advances on securities, i.e., advances to Stock Exchange operators, 
were somewhat restricted, and so were credits opened to correspondents; 
while there was a remarkable increase in the discount of Italian bills and in 
cash. It is probable that the increase in the bills item was mainly due to 
large subscriptions to Treasury bills, of which the amount discounted in 
76. June 2 5 , 1 9 2 1 , pp. 1370-1371. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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the last months of 1920 was very largely increased. The means for increas-
ing discounts and cash were found, apart from the decrease in "debtors" 
item, in the abundant "deposits". 
The industriai unrest of September, 1920, has not been traceable in the 
banking figures of deposits, but its influence was visible in the figures of the 
Treasury bills issue. The last Treasury account (published Aprii 5th, but re-
lating to the Treasury situation of November 30, 1920) gives the following 
figures (in millions of lire) of three to 12 months' ordinary Treasury bills: 
Issued 
July 1920 1,641-2 
August " 1,376-1 
September " 811-7 
October " 958-8 
November " 2,455-5 
In September, when the labour disturbances were at their height, and So-
viet régime seemed to be impending in Italy, the new net subscriptions to 
Treasury bills fell badly to a paltry 124.9 millions lire; but when the revulsion 
of public opinion commenced, the public returned to Treasury bills, and the 
subscriptions went up to the high-water mark of over 1 billion lire in the 
month of December, and it appears, notwithstanding the absence of subse-
quent figures, that subscriptions have been maintained at a high level. The will-
ingness of the public to subscribe to Treasury bills is increased by the fact that 
these bills are the only security which is excepted from the impending compul-
sory inscription of ali bearer securities for the purposes of income-tax. This is 
the reason why the Government has not dared to issue a new full-dress loan of 
4 billions lire. The public would have feared the compulsory inscription, and 
would have continued to prefer the usuai bearer Treasury bills. And so the first 
instalment of the loan of 1 billion lire was issued under the style of "seven-years 
Treasury bills", this name being used for reassuring the saving public. The con-
ditions were favourable to the ordinary investor: 5 per cent, interest, issue price 
at 94 per cent., first half-year dividend payable at once, instead of at August 15, 
1921. An additional interest of 0.25 per cent, is to be given to subscribers who 
will inscribe the bonds. Every half-year, on February 15th and August 15' , 
there will be drawings for 600 lots or premiums. At February 15th the first pre-
mium will be one of 100,000 lire, with a second of 50,000, a third of 10,000, 
four others of 5,000 lire each, and 593 of 1,000 lire. At August 15th there will 
be added to the paid premiums a first big lot of 1,000,000 lire. The whole issue 
of 1 billion lire was subscribed in a few days. 
An event of considerable financial importance was the abandonment of 
„ . j Increase in Bills 
F a l d Outstanding 
1,124-7 516-5 
1,047-0 329-1 
686-8 124-9 
537-6 421-2 
1,447-6 1,007-9 
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the coffee monopoly, which was started in 1919 with hopes of great gains 
for the state exchequer. As a matter of fact, the gains were not forthcom-
ing, or were extremely doubtful; the public was complaining of the bad 
quality of the State coffee, and Trieste was threatened with ruin to her 
big trade in coffee. Out of a total of 18 million bags of coffee consumed 
in the world, Trieste absorbed 1,250,000 bags, and upwards of 20,000 
workers lived on the transit trade. 
The greatest obstacle to the abolition of the coffee monopoly was the 
fact that the State had bought, and stili possessed at the date of Aprii lst, a 
stock of perhaps 200,000 metric quintals, sufficient for 10 months' Italian 
consumption. The stock was bought at an average price which is under-
stood to be not less than 740 lire per metric quintal, and perhaps more, 
while the current price of superior Santos is at Trieste only about 500 lire. 
The Exchequer was unwilling to lose the difference; and no private mer-
chant would have dared to commit himself to help the State out of this 
huge loss if the market had been opened to foreign coffee. The convention 
signed some days ago between the Government and a consortium of coffee 
merchants stipulates that the consortium will buy from the State ali its cof-
fee stock at the price of 740 lire per metric quintal; but the Government 
will prohibit ali import of coffee in Italy for a period of 10 months. 
73. 
ITALY 
DIRECTION OF FOREIGN TRADE -
FALLING WHOLESALE PRICES AND RISING COST OF LIVING 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 9 
The publication of our foreign commerce statistcs for December last 
gives the data for completing the figures given in my letter published in 
the Economist of Aprii 2, 1921. Our foreign commerce amounted in 
1920 to 29,862.1 million lire in imports, and to 2,803.2* in exports. What 
73. May 14, 1921, p. 976. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is also 
dated Turin. 
* The Economist of May 28, 1921 (p. 1176) corrected these figures as follows: "Italian Trade 
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countries have contributed most to these totals may be seen from the fol-
lowing figures: (Million of Lire) 
Imports Exports Balance 
Austria 464.7 443.9 - 20.8 
Czecho-Slovakia 184.0 75.1 - 108.9 
Germany 821.5 380.3 -441 .2 
France 1,333.5 1,095.3 -238.2 
Greece 45.2 160.5 + 115.3 
Spain 139.6 139.9 + 0.3 
Switzerland 336.0 898.1 +562.1 
Great Britain 2,368.3 884.3 -1,484.0 
British India 744.9 160.3 -584 .6 
Egypt 101.7 235.4 + 133.7 
Tripoli and Cyrenaica 21.8 68.4 +46.6 
Tunis 81.3 50.9 - 3 0 . 4 
United States 4,788.5 655.1 -4,133.4 
Argentina 1,676.7 419.1 -1,257.6 
Brazil 275.2 154.4 - 120.8 
Great Britain, India, United States, and Argentina are our great provi-
ders of food and raw materials, but from Germany also we bought much 
more than we could manage to sell. 
Commodity prices, according to the calculation of Professor Bachi, in 
the Economista of Florence and Rome, are continuing to descend. The new 
index is based on the prices of 1920 (made equal to 100), but for the sake 
of comparison with your index numbers, in the last line is added another 
general index calculated on the basis of 1901-1905: 
Nov., 1919 Dee., 1919 Feb., 1920 March, 1920 
Cereals and other products.. 107-7 106-8 103-4 107-8 
Animals 124 1 126-4 119-5 117-4 
Chemicals 107-7 102-8 89-2 86-9 
Textiles 94-0 81-9 65-4 63-5 
Minerals and metals 101-4 92-7 79-5 72-0 
Building materials 112-6 112-6 117-0 112-9 
Various vegetables 108-7 121-8 127-3 123-2 
Miscellaneous 105-2 106-8 106-7 103-9 
General index (basis 1920)... 107-33 104-97 98-23 96-66 
Do (basis 1901-1905) 844-41 825-84 772-81 760-66 
- A Correction. - We are indebted to a correspondent for pointing out an error in the figures 
given by our Italian correspondent of ItaHan imports and exports in 1920 (see Economist, 
May 14 , page 976). The figures should read as follows: 
Lire 
Import 15,862,135,935 
Export 7,803,791,704". 
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These are wholesale prices. As usuai, retail prices lag behind, so that 
the cost of living is increasing. The weekly budget of a workman's family 
of five (two adults and three boys) is calculated as follows at Turin: 
Food and 
Drink Clothing Rent. 
Heatig and 
Lighting Miscellaneous Total 
July, 1920.... ... 100 100 100 100 100 100 
August ... 99-82 104-34 100 99-62 100 100-57 
September " ... 101-43 110-89 100 103-80 100 102-88 
October ... 106-02 111-19 100 110-19 100 106-18 
November ... 111-89 115-19 110 118-91 105-38 111-99 
December " ... 119-69 114-25 110 127-43 112-66 118-11 
January, 1921 .... ... 121-07 114-25 110 127-06 112-66 118-25 
February ... 123-03 114-25 110 107-60 112-66 119-04 
March " ... 130-02 103-70 110 103-24 119-31 122-26 
The greatest increase has taken place in food items, owing to the be-
lated rise in bread from 1.10 to 1.40 lire per kilo, and in pastry from 1,20 
to 2 lire per kilo. The rise in the bread price caused no sensation. The 
bread subsidy problem seems to be solving itself with the minimum of 
friction, owing to lower prices of wheat in the U.S. and to better foreign 
exchanges. Last year the Government sold wheat at 60 lire per quintal to 
bakers the same wheat which they bought at 110-120 lire from national 
producers, and at 250-300 lire from foreign sources, and the bread sub-
sidy caused a loss of 6-8 billion lire to the Italian exchequer. Next finan-
cial year, 1921-1922, the Government will sell the wheat to bakers at the 
same price at which they will buy from internai producers, i.e., at 150 lire 
per quintal. As, however, the foreign imported wheat costs to-day only 
110-120 lire, c.i.f. Genoa, the Government will recoup themselves of a 
part of the loss sustained in past years. The situation is thus simply re-
versed. Instead of losing, the exchequer will gain from the wheat mono-
poly, and whereas the monopoly aimed in past years at a subsidisation of 
bread consumers, it will next year be in effect a subsidy to agriculture. 
This makes ali the more difficult the abolition of the wheat monopoly, 
as the Government for the sake of inducing agriculturists to grow much 
wheat, promised that the price for the 1921 harvest would be 150 lire per 
quintal. The agriculturist says that the promise must be fulfilled. But the 
rise in the cost of living makes workers and public servants unrestful, and 
desirous for a rise in wages and salaries. This week public servants in 
Rome held meetings, and threatened strikes and obstructions; and as gen-
eral elections are at hand, the Government had to give way and promise a 
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general revision of salaries, with a minimum rise which will apparently 
amount to 200 lire monthly. The State can raise salaries, because the yield 
of taxes is expected to rise. But private industry, which is obliged to face a 
falling market, cannot concede new increases in wages. If wages are as yet 
not openly reduced the end is obtained by reduced working hours and 
fewer men are employed. 
74. 
ITALY 
GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS - PROTECTIONIST THREATS -
T H E D Y E INDUSTRY 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 23 
The General Elections have taken place, and no party can claim com-
plete victory: 
1919 1921 
Constitutionals (Liberals, Democratic, Radicals, 
Nationalists, Fascists, &c.) 238 272 
Populars (Catholic party) 101 108 
Republicans 13 8 
Socialists 138 123 
Communists 18 16 
Germans - 4 
Slavs - 4 
508 535 
Southern Tyrol has sent four Germans, and the province of Gorizia 
four Slav representatives. This was expected as a result of the annexation 
of German and Slovene speaking minorities; but as the annexation was a 
national necessity, and the Italian Government is resolved to give to these 
minorities the largest autonomy compatible with national sovereignty, it is 
hoped that German and Slav members will do useful work in Parliament. 
The real crux of the problem is the relative position of Constitutional, 
Catholic, Socialist, and Communist parties. Republicans are a vanishing 
74. May 28, 1921, pp. 1179-1180. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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and hopeless minority. Communists, who are the representatives of the 
Russian Soviets in Italy, boasted to be sure of increasing from 18 to 30 
at the expense mainly of the Socialists. This prophecy was falsified by 
the electorate. Communists were beaten, and they are a negligible quantity 
in the new House. The Catholics and Socialists remain the greatest and 
most compact groups, as they were in the past Legislature. The Constitu-
tionals are greater in number, but not in unity. Among them there are 35 
"Lascists", who are neither monarchial nor republican, are opposed to 
Giolitti and Nitti, and only resolved to favour an anti-Socialist Govern-
ment. But the polis have not given an unmistakable anti-Socialist verdict. 
As in Italy no Government, from the days of Cavour, has ever been 
able to remain in power with a thin majority, and as the Constitutional ma-
jority is divided by internai differences, it is an easy prophecy that no Gov-
ernment will be able to last without the support of the Popular (Catholic) 
or of the Socialist party. We are doomed to a Coalition Government; and 
from this point of view the polis went contrary to the hopes of Signor Gio-
litti and of most Liberal leaders. As, however, the extremest men were not 
re-elected in the Socialist party, there is much talk of co-operation between 
Constitutionals and Socialists, which talk would have been an unheard of 
thing in the past Chamber. 
One of the gravest questions facing the new House is the fiscal pro-
blem. It appears that the Government have not yet made up their mind 
as to Protection or Lree-trade; provisionai solutions are preferred. In No-
vember last a high scale of duties was decreed against the import of motor-
cars, as much as 20,000 lire duty being imposed upon a single high-speed 
motor-car. These very high duties aimed at inducing Trance, United King-
dom, and United States to reduce their very high duties against the import 
of Italian motor-cars; but the hope was not fulfilled. 
The next provisionai Protectionist measure was announced by Signor 
Alessio, Minister of Trade, in his electoral speech in favour of the dye in-
dustry. What the measure will be it is as yet not known; some say a high 
import duty, while others prefer a limitation of imports, subject to Govern-
mental permit. The case for Prohibition or Protection is twofold. Lirstly, 
there is the direct interest of the Government. It appears that, in virtue 
of the Treaty of Versailles clauses, Italy had the right to have from Ger-
many at stated prices 3,500,000 kg of dyes up to December 31, 1920, 
and 200,000 kg monthly afterwards. Up to March 31st Italy had received 
only 1,500,000 kg, but even this reduced quantity was too much for the 
internai demand, which absorbed only about 400,000 kg. The Government 
had entrusted the sale of German dyes to a union of producers and con-
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sumers, but the results, which were highly satisfactory in 1919, are to-day 
very disappointing. German producers are successfully competing against 
German Treaty dyes sold by our Government. The price of the black sul-
phur dyes from 1.50-2 lire per kg went up to 14-15 lire in the second half 
of 1919, but is to-day, owing to the crisis in the cotton industry, only 6-6.50 
lire per kg. At this price the newly-established Italian producers clamour 
that they cannot produce without loss. They say that their industry has in-
vested 400 million lire, and that it employs upward of fifty thousand work-
ers. In actual fact, the workers employed, if we deduct those which are em-
ployed in chemical, matches, medicine, and explosive industries, do not ex-
ceed a thousand men, and the capital employed should have been amor-
tised during the war, when high profits were reaped in the making of 
explosive and of dyes. 
Against these paltry figures the industries consuming dyes are employ-
ing upward of 600,000 men, and are depending for their life upon exports. 
The silk industry provides 25 per cent, of the total Italian exports; cotton 
and wool exported before the war formed 11 per cent, of the total exports. 
Cotton goods (yarn and textiles) exported were in 1913-14 654,000 kg out 
of a total production of 1,897,000; in 1919-20 207,000 kg out of a total of 
1,539,000, the proportional figures being 34 and 35 per cent. The cost of 
dyes bore the following proportion upon the price per kg of cotton spun 
goods: 
Price of Cotton % of the Cost of 
Spun Goods Cost of Dyes Dyes Upon the 
Lire Lire Total Price 
Before the war 2.55 0.185 7.25 
March, 1921 12.50 1.82 14.50 
The cost of dyes is a by no means unimportant item in the cost of pro-
duction. While the price of cotton goods increased 4.9 fold, the cost of 
dyes increased 9.85 fold. An additional increase of the cost of dyes owing 
to a high import duty or to a vexatious Governmental permits system 
would have a serious effect upon silk, cotton, and wool exports. Dye pro-
ducers ask for a duty of 3 gold lire per kg. At the present rate of exchange 
this would amount to 9-10 paper lire per kg, while the price (internai) of 
black sulphur dyes is of 6-6.50 paper lire per kg. The proposed duty would 
amount to an increase of 150 per cent, in the price of dyes, and would 
make exports of textiles from Italy very difficult indeed. 
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75. 
I T A L Y 
A STRIKE AMONG PUBLIC SERVANTS - YIELD OF TAXES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 5 
The week has been characterised by an agitation among public ser-
vants. It appears than on the eve of general elections, Signor Corradini, 
Under-Secretary to the Home Department, let it be understood that 
monthly salaries would be increased by 200 lire, irrespective of grades. 
At the end of May, when the so-called promise should have been fulfilled, 
Signor Bonomi, the Treasury Minister, found out that the promise was 
never given by any authorised member of the Government, should never 
have been given, and, above ali, could not be fulfilled. The cost of public 
servants had already increased from 900 million lire in 1914 to 5,300 mil-
lion lire in 1921. 
This last sum represents more than a third of public income; and as, 
roughly, another third is absorbed by interest on debt, it appears impossi-
ble to exceed the present expenditure. The problem, however, is not to be 
put aside by the simple plea of impossibility. Public servants are making 
appeal to justice, pointing out that salaries given to the great and well-or-
ganised category of State railway servants are much higher than the salaries 
of ali other public employees. 
It is in vain that Ministers and politicians point out that railwaymen are 
working on an industriai basis, that the State railways should be regarded 
as an industriai concern, with wages and salaries equal to those prevailing 
in the private industry. Public servants reply that the railway work is no 
more difficult than theirs, and that ali public salaries should be made uni-
form. Railway salaries have been increased, they say, not by reason of the 
special difficulty of the work done, but in consequence of better organisa-
tion, and of strikes threatened or actually put in effect last year. The bad 
example has fructified, at present the public employees are at Rome, and 
in several other great cities practising the so-called white strike; that is, they 
76. June 25,1921, pp. 1370-1371. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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are at present in their office rooms, but they abstain from working. The 
Government have let it be known that they are disposed to increase sal-
aries, if it is possible to diminish the number of public employees, so that 
the total expenditure shall not exceed the present 5,300 million lire. The ali 
round increase of 200 lire a month would cost 900 million lire, and the 
equalisation to railway employees' salaries would put up the expense to 
8,000 million lire. The charge would be absolutely unbearable. Figures 
which are coming to hand point to an increase in public income, but we 
are far from the sum which would be necessary to satisfy the requests 
put forward by public employees. 
Below are given the figures of "principal" items of public income for 
the first nine months (from July l s t to March 31st) of the last and current 
financial years (in millions of lire): 
1919-20 1920-21 
Income-taxes 1,485-7 2,371-0 
Succession duties and other registration duties 465-4 568-8 
Stamp taxes 463 -4 894-4 
Excise and Customs 907-6 1,254-3 
Industriai monopolies (salt, tobacco, matches, and playcards) 1,286-2 2,025-1 
Lottery 70-4 106-7 
Commercial monopolies (coffee and coffee substitutes) 272-5 368-6 
Total 4,951-1 7,588-9 
The results obtained are highly gratifying, and it is to be hoped that the 
sum total of these principal items may touch the record of 11,000 million 
lire at the end of the financial year, and that the "minor" items will bring 
the general total of public income even higher, to 12 or 13 billion lire; and 
that the naturai development of new taxes will give next year a total even 
higher, up to 15,000 million lire. But there are not wanting ominous signs 
of distress owing to the great increase of taxation. Especially the confisca-
tion of war profits, i.e., the increase of the tax to 100 per cent., is the cause 
of the gravest financial difficulties to many taxpayers. As the law prescribes 
that the stocktaking for purposes of taxation shall be made at the date of 
June 30, 1920, and as at that date we in Italy had reached the high water 
mark of prices, the taxpayers are at the same time facing the tumbling 
down of prices and the demands of the taxing officers based on profits cal-
culated on past high prices. As a result of increasing protests on behalf of 
taxpayers, the Government have felt obliged to grant some delay for the 
payment of the tax. But I am afraid they will be obliged to grant also im-
portant reliefs in the hardest cases. 
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76. 
I T A L Y 
RETURN TOWARDS FREE TRADE IN CEREALS AND SUGAR 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 20 
The two last remaining war excrescences on the economie structure of 
Italy are disappearing - namely, the State monopolies of cereals and sugar. 
The Government has issued decrees by which internai trade in Indian 
corn, oats, barley, and rye are made absolutely free, and the imports from 
foreign countries are only made subject to the old duties of 1.15 lire for 
corn, 4 for oats, and 4.50 for barley and rye. But for wheat the problem 
is somewhat complicated by promises given to wheat producers and con-
sumers. To wheat producers the State promised by decree of June 4, 1920, 
that the price would be fixed from July 1, 1921, at 125 lire per quintal, with 
an additional premium of 21.50 lire for the wheat produced in the South-
ern provinces, in the Islands, and in the territory formerly occupied by the 
enemy. If the ports should be opened to the free imports of foreign wheat, 
the Government may run the risk of breaking its promise, made to induce 
producers to sow large areas with wheat. The price of North American 
wheat, c.i.f. Genoa, which had risen from 126 lire per quintal in Septem-
ber, 1919, to the maximum of 292 lire in May, 1920, fell to 140 in May, 
1921. Some quantities were even bought at 110 lire; and to-day the c.i.f. 
price is fluctuating between 130 and 140 lire. A complicated system of vari-
able duties and bounties would be, therefore, necessary to guarantee to 
wheat producers the promised prices. What will become, moreover, of 
the premium promised to Southern and other provinces? 
The Government, therefore, has limited itself for the moment to a de-
cree with which they declare that they will accept up to August 31, 1921, 
ali offers of wheat from internai producers at the stated prices of 125 lire 
per quintal in the Northern and Central provinces, and of 146.50 in the 
Southern and other provinces. It is to be feared that the offers will be very 
much greater than in past years. In the nine months from August, 1920, to 
76. June 25 ,1921 , pp . 1370-1371. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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Aprii, 1921, the State obtained with great difficulty and by means of forced 
requisitions 10,733,135 quintals of wheat. No producers would have freely 
offered a single quintal of wheat, as the free or clandestine price was higher 
than the State price. As the reverse situation will probably obtain in ensu-
ing months, the free offers will be, it is feared, very abundant, thus greatly 
lessening the necessity for foreign imports. 
But the troubles of the Government will not end there. If it were pos-
sible to free the price of bread from State regulation, State imports could 
be discontinued, and private traders could step in instead. No private tra-
der, however, would dare to import a single quintal of foreign wheat at the 
present c.i.f. cost of 140 hre if the bread price is to remain fixed on the 
present basis of 115 lire for wheat. On this basis, the bread prices are at 
Turin, for example, 1.40, 1.70, and 1.90 lire per kilogram, according to 
quality. The State loses the difference between 140 lire, which is the price 
of foreign-bought wheat, and 115 lire, which is the sale price of the same 
wheat to the distributing consortiums. 
Similar difficulties are handicapping the Government in the efforts 
made towards extricating themselves from the sugar difficulties. By a re-
cent decree, sugar rationing is to be abolished from July 1, 1921. The con-
sumption of sugar, which was about 2 million quintals in 1913 and 1914, 
was reduced by rationing only to 1,245,000 quintals in 1917. To-day, the 
consumption is 2,500,000 quintals yearly. The individuai monthly rations 
differ from the maximum of 780 grams for Leghorn, 770 for Turin, and 
760 for Genoa to 175 grams for Avellino, 185 for Teramo, Campobasso, 
and Palermo. If the imports were free, foreign sugar could be landed at 
Genoa for less than 500 hre per quintal - viz., 200 lire for sugar proper, 
c.i.f. Genoa; 216 Hre normal duty, equal to the internai excise; 22.85 
gold-Hre, corresponding about to 68 paper-Hre of protective duty; 3 lire 
for port dues and costs; making a total of 488 Hre. But the Government 
cannot proceed at once to abohsh the sugar monopoly, as they promised 
last year to beetroot producers a fixed price of 16.50 lire per quintal. It 
was a necessary guarantee, they said at the time, as they would not other-
wise cultivate beetroot. But the consequences are to-day rather ominous. 
As the foreign sugar can be landed for less than 500 Hre, the sugar pro-
ducers are clamouring that, if imports are made free, they cannot pay to 
beetroot producers the promised price of 16.50 Hre per quintal. And so 
the Government are finding themselves in the predicament of having abol-
ished the rationing system and of being forced to continue the State mono-
poly for some months, until, in October next, the agriculturists have deliv-
ered their production of beetroot. Then it wiH be possible to calculate the 
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difference between the fixed price of 16.50 lire and the price at which the 
sugar producers would have found convenient to buy beetroot with a view 
of meeting competition of foreign sugar. And then, if we will return to free 
trade in sugar, the taxpayer will pay the piper. 
77. 
ITALY 
T H E TRANSITION TO FREE TRADE IN WHEAT -
PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING EXPENDITURE -
T H E RESIGNATION OF THE GIOLITTI CABINET AND LINANCIAL PROBLEMS -
T H E LALL IN STOCK EXCHANGE QUOTATIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 2 
Since my last letter signor Soleri, the High Commissioner for Lood, 
has obtained the consent of the Cabinet to a scheme for the final passage 
to free trade in wheat. After declaring that they will accept until August 
31, 1921, ali offers from agriculturists of national wheat at 125 lire per 
quintal for soft wheat and 145 lire for hard wheat, with additional pre-
miums of 21.50 and 25 lire for southern provinces, islands, and territory 
formerly occupied, the Government were obliged to forbid until the same 
date any commercial intercourse between the two sets of provinces, those 
with and those without premiums, as otherwise ali wheat could be 
smuggled from the latter into the former provinces for the sake of the 
premiums. 
Lor the two months of July and August the sale price by the Govern-
ment to millers is fixed at 128 and 150 lire for the two qualities. They hope 
that agriculturists will prefer to sell to private millers at a price from 125 to 
128 lire rather than to the Government at 125 lire, so that the Government 
will be relieved of the burden of too great a mass of wheat thrown upon it 
by national producers fearing the competition of foreign wheat at lower 
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prices. As the imports of foreign wheat will be made free only from Sep-
tember ls t, the prices will oscillate until that date about 128 and 150 lire. 
The loss of the national Exchequer will be reduced to the payment of the 
premiums in the Southern and other privileged provinces. One may hope 
that this will be the last loss, and that after September ls t the State will be 
free from this appalling source of expenditure, and the wheat trade defi-
nitely restored to its naturai freedom. 
In his recent speeches the Premier uttered significant warnings against 
proposals of new expenditure which are forthcoming after the announce-
ment, repeatedly made by responsible Ministers, that the deficit of the Ita-
lian Budget was reduced from 14 billion Hre in 1920-21 to 4 bilHons in 
1921-22. Signor Giolitti said very pointedly that 4 biUions are not a matter 
to be trifled with, and that the deficit figure will easily increase if Parlia-
ment and Government will not set their faces resolutely against ali new ex-
penditure. The proposai, largely patronised in the Chamber of Deputies, of 
giving another monthly bonus of 200 Hre to aU pubHc employees woul add 
900 millions lire to the expenditure. A scheme for national health insurance 
would cost another 900 millions, and so on. 
The warnings fall as yet on sterile ground as far as concerns the House 
of Deputies, where the Government encountered a bitter opposition when 
they proposed the reduction of the number of public employees and the 
concession to this end of the necessary discretionary powers to Ministers. 
The Cabinet had to resign, apparently upon a doubtful vote on foreign pol-
icy, but in reality also owing to the difficulties encountered in the task of 
limiting the increase of expenditure and of applying the somewhat wild 
schemes of taxation voted by Parliament in September last. EspeciaUy 
the total confiscation of war profits is proving difficult in a falling market. 
As the law of September 24, 1920, prescribes that the valuations for taxing 
purposes shaU be made at the date of June 30, 1920, and as at that date aU 
prices were in Italy at their maximum, the taxpayers are confronted with 
the impossible task of paying enormous taxes upon a basis of values which 
is fast disappearing. For example, taxpayers who had invested, upon the 
advice of the Government, their war profits in ships, when these had to 
be bought from 2,000 to 2,200 Hre per deadweight ton, are to-day obliged 
to pay these same 2,000-2,200 Hre to the public Exchequer when the price 
of the ton has faUen to 500 Hre. 
To this cause of financial instability there is added the menace of com-
pulsory inscription of ali private securities. Inscribed securities are far from 
popular in Italy, where only bearer securities are practicaUy negotiable. The 
fear of compulsory inscription is not the least cause of general decreases in 
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the prices of stocks and shares. A recent calculation by Professor Bachi 
gives the following results on a basis of 100 for December, 1918: 
Dee., 1918 Dee., 1920 May, 1921 
Banks 100 103.17 96.54 
Ex-railways 100 62.21 51.37 
Transportation by land 100 70.86 60.11 
Transportation by sea 100 83.61 51.79 
Cotton 100 137.77 103.38 
Jute 100 118.18 96.07 
Wool 100 101.47 101.11 
Hemp and flax 100 152.81 98.42 
Silk 100 172.32 123.79 
Mines 100 74.54 55.79 
Metals 100 47.75 26.93 
Engineering 100 55.12 58.28 
Motorcars 100 72.71 50.39 
Electricity 100 67.68 68.48 
Chemicals 100 80.26 67.07 
Sugar 100 108.91 92.24 
Food 100 106.40 90.66 
Waterworks 100 87.13 87.44 
Land and houses 100 100.63 102.66 
Miscellaneous 100 130.50 108.67 
General index 100 79.67 68.39 
For cotton, wool, silk, and miscellaneous maximum prices were quoted 
later than December, 1920. The land and houses category is alone enjoying 
a continuous rise, owing to better prospects for the future, when the ex-
ceptional Rent Restriction Acts will cease to operate. The fall was most se-
vere in navigation, mines, engineering, motor-cars, which were the greatest 
war profiteers, and reaches its maximum to the metallurgical group, owing 
to the artificial nature of this industry in a country like Italy deprived of 
coal and iron. One of the last acts of the Giolitti Cabinet was a decree pro-
mulgating the new fiscal import and export duties. The publication of this 
new general tariff is awaited with interest, as it is feared that protection has 
gained by it a signal victory just at a time when ali people are clamouring 
for a reduction in the high cost of living. 
JULY, 1921 
78. 
ITALY 
THE NEW GENERAL TARIFF 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 10 
The most important measure enacted by the past Giolitti Cabinet on 
the eve of its fall was the hurried passing by Royal legislative decree of 
the new general tariff. The decree bears the date of June 9, 1921, and 
was published in the officiai Gazette of June 30, 1921. Professor Alessio, 
the former Minister of Industry, was evidently bent on leaving his mark 
on fiscal legislation. A new general tariff was necessary, for the existing tar-
iff of 1887 was growing obsolete. The great problem was - more or less 
protection? No one dreamed of a return to the Free-trade era of Cavour 
and his immediate successors. A Royal Commission had studied the pro-
blem, and published over 30 large volumes of special and general reports. 
Its findings were decisively protectionist. They proposed that the old sys-
tem of a general tariff and of subsequent treaties of commerce with foreign 
countries with lower binding duties should be discontinued, and that in 
place thereon should be substituted a system, akin to French or United 
States examples of a doublé tariff; a higher tariff to be applicable to some 
nations and a lower tariff to States giving us the benefit of lower duties, 
both duties to be variable at the pleasure of the Italian Government. 
The Protectionism in these proposals was too rampant to be acceptable 
to politicai parties. The present Alessio tariff maintains the old principle 
of a general tariff applicable to ali countries which apply their general tariff 
to our goods, and of a lower tariff based on future treaties of commerce. 
Much will depend, therefore, on the stipulation of commercial treaties, 
but evidently the general tariff is to be a basis on which negotiations will 
be conducted. The general features of the new tariff are as follow: 1) 
The tariff is applicable as from July 1, 1921, to ali goods which do not 
come from countries with which Italy has a treaty of commerce in force. 
78. July 16, 1921, pp. 99-100. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
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2) The duties are payable in gold, i.e., at a rate of exchange which is every 
week fixed by Government, on the basis, presumably, of a mean of the ex-
changes with France, Switzerland, Great Britain, and United States. 3) To 
the principal duty there is to be added, in the great majority of cases, an 
additional duty, called increment coefficient (coefficiente di maggiorazione). 
For instance, "Horses", which bear the schedule number 1 of the new tar-
iff, pay, if not less than 1.40 metres in height, 140 gold lire each. As, how-
ever, the increment coefficient is 0.5, we shall add another 70 lire, so that 
the whole duty will be 210 gold-lire, which, by the way, corresponds today 
to about 700 paper-lire. 4) The additional duty is variable at the will of the 
Government. If the Minister of Industry thinks that foreign competition is 
becoming too severe, he can put up the duty by a decree, and afterwards 
put the decree on the table of the House of Deputies, which, it is hoped, 
will accept the accomplished fact. 5) The new tariff includes 951 schedules, 
whereas the old tariff contained only 472. The increase is partly due to 
technical variations and progress in the industry between 1887 and 
1921, but is also, unmistakably, an indication of the more Protectionist ten-
dency of the new tariff. With more numerous and refined distinctions be-
tween goods and goods, the clause of the more favoured nation will not 
work at ali smoothly. The refinement in the classification of goods is direc-
ted against the perii - from a Protectionist point of view - that a lowering 
of a duty on a given class of goods in favour of a given country may be used 
by another country for claiming a decrease on other goods which happen 
to be in the same class. With more detailed schedules this stretching of de-
creases will not be so easy as in the past. The change of classification makes 
an exact comparison between old and new tariff more difficult. If ali sche-
dules resembled the first already cited ("horses higher than 1.40 metres"), 
the prospect for Italian consumers would not be bright. In the old tariff 
horses paid 40 gold-lire. Now they pay 140 lire principal duty, 70 lire ad-
ditional duty, in ali 210 lire, ali in gold, equivalent to about 700 paper-lire. 
The increase in paper-lire is about seventeenfold. Fortunately the increases 
are not everywhere so high. But the instance given is sufficient to point out 
a fundamental mistake in the new tariff. The compilers evidently adopted 
the "increment coefficient" to enable the Government to counteract the 
influence of increased costs of production of Italian goods in relation to 
the assumed lower cost of foreign goods. But the payment in gold-lire 
has already the very same aim and effect. The payment in gold and the ad-
ditional duty are bound to overlap, and to constitute, in most cases, a dou-
blé charge on Italian consumers. 
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The schedules are so varied as to give an impression of decrease in the 
lower grades of goods, but the decreases are few, and comparatively unim-
portant in comparison with the increases in the higher grades. If the "prin-
cipal" duty may appear lowered in some cases, this impression is reversed 
if we take account of the additional duty. Italian consumers, moreover, 
who pay duties in paper-lire and whose incomes, in not a few cases, have 
not increased in proportion to the depreciation of the lira, are apt to be hit 
by the gold duties even more severely than foreign importers from rela-
tively appreciated countries. The Government says that foreign States, 
as, for instance, Great Britain, France, Spain, Czecho-Slovakia, have in-
creased their tariffs even more, but the contemplation of worse cases will 
be a scanty comfort to Italian consumers. 
79. 
ITALY 
BUDGET SPEECH - DECREASING DEFICIT AND DECLINING NOTE ISSUE -
APPRECIATION OF PAPER-MONEY 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, July 29 
The Finance Minister, Signor De Nava, has made an emergency Bud-
get speech in the Chamber of Deputies. A cloud was hanging over the 
probable results of the financial year just commenced, from July 1, 1921, 
to June 30, 1922. The ex-Premier, Signor Giolitti, had announced to the 
Senate, before the General Elections, that the deficit had been reduced 
from 14 to 4 milliards lire. Signor Soleri, the present Finance Minister, 
loosely talked some days ago, of a deficit of 7 milliards lire. The public 
was at a loss to know which of the figures was the true one. 
The financial year 1920-21, the Finance Minister now says, closes with 
a deficit of 10,300 millions lire, or 4,000 less than the estimate made a year 
79. August 6, 1921, p. 225. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
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ago. The present financial year, 1921-22, was expected last year to give a 
deficit of 10,370 million lire. After the estimate was made, events took 
place which greatly changed the situation. I give below the principal causes 
of variation (in millions lire): 
Decrease in expenditure: 
Loss on bread 
Loss on State navigation 
Increases in income: 
Income taxes 
Stamp and registration taxes ... 
Wine tax 
Customs 
Tobacco 
Additional tax for war crippled, 
widows, &c 
Post and telegraphs 
Exchange-gain for Customs du-
ties 
Sundry tickets on State railways 
Other increases of real over bud-
geted income 
Total 
5,300 
200 
5,500 
204 
274 
300 
100 
300 
120 
150 
150 
26 
1,624 
1,000 
2,624 
8,124 
Increase in expenditure: 
Interest on debt 400 
Expenditure for reconstruction in 
new and formerly occupied 
by the enemy provinces 150 
War pensions 200 
Subsidy to private railways and 
tramways 126 
Increases of salaries and bonu-
ses to public employees, out-
of-work subsidies, public 
works, &c 1,291 
Loss on State railways and addi-
tional votes of credit 
Decreases in income: 
Coffee 
459 
2,626 
102 
2,728 
If we deduct from the originally estimated deficit of 10,370 lire the dif-
ference between the probable gain of 8,124 millions and the loss of 2,728 
millions, we obtain the new figure of about 5,000 millions lire of probable 
deficit for the current financial year. Public debt will increase, although at a 
lesser pace than in the past, when it increased from 9.8 billions at October 
31, 1920, to 106,621 millions lire at June 30, 1921. Of this enormous sum, 
probably 22,000 millions are foreign debt, taken at the par of exchanges, 
due to Great Britain and United States. If we were to pay these foreign 
debts at the present rate of exchange, instead of 22,000 we should pay 
about 80,000 millions lire. In addition, there exist 84,000 millions lire of 
internai debt. 
Of this internai debt, about 50,000 millions are funded debt, 25,000 
millions Treasury bills and bonds at short dates, and 9,000 paper notes is-
sued by the banks for Government account. 
The paper issues in Italy went up as follows, from the beginning of the 
war (in millions of lire): 
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Banking Notes (for State Notes (of 5 and 10 Lire, Number 
Index Government Account and exclusive of Notes Total for Commercial Purposes) of 1 & 2 Lire) 
First quarter of 1914 .. 2,200 400 2,600 100 
December 31, 1914 .... 2,936.0 657.2 3,593.2 137.0 
1915 3,968.0 1,082.1 5,050.1 192.5 
1916 5,012.4 1,317.3 6,329.7 241.3 
1917 8,425.0 1,748.8 10,173.8 387.8 
1918 11,753.2 2,124.1 13,877.3 529.0 
1919 16,281.3 2,271.3 18,522.6 707.3 
1920 19,731.6 2,269.3 22,000.9 846.1 
June 20, 1921 17,757.0 2,270.0 19,827.0 762.5 
After a continuous increase, which multiplied the originai circulation 
almost by 8V2, we have obtained, in the first half of 1921, a decrease of al-
most 2,200 millions lire. This is an omen of better times, and of reduced 
prices. It is doubtful, however, how far it will be possible to go in the 
way of monetary parity. 
Italy has made a very good beginning in the reduction of her Budget def-
icit and of her note issue; but, if dollars and pounds sterling gain more rapidly 
in buying power, it is even possible that our lira, although appreciating in 
terms of goods, will depredate in terms of dollars or sterling. For the sake 
of international trade, some sort of international agreement upon the relative 
progress of monetary appreciation in various countries would be helpful. 
80. 
ITALY 
REVENUE RETURNS - SAVINO BANKS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, August 13 
Recent revenue statistics give interesting particulars of the financial re-
sults of past year. The general real revenue was 12,600 millions hre. About 
1,700 millions are classified under the head of minor or miscellaneous 
items. The other items are classified as follows (in millions of lire): 
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1919-20 1920-21 Inc. or Dee. 
Income-taxes 2,331.4 3,993.4 + 1,662.0 
Stamp and concession taxes 633.4 1,107.8 + 474.4 
Succession and registration taxes 665.8 773.5 + 107.8 
Excise and other consumption taxes 1,314.7 1,608.0 + 293.3 
Industriai monopolies 1,829.1 2,744.1 + 915.0 
Lottery 90.5 151.0 + 60.5 
Commercial monopolies 452.5 521.9 + 69.3 
Total . 7,317.4 10,899.7 + 3,582.3 
In the income-tax category, the most interesting feature is the great in-
crease in the yield of the excess profits tax, which goes from 1,029 to 
1,991.5 millions lire. For two years this tax will stili give a large yield, 
but its ultimate disappearance must be looked forward to with some con-
cern. Fortunately, other taxes show signs of taking its place. First of ali 
there is the extraordinary tax on capital, which from nothing in 1919-20, 
rose to 452.5 millions lire in 1920-21, and may yield during the first ten 
years of its existence about 1,000 millions annually. This will enable the 
Treasury to surmount the most difficult period in the reorganisation of 
the old income-taxes. The oldest of ali, the tax on land income, progressed 
only from 114 to 115.6 millions lire in the last two years. The yield is sta-
tionary owing to the antiquated methods of valuing land incomes. Once 
reformed, the tax will give more important results. The tax on professional, 
industriai, commercial incomes and on incomes of capital and public and 
private employments rose from 686.4 to 935.3. This is a satisfactory rate, 
and full of promise. Next year the provisionai super-tax on incomes above 
10,000 lire will be superseded by a new complementary tax on total in-
come, which is bound to yield a much greater sum than the paltry one 
of 89.4 millions lire furnished by provisionai tax. 
In the stamp and concession category, perhaps the most interesting 
items are the luxury taxes: 
1919-20 1920-21 Increase 
Tax on cinematographs 14.3 17.4 + 3.1 
Tax on motor cars 36.2 83.2 + 47.0 
Tax on jewellery 17.8 24.1 + 6.3 
Tax on perfumeries 39.2 43.1 + 3.8 
Tax on restaurants 4.5 5.4 + 0.9 
Tax on liquor and fine wines bottles 14.2 21.5 + 7.3 
Tax on sales of luxury goods 66.1 + 66.1 
Tax on theatres 2.5 + 2.5 
This category, which is in its initial stage, is very promising, especially if 
the Exchequer will resist proposals to increase escessively the rates of tax. 
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The Increase of 293.3 millions in excise is wholly due to the new tax on 
wine, which from nothing in 1919-20 passed to 311,1 millions lire in 
1920-21. But the wine growers are very influential in Italy, especially 
among the popular or catholic party. This party has secured a partial repeal 
of the voted increase of the rate of the tax from 10 to 30 lire per hectolitre. 
The tax will be increased only to 20 lire. Even so, the wine tax will give 
next year an increased return. 
The commercial monopolies on coffee, coffee substitutes, & c., have 
been repealed, as I said in a recent letter, but the Exchequer will lose noth-
ing, as coffee and coffee substitutes will remain subject to an equivalent 
excise tax. 
The industriai monopolies continue their brilliant career: 
Sali 
Matches 
Playing cards 
Lottery 
1919-20 1920-21 Increase 
1,580.1 2,425.4 + 855.3 
125.8 133.3 + 7.5 
117.0 167.6 + 50.5 
6.2 7.8 + 1.6 
90.5 151.0 + 60.5 
Tobacco and matches are closely connected, and the regularity of their 
consumption, in spite of heavy increases of prices, is a most interesting fea-
ture of post-war finance. It appears that common people, who before the 
war consumed very little of this luxury, have learned the taste for tobacco 
in the trenches, and are not apt to lose it. 
A report on the ordinary saving banks (exclusive of postai savings 
bank) gives the following figures of deposits (in millions of lire): 
f June, 1914 2,800.0 
December, 1914 2,703.0 
1915 2,785.0 
1916 3,222.3 
1917 3,727.4 
1918 4,781.4 
1919 5,841.8 
1920 6,668.4 
March, 1921 7,135.0 
The increase is following the march of the depreciation of the lire; but, 
nevertheless, is a proof that workers, public and private employees, farm-
ers, and the middle-class of professional and commercial people, which 
constitutes the bulk of the saving bank clientele, are not losing their saving 
capacity. 
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81. 
ITALY 
REVIVAL IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE -
NEW REGULATIONS ABOUT CONFISCATION OF W A R PROFITS -
SuSPENSION OF THE COMPULSORY INSCRIPTION OF PRIVATE SECURITIES 
From Our Correspondent 
Turin, August 28 
After mid-August holidays, the Stock Exchange re-opened with a bet-
ter tone in regard to industriai securities. It is too soon to say whether the 
movement will be a short-lived one, but the undertone is distinctly im-
proved. Two facts stand out to explain the more roseate vision of the 
bourse. The first is the partial surrender of the Finance Minister in the face 
of the strong opposition encountered in financial and trade circles against 
the too severe interpretation of the law of September 24, 1920, which con-
fiscated ali war profits from August 1, 1914, to June 30, 1920. Several cri-
ticisms were formulated as to consequences of the law of confiscation, the 
first and most important of these being the fixation at June 30, 1920, of the 
end of the war period. At that date prices touched in Italy their highest 
mark. Suppose an industriai concern, at August 1, 1914, had a stock of, 
say, 1,000 tons English coal, valued at 40 lire per ton, or a total value of 
40,000 lire; if at June 30, 1921, the some company had the same stock, 
at 700 lire per ton, was to suffer a valuation of 700,000 lire, with a war-
profit of 660,000 lire, to be confiscated. The same thing happened to ali 
stocks of raw materials, machinery, &c. If, after June 30, 1920, prices of 
assets went down, the taxpayers may be ruined, having to pay the confisca-
tion tax on values very much higher than the present. A recent order of the 
Finance Minister prescribes that the valuation shall be made only after De-
cember 31, 1921, when the prices will have perhaps settled down. When 
made, valuation shall take account not only of the prices current at June 
30, 1920, but of the possibility for the taxpayers of utilising the various as-
sets. And so, machinery, of the value of 100,000 lire, at June 30, 1920, will 
81. September 3, 1921, p. 375. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable because it is dated Turin. 
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be valued only at 30,000 lire, if its future utilisation is capable only of this 
minor capitalisation. Various other devices are prescribed, so that the con-
fiscation of war profits may not result in the ruin of taxpayers. 
The Stock Exchange heard even more gladly the announcement that 
the Government had resolved to suspend the by-law regulating the com-
pulsory inscription to the name of the possessor of ali private securities. 
This was one of the principal planks of the Giolitti Cabinet's platform. 
The fundamental reason for compulsory inscription or registration of secu-
rities, in a country like Italy, where nine-tenths of securities were to bearer, 
was that the bearer securities made it very easy for taxpayers to evade the 
succession taxes, capital tax, and income surtax. Ali these taxes have a pro-
gressive rate, increasing with the increase of the capital or income of the 
recipients, so that it is imperatively necessary to know the name and the 
total fortune or income of the taxpayer. 
Protests were in vain. The law of September 24, 1920, made compul-
sory the inscription or registration of ali State or private securities, except-
ing only Treasury bills (Buoni del Tesoro). The consequences were rapidly 
felt. The issue of State loans was made impossible, the war loan 5 per cent, 
tumbled down from 82-83 to 67 lire, and stands to-day only at 75 lire. The 
Treasury was obliged to have recourse to short-dated bills. At the dose of 
the financial year 1920-1921, of a total external debt of 84,000 millions lire, 
only 50,000 are funded debt, 25,000 millions Hre being Treasury bills at 
short dates, and 9,000 paper notes, issued by the banks for Government 
account. Last spring, when the Government sought to float a loan of 
1,000 millions lire for the reconstruction of invaded provinces, banks ad-
vised the Treasury Minister that the public would not touch a loan liable 
to compulsory inscription. For this reason, the loan was launched under 
the nominai disguise of seven-year 5 per cent. Treasury bills. As "Treasury 
bills", they were exempted from inscription or registration, and the issue 
was therefore rapidly absorbed. One may add that the Treasury was wholly 
unprepared to the gigantic task of inscribing and transferring 90 billions 
lire of funded debt, apportioned among a million at least of individuai pos-
sessors. For these two reasons, the by-law which should have regulated the 
inscription of State securities was never published. The section of the law 
of September 24th is thus suspended, and no one knows when and if it will 
be put into execution. 
The other section, relating to private securities (stocks and shares of 
joint-stock companies, land bonds, loans of locai authorities, &c.) seemed, 
at one moment, to be ready for institution. In the last days of the Giolitti 
Cabinet a by-law was published in the Gaietta Ufficiale of July 2, 1921, 
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which purported to give the rules under which ali private securities were to 
be compulsorily inscribed before January 2, 1922, and ali issues of bearer 
securities were forbidden. Feeling ran high in financial circles; in the Sen-
ate a sort of revolt took place. The impending economie crisis, which was 
developing somewhat late to Italy, made doubtful of the wisdom of the 
abolition of bearer securities in a country where no other kind of securities 
can easily find a market, even those men who, for fiscal reasons, were fa-
vourable to the inscription system. The bourses, which had been for many 
months very apathetic, went down. The new Minister of Industry, Signor 
Belotti, who, during Parliamentary debates, in July and August of last year, 
was among the few members who opposed the Bill, took the opportunity 
of suspending the by-law with the consent of the Cabinet. That is how 
things stand at present. The law of September 24, 1920, is not repealed, 
but the by-laws, which are necessary to its practical application, do not ex-
ist. The one relating to State securities, was never published; the other, re-
lating to private securities, was first published, and afterwards suspended. 
The bourses, which had always been fiercely opposed to the inscription 
system, hailed the suspension as a token of the final repeal of the law. Per-
haps the law will not be repealed, for we in Italy are apt to follow the dic-
tum of our greatest poet, Dante Alighieri: Le leggi son, ma chi poti mano ad 
elle? There are the laws; but they are not applied if they prove a nuisance. 
82. 
ITAFY 
SUBSIDIES TO SHIPBUILDING, AND LEGISLATION BY DECREES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 11 
An interesting constitutional and financial problem has been debated 
this week in the Press and politicai circles. It is a residue of our 
D.O.R.A. war methods, which, by the way, were much more arbitrary than 
in your country. By a law of May 22, 1915, the Government was empow-
ered to legislate and to act freely on the basis of the old dictum salus pu-
82. September 17, 1921, pp. 444-445. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. 
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blica suprema lex. Ali the governments after May, 1915, freely used the ma-
chinery of Royal legislative decrees. Bureaucracy was substituted for Parlia-
ment. Not a single budget after 1915 was laid in the ordinary way before 
Parliament and subjected to a regular debate before the beginning of the 
financial year. Even to-day taxes are laid and expenditure effected on a 
vote of provisionai authorisation for the first six months of the financial 
year, which vote was given by Parliament after a perfunctory general de-
bate. Signor Giolitti promised in his Cabinet programme that he would 
put an end to the system of legislative decrees, but on the eve of his fall 
he did not refrain from publishing, on June 30, 1921, a Royal decree en-
acting a new protectionist custom tariff, thus breaking a solemn promise 
made to the Chamber that no new tariff would be enacted without the con-
sent of the Parliament. 
The slowness with which legislation by Royal decrees is dying is due to 
its being much more easy thus to impose taxes and make expenditure. Bu-
reaucracy felt supreme during the war and armistice, and is to-day sorely 
grieved to renounce any of her privileges. Industries dependent for life 
on the patronage of the State obtained subsidies and favours without em-
barrassing public debates. Ministers were satisfied with their almost abso-
lute powers. 
The Shipping Subsidies Bill furnished at last a test case. June 30, 1921, 
was the day after which ceased to be effective the decrees of August 18, 
1918, and March 30, 1919, giving new ships various subsidies amounting 
in ali, for a 8,000 D.W. tons ship, to the nice sum of 17,000,000 Hre. There 
were, at the date of June 30, 1921, in course of construction, a number of 
from 50 to 73 ships which, for various reasons, were not completed before 
the fatai date, and had not a legai claim to the State subsidies. ShipbuHders 
began to cry on the damage which would be done if ships remained unfin-
ished on the yard, and if thousands of men were put out of employment. 
Signor Alessio, who was Minister of Trade in the GioHtti Cabinet, felt that 
a continuation of the subsidies on the old scale was unbearable. Parliament 
would not have consented to an expenditure of from 850 to 1,240 million 
lire merely for the sake of shipbuHders, who were weU aware that ships un-
finished at June 30, 1921, had not the right to receive a single farthing from 
the Exchequer. But he beHeved that on the ground of equity a partial sub-
sidy could be given to those ships which were already laid on the yards at 
June 30, 1921, and for which constructional materials were already on the 
spot on Aprii 30, 1921. For this sort of ships it may be assumed that ship-
buHders had done aU their might for completing the construction at the 
prefixed date, but were impeded by some external cause. A BiH was ac-
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cordingly laid by Signor Alessio on the table of the House on June 20, 
1921. The subsidies were fixed on a new scale, and for a total sum of 
300 million lire. 
The fall of the Giolitti Cabinet and the politicai debates on the pro-
gramme of Bonomi Cabinet were not favourable to an immediate discus-
sion of the Alessio proposals. Moreover, the new Minister of Industry, 
Signor Belotti, dropped the Alessio Bill, substituting it with two new Bills, 
laid on the table of the House on July 26, 1921. Soon afterwards, however, 
the House rose for recess, and it is not probable that it will meet before 
November next. 
Shipbuilders began again clamouring against the imminent closing of 
the yards; Socialist deputies insisted that Government should give some 
aid against unemployment. Signor Belotti took an extraordinary course. 
As it was impossibile to obtain the consent of Parliament before November 
or December, and as he was afraid to legislate by Royal decrees without 
some sort of authorisation, he laid the Bills before the two committees 
of the House, those on finances and on transports, which, according 
to our legislative methods, are bound to report on Bills to the House as 
a whole. 
Committees of the Italian Chamber of Deputies are composed in exact 
proportion to the respective importance of various politicai parties - Lib-
erals, Catholic, and Socialist parties being exactly represented in each com-
mittee. If, then, argued Signor Belotti, the special committees of the House 
give an advice favourable to the Bills, he would be authorised to enact 
them by Royal decree. The committees, in effect, reported favourably to 
the first of the Bills, which granted a subsidy of 750 lire per D.W. ton 
to those ships which, however unfinished at June 30, 1920, had reached 
at that date a 30 to 40 per cent, stage of completion. The financial burden 
for the State was estimated at 125 million lire. The decree was accordingly 
enacted. 
On the second Bill, one of the committees felt at first unable to reach a 
conclusion. The Bill stated that a sum of 200 million lire could be spent by 
the Ministry of Industry for buying for State account a certain number of 
ships from among those unfinished at June 30, 1921, if from 500 D.W. 
tons upwards, and if built to carry men in addition to goods. The Bill 
was open to various technical objections. Above ali, a keen debate arose 
in the Press about the legitimacy of the new legislative method of enact-
ment after the advice of a House Committee. Committees, it was observed, 
have not the authority to legislate and of advising Government when Gov-
ernment thinks it urgent to legislate during the recess of Parliament. The 
— 218 — 
OCTOBER, 1921 
legislative authority is only enjoyed by the Chamber as a whole. Moreover, 
the Italian Parliament is composed of two branches - the elective Chamber 
of Deputies and the nominated (for life) Senate. Legislation by decree after 
advice of a Committee of the Chamber of Deputies amounted, in fact, to a 
practical abolition of the Senate. Grants of sums to be spent are the most 
jealous privileges of Parliament; they cannot be transferred to a single com-
mittee of a single House. 
The debate was not without influence on legislators. The Finance Com-
mittee of the House re-examined the matter, and after a lengthy debate re-
fused its assent to the Bill. There matters stand at present. It appears that 
Government has felt the lesson, and that it will abstain in future from leg-
islation by decrees, as everyone is feeling that it is a short cut to absolute 
government by bureaucracy. 
83. 
ITALY 
PUBLIC REVENUE - DECREASE IN THE CONSUMPTION OF LUXURIES -
COST OF LIVING AGAIN INCREASING 
Turin, September 26 
The officiai statistics on public revenue are good: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Fiscal Year 
July and August 
1920-21 1920 1921 
Income and capital taxes 4,067-1 450-7 794-4 
Succession and registration duties 773-6 115-1 116-0 
Stamp duties 1,107-8 195-3 315-7 
Excise, Customs, and other consumption taxes 1,608-0 191-2 214-7 
Industriai monopolies 2,744-1 406-7 487-5 
Commercial monopolies 521-9 59-0 118-8 
Lottery 151-0 21-7 26-9 
83. October 1, 1921, p. 510. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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Ali categories give an interesting yield; and if we multiply by sixfold the 
yield of first two months of the current fiscal year, we obtain figures sen-
sibly higher than those relating to the whole of the fiscal year 1920-21. But 
there are not wanting signs of the economie crisis, especially in those taxes 
which are liable to feel more immediately the effects of decreasing transac-
tions. In the succession and registration duties category, apart from the 
succession tax, which is stationary, the registration taxes diminished from 
66.8 to 59.4 millions lire in the two months considered, and the yield is 
much lower than the sum which would be necessary to come up to the 
491.7 millions obtained during the whole of last year. Stamps yield 110.2 
millions lire more in 1921 than in 1920, but of that increase 76.1 millions 
lire are due to stamp duty on the increased notes issue and 25.3 millions to 
the new tax on luxury sales. As in France, this tax is a little disappointing. 
The tax is exacted by means of stamps to be put on doublé notes of sale, of 
which a part is given to customer and a part is retained by the selling party. 
As the tax is very high - from July 1, 1921, it has been increased from 10 to 
11.50 per cent, of the sale price - it appears that very frequently sellers and 
buyers conspire together, to the loss of the Exchequer, for evading alto-
gether the tax, or inscribing in the note a sum notably less than the true 
sum paid. A symptom of the economie crisis may be seen also in the les-
sened yield of taxes on cinema palaces (from 1,897,970 to 1,848,501 lire), 
on gems and other jewellery (from 3,967,775 to 2,490,465 lire), liquore and 
fine wines (from 3,859,400 to 1,697,150 lire). 
The diminished consumption of luxuries is probably explained by the 
persistence of the high cost of living in the face of decreasing opportunity 
of employment, and more or less severe cuts in wages of the working class. 
The decrease of retail prices was short-lived, as may be seen from the follow-
ing table compiled by the Turin municipal bureau of labour statistics of the 
cost of living of the working family (father, mother, and three sons of 10 to 15 
years). The basis is fixed in the first half of 1914. (See table at p. 221). 
As rent is subject to legai maximums, the variations are those 
authorised by royal decrees. New occupiers, in fact, are obliged to pay very 
much higher rents if they desire to secure a house for their family. The in-
creases of rent above the legai maximums are unlawful, even for new oc-
cupiers, and house owners are liable to refund them at the request of 
the occupier. But, in fact, the restitution is never claimed, as the excesses 
above the maximum are frequently veiled as entrance fee, price of furni-
ture, and so on. 
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Food Clothing 
Year 1914 (first semester) 100 100 
1920-January 3510 327-2 
1921-January 5131 547-3 
February 509-5 547-3 
" March 536-5 496-7 
" Aprii 534-4 496-7 
" May 521-2 465-2 
June 485-4 433-4 
" July 446-2 411-4 
August 461-1 410-6 
Rent Light Miscellaneous Total 
100 100 100 100 
100 406-5 344-5 318-5 
110 527-3 513-6 467-4 
110 446-5 513-6 460-9 
110 428-4 543-9 472-2 
110 416-9 543-9 470-3 
110 378-0 542-6 455-7 
110 358-8 538-7 429-6 
120 354-2 537-1 404-7 
120 366-9 537-1 413-9 
84. 
ITALY 
BANKING SITUATION - CLOSING OF SHIPYARDS AT TRIESTE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 10 
The following figures of the four big ordinary banks reveal interesting 
movements in the first half of 1921. (See table at p. 222). 
As not ali the items of the balance-sheets are comprised in the above 
statements, the totals do not balance. But the main trend is clear enough. 
Deposits have continued to increase. The circular cheques are diminishing, 
though this sort of cheque - i.e., those accepted by the banks at the mo-
ments of issue - is the most popular and practically the only sort of cheques 
freely accepted in Italy. The ordinary cheque is regarded with suspicion. 
On the assets side, cash, secured loans, and debtors' accounts are di-
minishing, to the advantage of discounts and investments. This means a les-
sening of liquidity, but was perhaps inevitable owing to the prolonged eco-
nomie crisis and difficulties of sales by merchants and producers. 
The unfortunate policy of subsidies to shipbuilding, of which I wrote 
recently, has had a new development. When Ministers used to pledge 
the Government responsibility with royal decrees, Signor Alessio, Minister 
84. October 22, 1921, p . 624. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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(In Million of Lire) 
Banca 
Commerciale 
Italiana 
Credito 
Italiano 
Banca Italiana 
di Sconto 
Banco di 
Roma 
Total 
ASSETS 
Cash: 
December 31, 1920 276.2 420.8 447.5 133.0 1,277.5 
July 31, 1921 338.2 317.7 312.6 162.1 1,130.6 
Inc. or dee + 2 2 % - 2 4 % - 3 0 % + 2 2 % - 11% 
Discounts: 
December 31, 1920 3,260.2 2,549.3 2,445.6 768.5 9,023.6 
July 31, 1921 3,746.4 3,310.6 2,065.2 756.1 9,878.3 
Inc. or dee + 14% + 3 1 % - 1 1 % - 1.6% + 9 .4% 
Secured loans: 
December 31, 1920 669.6 332.9 361.9 195.9 1,560.3 
July 31, 1921 503.3 297.7 208.9 199.8 1,209.7 
Inc. or dee - 2 4 % - 10% - 4 2 % + 1.9% - 2 3 % 
Investments: 
December 31, 1920 163.1 102.9 128.0 96.3 490.3 
July 31, 1921 156.7 126.4 171.5 137.2 591.8 
Inc. or dee - 3 . 8 % + 2 2 % + 3 2 % + 4 2 % + 2 0 % 
Debtors: 
December 31, 1920 1,634.5 1,439.9 1,779.4 1,090.8 5,944.6 
July 31, 1921 1,446.2 1,317.0 1,766.7 1,233.0 5,762.9 
Inc. or dee - 1 1 % - 8 % - 0 .7% + 13% - 3 % 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits: 
December 31, 1920 770.2 877.3 939.1 642.8 3,229.4 
July 31, 1921 837.8 994.7 926.2 765.5 3,534.2 
Inc. or dee - 8 % + 13% - 1 % + 19% + 9 % 
Creditore: 
December 31, 1920 4,193.5 3,240.4 3,570.7 1,567.4 12,572.0 
July 31, 1921 4,562.3 3,772.9 3,542.8 1,701.6 13,579.6 
Inc. or dee + 8 % + 16% - 0 .8% + 8 % + 8 % 
Circular cheques: 
December 31, 1920 193.4 161.4 307.7 105.2 767.7 
July 31, 1921 129.5 102.1 194.1 100.1 525.2 
Inc. or dee - 3 3 % - 3 6 % - 3 6 % - 4 . 7 % - 3 2 % 
of Industry, wrote, as it seems, a letter to the Free Shipping Company of 
Trieste (Navigazione Libera Triestina), amounting to a promise to pay 
267 millions lire as a subsidy to the construction of 18 steamships. The ba-
sis of subsidy was the hypothesis that ships cost 1,600 lire per d.w. ton to 
build. The company says that a year ago, when the binding letters were 
sent, the 1,600 lire basis was very favourable to the State, as prices quoted 
by other shipbuilders were higher. Signor Belotti, the present Minister of 
Industry, observed that the letters of his predecessor were not binding 
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for the State, as they were unconstitutional, and offered to revise the stipu-
lation, so that the State should pay a subsidy proportional to the actual cost 
of construction, not to the theoretical basis of 1,600 hre. After prolonged 
discussions the company closed its works, and the workers struck against 
the company in a so-called protest against reduction of wages. The company 
plead the impossibility of building ships under the new situation of costs 
and prices. Public opinion was persuaded, however, that the company re-
sorted to the closing device so as to force the Government to maintain 
the promised subsidies; and many think that the workers' strike was a sym-
pathetic move to the same end. The strike was accompanied by the usuai 
skirmishes between Communists and fascisti, which are especially bitter at 
Trieste. After a keen struggle, Government and company found a compro-
mise, in virtue of which the subsidy will be paid according to the effective 
cost of building, to be ascertained by inspection of books and a panel of ex-
perts, provided that the said cost does not exceed the maximum sum of 
1,455 lire per d.w. ton. The compromise saves to the Exchequer a minimum 
of 58 millions lire. From this incident the opposition to legislation by de-
crees and by letters has gained new ground. If the contract between the 
State and Free Shipping Trieste Company had to be brought before the 
Parliament, as was the custom in pre-war days, its defects would have prob-
ably been noticed by some member. A discussion would have followed, and 
the loss to the Exchequer would have been less great. 
85. 
ITALY 
DECREASING NOTE ISSUES AND LIRA DEPRECIATION -
TRADE BALANCE - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 27 
A recent officiai statement shows how the note issue in Italy has de-
creased this year. The following are the most up-to-date figures: 
85. November 5, 1921, p. 816. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. 
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(In Million Lire) 
Notes Issued for Account of the 
State Commerce Total 
December 31, 1920 10,742-7 8,988-9 19,731-6 
Aprii, 30, 1921 9,601-2 8,677-0 18,278-0 
June 30, 1921 8,722-2 9,436-6 18,158-8 
August 31, 1921 8,351-7 9,489-9 17,841-6 
September 10, 1921 8,440-0 9,438-0 17,878-0 
To the above figures there are to be added two items: 1,867 million lire 
of State notes (currency notes of 5 and 10 lire) and 277 million lire of small 
1 and 2 lire notes. The last account for the State notes relates to Aprii 30, 
1921. The total issued is less by almost two billion lire than at December 
31, 1920, and the decrease is wholly due to issues on State account, indus-
try and trade being apparently relying in increasing ratio on the bank of 
issue's aid. Perhaps the economie crisis and the difficulty of sale are forcing 
companies and private business men to search for banking accommoda-
tions; but it is probable that under the disguide of commercial circulation 
are comprised discounts of Exchequer bills or other loans on State paper. 
Notwithstanding the reduction of notes issued, foreign exchanges go 
up by leaps and bounds. Sterling, which at June stood at 73.51 Hre, had 
risen to 84.30 at July 31st, to 93.55 at September 30th, and is to-day oscil-
lating about the 100 limit. Dollars went up from 18 to above 25 lire. We 
are approximating to the maximum of 109 and 30 lire respectively, reached 
about January and February, 1921. The figures for international trade 
would not seem to warrant such an evil course, as they are undoubtedly 
better than last year. For the first five months of the year they are as fol-
lows: 
(In Million Lire) 
Imports Exports Difference 
1913 1,522-8 1,039-6 - 483-2 
1919 7,098-9 1,635-5 - 5,463-4 
1920 6,337-6 3,137-5 -3 ,200-0 
1921 6,528-0 2,677-6 - 3,850-4 
The adverse balance is much greater than in the last pre-war year, but 
the lira has in the meantime greatly depreciated. As for the 1920 and 1921 
comparison, it is to be noted that the 1920 and 1921 are, owing to techni-
cal reasons, calculated on the basis of 1919 officiai values. As in 1920 the 
real values were much higher than the officiai values, the real adverse bai-
ance must be taken as notably higher than the apparent one. In 1921, how-
ever, the experience was inverted; the officiai 1919 values are probably a 
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little higher than the real values, so that the real adverse balance may prove 
to be less than the officiai figure. In short, it is extremely probable that the 
present adverse balance is less than in 1920, and so the figures do not pro-
vide any reason for the foreign exchanges going from bad to worse. 
Perhaps a partial explanation of the depreciation of lira exchange may 
be found, on the lines of the quantitative theory of money, in the fact that 
the same or slightly less quantity of paper money is performing less ser-
vices. The economie crisis has diminished the wages paid and the transac-
tions done with the aid of money. And so the present total of 17,878 mil-
lion lire (exclusive of 1, 2, 5, and 10 lire currency notes) may be a more 
redundant quantity than the 19,731 million lire of December 31, 1920. 
Probably this theory is true, as far as relates to commercial and indus-
triai activity. But in agriculture the latest statistics published by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture seem to point to better yields: 
1912-1913 1920 1921 
Tons Tons Tons 
Wheat 5,197,200 3,846,600 5,120,000 
Rye 136,900 115,300 130,000 
Barley 218,300 127,800 240,000 
Oats 545,400 351,600 550,000 
Rice 487,300 451,200 470,000 
Indian corn 2,546,400 2,268,300 2,400,000 
Beans 456,400 259,500 400,000 
Potatoes 1,671,000 1,422300 1,500,000 
Beetroot 2,085,800 1,199,900 1,500,000 
Hemp 84,100 97,800 100,000 
Flax 2,660 2,300 2,500 
Wine 4,633,900 4,229,400 3,300,000 
Silk cocoons 34,100 29,700 30,660 
With the conspicuous exception of wine, ali other agricultural products 
are doing better than in 1920, and the figures of 1921 are a symptom of a 
return to the prewar normal conditions. If we reflect, moreover, on the 
deep-rooted distrust of the farmers toward Government requisitions and 
maximum prices, we are led to believe that the figures for 1921 are more 
understated than the 1912-1913 figures, when no one dreamed that statis-
tica! reports would be utilised against the agricultural interest. It does not 
appear, therefore, that paper money is very much less in request than a year 
ago for economie transactions. Perhaps, in common with ali Europe, Italy 
is suffering from the widespread fear that the State will not be able to re-
store the equilibrium in its Budget, and new paper issues will be in future 
inevitable. If so, only a severe policy of economy and retrenchment will at 
length reverse the present downward tendency of the lira. 
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86. 
ITALY 
COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE - POSTAL AND OTHER SAVINGS BANKS -
T H E STATE BANK 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 13 
The notice that the treaty of commerce between Italy and France, da-
ted November 11, 1898, and renewed in 1907, was renounced by our 
neighbour, took the Italian public by surprise. Some see in this act a symp-
tom of bad politicai feelings between the two allies, but the Government 
explained that the end of the treaty was a matter of course; that the duties 
of 1898, based on the older tariff of 1887, were out of date, so that it was in 
the interest of both parties that a new treaty should be negotiated; that 
France had declared itself anxious to begin at once negotiations for such 
a new treaty. But it is rather unfortunate that the new treaty is to be nego-
tiated at a time when Protectionist feelings run high in both countries. 
French and Italian Protectionists have been successful in constructing de-
vices of high efficiency in making war on foreign imports, so that a very 
difficult task will be put before negotiators. 
The place of France in our international trade may be seen from the 
following table (in millions of lire). (See table at p. 227). 
The great increase in the figures from 1920 to 1921 is only an apparent 
one, as the values for 1920 are calculated on the prices of 1919, while those 
for 1921 were calculated on the prices of 1920, when the price-level 
reached a maximum. From France we took 8.4 per cent, of our imports 
in 1920, and 6 per cent, in the first six months of 1921, and respectively 
14 per cent, and 10.3 per cent, of our exports. In 1920 of a total export 
to France of 1,095 millions Hre 316.7 millions were silk and silk manufac-
tures; and it is probable that silk will be a bone of contention between the 
negotiators. 
The economie crisis has made itself felt in banking figures in Italy, only 
86. November 19, 1921, pp. 896-897. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, 
unentided but dated "Turin, November 13, 1921", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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Import from Export to 
1920 1921 1920 1921 
Whole Year 
First Six 
EUROPE Whole Year Months Months 
Great Britain 2,368-3 1,315-5 884-3 417-6 
France 1,333-5 801-6 1,095-3 543-7 
Belgium 209-4 - 79-8 
Switzerland 336-0 191-8 898-1 582-2 
Germany 821-5 924-1 380-3 420-0 
Austria 464-7 343-7 443-9 428-9 
Czecho-Slovakia 184-0 130-1 75 1 33-2 
Jugoslavia 194-5 - 244-2 
Greece 45-2 18-6 160-5 119-6 
Spain 139-6 78-3 139-9 75-5 
Egypt 101-7 83-6 235-4 81-4 
Tunis 81-3 110-3 50-9 19-2 
Tripoli 21-8 14-1 68-4 44-3 
Erithrea - 10-1 - 16-5 
British India 744-9 570-8 160-3 54-1 
Argentina 1,676-7 727-7 419-1 238-1 
Brazil 275-2 328-4 154-4 61-3 
United States 4,788-5 5,150-9 655-1 676-8 
Other countries 2,487-6 2,251-0 1,983-0 1,145-3 
Total 15,870-5 13,454-5 7,804-0 5,281-7 
in the shape of a decline in the rate of increase in deposits of savings banks. 
The two years of greatest monetary inflation, 1919 and 1920, were also the 
years of greatest increases in the deposits of the savings banks. Unemploy-
ment and reductions of wages began to have an effect in 1921, and if it 
were possible to separate urban and country deposits it would be found 
that the urban deposits have positively decreased, while country deposits 
have continued in their expansion, owing to very good agricultural prices. 
Postai saving deposits go to swell the budget of our greatest bank - a bank 
not known to the outside world, and somewhat akin to the Prussian Seehan-
dlung, but without the connections which the Seehandlung has with other 
banks, and with Exchange activities. Our Cassa Depositi e Prestiti - Public Bank 
for deposits and loans is a State Bank, which receives deposits mainly from Postai 
Saving Banks, public insurance institutions, individuai accounts, and so on. 
The principal items of the liabilities side of the last two balance-
sheets for the year ended December 31st are compared below: 
(Million Lire) 
Direct deposits 
Current account of State Treasury 
" of the Bank of Italy 
" of the Postai Department 
1919 1920 
433-8 472-9 
316-8 342-6 
20-6 20-0 
16-2 41-4 
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Miscellaneous accounts 143-9 183-5 
Postai savings banks and insurance institutions 5,270-4 7,109-8 
Trustee funds 157-7 174-0 
Reserve 189-4 535-2 
An interesting feature of these figures is the increase in the reserve of 
the bank, a useful item in these times of depreciation of securities. The 
bank specialises in loans to State, State institutions, provinces and munici-
palities. We in Italy have not a market for municipal securities, and only a 
very few of them are quoted in the public exchanges. Municipalities do not 
come on the market for supplying themselves with capital, as they can 
claim the aid of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. 
The following are the principal assets of the State Bank: 
(Million Lire) 
1919 1920 
Public securities (mainly State, but also special municipal 
securities) 3,917-2 5,791-4 
Loans to provinces and municipalities 1,125-2 1,707-3 
Loans to State Treasury 671-6 587-5 
Current accounts with public authorities 522-3 614-4 
Loans to public employees 11-4 22-9 
The loans (by purchase of securities and direct loans) to State and muni-
cipalities reached in 1920 the huge total of 2,464.3 millions lire. It is a safe con-
clusion that if the deficit of State and locai budget could be compressed within 
the limit of not over 2,000 millions lire yearly, it would no more be necessary 
to come on the market with new Exchequer bills or other State securities. 
87. 
I T A L Y 
T H E BUDGET SPEECH 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, December 10 
On December 8th, Signor De Nava, Minister of Finance, made his 
Budget speech in the Chamber of Deputies. By statute he was bound to 
87. December 17,1921, p. 1068. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, entitled 
"Budget speech in Italy" and dated "Turin, December 10 ,1921" , is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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review the past fiscal year 1920-21, the current year 1921-22, and the 
coming year. For the year ended June, 1921, it was estimated in Decem-
ber, 1920, that there would be a deficit of 12,141 million lire, the differ-
ence between 22,947 million lire expenditure and 10,806 revenue. In the 
final accounts, the figures were greatly changed; expenditure rose to 
28,783 million lire and revenue to 18,071 millions, so that the deficit 
was reduced to 10,712 millions. For the present year there was an esti-
mated deficit of 10,370 million lire. But in July the Treasury Minister 
was able to announce to Parliament that the estimated deficit was to 
be only 5,000 million lire, thanks mainly to the discontinuance of the 
bread subsidy. The results of the first quarter of the fiscal year, from July 
l s t to October 30 th, confirm that the deficit will be about 5,000 million 
lire, in spite of a rise of 1,750 million lire in revenue, which should have 
reduced the deficit to 3,250 million lire. But the rise in expenditure is 
swallowing up ali increase in the revenue. 
In the next fiscal year, 1922-23, the expenditure is calculated at 18,525 
million lire and the revenue at 15,763 millions, with an estimated deficit of 
about 3,000 million lire. The Minister might have safely estimated that the 
deficit will be wiped out next year, as there is no reason why the revenue 
should amount only to 15,763 million lire, having in the past year risen to 
18,071 millions, while in the present one it will probably touch 19,000 mil-
lion lire. The Minister evidently supposes that expenditure also will rise, 
and will absorb the surplus of effective revenue upon estimates. The situa-
tion is undoubtedly improving, as the deficit has diminished from 11 to 5 
and to 3 billion lire in three successive fiscal years. A good feature, which is 
worth noting, is that the Treasury does not put on the revenue side any 
figure from war indemnities. If indemnities are paid, so much to the good. 
It is probable that the 11 billions deficit of 1920-21 was less than the true 
deficit, as various State administrations had a separate current account 
with the Treasury, and their deficit did not enter into the general Budget; 
while the Minister has assured the Chamber that the 5 and 3 billions deficit 
of the current and next financial years are the true net results of ali public 
administrations, ali separate accounts being from July 1, 1921, thrown, as 
of old into the general Budget. 
The debt situation is as follows (in billion lire). (See table at p. 230). 
The external debt, which was non-existent before the war, increases 
slowly as unpaid interest accumulates with the capital. The items are calcu-
lated at the par of exchanges; and if we estimate them at the current rate of 
exchanges, the figure should probably be put at about 90 billion lire, a sum 
equal to the internai debt, and an over-powering burden for the Italian tax-
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July 31, June 30, Oct. 31, Oct. 31, 
1914 1919 1920 1921 
Perpetuai and long-dated debts 
Exchequer bills 
3 , 5 , and 7 year bonds 
State and bank notes 
Deposit and loans State Banks . 
Total internai debts 
External debts 
General total 15-7 
15-7 
14-8 
0-4 
0-5 
0-5 
58-2 
19-2 
77-4 
28-4 
15 0 
5-7 
8-6 
20-6 
9 8 1 
77-5 
48-9 
10-7 
4-6 
12-7 
0-6 
110-2 
210 
89-2 
49-3 
23-0 
5-7 
10-6 
0-6 
payer. Public opinion has not lost the hope that the Economisti thesis of 
the total cancellation of the inter-Allied debts will ultimately prevail; as, 
otherwise, ali hopes of balancing budgets are lost and total confusion will 
prevail in our financial and monetary situation. 
Notes (paper money) issued directly by the State or indirectly by the 
issue banks for the account of the State are less by 2.1 million, having fallen 
from 12,7 to 10.6 billion lire. The significance of this is, however, some-
what obscured by the rise of the so-called issues for the account of com-
merce, which rose from 8,230 million Hre at September 30, 1920, to 
9,775 milHon Hre at September 30, 1921, a rise of 1,545 miUion Hre. If 
we deduct this rise of the notes in circulation for the account of commerce 
from the decrease of 2,100 milHons lire in the circulation for State account, 
we have a net decrease of 600 milHon Hre. But the picture is marred by the 
great increase in the figure of outstanding. Exchequer bills, which have ri-
sen during the year from 10.7 billions to the utterly unmanageable sum of 
23 biUion Hre. As the longest dated are one-year biUs, and a large amount is 
maturing from day to day, the State is liable at a moment's notice to con-
vert them into cash; with the risk of a rise in the note circulation. The gist 
of the speech is that we are laboriously groping toward the Hght; that the 
revenue is coming on very weU; but that a very great effort is to be made 
toward curtailing the growth of expenditure. If the Treasury should suc-
ceed in the task of checking this growth, the port of rest for our financial 
ship would be within easy reach. 
DECEMBER, 1921 
88. 
ITALY 
T H E DEBT CHARGE - BANKING DEPOSITS -
STOCK MARKET DEPRESSION 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, December 24 
From the vast mine of the appendices to the Budget speech, which 
have been circulated only to-day, it is possible to add various interesting 
facts to my last letter. The figures of the annual charge on the public debt 
are as follows: 
(Millions of Lire) 
1913-14 1920-21 1922-23 (Estimate) 
Perpetuai debt 359-6 2,097-9 2,082-5 
Redeemable debt 89-3 157-4 155-3 
3 , 5 , and 7 years' bonds 38-3 261-9 265-0 
Other long term bonds 31-3 25-8 24-5 
Exchequer bills 10-0 575-0 1,500-0 
Current account 2-1 71-4 77-4 
Internai debt 530-8 3,189-4 4,098-7 
External debt 972-0 1,100-0 
Total 530-8 4,161-4 5,198-7 
The sum inscribed under the head of external debt is only figurative, as 
the interest is accumulating from year to year on the debts towards Great 
Britain and United States. If these debts were to be repaid, their repayment 
would absorb a great deal more in paper money, as the 972 millions for 
1920-1921 and 1,100 millions for 1922-1923 are in gold lire. 
Deposits in banks (issue and ordinary) and in savings banks are increas-
ing, as the following figures show: 
88. December 31, 1921, pp. 1157-1158. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: 
"Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai 
manuscript, unentitled but dated "Turin, December 24, 1921", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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(Millions of Lire) 
End of June 1914 1915 1919 1921 
Banks of issue 
Ordinary banks 
Popular and co-operative banks 
Savings banks (ordinary) 
Postai savings banks 
Pawn banks (Monti di Pietà) ... 
Rural banks 
100 0 649-6 774-5 996-8 
1,044-6 664-8 3,447-6 5,612-5 
1,211-3 1,010-8 2,661-1 3,665-7 
2,800-3 2,552-4 5,589-2 7,475-8 
2,121-3 1,861-7 4,223-7 7,869-4 
214-5 220-0 457-4 553-7 
103-7 96-9 282-0 444-4 
7,595-4 7,056-2 17,435-5 26,618-3 
The middle of 1915 was the moment of maximum panie and of re-
duced deposits. But thereafter deposits went on increasing year after year. 
It may, however, be observed that deposits have only increased about 3 V2 
times, as compared with the pre-war figure, whereas the purchasing power 
of the lira is only one-fifth of what it was before the war. If deposits had 
multiplied in the same ratio as the lira depreciated, the sum total of depos-
its should have increased to about 38 billion lire, instead of to 26. But we 
have to reflect that, upon a total sum of 26.6 billion lire of deposits at June 
30, 1921, upward of 21.7 billions were savings deposits and 4.8 current ac-
counts. In Italy only these last are truly banking deposits of the trading and 
financial classes. The savings deposits are derived from the middle, em-
ployee, and working classes, and are apt to reflect the pinch of high cost 
of living. As this cost has risen from 100 in 1913 to about 500 in 1921, 
it is interesting to find that these classes have maintained a sufficient mar-
gin for saving. It is also interesting to observe that the greater volume of 
deposits is not accumulated in the ordinary or issue banks, but in co-opera-
tive or public banks. Only 6,609 million hre are deposited with the issue 
and ordinary banks, 20 billions being under the patronage of the co-opera-
tive and public banks. This is an element of stability in the financial situa-
tion of Italy. In the last two weeks we have heard much of disastrous results 
of some giant companies, such as the well-known Ansaldo and Ilva iron 
and steel concerns. Shareholders' meetings were summoned to hear a story 
of capital wholly or almost wholly dissipated. Share quotations dwindled, 
to the despair of unfortunate holders. Much loose talk was heard about 
the consequences of the winding-up of concerns of such magnitude on 
the creditor banks; and a consortium was formed, under the Bank of Italy's 
guidance, for guaranteeing the Banca Italiana di Sconto, which, however 
solid, was known to the public as the Ansaldo's patron, against the perii 
of a rush by depositors. Amid ali these rumours, the foundations of Italian 
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credit remain unshaken, as depositors of popular and savings banks are 
sure that their savings are invested by their old-fashioned institutions in ac-
quiring bills of the surest description and moderate amount, and securities 
gradually written down to current prices. The stock exchanges are, how-
ever, closing the year in a very pessimistic temper, as they are feeling 
acutely the influence of the bad news relating to Ansaldo and Ilva compa-
nies. The public which has bought these iron and steel shares at 300 lire 
and upward and sees them to-day quoted at 45 and 16 lire, with a down-
ward tendency, is shy of the share market. 
89. 
ITALY 
BANCA DI SCONTO'S MORATORIUM - FEATURES OF THE CRISIS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 7 
After my last letter of December 24th, the story of the Banca Italiana di 
Sconto has filled the columns of ali Italian newspapers, and may be 
chronicled thus: - On December 26, 1921, the Minister of Industry signed 
a decree limiting Stock Exchange transactions to cash dealings. While the 
general public were puzzled, those with inside knowledge said that Banca 
Italiana di Sconto's shares were pouring into the market, and a precipitate 
fall was threatening. The Government were clearly of opinion that specu-
lative sales, with the consequent breakdown of prices, threatened a panie 
among the depositors, and accordingly stopped them. On December 
27th, the newspapers reported meetings at Rome between representatives 
of the Government and the banks. It appeared that the figure of 600 mil-
lion lire fixed as the capital of the banking consortium for the demobilisa-
tion of the Banca Italiana di Sconto was insufficient. Foreign depositors, 
and also some big Italian depositors, took alarm, and began hasty withdra-
wals. Several million lire were employed in supporting the market for the 
Banca's shares. On the same day an authoritative statement by Signor 
89. January 14, 1922, pp. 51-52. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Banca italiana di sconto's moratorium chronicled. Feature of the credit crisis", dated 
"Turin, January 7", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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Parodi, counsel to the Banca Italiana di Sconto, explained that an agree-
ment was finally reached that the sum necessary to put the Banca on its legs 
could only be furnished by the State or by the banks of issue acting on be-
half of the Treasury. On December 28th, Cabinet Ministers discussed the 
position, and decided to come to the rescue; the Government could have 
authorised the Bank of Italy to give to the Banca Italiana di Sconto sufficient 
advances to face the inevitable run; but they carne, as they were bound to 
come in the public interest, to the sound conclusion that direct assistance 
from the Bank of Italy would be unjustifiable. It would only mean that tax-
payers would have to pay for private faults or misfortunes. On December 
29th, the Gaiette published a Royal decree authorising the concession of a 
special "moratorium" to ali joint-stock companies and cooperative credit 
societies with a capital of not less than 5 million lire which could prove in-
ability to pay creditors owing to extraordinary and unforeseen events, or in 
cases where a moratorium might be in the creditors' interest. 
As soon as the Royal decree was published, Signor Pogliani, general-
manager of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, tendered to the Civil Tribunal 
of Rome a request for the concession of the moratorium, urging that the 
bank had assets largely in excess of liabilities. The tribunal, in the night, 
after a long discussion, accepted the request, and granted a moratorium 
up to December 30, 1922. On December 30th, another decree of the Min-
ister of Industry postponed to January 4, 1922, the monthly Stock Ex-
change settlement which should have taken place on December 31, 
1921. It appeared that some 60,000 shares or more of the Banca Italiana 
di Sconto had been sold for December and January settlement; but it 
was feared that buyers would not pay for them when duly tendered by sell-
ers. The principal buyer is, it is said, the Banca Italiana di Sconto; not, in-
deed, directly, as the ItaHan law forbids joint-stock companies to acquire 
their own shares, but indirectly, through the agency of the Banca Italo-
Caucasica, whose capital was wholly subscribed by the former. On January 
31x1 the Tribunal of Rome expressly forbade the Banca di Sconto from pay-
ing the sum needed to settle the Stock Exchange purchases of its own 
shares either directly or indirecdy. Up to the moment of writing, the settle-
ment, already postponed to January 4th, is not completely effected. A great 
many brokers in ali the Italian bourses have been parties to sales of Banca 
di Sconto's shares, and are unable, owing to the default of the buyer, to 
fulfil their obligations toward their seller. It is a matter of 30 mi l l ions , 
and it is hoped that a voluntary consortium may be formed to carry over 
this unfortunate deal. The Government has very wisely declined to accept 
Habilities in a matter which only interests a number of professional Ex-
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change men. Another decree, of the same day, changed from the permis-
sive to the compulsory the substitution of the former directors by Judical 
Commissioners when a moratorium is requested. The directors of the Ban-
ca Italiana di Sconto are therefore obliged to abandon the bank, and their 
assets are, moreover, put under seizure. The Tribunal of Rome used strong 
expressions to describe the directors' conduct: - "Serious and systematic 
mistakes", "risky financing methods", "favouring industriai concerns not 
worth financing", "mistaken interest taken in enterprises apt to produce 
great losses", "disastrous situation of the bank". On January 5th, the Med-
iterranean Lloyd Navigation Company preferred a request for a morator-
ium to the Civil Tribunal of Rome. This company is a creature of the Banca 
Italiana di Sconto. 
Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for a careful and reasoned judgment of 
the crisis. But three observations may be made. The first is, that in Italy eco-
nomie education has advanced not a little, as will be realised by those who 
remember the great outburst of public opinion in the old days of Tiberina, 
Esquilino, Credito Mobiliare, in the early nineties. The public opinion and 
Government were unanimously in favour of stopping the crisis with gener-
ous use of public money. The liberal advances to private concerns and 
banks were the first and foremost cause of the subsequent crisis in the pub-
lic banks of issue. Nothing of the sort has happened to-day. The Govern-
ment encouraged in an early stage, when they hoped the crisis might be 
averted, the formation of the 600 million lire consortium, whose advances 
were, I am informed, covered by adequate assets. But when the position ap-
peared untenable, further assistance, at the expense of the taxpayer, was re-
fused; and Ministers will certainly stand by their decision. Secondly, it may 
be doubted whether the resurrection of the moratorium was a happy one. 
Professor Sraffa, in a letter to Professor Cabiati, says that at most the mor-
atorium should have been confined to the Banca Italiana di Sconto, and not 
extended generally to ali embarrassed companies. Thirdly, the public has 
accepted the disagreeable notice of doors closed by one of the four big 
banks with great cairn. Throngs at other banks were not noticeable, and 
if a little stream of depositors was seen requesting reimbursement during 
the two or three days following the announcement of the moratorium, it 
had ceased wholly by January 3rd or 4th. In the great savings banks the pay-
ing in of deposits continued. As I explained in my last letter, out of a total of 
26.6 billion lire of deposits at June 30, 1921, only 6.6 billions are entrusted 
to ordinary banks, and upwards of 20 billions to co-operative and public or 
quasi-public savings banks. Given our social and economie conditions, this 
distribution of deposits is perhaps the greatest asset of our credit fabric. 
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90. 
ITALY 
BANKING - FOREIGN EXCHANGES -
T H E LIRA'S EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL VALUE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 22 
No further important news is to hand as regards the Banca Italiana di 
Sconto affair. Two or three minor banks have closed their doors in conse-
quence of the Banca's moratorium, but the effect is hardly noticeable. It 
appears that several plans for the reconstruction of the Banca have been 
submitted to the Government for approvai, but no definite decision has 
been arrived at. The Uva iron and steel company shareholders, after inquir-
ing into the loss of their capital, have come to the conclusion that it was 
inexpedient to prosecute past directors, and was better to accept a formai 
offer from the same directors of a payment of 30 million lire. Notwith-
standing these and other bad incidents of the crisis, the impression is gain-
ing ground that the worst is passing. 
Some interesting financial data are contained in the new edition of 
"Prospettive Economiche", by Professor Giorgio Mortara. Professor Mor-
tara studies the relations between the internai and external buying power 
of the lira. At first sight the situation is not bettered, perhaps is yet wor-
sening. Exchanges continue very much against Italy, as is seen from the 
following table of average monthly prices at the end of half-years: 
Dollars 100 Swiss Pound 100 French 
Francs Sterling Francs 
Parity lire 5 1 8 100 25-22 100 
June, 1914 5 1 6 100-22 25-27 100-33 
December " 5-30 101-60 25-88 103-31 
June, 1918 9 1 0 230-70 43-75 161-02 
December " 6-34 130-00 30-37 116-25 
June, 1919 8 0 5 151-32 37-33 125-43 
December " 13 07 241-67 50-08 121-92 
90. January 28, 1922, p. 129. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai 
manuscript, unentitled but dated "Turin, January 22, 1922", is kept in the Einaudi ar-
chives. 
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June, 1920 " 16-89 308-98 67-14 133-74 
December " " 28-57 441-02 99-79 169-65 
June, 1921 " 19-84 339-40 75-63 161-51 
December " " 22-70 439-85 94-00 177-10 
If not quite at its worst, the lira remains gravely depredateci. The value 
of the lira in terms of the gold lira has moved thus: - December, 1914, 98 
per cent.; 1915, 79 per cent.; 1916, 76 per cent.; 1917, 62 per cent.; 1918, 
82 per cent.; 1919, 40 per cent.; 1920, 18 per cent.; 1921, 23 per cent. For-
tunately, it seem that the two levels - internai and external - for the buying 
power of the paper lira are approximating. Thanks to the decrease of 
prices in the United States, the lira purchases more goods there than a year 
ago. Professor Mortara has calculated the weight which a given sum of 
money could acquire in 1913 and in September, 1921. Making 100 the 
weight acquired in both markets in 1913, with a given sum of lire, the same 
sum acquired in September, 1921, the following weights: 
In Italy 
Wheat 23 
Indian corn 20 
Wine 15 
Olive oil 16 
Butcher cattle 15 
Butter 14 
Raw wool 23 
Raw hemp 19 
Raw silk 14 
Sulphur 17 
In the United States 
Wheat 17 
Indian corn 25 
Sugar 17 
Petroleum 23 
Calf skins 29 
Coal 13 
Raw wool 22 
Raw cotton 14 
Pig-iron 17 
Steel 20 
As far as these scattered data go, it seems that the buying power of the 
lira is reduced to a fifth part of 1913. And the reduction is not very much 
different in the two markets. If that is a true picture, equilibrium ought not 
to be a very distant hope, and when it is attained, the stabilisation of the 
foreign exchanges would no longer seem an impossible dream. 
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91. 
ITALY 
CABINET RESIGNATION - POLITICAL CRISIS -
BANCA ITALIANA DI SCONTO 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 11 
H.M. the King has invited the Premier, Signor Bonomi, and the Cabi-
net to obtain an open vote from the House of Deputies. This was the end 
of an extraordinary performance of the numerically strongest party in the 
House, the democratic party, which, at the eve of the reopening of Parlia-
ment, due for February 2nd, declared by a sudden caucus vote a want of 
confidence in the Cabinet. Out of a total of 535, the democratic party num-
ber about 150 votes, the popular (Catholic) party 110, the Liberal (Conser-
vatives, Nationalists, and Fascisti) party about 70, while the Socialists are 
125, the Communists 15, and the other little parties (Agrarian, Social De-
mocrats, & c.) about 65. No Cabinet can live without a coalition between 
Democratic, Popular, and Liberal parties, or Democratic, Popular, and So-
cialist, yet no one party is willing to submit to the necessity of a compro-
mise with other parties. 
The move of the Democratic party against Signor Bonomi's Cabinet 
was engineered, as it appears, by Signor Giolitti's followers. But, when 
Signor Bonomi resigned, the Popular (Catholic) party, which were greatly 
incensed by the rupture of the alliance, pronounced against a Giolitti Ca-
binet. So it happened that neither Giolitti, nor De Nicola, Speaker of the 
House, nor Orlando and Meda, have dared to form a new Cabinet. In the 
end, the King was obliged to refuse the resignation of the Bonomi Cabinet, 
so that the House can, by an open vote, express its wishes and opinions. 
General elections would not mend the matter, as the existing proportional 
system of election does not allow sudden changes in the composition of the 
House; and the swing of the pendulum is almost without effect. 
91. February 18, 1922, pp. 281-282. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, 
entided "Cabinet resignation. A difficult politicai crisis. Banca italiana", dated "Turin, February 
11", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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Discontent against Bonomi's Cabinet had manifold origins. The con-
clusions of the Cannes Conference were displeasing to a section of Italian 
public opinion, which appeared to think that Italy was ignored when Great 
Britain and France were concluding a pact of alliance between themselves. 
Irritation against the popular (Catholic) party, which has obtained the 
introduction of a Bill purporting to establish the so-called freedom of edu-
cation, but in reality giving to the private (Catholic) schools the right to be 
the legai centre of final examination in secondary education. Last, but not 
least, the Banca di Sconto moratorium. Newspapers and politicai circles 
are, after December 29, 1921, full of stories about the cause of the fall 
of the Banca di Sconto, and the inability of the Government to come to 
the rescue. The Government has done ali in its power to bring the affair 
to a satisfactory conclusion. The judicial commissioners have circulated a 
scheme on the following lines: - The Banca Italiana di Sconto is to go into 
liquidation. A new Banca Nazionale di Sconto is to be formed with a ca-
pital of 270 millions lire, of which 150 millions are to be subscribed by 
creditors of the old Banca di Sconto with 7 per cent, of their credits, 
and 120 millions by the ex-directors. The capital may be successively raised 
to 420 millions with an option to creditors to subscribe the increase. 
Deposits will be repaid to creditors on the following basis: 1) Creditors 
up to 1,000 lire will be fully repaid after a month; 2) creditors between 
1,001 and 5,000 lire will receive 70 per cent, of their credits not later than 
December 31, 1922; 3) creditors of upwards of 5,000 lire will receive 60 
per cent, in instalments up to December 31, 1923. For the unpaid 30 or 
40 per cent., a scrip will be given to creditors, which gives a right to the 
distribution of the assets of the old Banca eventually remaining after pay-
ment of the above instalments. The creditors' representatives are not satis-
fied with the scheme, and claim the aid of the Government. Politicai par-
ties, unmindful of the public interest, have caught up the problem as a 
weapon against the Government. 
But how the creditors of the Banca di Sconto can be given more than 
the above scheme proposes to give, i.e., ali that can be realised from a 
winding-up of the assets, without laying an unjust burden on taxpayers, 
is difficult to see. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the Government, which 
will be formed after the vote of the House of February 16th, will do nothing 
prejudicial to the public exchequer. 
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92. 
ITALY 
POLITICAI. CRISIS -
FINANCIAL SITUATION: EXCHANGE FALLING AND CONSOLS RISING -
LEVY ON CAPITAL 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 25 
The debate in the House of Deputies ended in an over-whelming vote 
against Signor Bonomi's Cabinet, but the renewed efforts of Signori Gio-
litti, De Nicola and Orlando to form a new Cabinet were fruitless. Signor 
Giolitti encountered the veto of the popular (Catholic) party, and De Ni-
cola and Orlando refused to give their support to Giolitti in the building 
up of a strong coalition. At the bottom the struggle is against Signor Gio-
litti, the old man, who for a long time was supreme in the Government of 
Italy, and without whose consent no one ever dared to form a Cabinet, and 
against whom no one revolted, save Signor Salandra on the memorable 
event of the declaration of war against Austria. But for this very reason 
Signor Salandra was ostracised. The man who has set his face against Gio-
litti and vetos his return to power is a Sicilian priest, Don Sturzo, the or-
ganiser of the popular party. A little, nervous, indefatigable man in his for-
ties, Don Sturzo is the soul and inspiration of the Catholic party, and keeps 
his party under an iron hand. 
In the meantime, Signor Bonomi, who remains in charge until the ap-
pointment of his successor, was obliged to postpone for a few days or 
weeks the Genoa Conference perhaps interpreting the secret wishes of 
the Premiers of Great Britain and France. 
The absence of a Government and the Banca di Sconto's crisis have not 
been obstacles to a marked betterment in the Bourse situation. A begin-
ning was made by the reduction from 6 to 5V2 per cent, in the rate of in-
92. March 4, 1922, pp. 454-455. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
tided "Politicai crisis. A Sicilian priest against the old dictator. Betterment of the financial situa-
tion: exchanges falling and consols rising. The new decree on the levy on capital", dated "Turin, 
February 25", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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terest on nine-twelve months' Exchequer bills. The rates on three-five and 
six-seven months' bills were reduced respectively to 4.75 and 5.25 per cent. 
This move of the Treasury was the consequence of the improved situation 
of the public Exchequer, whose liquid funds passed, as may be seen in the 
last accounts, published February 17th, from 2,173 million lire at Septem-
ber 30, 1921 to 2,932 millions at October 31, 1921. 
However much we may regret the delay in publication, these figures 
are a testimony to an improving situation. The difference between the 
public income and public expenditure, which in July, 1921, was 145.5 mil-
lion lire, in August 195.2 and in September 521.2 on the wrong side, was 
in October 17.1 millions on the right side. The average monthly deficit, 
from July to October, was 212 million lire, or at the rate of about 2,500 
million lire for the whole year. The Bourses at once instinctively felt the 
beginning of the improvement, and the hope that an end will at last be 
put to the usuai huge increase of public debt sufficed to give new life 
to prices. Senator Wollemborg has recently calculated that public debt 
of ali classes reached at December 31, 1921, the sum of about 120 billion 
lire, including 21 billions of external debt, taken at the par of exchanges. 
If the increase had continued at the rate of 12 billions a year there would 
have been little hope of salvation, but the efforts to put new burdens on 
the shoulders of taxpayers are hearing well-won fruits: 5 per cent. Consols 
rose in a few days from 75 to 78-79, and 3 V2 per cent, from 72 to 74. For-
eign exchanges are falling: pounds sterling from 95-96 to 87-88, dollars 
from 24 to 20, Swiss francs from 450 to 390, and the tendency is towards 
lower quotations. 
A new Royal legislative decree was published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 
of February 15th modifying the extraordinary levy on capital. No changes 
are made in the sections relating to foreigners having possessions in Italy. 
They remain subject to the levy. A new term is fixed for compulsory de-
claration of assets for ali taxpayers, who have not as yet sent their declara-
tion or who had sent an incomplete or inexact one: June 30th for residents 
in Italy, July 31st for residents in Europe, and August 31st for non-Eur-
opean residents. The declarations in foreign countries may be sent to Ita-
lian Consulates. As the decree contains many new regulations about valua-
tions of land, houses, and securities, and gives reductions for immediate 
lump payment of the tax, I think that foreigners, who are taxpayers in Italy, 
should carefully read this legislative decree, which is dated February 5, 
1922, and bears the number 78 of the officiai series of laws and decrees 
of 1922. 
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93. 
ITALY 
PROPOSED TAX ON BEARER SECURITIES - DUTY ON WHEAT POSTPONED -
BANCA DI SCONTO AFFAIRS - STATE REVENUE 
From our Correspondent 
Rome, March 26 
The new Finance Minister, Signor Bertone, has laid on the table of the 
House of Deputies a Bill imposing a tax of 15 per cent, on the dividends of 
State bearer securities. If a bondholder desires to be exempted from the 
tax, he can do so by inscribing the security to his name. If accepted by Par-
liament this Bill will put an end to the compulsory inscription of ali secu-
rities. Signor Giolitti had made compulsory inscription one of the chief 
items of his financial programme, and by the Law of September 24, 
1920, the principle was formally introduced into our legislative code. Si-
gnor Giolitti foresaw many good results from its adoption, of which the 
chief was the certainty that taxpayers could no more escape succession 
tax, capital levy, and income-tax. Having securities inscribed to their name, 
taxpayers would be obliged to fili in tax forms correcdy, whereas at present 
the custom of omitting bearer securities altogether is prevalent. 
Joint stock companies have been unable to issue new shares, for no ca-
pitalist would touch an inscribed share. Unfortunate subscribers to such 
shares cannot get rid of them, for they are unsaleable, and no bank would 
think of making advances upon them. In Italy the public is bent on having 
bearer securities, and the methods of transferring inscribed shares are 
clumsy and costly. The Treasury found itself obliged to recognise facts, 
for it was impossible for the State to issue Consols or other bonds liable 
to the compulsory inscription. The only State security which has a market 
is the seven-year Exchequer bonds, as these were, by the Law of Septem-
ber 24, 1920, exempted from compulsory inscription. At last the Govern-
93. Aprii 1, 1922, p. 627. The article, unsigned and dated Rome, was published in the section: 
"Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is uncertain. The argument and its 
treatment bear similarities with two Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera (January 19 and 
March 23, 1922) entitled respectively "Il rinnovato problema del pane" and "Le proposte sulla 
nominatività". 
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ment has yielded to the lesson of hard facts, and the new Bill, while main-
taining the principle of compulsory inscription - the present Cabinet is 
made up by Giolitti followers and a formai renunciation of a cherished 
shibboleth of the old chief was impossible - authorises every possessor 
of State or private securities to keep them in bearer form if they will submit 
themselves to a 15 per cent, tax on the dividends. Foreigners and Italian 
residents abroad will have also to pay the tax if they object to technicalities 
of the inscription. The new tax will not be favourable to the easy marketing 
of Italian State securities. 
A recent decree has postponed to July 1, 1922, the duty on wheat, 
which was suspended during the war and was to be re-established on Aprii 
1, 1922. The duty is 7.50 gold lire, corresponding to about 30 paper lire 
per quintal. As the price is to-day about 110 lire, the duty would have 
added from 25 to 30 per cent, to the bread price. It seems unlikely that 
the duty on wheat will be eventually restored, as the Socialist and popular 
parties are obliged to oppose it. Perhaps this will be the beginning of the 
wane of protectionism. Agricultural interests will feel more and more ag-
grieved by high duties on implements, machinery, and textiles not counter-
balanced by protective duties on agricultural products. 
The affairs of the Banca Italiana di Sconto are stationary. By a decree of 
the Roma Tribunal a balance-sheet dated December 31, 1921, has been 
published in which the assets are estimated at 4,929.2 millions lire, and 
the liabilities (exclusive of capital and the reserves) at 5,916.7 millions lire. 
Of these 1,673.7 are privileged, so that only 3,255.5 millions are left to be 
shared among 4,243 millions lire of ordinary credits. The various classes of 
creditors and employees, though divided among themselves, are bent on 
obtaining the maximum aid from the banks of issue and the public Exche-
quer. It is not known exactly what shape State aid will take. 
A recent officiai report states that the public revenue for the first eight 
months of the financial year 1921-22 (July to February) was 8,425 millions 
lire, against 7,016 millions lire for the corresponding months of 1920-21. 
Thè tax yield for the whole year can be estimated at 12,500 millions lire, 
against 2,500 in 1913-14. Adding about 2,500 millions lire paid to pro-
vinces and municipalities, we reach a sixfold increase on the pre-war year. 
As the purchasing power of the lira has been only reduced to one-fourth or 
one-fifth of its pre-war value, it appears that taxation has more than kept 
pace with the increase in paper incomes. 
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94. 
ITALY 
BANCA DI SCONTO - STATE RAILWAY MATERIAL - CIRCULATION -
CLEARINGS - BANK OF ITALY - SECURITY AND COMMODITY PRICES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, Aprii 30 
The affairs of the Banca Italiana di Sconto are nearing the end. A de-
cree of the Rome Civil Tribunal has given consent to a pian, which gives 
creditors 58 and 65 per cent, of their credits at various stated dates before 
December 31, 1923. On the ashes of the "Sconto" will arise a new Banca 
Nazionale di Credito, which will be, however, primarily a concern charged 
with the winding-up of the parent. 
The Government has laid on the table of the Chamber a Bill authoris-
ing State railways to order 1,750 millions lire worth of railway materials in 
the next five years. No objection can be raised against the principle of pre-
paring a pian of railway reconstruction. But rumour is current that the 
1,750 millions lire order will be exclusively given to the Uva concern, where 
work is scarce and there are fears of increasing unemployment. It is also 
stated that the Government will renounce several hundred millions of ex-
cess profits tax due from "Ansaldo", for the same purpose of preventing 
the closing up of their shops. The perii is that, if these rumours prove true, 
there will be a scramble on the part of manufacturers and traders to obtain 
similar favours. 
The most important event of the month, from the point of view of eco-
nomie students, has been the issue of the annual report of Signor Stringher 
to the shareholders of the Banca d'Italia. He gives the following figures of 
circulation of the three banks of issue and of the State. (See table at p. 245). 
The figures testify to a laudable effort to keep Constant the amount of 
total issues. The increase at December 31, 1921, was obviously due to fears 
of panie consequent on the closing up of Banca Italiana di Sconto, but as 
nothing happened notes have come back to the issuing banks. With the 
94. May 13, 1922, pp. 905-906. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript un-
entitled but dated "Turin, Aprii 30" , is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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(In Millions of Lire) 
Banking Issues 
Commercial , Total State Notes Total 
Account 
December 31, 1918 4,584-7 7,165-6 11,750-3 2,124-1 13,874-4 
" 1919 5,651-6 10,629-7 16,281-3 2,271-3 18,552-6 
June 30, 1920 7,483-9 10,333-1 17,817-0 2,270-3 20,087-3 
December 31, " 8,988-9 10,742-8 19,731-7 2,269-3 22,001-0 
June 30, 1921 9,436-6 8,722-2 18,158-9 2,268-4 20,427-3 
December 31, " 10,704-1 8,504-8 19,208-9 2,268-3 21,477-2 
February 20, 1922 9,507-9 8,643-7 18,156-6 2,268-3 20,419-9 
progressive liquidation of State wheat, coffee, meat, and other enterprises 
the issues for account of the State are diminishing, with a corresponding 
increase in the commercial circulation. Clearings have continued to in-
crease in 1921 as against preceding years: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Sums Cleared 
1913 53,711-3 
1916 59,307-2 
1917 159,695-2 
1918 182,193-4 
1919 259,319-9 
1920 519,916-6 
1921 649,481-8 
The statistics relate to the Clearing Houses of Genoa, Milan, Rome, 
and Florence. For 1921 the figures for Trieste are added. However, the to-
tal Trieste figure is only 9,861.8 millions. 
The operations of the Bank of Italy are also increasing, as will be seen 
below: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Bills Discounted Advances on Securites 
1913 429-1 92-8 
1916 466-6 245-3 
1917 600-4 399-0 
1918 768-3 626-0 
1919 862-5 782-0 
1920 2,423-6 2,079-4 
1921 3,189-3 2,401-1 
As paper inflation has not increased since june 30, 1920, the extraor-
dinary increases of discounts and advances in the last two years are star-
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tling. No increase in the effective activities of the banks can justify the sud-
den jump. The process is evidently not one of healthy growth, but of a 
transference to the shoulders of the Bank of Italy of the task of financing 
industriai concerns. Banks of issue, instead of being bankers' bankers, are 
transformed into ordinary bankers, in direct touch with traders and man-
ufacturers. This position, although it cannot be called perilous, claims the 
closest attention. 
In the meantime, profits of the issue banks are increasing. With a paid 
capital of 180 millions lire and a reserve of 60 millions, the gross profits of 
the Bank of Italy reached in 1921 the huge sum of 500.4 millions lire, 
against 394.9 in 1920. Of this sum 15 millions were paid in "ordinary" 
taxes, 55 millions to funds for risks and amortisations, and 106.2 millions 
to various administrative and other expenses. The distribution of the net 
profits in recent years is explained in the following table: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Shareholders State 
Year 
in- • j j t 15 - r i State Part of the Tax on Issue of ~ , Dividend To Reserve Total N e t Profits Notes T o t a l 
1913 14.4 - 14.4 4.8 1.4 6.2 
1916 14.4 10.6 25.0 15.7 2.5 18.2 
1917 14.4 15.9 30.3 21.0 16.2 37.2 
1918 14.4 18.1 32.5 23.0 56.6 79.7 
1919 16.5 10.9 27.4 18.1 91.4 100.5 
1920 18.0 12.8 30.8 21.5 197.0 218.5 
1921 18.0 8.2 26.2 16.9 281.1 298.0 
Total 191.1 82.0 273.1 150.4 656.9 897.3 
Most of the money paid to the State Exchequer is a windfall of which it 
would be unwise to prophesy the repetition. Moreover, banks of issue are 
highly complaining that the State is absorbing ali the gross profits of the 
huge increase of discounts, whereas the unexpired risks pertaining to the 
same discounts are left on the shoulders of the shareholders, whose divi-
dends have risen only slightly notwithstanding the great depreciation of 
the paper money in which dividends are paid. In a different degree, the 
same complaint is heard from ali joint stock companies in Italy. Dividends 
have risen little or nothing since 1914, and almost the whole increase of 
profits is going into the State Exchequer. This goes a long way to explain 
why in Italy there are no traces of the booms in shares which are charac-
teristic of periods of paper depreciation in Germany. A general index num-
ber for securities which compares present with pre-war prices is not avail-
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able. But Professor Bachi publishes monthly a number index for share 
prices, where 100 is the price for December, 1918: 
December, March, 
1921 1922 
Banks 94-19 90-47 
Railways 50-84 50-09 
Land transportation 58-45 61-46 
Navigation 53-97 47-56 
Cotton 125-08 115-75 
Jute 102-15 108-27 
Wool 118-41 118-35 
Hemp and flax 155-41 124-64 
Silk 153-85 128-62 
Mines 53-23 50-14 
Iron and steel 17-77 13-95 
December, March, 
1921 1922 
Engineering 32-81 18-12 
Motor cars 56-29 47-55 
Electricity 67-95 68-36 
Chemicals 58-98 54-66 
Sugar 101-54 96-92 
Food 107-33 98-80 
Water supply 90-35 87-06 
Building & land 100-64 93 -23 
Miscellaneous 112-26 103-62 
General index 63 -84 56-70 
In Italy the present level of security prices is lower than in 1914, not-
withstanding the depreciation of paper money. The slump is the most sen-
sibile in iron and steel (a decrease of 86.05 per cent, on the December, 
1918, level), engineering, navigation, motor-cars, railways. 
The motor-car industry is greatly hampered by the dwindling of the de-
mand for high-priced motor-cars in the United States and by high duties in 
most foreign States. Bachi's commodity index number (based upon the 
average price for 1920=100) shows that the decrease of prices has been 
continuous for the last six months: 
Vegetable foods 
Animai foods 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Minerals and metals 
Building materials 
Vegetables 
Miscellaneous 
General index (basis 1920) 
General index (basis 1901-
1905) 
Number of 
Commodities Oct. Nov. Dee. 
Jan. Feb. March 
25 116-4 115-3 113-7 111-6 108-8 106-7 
13 125-1 123-1 116-9 113-7 112-4 95-7 
11 75-0 76-0 74-0 73-0 73-0 71-8 
12 73-2 74-5 77-0 72-4 67-9 64-9 
16 63-0 63-9 64-1 63-9 61-6 59-2 
6 90-3 88-4 87-9 91-6 90-9 84-1 
5 116-0 113-4 112-4 112-4 110-8 102-8 
12 94-7 93-9 93-9 94-3 92-2 87-2 
100 95-0 94-8 93-9 92-4 90-1 85-4 
100 747-2 745-7 739-1 727-3 708-7 672-1 
Whereas the class index numbers are given on the basis 1920, the gen-
eral index number is given also on the basis of 1901-5. There is a 10 per 
cent, decline in the half-year, but we are yet on a level six to sevenfold high-
er than in 1901-5. 
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95. 
ITALY 
POSTAL SERVICES - STATE RAILWAYS FINANCIAL RESULTS -
COST OF LIVING AGAIN DECREASING 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 27 
Postmaster-General has published a very interesting report on the 
working of his services. The figures (in millions of lire) are based on the 
estimates: 
1907-1908 1922-1923 
Income 151-2 794-2 
Expenditure 113-4 962-0 
Profit (+) or loss ( - ) .... + 37-8 - 167-8 
The war has played havoc with this great public service. While in 1907-
8 there was a margin of 25 per cent, between income and expenditure, in 
1922-3 the expenditure exceeds income by 21 per cent. A remarkable de-
crease in the traffic handled by the Post Office took place between 1917-18 
and 1920-21, and is partly attributable to the ali-round increase of the tar-
iffs. For instance parcels, which once cost 0.60 Hre up to 3 kilograms and 1 
Hra up to 5 kilograms, must to-day pay 2.50 Hre up to 1 kilogram, 5 Hre up 
to 3 kilograms, and 8 Hre up to 5 kilograms, and so the traffic dwindles. In 
February, 1921, postai charges were increased by 60 per cent. If the traffic 
had maintained itself at the previous level, income should have increased 
by 60 per cent. In fact, the increase was considerably less. In the tele-
graphic services the increase in the tariff charged was only 20 per cent 
but (excepting the period from February to May) the income was every 
month below the expectation by margins varying from 4 to 15 per cent. 
In the case of telephones, the experience was somewhat mixed; but 
when, in January, 1922, to the old increase of 33 per cent, was superadded 
95. June 3, 1922, pp. 1154-1155. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Postai services. State railways financial results. Cost of living again decreasing" and dated 
"Turin, May 27", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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a new increase of 53 per cent, in the tariff charged, the increase of income 
fell short of expectation by 24.8 per cent. 
Signor Repaci gives in the Aprii number of the Riforma Sociale (Turin) 
an interesting account of the Italian State Railways. Unfortunately, as Sena-
tor Bianchi, chairman of the permanent supervising Parliamentary Com-
mittee on State Railways, remarks in a report laid on May 17, 1922, before 
the Senate, the railway administration has not yet published its report for 
the financial year 1920-21. But, although somewhat belated, the figures cal-
culated by Signor Repaci are of importance as being the first attempt to 
gauge the financial results of the State railway system from its origin in 
1901-6 up to 1919-20. 
The following table shows expenses (in millions of lire): 
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1905-6 ... 35-3 36-5 93-4 64-9 _ 21-0 17-6 241-5 510-2 
1906-7 ... 53-4 46-8 122-9 93-3 0-3 25-0 20-5 247-0 610-4 
1907-8 ... 54-6 52-5 144-1 104-3 0-5 26-1 20-6 255-4 658-6 
1908-9 ... 60-7 57-3 140-7 119-0 0-4 21-6 29-6 266-3 695-9 
1909-10 . 5 6 0 61-6 159-8 128-7 0-6 22-2 28-6 262-8 720-5 
1910-11 . 59-8 64-7 166-5 133-3 0-7 23-6 29-9 271-4 750-2 
1911-12 . 61-2 70-0 188-8 139-6 0-8 25-7 28-0 279-5 794-0 
1912-13 . 68-5 73-1 193-9 140-6 0-9 26-5 30-2 287-1 821-0 
1913-14 . 72-9 74-4 194-6 144-7 0-9 27-1 34-8 293-9 842-6 
1914-15 . 77-5 80-0 223-6 150-6 1-2 19-7 39-2 303-8 895-9 
1915-16 . 79-9 76-9 340-0 165-5 1-9 24-4 48-8 311-9 1,048-5 
1916-17 . 61-2 85-5 560-7 164-0 2-9 42-6 61-5 312-2 1,290-8 
1917-18 . 102-9 99-8 811-0 218-0 6-3 36-2 92-7 313-1 1,680-2 
1918-19 . 194-8 164-6 855-6 326-1 4-8 64-0 100-4 314-1 2,024-8 
1919-20 . 63-3 312-6 1,528-5 614-0 8-5 72-2 118-1 315-0 3,032-3 
The officiai figures are those for the first six columns. The two columns 
7 and 8 had to be estimated by the author so as to give a complete idea of 
the position. Owing to legai technicalities the railways administration omits 
in its accounts some items of expenses, which must be included if we wish 
to have a complete idea of the whole working of the railways. For instance, 
the interest and amortisation of the old capital invested in the State railways 
- i.e., the capital invested previously to July 1, 1905, when the State took 
over the railways from the companies, is wholly omitted from the accounts. 
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Signor Repaci estimates this charge at 214 millions lire, which are included 
in column 8. The next table shows income (in millions of lire): 
Passengers 
Baggages and 
Express 
Goods 
Goods 
Navigation in 
the Messina 
Channel 
Transportation for State 
Accounts, Miscellaneous 
and Indirect Income 
Total Deficit 
1905-6 129-5 26-2 183-1 _ 8-3 347-2 163-0 
1906-7 153-9 30-7 221-8 - 15-9 422-5 187-8 
1907-8 161-9 33 1 238-9 - 20-1 464-1 194-4 
1908-9 172-1 33-5 249-8 - 25-9 481-2 214-7 
1909-10 .. . 181-1 34-9 274-9 0-5 26-5 518-0 202-5 
1910-11 .. . 186-6 35-6 287-0 0-5 31-7 541-5 208-6 
1911-12 .. . 202-2 42-6 300-7 0-6 32-6 578-9 215-2 
1912-13 .. . 218-3 42-2 311-6 0-7 36-2 609-1 211-9 
1913-14 ., . 227-8 41-4 320-0 0-7 37-3 627-1 215-5 
1914-15 .. . 197-3 56-0 327-7 0-7 35-4 617-2 278-7 
1915-16 .. . 251-3 135-3 376-5 0-7 52-4 816-3 232-2 
1916-17 .. . 324-3 289-9 457-0 1-6 47-6 1,120-4 170-6 
1917-18 .. . 405-3 377-4 467-4 1-3 103-9 1,355-4 324-8 
1918-19 ., . 653-4 352-7 574-9 1-4 111-6 1,694-0 330-7 
1919-20 .. . 734-3 227-6 806-6 1-8 139-7 1,910-1 1,122-2 
The extraordinary increase in 1919-20 in the deficit, and the even 
greater loss which in 1920-21 is known to have been suffered, is an intol-
erable burden, especially in view of the manifold increases of railways 
charges. The increase in the price of coal goes far to explain the loss; 
and so far as coal goes it is hoped that better times have come. But other 
more permanent causes are at work. The recent debate in the House of De-
puties on the Railways Budget was terminated with an unanimous vote on 
the desirability of a better application of the principle of an eight-hour day 
for railwaymen. Many members spoke with alarm of the fact that railway-
men understood the eight-hours' principle as an obligation not to work, 
but to be present for eight hours, so that the effective hours of work are 
said to be only 2.6. The number of men employed on the State railways 
went up from 147,289 in 1913-14 to 206,000 in 1920-21, and the average 
annual cost from 2,065 lire to 9,700 lire. And this greatly increased number 
of men gives a less efficient service, as appears from the vastly increased 
cost of damages paid to shippers for delay, waste, thefts, &c. From 3.9 mil-
lions lire in 1913-14 (1.13 per cent, on a total of goods carried of 347.4 
millions lire) the damages paid rose in 1920-21 to 97.8 millions Hre (3.64 
per cent, on a total of goods carried of 2,685.6 millions lire). Public opi-
nion, as the debate in the Chamber shows, is awakening to the danger, 
and the responsible Minister claims that in a year or two things will be once 
more normal. 
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The cost of living is again slowly receding; but we are as yet at a level 
very much higher than the lowest reached last year. The following index 
number relates to the city of Turin, and is calculated on the basis of the 
first half of 1914. I have only included the maximum and minimum levels 
after September, 1920: 
Food Clothing House 
Light and 
Hearing Miscellaneous Total 
First semester, 1914.. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
September, 1920 420-1 531-2 100 430-8 455-9 398-4 
March, 1921 536-6 496-8 110 428-5 543-9 472-2 
July, 1921 446-3 411-4 120 354-2 537-1 404-7 
December, 1921 536-7 448-0 120 433-5 578-3 471-0 
January, 1922 523-7 454-3 120 435-4 590-7 465-6 
February, 1922 522-7 449-6 120 406-9 597-5 463-5 
March, 1922 491-4 437-7 120 383-1 597-5 442-3 
Aprii, 1922 470-3 433-3 120 378-0 587-1 424-4 
The index applies to a working man's family, with wife and three chil-
dren, inhabiting a house under the Restriction of Rent Acts. If the family 
were obliged to find a house in the free market a rent from two to four-fold 
the pre-war rent would have to be paid. 
96. 
ITALY 
RISE IN SAVING DEPOSITS - PUBLIC REVENUE -
SECURITY INDEX NUMBER 
From our Correspodent 
Turin, June 30 
The collapse of the Banca Italiana di Sconto has led to a new increase 
in the deposits of the State postai savings banks. The following are the 
most significant figures (in millions of lire): 
96. July 15, 1922, p. 108. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Corre-
spondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, entided 
"Rise in the postai saving deposits. Public revenue. Agrarian legislation. Share-prices' number 
index" and dated "Turin, June 30", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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June, 1914 2,138-4 
1918 2,927-9 
1919 4,232-9 
1920 5,896-2 
1921 7,869-4 
July, 1921 7,932-0 
August, " 7,946-5 
September, 1921 7,960-6 
October, " 7,940-2 
November, " 7,948-2 
December, " 8,146-2 
January, 1922 8,230-9 
February, " 8,290-9 
March. " 8,349-1 
The increase in the December, 1921, figure was wholly due to a sum of 
206.3 million lire of yearly interest falling due. Apart from this exceptional 
variation, the stagnation of deposits in the second half of 1921 compares 
strikingly with the increase in the first three months of 1922. The public, 
uneasy about the private banks, are again bringing their savings to the pub-
lic postai savings banks. 
The latest accounts of the principal revenue items are not so satisfac-
tory as the previous ones: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
1920-21 1921-22 (Inc. or Dee.) 
Taxes on incomes 3,146-9 3,984-9 + 837-9 
Stamp 1,071-4 1,260-9 + 189-6 
Registration and succession duties .... 716-5 863-9 + 147-4 
Customs and Excise 1,561-5 1,846-6 + 285-1 
Monopolies 2,527-0 2,729-7 + 202-7 
Sale monopolies 466-7 382-1 - 8 4 - 6 
Lottery 133-3 168-9 + 35-6 
9,623-3 11,237-2 + 1,613-9 
These results are not so satisfactory as they appear on the face of it: 1) 
It is uncertain how much the month of June will yield; but it seems unlikely 
that the sum total of principal revenue items for the fiscal year 1921-22, 
which ends to-day, will exceed 13 billion lire. "Minor" items of revenue 
may perhaps bring it up to 17-18 billion lire; but even that leaves us far 
below the expenditure total. The latest hints from the Treasury point to 
a deficit of 6.7 billion lire for the fiscal year just ending. 2) A beginning 
of slackening is noticeable in various items. For instance, in the taxes on 
incomes group the war profit tax in the 11 months has yielded 1,565 mil-
lion lire, against 1,623 millions in the preceding year; and this item is 
bound to go rapidly to zero. How this source of revenue is to be replaced 
is uncertain. The new tax on income will be slow to give abundant fruits. In 
the meantime, the extraordinary capital levy will teli the position, especially 
if taxpayers can be induced to pay the whole of tax in a lump sum instead 
of spreading it over 10 or 20 years. 
Another doubtful item is the increase of 189.6 million lire in the yield 
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of the stamp tax. The good result is for the greater part due to 134.5 mil-
lion lire of increase in the yield of the stamp tax on luxury sales. This tax is 
12 per cent, on the sale of luxury goods to customers and of 0.30 per cent, 
on the sales between merchants and merchants. Like the sale tax in France, 
this tax has given somewhat disappointing results. The estimated yield was 
350 million lire for the whole fiscal year; and the actual yield for the first 11 
months was only 188.3 millions. Other items in this group are rather dis-
concerting. Apart from an increase of 52.2 million lire in the tax for the 
benefit of wounded and mutilated men and their families, which is simply 
an additional tax on ali stamps, we see decreases in the yield of the stamps 
on contracts (-22.6 million lire), on motor-cars (-18.6), on precious stones 
(-9.3), &c. The greatest increase in the old stamp taxes is ominous: the 
yield of the tax on the paper circulation of issue banks has gone up from 
228.9 to 273.1 million lire. As it is desirable that the paper issues should be 
checked, this item should be bound to decrease. 
Professor Bachi has published the usuai index number of share prices 
for May, the basis of 100 representing the price for December, 1918 (see 
Economist, May 13th, page 906): 
December, March, May, 
1921 1922 1922 
Banks 94 19 90-47 92-14 
Railways 50-84 50-09 53-80 
Land transport 58-45 61-46 66-13 
Navigation 53-97 47-56 52-07 
Cotton 125-08 115-75 128-83 
Jute 102-15 108-27 104-04 
Wool 118-41 118-35 123-41 
Hemp and flax 155-41 124-64 144-06 
Silk 153-85 128-62 161-60 
Mines 53-23 50-14 48-61 
Iron and steel 17-77 13-95 15-90 
Engineering 32-81 18-12 17-73 
Motor cars 56-29 47-55 56-71 
Electricity 67-95 68-36 69-13 
Chemicals 58-98 54-66 61-40 
Sugar 101-54 96-92 103-57 
Food 107-33 98-80 105-02 
Water supply 90-35 87-06 86-21 
Building and land 100-64 93-23 90-48 
Miscellaneous 112-26 103-62 110-68 
General index 63-84 56-70 59-45 
In March the quotations reached low-water mark. The subsequent rise 
is as yet not general, nor very sure of permanency. The group of textiles 
shows up most prominently, and it can be said that there the crisis is past. 
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Almost ali mills are working at full time. Iron and steel engineering are stili 
at their worst. Not only are the prices of shares seriously depressed, but a 
national strike has been in progress for about a week in this industry. We 
have no trace in Italy of the phenomenon known in Germany as the cata-
strophe-boom. After December, 1918, the number of lire necessary to buy 
a pound sterling has gone up from 30 to 80-100, but the average index 
number of share prices has gone down from 100 to 59.45. It is true that 
in December, 1918, foreign exchanges were pegged, but, at the utmost, 
this fact signifies that lira has not depreciated in the meantime. This should 
have kept up values at their former level. The decrease is a sign of the after-
war liquidation process which is going on. 
97. 
ITALY 
CABINET CRISIS - SOCIALISTS AND GOVERNMENT -
COMMODITY AND SHARE PRICES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, August 2 
While I write, a general strike is being proclaimed by the Labour organi-
sations as a protest against the assault and burning down of co-operative and 
Labour houses in Cremona and Ravenna at the hands of Fascisti. The result 
of the strike may be slight, but the air is full of bad temper and uncertainties. 
The Cabinet crisis has been patched up, after twelve days of negotiations, by a 
revision of the Facta Ministry. On the eve of the Genoa Conference, a Gov-
ernment was constituted in a hurry under the presidency of Signor Facta, for 
the sole purpose of having a Government when the assembly of nations met 
on Italian soil. Anyone who tried to form a Government was welcome. To-
day the same story is being repeated, Signors Orlando, Bonomi, Meda, De 
Nava, De Nicola being offered the premiership in turn. The politicai groups 
97. August 19, 1922, pp. 325-326. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Cabinet crisis. Signor Turati's advice, as chief of the Socialist party, heard by the King. 
Index numbers for commodities and share prices", dated "Turin, August 1, 1922", is kept in 
the Einaudi archives. 
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of the Chamber are unable to agree. The proportional representation system 
has split the Chamber into 12 groups, which cannot be moulded into a stable 
majority. The Liberal-Conservatives are split into three groups (Liberals, Na-
donalists, and Fascisti), the Democrats into five. Besides them, there are the 
Communists, the Socialists, and the Catholic Populars. As die Populars num-
ber 105 and Socialists 125 out of a total membership of 535, it follows that no 
Government can be formed in which one of these parties does not participate. 
Hitherto the Populars alone were willing to go into office. But now a new de-
velopment has occurred: 70 members out of 125 of the Socialist party have de-
clared themselves willing to take office. Their leader, Signor Turati, after 40 
years of fight against monarchy and so-called capitalistic constitution, has been 
received by the King, and has officially given him the advice of the Socialist 
group on the politicai situation. The Socialist-Labour party is transforming it-
self from a revolutionary into a constitutional party. Signor Giolitti says that the 
change was prompted, not by a change in ideas, but by the fear of the Fascisti. 
Socialists hope to use the Government weapons - Royal Constabulary (guardia 
regia) and the army - to repress the aggressions of the Fascisti on Labour or-
ganisations. If the accession of the Socialist party to office merely signified bet-
ter public order, it would be generally welcomed. Many fear, however, that the 
economie policy of the Socialists in office would be dangerous - public works 
for unemployed, doles out of public purse to Labour organisations, and a new 
vast army of followers to be satisfied at public expense. 
Professor Bachi's commodity index number (based upon the average 
price for 1920, equals 100) shows an increase for June: 
Number of Oct., Dee., Mar., Aprii, May, June, 
Commodities 1921 1921 1922 1922 1922 1922 
Vegetable foods 
Animai foods 
Chemical 
Textiles 
Minerals and metals 
Building materials 
Vegetables 
Miscellaneous 
General index (basis 1920) 
General index (basis 1901-
5 
12 
100 
25 
13 
11 
12 
16 
6 
116-4 113-7 106 7 104-9 106-3 108-7 
125-1 116-9 95-7 102-5 93-9 97-0 
75-0 74-0 71-8 69-5 67-3 67-0 
73-2 77-0 64-9 63-3 65-7 73-0 
63-0 64-1 59-2 57-6 57-5 57-4 
90-3 87-9 84-1 81-5 78-7 75-7 
116-0 112-4 102-8 92-2 96-4 104-9 
94-7 93-9 87-2 88-4 87-9 87-0 
95-0 93-9 85-4 84-4 83-3 86-1 
1905) 100 747-2 739-1 672-1 663-8 659-6 677-0 
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The rise is due pardy to the rise in the staple prices in foreign markets, 
but perhaps more to the rise in Italian exchanges, and it is to be feared that 
July figures will be worse than those for June. 
Figures on the cost of living of a working-man's family of five in Turin 
show that the improvement reaches its climax in Aprii. Since Aprii, every 
month has marked an increase in retail prices: 
Food Clothing Rent Miscellaneous Total 
First half of 1914 100 100 100 100 100 100 
June, 1920 410 434 100 385 425 374 
June, 1921 485 433 110 358 538 429 
January, 1922 524 454 120 435 591 465 
Aprii, 1922 470 433 120 378 587 424 
May, 1922 473 433 120 351 583 428 
June, 1922 484 432 120 358 586 435 
July, 1922 487 433 120 365 584 437 
Financial markets are not so bad as they might be; the general index 
number which Professor Bachi publishes for share prices (price of Decem-
ber, 1918=100) fell from 63.84 at the end of last year to 56.70 at the end of 
March, but has since recovered to 60.54 at the end of June. The most fa-
voured group has been the textile, which has been encouraged by the ris-
ing prices of the raw materials and by the expanding consumption. Stocks 
have been reduced to a very low ebb, and want replenishing. Motor cars, 
chemicals, sugar, and food shares are also better. After the long-drawn-out 
crisis of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, the leading banking shares show 
some signs of vitality. 
Rent restriction laws keep shares of building companies low. Generally 
speaking, the most noticeable fact about share prices is that the deprecia-
tion of the lira has not resulted in a great rise in share quotations. "Valuta" 
booms are ignored in Italy. Limitation by decree of dividends during the 
war, taxation or confiscation of war profits after the war, fear of new taxa-
tion and of compulsory registration of shares, are perhaps the most potent 
causes of this interesting phenomenon. 
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98. 
ITALY 
T H E CRISIS ABATES - FASCISTI IN GENOA -
ITALY'S NATIONAL WEALTH AND TAXES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 5 
When I last wrote (August 2nd) Italy was approaching a crisis. The Fac-
ta Ministry was hurriedly reconstituted to meet the growing danger from 
the Fascisti. There were indeed rumours that the Fascisti were to march 
on Rome to dissolve Parliament and set up a dictatorship. The rumours 
proved, as generally in Italy, unfounded. The Government laid on the mili-
tary authorities the duty of maintaining order in the disturbed provinces; 
and ali ended in nothing. The country is to-day peaceful and contented. 
The Chamber has given a large vote of confidence to the same Facta Min-
istry, of which it endeavoured to get rid a few weeks before. The great to-
pic to-day is the General Election. The Fascisti claim that their representa-
tion - about 20 Deputies - is too small; that the trend of public opinion is 
against Socialism and in their favour. Therefore a General Election is due, 
notwithstanding that the Chamber is only one year old. Liberals and De-
mocrats hesitate, and say that the proportional system should be abolished 
before going to the constituencies. Proportionalism was undoubtedly fa-
vourable to the great mass parties, i.e., Socialists and Populars, and fatai 
to the old non-organised Liberal parties. 
Meanwhile, under the pressure of Fascism, Municipal-Socialist and 
Communist councils are resigning or being dissolved; first among them, 
the Socialist council of the great northern capital, Milan. Socialist admin-
istration in Milan was of the worst species. The number and salaries of 
public employees were raised without regard to economy and even de-
cency, and the city was almost bankrupt. The cry for economy in State 
and locai Budget is at last loud, and we may hope that a new era of re-
trenchment is in sight. 
98. September 9, 1922, p. 432. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because in the first line the author 
declares to be the same one as that of the article of August 19, written for certain by Einaudi. 
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Another result of the Fascist movement is the dissolution of the author-
ity of the Port of Genoa (Consorzio del Porto di Genova). On August 5th, 
Palazzo San Giorgio, the magnificent old building where the Genoa Con-
ference sat, was occupied by Fascisti. Senator Ronco, president of the Port 
Authority, was compelled to sign a series of decrees dissolving the mono-
polistic Socialist co-operatives of working men, to whom the operations of 
the port were entrusted, and was ultimately compelled to resign. The 
closed lists of the workers (ali Socialists) authorised to work on the port 
were reopened, and new nationalist workers admitted. True, the cost of 
operations in the Genoa port were going up, but it is doubtful if this 
was due more to the high wages paid to monopolistic red co-operators 
than to the exactions of various classes of middlemen bent upon squeezing 
the utmost farthing from every ton of merchandise passing through the 
great Italian port. 
Signor Matteotti, M.P., has presented an interesting report to the 
House Committee on Finance. The following table gives the yield of State 
taxes before and after the war: 
(In Million Lire) 
Ordinary Taxes 
1913-14 1920-21 1921-22 
On incomes, capital and wealth 
On transactions (stamp and registration taxes) 
On consumption 
607-7 
261-5 
1,138-9 
2,021-0 
1,471-8 
5,555-7 
2,908-9 
1,612-0 
6,179-8 
Extraordinary Taxes 2,008-2 9,048-5 10,700-7 
Ali on income and capital - 2,156-0 2,071-1 
Even leaving out of account the extraordinary taxes (excess profit 
taxes, war income-tax, exceptional increase of capital levy) the tax yield in-
creased more than fivefold, and, including extraordinary taxes, more than 
sixfold. 
The increase was highest on transactions and consumption, almost 
from 1 to 6, while the direct taxes on income and capital increased less 
than 3V2 fold. But if we add to the ordinary taxes on income the extra-
ordinary taxes, we see that the increase of direct taxes was from 607 to 
4,170 million lire, or almost from 1 to 7. Thus ali classes of taxpayers are 
to-day more severely hit by taxes than before the war. The lira has de-
preciated from 1 to 0.21; but taxes having risen from 1 to 6, the real 
burden is increased by 50 per cent. And we are only at a beginning. 
A report by Signor D'Aroma, Director-General of Direct Taxes (on in-
come, capital and wealth) to the Ministry of Finance is illuminating. Our 
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most productive ordinary tax is called imposta di ricchezza mobile, and 
corresponds closely to your income-tax, except in so far that it leaves 
out, for separate taxation, net rents accruing to land and house proprie-
tors. The total income assessed to the imposta di ricchezza mobile was in 
1918 only 2,030,774,117 lire. In 1921 it rose to 3,974,277,318 lire, and 
in 1922 to 6,002,747,033 lire. This huge increase signifies that more and 
more incomes are brought into the fiscal net. The administration, some-
what lax before the war, is becoming more and more severe. Signor 
D'Aroma hopes to be able, in a few years, to increase assessed income 
considerably. He observes that only 1 billion lire annual income is as-
sessed to the land tax, 0.8 to the house-tax, 6 to the income-tax (;ricchez-
za mobile), 4.5 to the direct income-tax (income-tax on State servants' 
salaries and other incomes paid by the Government, which are not as-
sessed, but directly taxed at the source), making 12.3 billion lire of in-
come assessed and taxed. The true national income is much higher, 
and cannot be estimated at less than 60 billions lire. Italy, it is true, is 
a country of small incomes, which should be exempt from direct taxa-
tion; but if 30 out of 60 billions are small incomes, rightly exempted, 
there is a long distance between 12 billions taxed and 30 billions which 
ought to be taxed. Even allowing for 6 billions legally exempt (interest 
of public debt issued under the clause of tax exemption and other simi-
lar items), the administration has a large virgin soil left to till to the ben-
efit of the exchequer. 
One potent cause of tax evasion, however, is the extravagant method of 
putting up tax rates, so that the taxpayer is bound to minimise the income 
assessed to save himself from utter ruin. Land income assessed is only 1 
billion, but upon this paltry sum is laid from State, Provinces and munici-
palities a tax burden of 875 millions lire. A rate of 88 per cent, cannot be 
paid; the only way of escape for the taxpayer is to understate his assessed 
income. The burden of the house tax is 639 millions lire. 
FROM POST-WAR CRISIS TO T H E FIRST PERIOD OF FASCISM IN POWER, 1919-1924 
99. 
ITALY 
CENSUS OF POPULATION - SULPHUR AND SHIPBUILDING QUESTIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 30 
The Central Department of Statistics publishes the final results of the 
Census taken on December 1, 1921. Population statistics at various dates 
are as follows: 
Population Average Annual Inhabitants per Increase per 1,000 Square Kilometre 
1770 16,477,000 2-51 57-5 
1816 18,383,000 8-89 64-1 
1848 ... 23,618,000 3-95 82-4 
1862 (January 1) 25,000,000 7-66 87-2 
1901 (February 10) ... 32,475,253 6 0 0 113-3 
1911 (June 10) ... 34,671,377 7-51 121-0 
1921 (Dee. 1), old territory ... 37,276,738 _ 130-0 
Territory with the new provinces ... 38,835,941 - 125-7 
The war and the influenza epidemie have not left very marked traces 
on the Italian population; the growth between 1911 and 1921 is not ap-
preciably lower than the average of the best periods of the past. The 
density of population per square kilometre is increasing fast, and is a 
most potent cause of emigration in an agricultural country like Italy, 
which is not capable of absorbing the annual surplus of births over 
deaths. 
In the new provinces acquired from Austrian Empire the population 
decreased between the two last censuses from 1,592,278 to 1,559,203 
(2.08 per cent.), but the decrease is very easily explained as a consequence 
of the war. 
Two problems are being keenly discussed at present - sulphur and 
shipyards. Interested circles petitioned the Government with the object 
of obtaining Royal decrees in favour of these industries, which are said 
99. October 7, 1922, pp. 586-587. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. Moreover, the treatment of the argument bears some similarities with some Ei-
naudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera in the period March-October. 
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to be gravely hit by the economie crisis. Sicilian sulphur is not freely sold. 
AH producers are obHged to consign sulphur to a compulsory Consortium, 
which fixes prices and advances immediately a provisionai sum, settling ac-
counts every year. At the end of 1921 the officiai price was 750 Hre per ton, 
and the provisionai advance 500 Hre. Producers hoped that the residuai 
250 Hre would be paid in due time, subject to a deduction of 90 Hre for 
taxes and Consortium expenses. But for the whole of 1922 sales have been 
much restricted. The Louisiana producers are underselling Sicilian sul-
phur, and the menace is growing, thanks to better situation and better ap-
phances of American sulphur mines. Stocks of 270,000 tons had been ac-
cumulated by the Consortium at Aprii 30, 1922, and this stock, though 
now somewhat reduced, is obstructing the sale of new sulphur. The Con-
sortium had continued up to September to accept new sulphur, making 
advances on it by means of funds accumulated in the past and of loans 
from the issue banks. But now banks have refused to go on with new loans; 
the Consortium in their turn had to stop advances on new sulphur, and 
producers, who cannot sell to the public, are obliged to stop production. 
To avert unemployment the Government has been persuaded to recom-
mend to Parliament a Bill for a State guarantee of a loan of 120 millions 
hre, with which the Consortium would start a sort of sulphur-valorisation 
scheme. The old stock of 200,000 tons would be put aside and left unsold 
until better times and better prices. 
The production would go on, and the Consortium, free from the care 
of the old stock, would endeavour to sell only the new production. The af-
fair is a wild gamble on the continuance of the present high foreign ex-
change rate and on the probability of a pool with American producers. 
If the Hra improves and American competition becomes keener, internai 
prices would tumble down and the bubble explode. The Chamber, how-
ever, has voted the Bill, which is awaiting discussion in the Senate. During 
the recess producers, growing impatient, have petitioned Government to 
sanction the State guarantee of the 120 millions loan by means of a Royal 
decree. Ministers and Under-Secretaries of State backed this unconstitu-
tional request, the acceptance of which would cancel Parliamentary control 
of public money. In the face of a vigorous newspaper campaign started 
against the abuse of Royal decrees, the Government have not dared to issue 
the decrees. 
Another decree, which is from time to time mooted in the public Press, 
is one which would aim at giving orders for from 35 to 40 thousand tons of 
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steamers for goods and passenger service in the State-subsidised lines. In 
pre-war times Italy possessed 10 private shipyards capable of turning out 
80,000 gross tons annually. They should have had plenty of work, for, as 
the mercantile fleet was 1,500,000 tons, the demand of new ships should 
have been greater than the production. But shipowners did not renew 
the fleet in the rational proportion of 1/15 every year; moreover, they pre-
ferred to buy old ships sold in foreign markets or to order more cheaply in 
foreign shipyards. The normal national production was limited to a few 
tens of thousands of tons. Practically the only shipyards which were some-
times busy with work were the Ligurian ones. 
The war changed things. In 1918, and in the two years after the Ar-
mistice, shipbuilders screamed for Government aid, obtained it, and 
sank in the improvement of old and the building of new yards a sum 
not less than 250 million lire. To-day there exist in Italy 27 shipyards, 
with a total productivity of 250,000 gross tons. The fleet, it is true, 
has doubled to 3,000,000 tons, and should furnish a theoretical sum to-
tal of orders of 200,000 tons annually. But this figure is to-day purely 
theoretical, owing to the shipping crisis. Building has been begun on 
74 ships for a total of 436,520 gross tons, but is proceeding only on 
34 ships for 210,890 tons, mostly in an advnced state of construction. 
In a year the work in hand will be terminated, and no new work is forth-
coming. Shipbuilders are therefore clamouring for Government orders, 
to be equally distributed among ali shipyards, old and new. As the num-
ber of 27 shipyards is evidently excessive, only the best equipped and 
best managed ones should survive, and the survival of the 12 or 15 best 
ones would be greatly beneficiai to the shipbuilding industry and the na-
tion. But the technically or financially weak yards die hard; and as they 
possess influence through their banking and politicai connections, they 
hope for a new lease of life, if only the State can be persuaded to give 
their orders to ali yards, bad and good alike. These are the circum-
stances under which, during parliamentary recess, the Government is 
asked to issue a Royal decree placing 35 or 40 thousand tons of ship-
bulding orders. 
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100. 
ITALY 
T H E FASCISTI AND THEIR PROGRAMME -
GLOOMY SPEECHES OF GIOLITTI AND NITTI -
EXCHANGES AND PRICES RISING -
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, October 28, 1922 
The important question is, what is the economic platform of the new 
party? Signor Mussolini, the chief, is not an economist. Passionate and full 
of vigour, he is able to commit his party to headlong plunges into unknown 
seas. For the moment, he has uttered at Naples only one economic sen-
tence: "Italy needs at the helm a man capable of saying No to ali requests 
of new expenditure". So far, so good. Ah leaders are saying the same thing. 
Signors Nitti and Giohtti have recently made speeches, in which Italy's si-
tuation was coloured very darkly, and public opinion was seriously and 
gravely warned of the necessity of putting an end to the increase in public 
expenditure, and of reducing even useful expenses. Signor Giohtti was 
very resolute on the topic, and prophesied the lira going to ruin, following 
the evil example of the German mark, if the State Budget were not put in 
order in a reasonably short time. The words of the old statesman, who is 
passing his eightieth birthday, had an immediate effect. The lira went trum-
bling in foreign markets, and in a few days the pound sterling rose from 
105 to 117 lire, and the dohar from 24 to 26 hre. 
From this rise was born in the Italian bourses a faint approximation to 
a tentative valuta boom, as is apparent from the following table: 
September 26 October 25 
Consols 3V2 72-70 72-15 
" 5 % 81-80 80-30 
SHARES 
Bank of Italy 1,347 1,375 
Banca Commerciale 863 878 
100. November 4, 1922, pp. 853-854. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. 
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Credito Italiano 650 670 
293 291 
Libera Triestina (navigation) 445 430 
Cantoni (cotton) 1,001 1,250 
Cascami seta (silk) 582 688 
De Angeli (cotton printing) 429 480 
Rossi (wool) 2,000 2,120 
Terni (iron and steel) 476 468 
Fiat (motor car) 233 240 
Edison (electricity) 440 466 
Fondi Rustici (agricultural land) 230 232 
Immobiliari (house property) 510 540 
Nebiolo (printing machines and types) 326 397 
Silos (wheat elevators) 238 268 
FOREIGN EXCHANGES Sept. 26 Oct. 27 
178 179 
London 102-80 115 
Switzerland 435 465 
New York 23-30 26-45 
1-67 0-68' 
Nearly ali shares have participated in the boomlet, rise of prices being 
the highest in textiles, where high profits are obtained. Consols and ali 
other fixed interest securities are low. Although prices are increasing, the 
following figures on the cost of living of a working man's family of five 
in Turin do not yet bear the full repercussion of recent rises in foreign ex-
changes. This rise in the cost of living has, however, not been accompanied 
up to date by requests for higher wages. 
Food Clothing Rent 
Fuel and 
Light Miscellaneous Total 
First half of 1914 .... 100 100 100 100 100 100 
June, 1920 .... 410 434 100 385 425 374 
June, 1921 .... 485 433 HO 358 538 429 
January, 1922 .... 524 454 120 435 591 465 
Aprii, 1922 .... 470 433 120 378 587 424 
May, 1922 .... 473 433 120 351 583 428 
June, 1922 .... 484 432 120 358 586 435 
Tuly, 1922 .... 487 435 120 365 584 437 
August, 1922 .... 489 435 120 372 584 438 
September, 1922 .... 521 436 120 387 582 458 
Will the new party have the will and the power to redress the awkward 
financial situation of the State, which is the only true cause of the present 
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unfavourable movements of exchanges and prices? I say the only cause of 
the trouble, as the economic situation of the country is not bad. Far from 
it. Agriculture has had some adverse experiences - the wheat harvest under 
the average, and a deficiency of rain, which in various regions made havoc 
among the cattle; but the cocoons and vintage seasons went very favour-
ably, and prices of agricultural products are high, so that the agricultural 
community is faring well. Textile products are, therefore, in good demand, 
and building shows, after years of complete quiet, some signs of vitality. 
State and banking circulation are not increasing, and the State finances it-
self by means of Treasury bills sold to real investors. The deficit of the cur-
rent fiscal year was estimated by Signor Giohtti at not less than seven bil-
lions hre - i.e., Italian savers are buying this year State securities to the tune 
of seven billions hre for the sake of balancing the State Budget. If we as-
sume that the present lira is worth only 20 per cent, of the old good money, 
we must conclude that the minimum capacity to save of Itahans is not less 
than 1,400 millions gold lire. At present, unfortunately, ah these savings are 
poured into the all-devouring State Treasury. 
Therefore, the most urgent necessity is the reduction of public ex-
penses. Even if taxes should be somewhat increased, the balancing of 
the State Budget would set free a large margin of savings for industriai 
and agricultural investments. Economy in pubhc services is possible; the 
huge deficit of the State Railways of over one billion hre is related to 
two principal causes: high exchanges, which raise the price of coal, and 
the bad organisation of the eight hours day, in virtue of which many rail-
waymen work effectively only for two or three hours a day. In the postai 
services the tale is very much the same. Large sums could be saved if 
the State could buy ah they want in the cheapest market; if State bounties 
and subsidies were suspended or reduced; if war pensions were revised, so 
as to limit them; if plans for pubhc works were restricted to a minimum. 
But the man who will attempt to put in practice the Mussolini dictum of 
replying No to ali requests of expenditure will possess remarkable courage. 
Populars and Socialists have not this sort of courage, as they cater for the 
vote of multitudes crying always after State aid, and it is to be feared that 
Fascisti, who are proud of marshalling 800,000 adherents, will hesitate be-
fore the task. 
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101. 
ITALY 
ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT IN ITALY - TAXES TO BE SIMPLIFIED -
WORKING OF THE SUCCESSION TAX - A NEW EXCISE? 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 27 
The first financial acts of the Fascist Government are promising. They 
have abolished useless train services in the State railways, and declared 
their intention to drop many Royal decrees instituting port authorities in 
minor ports, which would simply have expanded into a new bureaucracy, 
additional to the State, municipal, and other authorities governing the port 
administration. But the most important act of the new Cabinet has been its 
demand for provisionai powers to collect and expend revenue (esercizio 
provvisorio) till June 30, 1923. The Chamber has readily assented, and 
the Senate will do likewise. The Government is thus empowered to act 
as if the budgets had been regularly discussed and voted by Parliament. 
Moreover, the Chamber has passed the so-called Bill of fuh-powers. The 
Senate will certainly concur. 
This Bill authorises the Government until December 31, 1923, to re-
form the civil and military services; to suppress this or that pubhc service; 
to transfer railways and the other industriai State concerns to private hands; 
to reduce, simplify, or increase existing taxes, and to introduce new ones; to 
act as they will in the domain of public administration and finance. Never 
was such absolute power entrusted by a Parhament to the Executive. Even 
in time of war there were limits to the free action of the Government. This 
time the only limit set to the absolutism of the Government is the duty to 
report before March 31, 1924 - a vague and ineffectual limit, as Parhament 
will not be called to give a vote on such a report. 
The renunciation by Parliament of ah its powers for so long a period 
was received with general cheers by the pubhc. Italians were sick of talkers 
and of weak executives. The general feeling is one of profound distrust to-
wards Parhament. Men would accept a Czar for the sake of getting out of 
101. December 2, 1922, pp. 1032-1033. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: 
"Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham 
Hutton. It is also dated Turin. 
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chaos. In finance this revulsion against politicai talk, abuses, tricks, and so 
on ought to have been a revulsion against bureaucracy. The excessive taxa-
tion, the system of piling tax upon tax, the demagogie persecution of sav-
ings and capital by taxes up to 100 per cent, of income or capital - ali this 
was characteristic of the war and post-war period, when the Chamber was 
never asked to vote on financial bills, but decree followed decree on the 
initiative of the Government. But people who are sick of a given state of 
things frequently seek remedies at the source of the evils of which they 
complain. Oppressed by the absolute rule of an old, ineffectual, compro-
mising, sceptic set of politicians, they hope for redress from another set 
of politicians, young, energetic, full of vigour and of patriotism. True, there 
was little to hope for from the dying Chamber. Moreover, most of the new 
Ministers are capable men, truly desirous of doing well. Signor De Stefani, 
Minister of Finance, has not announced a big programme, as did several of 
his predecessors, who went out of office with nothing done. He is profes-
sor of politicai economy at the Venice High School of Commerce, and has 
declared his intention of simplifying and consolidating taxes, increasing 
their yield not by putting rates up, but by prosecuting defaulters. If new 
taxes must be imposed, for every penny of new taxes a corresponding sav-
ing ought to be made in the public expenditure. His only definite disclo-
sure was that the succession tax is to be reduced. It was high time that from 
the Government bench a voice should be raised against the frenzied fi-
nance of the Bolshevist after-armistice period. A few examples will suffice 
to give an idea of what this system meant: 
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On top of this there was a) a tax of 0.75 per cent, on the land and 
houses included in the inheritance. b) A tax of 6 per cent., 9.60 per cent., 
and 12 per cent, of the heritage, when it falls to an heir or legatee, not the 
son, husband, or wife of the deceased, who receives more than 200,000 
lire, and is possessed in his own right of an estate of more than 200,000, 
400,000, and 600,000 hre respectively. When the maximum rate of 90 
per cent, is due from a second cousin, and the rules under a) and b) are 
working at their maximum, the inheritance is subject to a rate of 102.75 
per cent., which is manifestly unthinkable. Moreover c) if the estate is sub-
ject to a life interest, the remainder-man is bound to pay the succession tax 
at once on the half of the full value if the usufructuary is under 50 years of 
age, and on three-fourths is over 50. If, as frequently happens, a husband 
without sons makes his wife a life-usufructuary, and leaves the estate to a 
nephew or a cousin, the tax to be paid at once swallows up, with the ac-
crued interests on the tax, the whole value of the succession. Therefore, 
latterly many heirs have been compelled to refuse to take advantage of 
wills in their favour. d) There is added to the estate 7.10 per cent, of the 
gross sum - before deduction of the debts - for jewels and furniture; e) 
funeral and other expenses are deducted at the rate of 1 per cent, on an 
estate from 10,000 to 100,000 lire, and of 0.50 per cent, from 100,000 
lire upward; f) debts are deducted only when hearing a certain publicly 
registered date. Most debts are therefore not recognised as such, and 
the heirs have to pay the tax on them. Such was the old system. The an-
nouncement made by Signor De Stefani that the Government intends to 
reduce rates ali round was greeted with relief by many families, me-
naced with ruin. 
On new taxes Signor De Stefani spoke cautiously. He seemed to be fa-
vourable to a new excise capable of bringing into the tax-gatherers' net the 
great masses of agricultural and industriai workers, who are not subject to 
any direct tax on income. Except for the higher classes of workers, whose 
wages are over 25 hre per day, direct taxation is practically impossible; the 
only substitute is an excise. Wine is already taxed at the rate of 20 hre the 
hectohtre. As the internai price is over 200 hre, a higher rate would not be 
unbearable. There is much talk of the re-estabhshment of the flour tax, but 
the old flour tax (macinato) has left so bad a record that it is doubtful if 
even a strong Government dare reimpose it. 
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102. 
ITALY 
PUBLIC ECONOMIES - T H E TASK OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RAILWAY 
COMMISSIONER - REDUCTION OF THE DUTY ON FLOUR - COST OF LLVING 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, December 31 
The Mussolini Government is working in earnest. The last meeting of 
the Cabinet produced a wholesale disbandment of committees and consul-
tative councils created from time to time to give counsels to the Ministry of 
Agriculture; 21 committees with 332 members being abolished at one 
stroke. At the same meeting the Minister for Public Education reduced 
the total number of employees in his department from 1898 to 1159. 
An experiment which will be watched with the utmost interest is the 
appointment of Mr Edward Torre, M. P., to the newly created post of Ex-
traordinary Commissioner for State Railways. A medicai man and a Fascist, 
Mr Torre is said to possess the will and the power to restore order in the 
railway administration, whose officiai deficit in 1921-1922 was upwards of 
1,200 million lire, and whose true deficit, taking into account ali expenses 
and losses borne by other departments, may be calculated to reach 1,600 
millions lire. The commissioner will have ali the powers of the dissolved 
Executive Railway Council. It is said that Mr Torre is determined to dis-
miss 50,000 railwaymen, and truly nothing short of such a drastic measure 
can save the railway budget. The increase in the number of railwaymen was 
as follows after the war: 
1913-14 1921-22 Increase % 
Clerks 16,713 18,054 8 
Stations 39,485 61,531 56 
Trains 11,748 22,750 94 
Locomotives 11,245 19,278 71 
Miscellaneous 68,098 82,812 21 
Total 147,289 204,425 39 
102. January 13, 1923, pp. 62-63. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Economies in public expenses. The task of the extraordinary railway commissioner. Re-
duction of the duty on flour. Cost of living", dated "Turin, December 30, 1922", is kept in the 
Einaudi archives. 
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While the number of men employed increased, the work done dimin-
ished. Train-kilometers diminished from 153.7 millions in 1913-14 to 129.5 
in 1921-22. The average number of hours worked by a man in the year var-
ied as follows: 
1913-14 1920-21 Decrease % 
Stations 3,423 2,192 36 
Trains 3,498 2,160 38 
Locomotives 3,030 2,112 30 
General workshops 3,220 2,040 37 
Locomotive workshops .... 2,790 1,992 29 
An application of the policy of the eight hours' day, and of the weekly 
rest, by which the hours of effective work done were sometimes reduced to 
two or three hours a day, is largely responsible for this lamentable state of 
affairs; but lack of discipline contributed no less to it. 
The average number of days of sickness increased, per year and per 
man, as follows: 
1913-14 1921-22 Increase % 
Stations 13 19 46 
Trains 14 22 57 
Locomotives 20 25 25 
General workshops 21 43 105 
Locomotive workshops .... 21 43 105 
Free-trade ideas are making some progress in Italy. The newly consti-
tuted group has published in the Riforma Sociale of Turin, which is its pro-
visionai organ, a long analysis of the new tariff of July 1, 1921, by Signor 
Repaci, who calculates the increase in the weight of general duties to be 
from 100 per cent, to 184 per cent. But the variations are extreme, and 
many examples are quoted of extraordinary and even ludicrous protection. 
One of the first acts of Signor De Stefani, the new Minister of Finance, has 
been the reduction from 11.50 to 4 gold hre per quintal of the duty on 
flour. The story of this duty provides an interesting example of the by-ways 
of protection. When foreign wheat was dutiable at 7.50 gold hre per quin-
tal, flour was also dutiable at 11.50 gold hre. The duty on flour gave a pro-
tection to milling industry, as 10 gold lire would have sufficed to counter-
balance the duty of 7.50 on wheat. During the war both duties were sus-
pended, but it seems that, as from July 1, 1921, the duty on flour was ta-
citly re-estabhshed at the old figure of 11.50, while the duty on wheat 
remained in suspense. From this odd mistake the protection to the milling 
industry was raised from 11.50 less 10 (equivalent of the 7.50 duty on 
wheat) to the whole amount of 11.50 gold hre. Signor De Stefani, while 
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maintaining the free importation of wheat, reduced the duty on flour to 
4 lire. It should have been reduced to 1.50, but the tentative step is a 
good one. Millers are clamouring that they did not avail themselves of 
the protection, but the possibility was there, and in some cases was 
exploited. 
The cost of living in recent months has been slowly increasing. The index 
number of the cost of living for a working man's family of five has varied thus: 
Turin Milan Florence Rome 
First half of 1914 .... 100 100 100 100 
January, 1920 .... 318-5 302-6 323-5 263-4 
March, 1921 .... 472-2 472-1 517-7 384-5 
Aprii, " .... 470-4 491-8 521-9 410-9 
May, " .... 455-7 507-9 523-1 395-8 
July, " .... 404-7 465-8 450-8 387-3 
December, .... 470-9 496-4 532 422-5 
Aprii, 1922 .... 424-5 450-2 475 420-3 
May, " .... 428-1 450-9 476 426-6 
June, " .... 435-1 454-8 473 425-4 
July, " .... 436-9 460-4 478 428-9 
August, " .... 438-4 464-8 473 430-9 
September, .... 457-8 469-9 479 437 
October, " .... 462-4 471-9 506 444 
November, " .... 465-3 - - -
The maximum was reached between March and May, 1921. Some sub-
stantial declines took place in the summer of 1921 and the spring of 1922. 
But after the middle of the year the tide was again rising. Perhaps the im-
provement in the foreign exchanges will have a favourable influence on the 
December and January figures. 
103. 
ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS 
By an Italian Correspondent 
At the Cabinet Council's meeting of yesterday Signor Mussolini gave a 
formai denial to rumours of a project of a Continental bloc against Anglo-
103. January 20, 1923, pp. 88-89. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Leading 
articles". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, unentitled 
but dated "Rome, January 16", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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Saxon countries. "The bloc", said the Premier, "simply does not exist. The 
Italian Government never made such a proposai, and never planned a 
French-Italian-German coalition against Great Britain. The importance 
which Great Britain has in the economic life of the European Continent 
would alone have forbidden this pian, to say nothing of the special rela-
tions between Great Britain and Italy". There is thus an end to the wild 
talk which had been current for some days in the Italian and foreign Press 
about a resurrection of the ill-fated Napoleonic pian of a Continental bloc 
against England. 
The interesting point is, however, whether there exist in Italy under-
currents of public opinion which warrant such a pian being spoken of. 
It would be useless to deny that, if the reception of the pian was far from 
enthusiastic, it met with a degree of favour in some sections of the Press, 
which in the common interest of England and Italy should not be ignored. 
The first undercurrent is the old pro-German feeling, which was in 
1914 and 1915 favourable first to war on the German side and afterwards 
to neutrality. Even the most obdurate pro-Germans were converted by the 
spectacular fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which would not have 
been possible without the defeat of Germany. But, now that Italy has 
reached her naturai boundaries to the Northern Alps, a feeling is becoming 
vocal that Germany was, after ali, a great market for several agricultural 
products of Italian soil, and that this market will never be recovered till 
Germany herself is once again producing and consuming in full swing. 
On the other side, Germany was our greatest supplier of machinery, 
chemicals, and industriai products, and many consumers are identifying 
old days of cheaphess with the steady flow of cheap German goods. France 
and England have not taken the place, as buyers and sellers of Germany. 
Italian producers are complaining bitterly against British duties on motor-
cars, 33 per cent, on key industries products, and similar hindrances to our 
export. Perhaps British duties are not so bad as is said, especially when 
their action is wholly or partiahy suspended in virtue of existing treaties. 
But they have, nevertheless, done an enormous harm, and have furnished 
an eagerly seized weapon to the Italian Protectionists. England is said to be 
preaching Free-trade to other peoples, but practising rampant Protection 
at home against foreign imports. The Italian ultra-Protectionist tariff of 
July 1, 1922, was justified, therefore, on the score of British Protection. 
As in other countries, faith in the economic future of Germany was so 
strong in those circles which admired German thoroughness, system, 
strong government, plodding, industry, and inventiveness, that a large vo-
lume of marks was bought when the exchange was not unreasonably low. 
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Warnings were in vain. It seemed impossible to people believing in the 
economie future of Germany that marks should not recover also. When 
the mark collapsed and got every day worse, it was not ascribed to the fee-
ble financial policy of the German Government, but the responsibility was 
put on the shoulders of France, England, and the United States. Among 
some mark speculators the fall of the mark was attributed to a sort of con-
spiracy among gold countries, and as the frane could not be accused of fat-
tening at the expense of the German mark it was, in some mysterious way, 
made out to be the fault of sterling and of the dollar. 
Pre-war theories on old and new, rich and poor, nations were again in 
favour. Before the war it was a favourite doctrine with nationalists that 
new, rising nations, with a high birth rate, with an expanding emigration, 
with an incipient and growing wealth, such as Germany, Italy, Russia and 
Japan, were called to high destinies, to conquer territories, to become 
world-Powers. They would encounter the jealousy and the bitter opposi-
tion of old-established nations such as France and Great Britain, with great 
accumulated wealth, with a low or lowering birth rate, with territories ex-
ceeding the possibilities of the native population. The war of new and ris-
ing nations against old and stationary was the outeome of this theory, 
which was, even in pre-war times, erroneous both historically and econom-
ically; and events have demonstrated that in the world war so-called new 
and old countries fought side by side. 
The theory is being resuscitated in a new form; countries to whom the 
war has given a heritage of debts should show a united front against cred-
itor countries. And as the Continental powers, victors and beaten alike, are 
groaning under the weight of debts, of Budget deficits, and of devaluated 
paper money, they should unite themselves against the predominance of 
the creditor gold countries. These are nebulous conceptions indeed; but, 
unfortunately, the popular mind is apt to be caught by shibboleths; and 
it was unfortunate that at the last Paris Conference there crept out sud-
denly, without previous discussion, the question of the French and Italian 
gold sent during the war to London, and thence shipped to the United 
States for the sake of the so-called "pegging of the exchanges" operation. 
The 420 millions of gold-lire sent from the Italian Banks of Issue to Lon-
don was seized upon as a proof of a determined British policy of depriving 
Italy of her last remnants of gold. I do not know what were the exact terms 
of the transaction, as they have never been officially published in full in 
Italy; but I do know that the pegging of the exchanges was not an unmixed 
good as a means of maintaining the price of the pound sterling at about 37 
lire. The operation was cosdy; and no one would begrudge the cost if the 
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results achieved had been good. But the public debt incurred by the Italian 
Government stili remains, and no one can predict at what rate of exchange 
it will be, if ever, repaid; so that, from the exchequer point of view, the 
operation is not yet closed. As to private Italian purchases of foreign goods 
made at 37 or thereabouts, if they were closed with payment at that rate, 
they were good for the private Italian purchasers who bought exchange at 
the low artificial price at the expense of the Italian exchequer. But many 
payments were left in suspense by purchasers who hoped to buy exchange 
at a stili lower price, and many losses were incurred when the peg was re-
moved and exchanges rose to 100 and over. 
If you add that in Italy at the present time nationalism is in the ascen-
dane and nationalism means colonialism and accusations against Allied 
Powers who made vast colonial acquisitions in Africa, Mesopotamia, Ocea-
nia, and left nothing to Italy, you will have an almost complete picture of 
the causes which are unmistakably swinging the pendulum of Italian pubhc 
opinion against the Allies. 
The movement however is, as yet, superficial, and has an academic 
tinge. As Mussolini's pronouncements show, responsible statesmen are 
cautious, and do not favour a fundamental change of our policy. Editors 
of leading newspapers examined in a very criticai spirit the Continental 
bloc pian, when it was first rumoured. It has been, from 1860 onwards, 
a fundamental principle of Italian foreign policy to maintain friendly rela-
tions with Great Britain. Both nations have the same interest -i.e., not to 
let Europe become the prey of a paramount Power, be it called Napoleonic 
Empire or Hohenzollern Germany. A paramount Power is alike distasteful 
to Great Britain and Italy. Both have to fear much, the first for the conti-
nuity of her world power, the second for her national independence from 
such a European ascendency. The equilibrium of the various European 
Powers was destroyed by the world war, and is bound to be re-estabhshed 
by some means or other. Italy will work with England if such an end is in 
sight. But she needs to be previously freed from economic fetters. 
The position of Italy as to reparations is somewhat different from Fran-
ce's position. France needs a certain amount of reparation in addition to a 
clear slate in the matter of inter-Allied debts. Italy needs, first and fore-
most, the cancellation of State debts to Great Britain and United States. 
Once this matter can be righted, Italy will very easily give her assent to a 
pian which should gready decrease Germany's obligations. Italians always 
looked on their share of German reparations with the utmost scepticism. It 
will not cost much to them to make renunciations in this matter. But they 
are sorely grieved at the thought of being debtors for 22 or 23 billions of 
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gold lire to peoples who were our allies in a common fight for world lib-
erty. If other grievances are sectional, academic and superficial, this one 
grievance is strongly felt by ali classes. Italians do not appreciate the game 
of give and take in this matter. The only policy which would disperse the 
clouds which have been allowed to accumulate on the British-Italian sky is 
a straightforward cancellation of war debts. Nothing short of this will sa-
tisfy average public opinion in Italy. Italians know that they have powerful 
allies who in England have embraced the cause of the complete cancella-
tion of public debts. 
104. 
ITALY 
RESTRICTION OF RENTS TO END -
FOREIGN TRADE: GREAT BRITAIN'S SHARE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 29 
There is probably no Italian family whose daily talk is not about house 
rents. This is the universal topic of discussion. By a Royal legislative decree 
of January 7, 1923, Signor Mussolini attempted to cut the Gordian knot 
which had grown about the Restriction of Rents Acts. A recent decree 
of October 23, 1922, the last days of the Facta Government, had pro-
longed for a year from July 1, 1923, to June, 1924, the war Restriction 
of Rents Acts, with fixed increases uniform ali over the country. After June 
30, 1924, till June 30, 1926, rents were to be determined, in case of dis-
agreement, by an arbitration court. After June 30, 1926, absolute freedom 
was to return. 
Public opinion interpreted the Facta-Alessio decree in the sense that after 
the first year a new lease of life would be conceded to the restriction system, 
and so on indefinitely. Nobody was troubled about the prospect of restitution 
104 February 3, 1923, p. 211. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, 
entided "Restriction of rent acts and their abolition. House rents fixed by arbitration. Trade 
relations between Great Britain and Italy", dated "Turin, January 29", is kept in the Emaudi 
archives. 
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of freedom to house landlors. The decree of January 7th, by the Mussolini 
Government, took the country by surprise. This decree provided that the re-
striction system was to be abolished at once, as from July 1, 1923. 
Freedom of contract was the only remedy to the numerous grievances 
which had arisen out of the restrictions; uneconomic rents much below the 
market level; ruin of landlords crushed between fixed rents and high ex-
penses; lack of encouragement to building; the retention of large flats by 
small famihes who could not move to other quarters owing to the absolute 
impossibility of finding vacant houses; the tragic position of new famihes of 
pubhc employees and other people obliged to move by reason of their un-
employment from town to town, &c. The new freedom is, however, not to 
be an absolute one. For an intermediate period of three years, from July 1, 
1923, to June, 1926, the rents, in case of disagreement, will be fixed by an 
arbitration court of three members, a landlord, a tenant, and a judiciary 
umpire as president. Signor Mussohni solemnly admonished landlords 
not to abuse their restored freedom, as, in the event of excessive increases, 
restrictions would be re-estabhshed. In many cities general agreements 
have taken place between unions of landlords and tenants. For instance, 
at Turin the two unions agreed to recommend that, taking as a basis the 
rents paid in 1914, rents up to 1,000 hre per year should be increased 
70 per cent, for yearly leases and 120 per cent, for three-year leases. Rents 
from 1,001 to 1,600 lire to be increased respectively 80 and 130 per cent, 
for one and three years' leases; rents from 1,601 to 2,400 to be increased 
100 and 150 per cent.; rents from 2,401 to 4,000 respectively 130 and 
220 per cent. Rents above 4,000 to be freely discussed by two parties with-
out any general recommendations. Ah over Italy agreements more or less 
similar are taking place. It will be very interesting to fohow the results of 
the courageous experiment made by the Government. Just as Signor Gio-
htti had the courage to abohsh the ruinous bread subsidy which caused a 
loss of billions yearly and doomed the lira to the fate of the mark, and was 
not afraid to incur unpopularity among the Socialist masses on that score, 
so Signor Mussohni has not hesitated to arouse discontent among the 
working and the middle classes by the abolition of Restriction of Rents 
Acts. He paved the way to complete freedom by the method of the arbi-
tration courts; but, none the less, his decision is bold and creditable. 
The pubhcation of statistics of foreign commerce is belated in Italy. 
The latest volume pubhshed refers to June, 1922, and from this volume 
we can extract the following figures on the direction of trade for five prin-
cipal countries. The figures for Germany are exclusive of Reparation pay-
ments: 
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Millions of Lire 
First Half % of the Total Whole Year Whole Year Whole Year First Half 
of 1922 Trade 1913 1919 1920 1921 
Imports from: % % % 8-4 
% 6-0 
France 537 0 6-9 7-8 4-6 
Germany 609-1 7-9 16-8 0-5 5-2 6-9 
Switzerland 134-5 1-7 2-4 2-2 2-1 1-4 
Great Britain .. 969-7 12-5 16-2 14-7 14-9 9-8 
United States .. 2,164-7 27-9 14-3 44-2 30-2 38-3 
Exports to: 
5-7 10-3 France 671-2 16-0 9-2 23 1 
Germany 508-1 12-1 13-7 1-4 4-9 8-0 
Switzerland 532-4 12-7 9-9 13-0 11-6 11-0 
Great Britain .. 510-7 12-2 10-4 12-7 11-3 7-9 
United States .. 378-1 9-0 10-7 10-4 8-4 12-9 
On the import side, the share of the United States, though less than 
during the war, is greatly in excess of the pre-war share. Germany has 
not yet recovered her 1913 position. Great Britain is sending us less, espe-
cially coal. On the export side, we have almost recovered the old position 
in the German markets; France, Switzerland, and Great Britain are better 
customers for us, while the United States have put up high walls against 
our exports. 
It is very unfortunate that Great Britain has abandoned the good prac-
tice of admitting our goods free, and is subjecting herself to obloquy by 
Safeguarding of Industries Acts and other protectionist measures, which 
are daily quoted by our protectionists as a proof that Great Britain is 
greatly obstructing our export trade. 
105. 
ITALY 
FOREIGN TRADE. - For the first eight months of 1922 Italy's imports 
were valued at 9,928.5 million lire and exports at 5,572.4 million lire, leav-
ing an import excess of 4,356.1 million lire. This balance was smaller than 
105. February 17, 1923, pp. 326-327. The article, unsigned, was published in the supplement: 
The Economist. Commercial History & Review of 1922. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain 
because the originai manuscript, without title and date, is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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that for the corresponding period of 1921, which was 5,292 million hre. Of 
the imports last year wheat accounted for about one-third. 
CROPS. - Generally speaking, crops were not so large as in 1921, 
Northern Italy in particular suffering from drought. Wheat production 
was 43.7 million quintals against 52.5 million quintals in 1921, corn 18.0 
million quintals against 23.5 million quintals, but grapes, with 53 million 
quintals against 50 million quintals, were better than in 1921. 
INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT. - Industriai production was not inter-
rupted by strikes. The silk industry, favoured by a good crop of cocoons 
(311,000 quintals against 309,000 quintals in 1921), had a good season, ex-
cept for the last two months, when the foreign markets were bad. Cotton 
and wool had a good year. Idle spindles were estimated at 10-12 per cent, 
in the first half-year, and decreased to 6 per cent, in the autumn. Sugar 
produced was 2,600,000 quintals against 2,030,000 quintals in 1921. Very 
good profits were reaped by the milling industry. Sulphur, iron and steel, 
chemicals, and shipbuilding had a bad year, owing to American competi-
tion in sulphur, low freights for ships, and the cessation of war demands 
for iron, steel, and chemicals. Unemployment has been declining during 
the past year. The officiai figure of the total number of unemployed was 
541,775 in January and 354,238 in December. The number of strikes 
was the lowest since 1900. The labour market was not eased to an appreci-
able extent by emigration. Transoceanic emigrants were 31,291 in the first 
half-year against 122,390 in the corresponding period of 1921. Emigrants 
to European countries were 61,293 against 28,424 in 1921. Wages have 
been lowered. 
PRICES. - Prices were lower than in 1921. Bachi'S Index Number shows 
an almost continuous decrease up to May, 1922, when the total was 83.8 
per cent, of the average for 1921. At this point reaction set in, and in Oc-
tober the maximum level of 96.2 was reached. The decline in foreign ex-
changes following the formation of the Fascist Government exercised a fa-
vourable influence on prices, which closed at 92.8. Textiles, minerals, 
metals, and chemicals were below the average, while food and meat 
went down. 
EXCHANGES. - The average price of the dollar started at 23 hre in Jan-
uary, decreased to 18.7 hre in Aprii, increasing afterwards in October to 24 
hre, owing to the combined influence of the autumnal pressure and politi-
cai unrest. With the usuai easing of foreign purchases and the better poli-
ticai outlook dollars went down afterwards to 19.9 hre. The curve was not 
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differently shaped in the case of London and Swiss exchanges; but Paris 
cheque was naturally influenced by the vagaries of the frane. Starting from 
the maximum of 187.1 hre for 100 francs in January, the exchanges oscil-
lated between 180.2 hre and 172.5 lire till October. In November the quo-
tation fell abruptly to 151 lire, and in December to 143.7 lire. To-day, ow-
ing to Ruhr affair, the frane is even lower. 
MONEY AND STOCKS. - The officiai Bank rate was reduced on July l l t h 
from 6 to 5V2 per cent. The volume of payments passing was less than in 
preceding years. The clearings at the Italian clearing-houses, which in 
1921 had a maximum of 63,672 million lire in January and a minimum 
of 49,639 million hre in July, had in 1922 a maximum of 69,978 million 
lire in November and a minimum of 40,820 million lire in September. 
The paper circulation was 21,476 million lire at December 31, 1921, 
and was gradually reduced during 1922 till at November 10th it amounted 
to 20,479 million hre. 
The improvement in stock exchange quotations is an index of in-
creased hopes in the future of the country. The 3V2 per cent. Rentes re-
mained stationary between 71.93 and 71.65 in the first ten months of 
the year, but rose suddenly to 77.58 in November and 77.96 in December. 
In the variable dividend hearing securities market the tide was also rising. 
Taking as a basis (100) the average of prices for December, 1921, the index 
number of 135 leading securities (with an issued capital of 6,893 million 
hre) was 96.61 in January, decreased to 88.43 in Aprii, rose to 103.01 in 
August, to 11.94 in November and 112.91 in December. Prices are, how-
ever, as yet at a lower level than in December, 1918. Taking that level as 
100, the index was 63.84 in December, 1921, and 72.08 in December, 
1922. 
PUBLIC FINANCE. - Pubhc finance is slowly improving. The figures for 
the three last budgets are as follows: 
Pubhc internai debt, which was 88,423 million paper hre at October 
31, 1921, rose to 92,997 million paper hre at October 31, 1922, and was 
probably about 95,000 million paper hre at end of the year. External debt 
(In Millions of Lire) 
Expenditure Revenue Deficit 
1920-21 
1921-22 (about) 
1922-23 (estimated) 
36,229 18,820 17,409 
26,000 18,000 8,000 
23,000 18,000 5,000 
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(to Great Britain and United States) at October 31, 1922, was 21,811 mil-
lion gold lire. The decrease in the budget deficit, which has been rapid in 
the last three years, is bound to continue, though perhaps somewhat more 
slowly. The last billion of deficit will be the hardest to cancel. 
106. 
ITALY 
SHIPPING SUBSIDIES - FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SHIPYARDS -
PUBLIC REVENUE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 27 
Two Royal Decrees have been issued this month regulating shipping 
services and shipbuildings, two main causes of huge after-war expenses 
to the Treasury. Before the war shipping services cost the Italian Exche-
quer in subsidies 25,980,400 lire for annual voyages of 3,920,469 miles; 
to which were to be added an annual subsidy to the "Neerland" Company 
for a bi-monthly cali at Genoa of one of its regular lines. The Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy paid a subsidy of 13,803,630 kronen to companies now 
Italianised for a total yearly mileage of 3,760,232. The rise of costs during 
the war threatened to bankrupt ali the companies; so that, after various ex-
periments, the State requisitioned subsidised ships, paid ali expenses, and 
received ali freights. Companies became mere agents for Exchequer ac-
count, and received, in addition to the reimbursement of the current actual 
expenses, a percentage from 10 to 17 per cent, of freights and other 
revenue. Although the companies were thus interested in increasing 
revenues, expenses soon greatly exceeded receipts. The last two financial 
years closed thus: 
106. March 10,1923, pp. 544-545. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. Moreover, the treatment of the argument bears strong similarities with some of 
Einaudi's articles in II Corriere della Sera (February 10 and March 25, 1923) entitled "Il decreto 
sui cantieri navali" and "Otto mesi di entrate pubbliche". 
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1920-21 1921-22 
Mileage Loss Miln. Lire Mileage Loss Miln. Lire 
Italian services 1,486,905 148-1 1,984,161 177-5 
Ex Austro-Hungarian services ... 1,387,066 1250 1,813,919 121-3 
Total 2,873,971 273 1 3,798,080 298-8 
For the current financial year 1922-23 the loss was estimated at 160 
million lire for Italian services, and 140 for ex-Austro-Hungarian services, 
making a total loss of 300 million lire. The late Cabinet had made plans for 
returning to the old system of definite subsidies; the present Cabinet has 
carried this out. In virtue of agreements with the several companies (18 
in ali), the State will pay, as from January 1, 1923, an annual total subsidy 
of 147,290,000 lire for a total mileage of 3,522,820 miles. Of these 
2,029,802 miles are said to relate to lines between the Continent and Italian 
Isles and colonies and other similar postai lines, while 1,493,018 miles re-
late to commerce. It is very difficult to say whether the cost to the Exche-
quer, especially of the commercial lines (postai lines are naturally to be run 
at loss), will be compensated by indirect advantages to the public. Where 
figures hearing on the question are available they make us doubtful. On the 
Genoa-Bombay line passengers were 3,478 in 1910-11, and after going to a 
maximum of 5,484 in 1912-13 relapsed to 3,014 in 1920-21. Goods carried 
at the same dates were 53,214, 63,290, and 41,355 tons. Not very good fig-
ures for justifying the huge subsidy paid by the State for the apparent pur-
pose of promoting trade between Italy and India. 
Another Decree regulates the difficult matter of encouragement to 
shipbuilding. Before the war there existed in Italy 10 shipyards, with a 
maximum building productivity of 80,000 tons yearly. The union of new 
provinces (Trieste and Istria and Litoral) added to this number six ex-Aus-
tro-Hungarian shipyards, some of them very good. Unfortunately, the 
after-war fever and some injudicious encouragement given by the Govern-
ment added to the said number 11 other new shipyards. The productivity 
of ali these old and new shipyards together can be now estimated at 
250,000 tons yearly. The offer of new ships is thus much in excess of 
the maximum demand on the part of Italian shipowners, which, including 
demand from abroad, is well below 200,000 tons. 
The new Decree has the great merit of not having accepted the request 
made by some shipyards, that the Government should order directly new 
ships for its own account, and should order them proportionately to the 
productivity of the shipyards, so that ali could remain in existence. This 
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would have been the best way of continuing the present unsafe state of 
things, as ah 27 shipyards would have survived. As 27 are too many, some 
of them are bound to be dismantled. The sooner this happens the better. 
But the Decree has not accepted the conclusions of a Naval Engineering 
Congress held at Genoa in the last days of December, which were in favour 
of the unlimited freedom of import of ali material for shipbuilding. The 
Genoa meeting held that Italian shipyards would be capable in the main 
of meeting the competition of British or other foreign shipyards, if only 
they were enabled to buy materials in the best market. The Government 
apparently was not persuaded that this was the case as yet. After July, 
1926, freedom will be granted to ah imports needed for building ships, 
and at the same date premiums and other encouragements will cease. 
But for the intermediate period an intermediate system is to be maintained. 
Freedom of imports is only granted to metallic materials needed for the 
hulls of the ships, up to a maximum of 480 kilograms for every gross 
ton of ships. If, however, shipbuilders buy the same materials on the inter-
nai market, they will receive a premium of 120 gold hre per ton of material. 
As compensation for the higher cost of building in Italy, as compared with 
foreign countries, a premium of 55 gold hre is granted for every gross ton 
and for metallic hulls. If hulls are to be made in cement the premium is of 
20 gold hre; if in wood of 15 gold hre. Exemption from the income-tax is 
granted for five years to ah ships coming into effective navigation not later 
than December 31, 1923. The period of exemption is reduced to three 
years if ships enter into effective navigation as from January 1, 1924, to De-
cember 30, 1926. Special regulations are enacted for minor points. These 
grants will cost to the Exchequer 34,700,000 hre in the financial year 1922-
23, 42,700,000 lire in 1923-24, and in 1924-25, and 29,900,000 in 1925-26. 
That pubhc revenue is stationary is the first impression made by figures 
of the first seven months of the financial year 1922-23, from July, 1922, to 
January, 1923: 
(In Millions of Lire) 
1921-22 1922-23 Inc. or Dee. 
Income and capital direct taxes .. 2,398-6 2,216-4 - 182-2 
Stamp and registration taxes 1,497-4 1,422-1 -75 -3 
Excises 1,330-0 1,537-5 + 207-5 
Monopolies .. 1,768-5 1,812-4 + 43-9 
Lottery 105-7 138-7 + 33-0 
Total .. 7,100-2 7,127-1 + 26-9 
But the figures, if jusdy interpreted, teli a more encouraging tale. De-
creases in the yield of the income and stamp and registration taxes are due 
to transient reasons. In the income-tax category the decrease of 182.4 mil-
APRIL, 1923 
lions lire is the net result of a decrease of 435.6 millions lire in the war-
profit tax yield, and of an increase of 253.4 millions hre in the various 
permanent taxes on incomes. That the war profit tax yield is gradually 
disappearing is naturai, but that other income-taxes give so much more 
is an encouraging fact in view of the difficult economic period through 
which Italy, as other countries, is passing. The decrease of 75.3 millions 
lire in the yield of stamp and registration taxes is also the net result of a 
huge decrease of 151.5 millions hre in the stamp tax on bank of issue cir-
culation, and a rise of 76.2 millions hre in ah other stamp and registration 
duties. As a rise in the stamp tax on currency can only be the result of 
inflation, so the decrease is the result of deflation. So far the deflation 
is limited to one or two billions of lire, but none the less it is a gratifying 
fact, and therefore the corresponding decrease in the revenue is to be re-
garded also without regret. 
107. 
ITALY 
WHOLESALE PRICES - COST OF LIVING - STABILISATION OF THE LIRA -
ABOLITION OF OBSTRUCTIVE TAXES AND A NEW TAX ON TURNOVER -
HOTEL AND RESTAURANT TAXES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, March 27 
Professor Bachi's index number of wholesale prices, calculated on the 
basis of 1920's prices (100), has settled down in recent months. (See table 
at p. 284). 
In this series a seasonal movement of prices is evident, which corre-
sponds closely to the usuai strengthening of foreign exchanges in the au-
tumn and decreases in the paper cost of purchasing foreign goods in the 
spring months. It seems, however, that the worst point was in the autumn 
of 1920, when Italy was on the brink of a Bolshevist experiment. In recent 
months the general index would have been better if the Ruhr affairs had 
107. Aprii 14, 1923, p. 789. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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Nov., June, Oct., May, Oct., Jan., Feb., 
1920 1921 1921 1922 1922 1923 1923 
Vegetable foods 107-7 97 0 115-8 106-3 112-9 109-4 109-1 
Animals 124 1 100-5 128-5 93-9 113-5 108-4 107-8 
Chemicals 107-7 63-4 74-6 67-3 72-1 69-3 69-8 
Textiles 94-0 45-8 75-6 65-7 84-6 80-8 83 0 
Minerals and metals 101-4 60-4 64 1 57-5 69-1 62-5 64-3 
Building materials 112-6 101-6 90-9 78-5 86-3 87-5 86 1 
Miscellaneous vegetables 108-7 95 0 114-4 96-4 123-6 124-7 129-9 
Miscellaneous 105-2 90-4 94-2 87-9 96-0 98-8 92-3 
General index 107-3 81-5 95-9 83-3 96-2 96-2 93-2 
not exercised an evil influence on the exchanges, and textiles had not gone 
up, according to a general world tendency. If the lira has not followed 
more stricdy the vagaries of the French frane, the cause may He in the in-
creased hope that the public budget will balance, and that sales will be 
made of balances held by Italian business men in foreign centres. Not a 
few heads of trading firms used to hold balances in sterling or dollars as 
insurance against the risk of great and sudden increases in foreign ex-
changes. To-day they may hope that the lira will go on improving, and, 
by their realisations of balances, co-operate to keep down exchanges in 
face of the threatening international situation. 
Retail prices and the cost of living are somewhat slow in following 
wholesale price variations. The cost of living of a working family of two 
parents and three sons (on the basis of the first half of 1914=100) is calcu-
lated as follows in Turin: 
Food Clothing " f u s e Heat & M i s c e U a n e o u s General 
6 Rent Light Index 
January, 1920 351 327 100 406 344 318 
Aprii, 1921 534 497 110 417 544 470 
July, " 446 411 110 354 537 405 
January, 1922 524 454 120 435 591 466 
Aprii, " 470 433 120 378 587 424 
November, " 531 437 120 411 578 465 
December, " 517 437 120 416 578 457 
January, 1923 499 433 120 423 574 446 
February, " 484 435 120 428 574 438 
We may observe here the same tendency towards maximum in the win-
ter and minimum in summer and spring months. The average increase in 
the cost of living corresponds closely with the depreciation of the lira in 
gold; and as the gold has been depreciated itself, it seems that the purchas-
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ing power of the lira is better in Italy than in foreign countries. When the 
July figures are forthcoming the house rent item will rise abruptly to about 
200, as the new system of rent regulation by arbitration will then begin to 
be applied. 
At the recent meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce held 
at Rome, a renewed proposai by Professor Cassel for the stabilisation of 
exchanges met with a very cool reception by the average public opinion 
in Italy. The motion was shelved under the guise of a vague acceptance 
of the principle. Public opinion in Italy stili clings firmly to the hope that 
in some future day the hra will be restored to the old gold parity. No pro-
posals for fixing the hra at, say, 25 cents gold has the slightest chance of 
being entertained by responsible statesmen or parties, notwithstanding that 
no one is capable of predicting when and how the full restoration to parity 
will be effected, and how it will be possible to overcome the great difficul-
ties which would arise in the balancing of the public Budget and in the dis-
location of industries. Perhaps time will work its own salvation, so that 
when stabilisation has been reached in fact, no one will cavil at a law to 
sanction it. 
Signor De Stefani, Minister of Finance, has taken another step in the 
truly gigantic task of simplifying our complicated tax system. A decree 
of March 18, 1923, abohshes certain taxes: 1) On production of silk tex-
tiles, which was imposed at the rate of 10 per cent, on ali naturai and arti-
ficial silk goods, and greatly hampered the trade and export of this our 
greatest national industry; 2) on sales of gems and gold and silver goods, 
at a progressive rate of 5 to 20 per cent. As gems and gold objects are easily 
smuggled, the tax was scarcely productive, and encouraged the substitu-
tion of secret deals for honest and open commerce; 3) on sales of so-called 
luxury goods, at the rate of 12 per cent, of the price. The high rate of the 
tax favoured collusion between dealer and chents. In its stead, Signor De 
Stefani has enlarged an existing tax of 0.36 per cent, on ah sales of goods 
between producers and dealers, and dealers and dealers. Excepting foods, 
ah goods sold will be subject to a tax every time they change hands. The 
tax is somewhat on the pattern of the French turnover tax, with this differ-
ence, that it will not hit sales direct to final consumers, but only sales be-
tween the originai importer or producer and the last dealer. The tax will be 
at the rate of 0.50 per cent, on the price of raw materials and agricultural 
produce, and of 1 per cent, on ah other products. A select list of a few lux-
ury goods (gems, ivory, motor cars, Orientai carpets, choice furniture, &c.) 
will be taxed at 2 per cent., and in these cases alone the tax will also affect 
the sales direct to final consumers. 
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Foreign travellers in Italy will be interested in another decree published 
on March 18, 1923, concerning taxes on expenditure in hotels and restau-
rants. Ali over Europe travellers are often bewildered at the variety of taxes 
and stamps laid on their hotel expenses and bills. From July 1, 1923, taxes 
will be laid as follow, without additions: Tax on hotels or pensions, 8 per 
cent, for luxury or extra category, 4 per cent, for first and second category, 
0.50 per cent, every other category. Tax on restaurants (single meals): -
Fuxury or extra category, 1 lira for every person, irrespective of amount 
paid; every other category, inclusive of meals at clubs, &c., 20 cents., what-
ever the number of persons, if the amount paid is not higher than 20 lire 
per person; if the sum paid exceed 20 lire, a fixed tax of 20 cents and, in 
addition, 30 cents for every person. 
108. 
I T A L Y 
BANK OF ITALY REPORT - FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE -
FLUCTUATIONS OF NOTE ISSUES AND DISCOUNTS - GOLD RESERVES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 1 
From the report of Signor Stringher to the last ordinary meeting of the 
shareholders of the Bank of Italy one can glean some interesting figures on 
commerce, banking, and finance in Italy. On the adverse foreign trade bai-
ance, which may be calculated at 6,000 million lire yearly, Signor Stringher 
remarks that Italy can only compensate it in the usuai old way of remit-
tances of Italian emigrants and expenses of foreign travellers. These are dif-
ficult to gauge, but remittances from emigrants through the agency of the 
Bank of Naples were in 1920 980,756,000 lire, in 192 1 711,549,000 lire, 
and in 1922 525,688,000 lire. The Bank of Naples handles about a quarter 
of the savings of the emigrants, so that it may be calculated that remittances 
contribute over 2,000 millions to alleviate the annual indebtedness of Italy 
on the score of foreign trade. 
108. May 12, 1923, pp. 999-1000. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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The note issue at the end of the four last half-years was as follows (in 
millions of lire): 
Issued by Banks for the 
Account of the Issued by the Gross 
June 30 1921 9,436-6 8,722-3 18,158-9 2,268-4 20,427-3 
December 31, 1921 .. 10,704-1 8,504-8 19,208-9 2,268-3 21,477-2 
June 30 1922 9,773-9 8,049-1 17,823-0 2,267-0 20,090-0 
December 31, 1922 ,. 9,935-4 8,076-6 18,012-0 2,267-0 20,279-0 
The maximum was reached at the end of 1921, in consequence of the 
collapse of the Banca Italiana di Sconto; and it is easy to see that the 
banking issues on account of the State were not responsible for the rise, 
which was wholly limited to the issues on account of trade. This unfortu-
nate affair retarded for a year a decrease which should have taken place in 
the note circulation. The losses will be borne ultimately by the taxpayers, 
as the Government, by a royal decree of January 2, 1923, agreed that 
three-fourths of the tax on notes issued above a certain limit and not cov-
ered by gold, instead of being paid into the Exchequer, should be paid 
from January 1, 1922, to December 31, 1925, into a special fund, which 
eventually will cover the losses incurred by the banks of issues on Banca 
di Sconto liquidation. An indication of the pressure exercised by these 
extraordinary rediscounts of banking bills may be gathered from the fact 
that the Consortium for industriai-securities, largely an offspring of the 
banks of issues, which rediscounts long-dated bills of industry and trade, 
increased its operations from 1,496 million hre in 1921 to 2,254 millions 
in 1922, and closed the past year with the big sum of 767 million lire in 
loans and discounts; to which were to be added 898 million lire of a spe-
cial section of this same Consortium created for the rediscount of bank-
ing bills. 
The bills discounted by the Bank of Italy increased, therefore, very lar-
gely. The following figures of such bills may give an idea of the extent to 
which bankers and traders had recourse to the aid of our first bank of issue 
(millions of hre): 
November 20, 1921 3,328-9 
December 31, 1921 3,895-8 
January 10, 1922 4,244-3 
Aprii 30, 1922 4,559-8 
June 30, 1922 4,539-1 
October 20, 1922 4,365-3 
November 30, 1922 4,596-2 
December 31, 1922 4,635-3 
March 20, 1923 4,288-6 
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The item of bills discounted by the Bank of Italy, which increased be-
tween November 20, 1921, and Aprii, 1922, by the huge sum of 1,231 mil-
lion lire, has fluctuated since; but at the end of 1922 was at its highest 
point. It is to be hoped that the decrease experienced in the New Year 
may not prove a merely seasonal movement. Loans on securities have done 
better; beginning at 3,669.5 million lire at January 31, 1922, they de-
creased, almost continuously, to 1,955.2 million lire at November 30, 
1922, only to increase to 2,533 millions at December 31, 1922, owing to 
the usuai end-of-the-year necessities. 
While the officiai discount rate remained at 6 per cent, until July 10th, 
and was reduced to 5V2 after that date, the average effective rate of dis-
count applied was 5.55 per cent, in 1922, against 5.83 per cent, in 1921 
and 5.69 in 1920. 
A great deal of interest was aroused in Italy by Signor Stringherà utter-
ance about gold reserves and the war transfer of gold to England. It ap-
pears that the reserves of the Bank of Italy varied thus (in millions of lire): 
December 31, December, 
1915 1922 
G o l d 1,077-4 883-9 
S i l v e r : 104-8 75-8 
Gold credits on foreign countries 48-1 320-1 
Various 27-9 9 6 
1,258-2 1,289-4 
Deposit of gold in foreign countries' certificates 73-7 381-4 
1,331-9 1,670-8 
It was always the custom of the Bank of Italy to hold a part of its gold 
reserve under the form of gold credits on first-rate foreign banks. It was a 
sort of informai gold exchange system, and was useful, in old times, for the 
regulation of exchanges. But the item of "deposit of gold certificates" has 
to-day a wholly different signification. This sum of 381.4 million lire is a 
part of a greater sum of 562.3 million lire which the Italian Government 
deposited in London, at the request of British Government, for the sake 
of pegging the sterling exchanges in the common interest of the Allies. This 
is the sum which the British Premier proposed at Paris should pass to the 
British Treasury in part compensation of the cancellation of the Italian 
debt to Great Britain. We do not know in Italy if this same gold is counted 
somewhere in foreign gold reserve. If so, it would be necessary not to count 
it twice in figuring world gold reserves. 
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109. 
I T A L Y 
SIGNOR D E STEFANI'S SPEECH - AN ITALIAN GEDDES COMMITTEE -
THE DEFICIT FOR 1 9 2 3 - 2 4 - NEW DEBTS AFTER 1 9 1 4 -
TREASURY CONTROL - ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT 
The great financial event of the week has been the speech of Signor De 
Stefani, Minister of Linance, at the Scala Theatre, in Milan. The interest 
centred in the final figure of the reduction of the deficit, which was the 
avowed aim of the Lascist Government to reach. The results of the work 
of a small committee may be summed up as follows: Net decrease in ex-
penditure, 1,305 million lire; increased yield of revenue, 442 million lire; 
net reduction in the deficit, 1,747 million lire. The totals of revenue and 
expenditure estimated for the financial year 1923-24 are now, therefore, 
as follows: 
These figures cali for comment. In the extraordinary revenue are in-
cluded 1,000 millions for German reparations, a more than doubtful item, 
from which it may be expendient to deduct 750 millions. On the other 
side, in the ordinary expenditure there are included 1,153 millions as inter-
est on the sums due to Great Britain and the United States. It may safely be 
assumed that not a penny will be paid on this score, at least in the next 
financial year. This is a matter which will be eventually arranged between 
interested Powers, but it seems useless to budget next year for payments 
which will not be made. 
109. May 26, 1923, pp. 1194-1195. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. 
It is also dated Turin. 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 20 
(Millions) 
Ordinary budget 
Extraordinary budget 
Total 
Revenue Expenditure Difference 
14,332-5 12,368-8 + 1,963-7 
1,233-0 5,812-8 -4,579-7 
15,565-5 18,181-6 - 2 ,6160 
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The deficit of State Railways is estimated for 1923-24 at only 374 mil-
lion lire. This may be, perhaps, too sanguine. And it may be that new un-
avoidable expenses may arise, which will add something to the deficit. 
Summing up, it seems probable that, with 750 millions less income than 
budgeted and 1,153 millions less cash expenditure, the Budget, even allow-
ing for 400 millions unforeseen expenditure, will close with a deficit of 
about 2,616 million lire, as estimated by Signor De Stefani. Up to 1,500 
millions, the ways and means to pay for this deficit are already provided, 
as the Government has announced its intention to pay no more war da-
mages compensation in cash. Next year the sum of 1,500 millions, which 
is included in the above estimates of extraordinary expenditure, will be 
paid in the form of 25-year 3V2 per cent, bonds compulsorily given at 
par. The remaining 1,100 million hre deficit will be easily covered by 
nine-years Exchequer 5 per cent, premium bonds, which find in Italy a 
ready market at an issue price of 99 or 99V2. The new internai debt created 
in Italy every year since the war may then be calculated as follows (in mil-
lions of hre): 
1914-1915 2,629-3 
1915-1916 5,643-0 
1916-1917 9,555-2 
1917-1918 14,012-5 
19J8-1919 11,961-0 
1919-1920 13,117-5 
1920-1921 13,513-5 
1921-1922 6,286-1 
1922-1923 (estimated) 4,000-0 
1923-1924 (estimated) 2,616-0 
The greatest decrease took place from 1920-21 to 1921-22, when Si-
gnor Giolitti abohshed the bread subsidy, the greatest scourge of our Bud-
get. After that great feat the betterment was continuous. The last billions 
are diehards indeed; and Signor De Stefani deserves great credit for the va-
liant efforts to eliminate the causes which compel the Treasury to incur 
new debts. 
He is distincdy optimistic; and, truly, the fact that the ordinary Budget 
shows a surplus gives stimulus to hopes. But are extraordinary expenses 
bound to decrease? Of the huge sum of 5,812.8 millions, the greatest item, 
1,500 millions yearly for war damages in invaded provinces, will disappear 
in about six years. Another formidable item -1,318 mi l l ions of war pen-
sions - will disappear also, if more slowly; it is estimated that the expendi-
ture will fall below 1,000 millions in 1929-30, and below 500 millions in 
1946-47. The railway deficit, estimated at 374 millions in 1923-24, should 
be cancelled in three years; and so will be cancelled the postai deficit of 81 
million hre. 
Signor De Stefani laid great stress on the efficacy of the British Treas-
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ury in checking expenses and controlling expenditure departments. AH ef-
forts to increase the powers of the Italian Treasury over spending depart-
ments are meritorious; and to that end Signor De Stefani has decreed that 
the departmental accountants shall no more be appointed by the spending 
Ministers, but by himself as head of Treasury, and shall be the subordi-
nates of the Accountant-General of the State. Ministers shall no more have 
authority to order departmental accountants to countersign an order of 
payments or expenditure. Expenditure will be authorised only when hear-
ing the consent of the Accountant-General of the State and his subordinate 
officials. Perhaps this seemingly little reform will be the greatest achieve-
ment of the new Government in financial matters. 
Economie conditions in Italy, as seen by Signor De Stefani, are improv-
ing. Unemployed, after increasing from 88,101 at July 31, 1920, to a max-
imum of 606,819 at February 1, 1922, decreased to 498,606 at Aprii 1, 
1922; reached bottom whith 304,242 at August 1, 1922; increased as usuai 
in the winter to a maximum of 391,974 at February 1, 1923, only to de-
crease to 280,201 at Aprii 1, 1923. 
Imports decreased from 17,267 million lire in 1921 to 15,728 in 1922, 
while exports increased from 8,275 to 9,293 millions, the adverse balance 
thus falling from 8,992 in 1921 to 6,435 millions in 1922. In the last three 
months for which figures are available - December, 1922, to February, 
1923 - imports increased by 296 million lire, chiefly owing to larger takings 
of raw materials - e.g., cotton, wool, coal, and metals; but exports in-
creased 352 million lire, silk and cotton textiles and agricultural products 
contributing largely. 
Railway traffics are also increasing; in the first quarter of 1923 11.8 mil-
lion tons of goods were carried, against 9.5 million tons in the correspond-
ing months of last year. Passengers were decreasing in numbers, in the last 
two months of 1922, but the total was gaining ground in the first two 
months of 1923. 
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110. 
I T A L Y 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL INDEX-NUMBERS - DEBATE ON TARIFFS-
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN 1 9 2 2 AND FIRST QUARTER OF 1 9 2 3 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 24 
There is talk at present of a new increase in prices. The widespread im-
pression that there has been an increase is not borne out by the Bachi's index 
number in the wholesale market, on the usuai basis of 1920's prices 100: 
Nov., June, Oct., May, Jan., Aprii, May 
1920 1921 1921 1922 1923 1923 1923 
Vegetable foods 107-7 97-0 115-8 106-3 109-4 110-6 109-9 
Animals 124-1 100-5 128-5 93-9 104-4 113-6 109-7 
Chemicals 107-7 63-4 74-6 67-3 69-3 69-6 69-7 
Textiles 94-0 45-8 75-6 65-7 80-8 83-0 81-6 
Minerals and metals 101-4 60-4 64-1 57-5 62-5 65-5 65-0 
Building materials 112-6 101-6 90-9 78-5 87-5 83-4 83-3 
Miscel. vegetables 108-7 95-0 114-4 96-4 124-7 128-1 122-4 
Miscellaneous 105-2 90-4 94-2 87-9 98-8 93-2 92-0 
General index 107-3 81-5 95-9 83-3 92-1 94-2 92-9 
The only difference in the figures for this spring is the maintenance of 
prices at the high level reached in the autumn and winter months; while in 
past years the months from March to June usually saw lower levels. 
Retail prices, which are always slower to move, are as follows (the 
figures relate to the cost of living in Turin of a working family of two 
parents and three sons, on the basis of the first half of 1914=100). 
(See table at p. 293). 
The characteristic of this year is the same as in the wholesale market: 
retail prices are not decreasing this spring as they did in past years. Food 
is dear, a strange thing in the face of a good season, with plenty of vegeta-
bles and very good prospects for fruits. The Government has taken various 
108. May 12, 1923, pp. 999-1000. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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Food Clothing H ° u s e ^eat & M l s c e u a n e o u s General Index 
January, 1920 351 327 100 406 344 318 
Aprii, 1921 534 497 110 417 544 470 
July, " 446 411 110 354 537 405 
January, 1922 524 454 120 435 591 466 
Aprii, " 470 433 120 378 587 424 
January, 1923 499 433 120 423 574 446 
February, " 484 435 120 428 574 438 
March, " 481 437 120 423 574 436 
Aprii, " 488 437 120 394 574 438 
May, " 493 437 120 370 570 440 
measures to prevent the rise of the cost of living, the most important being 
the abolition or lowering of various duties on animals, sugar, meats, oils, 
cheese. Yesterday there was held at Rome a great meeting convened by 
Signor Rossi, Minister of Trade and Industry, for the purpose of devising 
remedies against the high cost of living. Chambers of Commerce, munici-
pal councils, and co-operatives gave various opinions on the causes of the 
rise in retail prices; increases of taxes on consumption (turnover tax), in-
creases of rents of shops after the abolition of the rent restriction act 
and fixation of rents by arbitration tribunals; increased export of cheese, 
vegetables and meat; imperfect organisation of transport, and so on. For-
tunately, notwithstanding some high words and threats of penalties against 
speculators and middlemen, no direct action by the Government was ad-
vocated. The Fascist Government gives no support to policies of maximum 
prices, restrictions of exports, or regulation of consumption. 
The debate in the House of Deputies about the general customs tariff, 
although not formally closed with a vote, may be said to have come sub-
stantially to end. The protectionists mustered ali their forces, and won a 
great deal of success. But the Government promised that the general tariff, 
although wanted for purpose of negotiation of the treaties of commerce 
with foreign countries, ought to be lowered in virtue of the lower treaty 
duties and the extension of the most favoured nation clause. Perhaps the 
most important outcome of the debate was a vote taken inviting the Gov-
ernment to abolisti ali duties on pig-iron and broken iron, and to substitute 
in their stead a system of premiums on pig-iron production which might be 
deemed necessary for the defence and independence of the nation. If we 
consider that the iron industry is at present the chief barrier against the 
adoption of a more liberal fiscal policy, that the premium system is more 
apt for measuring the exact sacrifice which the State is making for the sup-
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port of SO costly an industry, we may say that this House vote, if acted 
upon, is perhaps the most important step taken by the present protection-
ist majority of the Parliament. 
The latest statistics of foreign trade relate to the first quarter of the year 
(in millions of lire): 
Imports: January February March Whole Quarter 
1922 1,315-5 1,056-2 1,310-8 3,632-6 
1923 1,059-7 1,571-8 1,495-7 4,127-3 
Difference - 2 5 5 - 8 +515-8 + 184-9 + 444-7 
Exports: 
1922 619-9 720-1 716-1 2,056-0 
1923 788-8 750-4 886-7 2,425-9 
Difference + 168-9 +30-3 + 170-6 + 369-9 
Excess of Imports: 
1922 695-6 336-2 594-7 1,626-6 
1923 270-9 821-9 609-0 1,701-4 
The interesting fact is that figures are rising in both ways, indicating 
that trade is increasing. Wholesale prices, not being much different in 
the two periods, do not exercise a notable influence. 
The distribution in 1922 of imports and exports among various classes 
was as follows (in millions of lire): 
Imports Exports Difference 
Raw materials of industry .... 5,504-8 
% 
35-0 1,165-2 
% 12-5 
+ 4,339-6 
ffalf-worked materials 2,825-7 18-0 2,816-0 30-3 + 9-7 
Finished products 2,394-3 15-2 3,126-7 33-7 -732-4 
Foods 5,003-5 31-8 2,184-9 23-6 + 2,818-5 
15,728-3 100-0 9,292-8 100-0 + 6,435-5 
We see that what is called the adverse balance of Italian trade is due 
wholly to the necessity of importing vast quantities of food and of raw ma-
terials for the national industry. Raw material imports are Iikely to increase 
in the future; and the increase will be a good omen as a proof of better 
working capacity of our industry. The figures of food imports are not so 
encouraging. The most important items in food imports were: Wheat, 
3,057; other cereals, 500.5; fish, 422.7; coffee, 305.8; meat, poultry, game^ 
191.2; catde, 154.3, million hre. It should be possible to buy more manures 
and to improve agricultural methods, and, without increasing and even di-
minishing the planted area, to increase the cereal production. To many 
people it seems a pity that Italy, with so long a sea coast, should be obliged 
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to buy abroad such a vast quantity of fish (85,477 tons, of a value of 422.7 
million lire). It seems that such a lamentable result is due to out-of-date 
methods of fishing. Public opinion was therefore delighted when it was an-
nounced that, following in the steps of the Duke of Abruzzi, who is con-
ducting a great cotton enterprise in Italian Somaliland, the Duke of Udine, 
of the Blood Royal, intended to start a new experiment on a vast scale in 
fishing with modem apparatus and fleet. The fleet will fish not only in Ita-
lian waters, but also in distant seas. 
111 . 
ITALY 
RESTRICTION ON SALE OF OCCUPIED HOUSES -
EXEMPTION FROM TAXES TO FOREIGN LOANS - SUCCESSION DUTY -
INCREASE OF FAILURES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, August 4 
After my last letter, a group of interesting Royal decrees has been pub-
lished in the Gazzetta Ufficiale. The War Rents Restriction Acts encour-
aged the sale of flats, and even of single rooms, to tenants as a means of 
escaping the min with which restrictions threatened the landlords. Proprie-
tors, who received nothing, or almost nothing, as the net rent of their 
houses, were very glad to sell them piecemeal to their tenants; and tenants 
rejoiced in the hope of escaping future increase of rent, when freedom 
would be reintroduced in the rent-market, by the payment of a somewhat 
Uberai capitalisation of present rents. 
Rent restrictions were abolished by the Royal Decree of January 7, 
1923; but the Arbitration Committees did not allow landlords to increase 
rents at will, with the result that piecemeal sales were encouraged. When 
tenants, owing to shortage of money, were unable to purchase flats or 
rooms occupied by them, a middleman took charge of the affair. He pur-
111. August 25, 1923, p. 298. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, entitled 
"Restriction on the sale of occupied houses. Exemption from taxes to foreign loans. Abolition of 
the succession duty. Wholesale increase of failures", dated "Turin, August 4, 1923", is kept in 
the Einaudi archives. 
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chased the house as a whole, and, by threats of selling the rooms to other 
people - who, as landlords, would have the right of evicting the present 
tenants, compelled tenants, however unwilling, to purchase at a high price. 
A decree of July 7, 1923, proposes to stop these speculative operations. In 
the event of sale, the new landlord is bound to respect current leases, and 
tenants cannot be evicted by new landlords. 
The praise justly given to the royal Decree of December 16, 1922, ex-
empting from Italian income-tax ah loans issued in foreign countries for 
the purpose of importing new capital into Italy, gave place to criticism when 
the regulations were published recently. These prescribe that borrowers 1) 
must exhibit a public deed of loan; 2) indicate the use to which the proceeds 
of the loan will be applied; and 3) within six months of the provisionai ap-
provai of the Finance Minister, give proof that the loan has been issued in 
conformity with the regulations. Then only will exemption be accorded; but 
it is always open to revocation if the proceeds are apphed to purposes other 
than the originai ones, or if other regulations are unobserved. 
It is feared that those restrictions will somewhat limit the usefulness of 
the exemption-decree as a means of promoting the introduction of foreign 
capital in Italy, and it is earnesdy hoped that, in his usuai experimental 
way, the Finance Minister will simplify the procedure. 
I have repeatedly called attention to the loud complaints aroused by 
the extraordinary severity of the succession duty, which comprises the 
taxes known in Great Britain as estate, succession, and legacy duty. 
The rates are as follows, and fall on the amount severally received by 
heirs and legatees: 
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1,000 Exempt Exempt Exempt 8-40 10-80 21-20 21-60 
5,000 1.80 1-80 5-40 9-60 12 14-40 22-80 
10,000 2-40 2-40 6 10-80 13-20 15-60 21 
50,000 3-60 4-80 9-60 14-40 10-20 28-80 42 
100,000 4-80 6 12 18 21-60 32-40 48 
500,000 10 80 12 19-20 25-80 28-80 39-60 62-40 
1,000,000 16-80 18 26-40 32-40 36 48 70-80 
5,000,000 21-60 25-20 32-40 39-30 45-60 57-60 78-
10,000,000 25-20 28-80 36 43-20 50-40 62-40 81-60 
20,000,000 28-80 32-40 39-60 46-80 54 67-20 86-40 
Over 20,000,000 32-40 36 43-20 50-40 57-60 72 90 
— 296 — 
AUGUST, 1923 
In certain cases additional taxes are imposed, and when it is remem-
bered that debts are not wholly deducted, that valuations are often very 
high, and that money, jewels, and furniture are valued at fixed rates, it is 
not surprising that heirs or legatees frequently prefer to relinquish their 
rights wholly to the benefit of the exchequer. 
When the present Minister took charge of his office hopes were held of 
a betterment, but, as time went on, it was feared that nothing would come 
out of these. Suddenly Signor De Stefani proposed in the Cabinet Council 
that the succession duty should be wholly abolished in the family group, 
and the proposai was unanimously carried. It appears that this category 
comprises parents and sons, brothers and sisters, and husband and wife. 
The succession duty is to be retained only between uncles, nephews, cou-
sins, and strangers, but rates will be reduced in these cases. 
The reform is a bold one. Perhaps 85 per cent, of the present yield of 
the tax is to be given up. As the yield was in the present year about 300 
million lire, the sacrifice on the part of the exchequer is considerable. Si-
gnor De Stefani briefly sums up the reasons in favour of the abolition of 
the tax: 1) The reinforcement of the family institution; 2) the injustice of 
the existing tax, which leaves scot-free almost ali movable wealth and 
bearer securities, and which bears almost exclusively on real property; 3) 
the injustice of a tax which weighs more on the South than on the North 
of Italy, as in the South the wealth consists in very large measure of land 
and houses, which cannot escape taxation; 4) the stimulus which should 
thereby be given to savings. 
As in other countries, the war had a beneficiai effect on the number of 
failures, but this result was really quite abnormal. Profits were high enough 
to allow even inefficient men and badly managed enterprises to prosper. In 
1921 the laws of competition re-asserted themselves, and failures in-
creased. The increase is progressing in 1923: 
While the average figures of 1912-1915 have not as yet been reached, 
progress towards a normal elimination of the unfit is noteworthy. 
1921 1922 1923 
January ., 
February 
March ... 
Aprii 
May 
82 132 402 
71 2 5 8 367 
99 3 3 2 4 3 7 
114 2 6 1 4 3 1 
96 2 8 8 4 7 3 
462 1,371 2 , 1 1 0 
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112. 
ITALY 
NATIONAL FEELINGS ON THE GREEK AFFAIR -
POLITICS AND LABOUR CONGRESS - SPLITTING OF AGRICULTURAL LAND -
RATES OF THE SUCCESSION DUTY - OCTROIS AND THE MUNICIPALITIES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 14 
A great stirring of national feeling took place last week over the mas-
sacre of General Tellini and his officers in Greek territory. The nation 
stood firmly behind the Government while the issue was pending, and 
the whole situation was characterised by an unusual absence of public 
meetings and utterances calculated to embarrass the Government. From 
the Italian point of view, the Government's conduct was founded on a firm 
determination to obtain the proper reparation for the truculent deed. 
Times are past when Italians could be slain in foreign lands and the Gov-
ernment content itself with languid protests. 
Domestic politics are quiet in this summer season. After the passing of 
the Bill for the new electoral system through the Chamber of Deputies, 
Signor Mussolini decided not to urge it through the Senate, and declared 
that general elections are not to take place shortly. As the new electoral sys-
tem gives 356 places out of 534 to the party which receives the greatest 
number of votes, and not less than 25 per cent, of ali votes polled, the Gov-
ernment is sure of a large majority in the next Chamber. It is highly im-
probable that the Socialist party, which at the two last General Elections 
polled the largest individuai party vote, will next time take the lead. Soci-
alism is splitting into minute factions - communists, revolutionary, giron-
dinos, and so on. The General Labour Confederation at its meetings from 
August 23rd to 25th at Milan proclaimed its independence from ali politicai 
parties - a novelty for a movement which was until lately almost identified 
with Socialism. There has been much talk of some representatives of the 
Labour Confederation going into the Mussolini Cabinet as under-secre-
112. September 22, 1923, p. 440. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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taries; but so far nothing of the sort has happened. The severance of La-
bour men from Sociahsm is highly significant. The masses have tired of So-
cialist promises, and are increasingly inclining to the strenuous life ideals. 
While industriai Italy is making great strides, in the agricultural world 
the old tendency towards the sphtting up of the land in favour of small pro-
prietors continues to gain ground. Recent statistics of the Finance Depart-
ment teli us that the number of land and house sales, which amounted to 
343,362 in the financial year 1914-15 rose to 508,440 in 1920-21, and to 
489,803 in 1921-22. As the only buyers of agricultural land are farmers 
Ccontadini) it is easy to see how rapidly land is passing into the hands of 
small direct cultivators. There are villages, especially in the North of Italy's 
mountain and hill regions, where not a single non-cultivating great land-
holder survives. The great movement of property from class to class took 
place without Government aid and without credit organisation, and was 
almost entirely financed by the savings of the peasant class. 
From the point of view of giving security to family holdings and to the 
saving tendencies of this great landholding community, the bold decision 
of Signor De Stefani, Minister of Finance, to abolisti the succession tax will 
have beneficiai effect. The decree was finally signed by the King on August 
20th, and abohshes the tax on ali successions between 1) parent and sons, 
grandfather, grandmothers, and descendants in direct line; 2) husband and 
wife; 3) brothers and sisters; 4) uncles and nephews. As to ali other succes-
sions, between other relatives and strangers, the tax is only graduated in 
relation to the sum received: 12 per cent, up to 10,000 hre, 15 per cent, 
from 10,001 to 25,000 lire, 18 per cent, from 25,001 to 50,000 hre, 22 
per cent, from 50,001 to 100,000 hre, 26 per cent, from 100,001 to 
250.000 hre, 30 per cent, from 250,001 to 500,000 hre, 35 per cent, from 
500.001 to 1,000,000 hre, 40 per cent, from 1,000,001 to 5,000,000 hre, 45 
per cent, from 5,000,001 to 10,000,000 hre, 50 per cent, over 10,000,000 
lire. The old tax went up to over 100 per cent, in big successions, so that 
the new scale will prove a great boon to many embarrassed heirs, who were 
frequently obliged to relinquish the estate, not being able to pay the suc-
cession tax. 
Signor De Stefani is quietly adding, almost every week, something to 
his rebuilding of our financial system. His last decree allocates to the mu-
nicipalities the entire yield of the octrois or duties paid on the retail sale of 
some goods on their entrance in towns. The yield was hitherto shared be-
tween State and municipalities in a mysterious and complicated way. In 
some cases the State paid the cost of the collection, but the yield was re-
ceived by the municipalities. The new decree sweeps away ah those techni-
— 299 — 
23 
FROM POST-WAR CRISIS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF FASCISM IN POWER, 1919-1924 
calities, and gives the whole yield of the tax and the whole responsibility of 
the collection to the municipality. 
113. 
I T A L Y 
PRICE VARIATIONS - G O O D CROPS AND VINTAGE - COST OF LIVING RISING -
WORKING-CLASS SAVINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT -
T H E NEW REGULATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 24 
Average wholesale prices have remained fairly stationary recendy, as 
Bachi's index numbers show: 
(1920 = 100) 
June, Oct., May, Aprii, July, Oct., 
1921 1921 1922 1923 1923 1923 
Vegetable foods 
Animals 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Minerals and metals 
Building materials 
Miscellaneous vegetables 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
General index 
97-0 
100-5 
63-4 
45-8 
60-4 
101-6 
95-0 
90-4 
81-5 
115-8 
128-5 
74-6 
75-6 
64-1 
90-9 
114-4 
94-2 
95-9 
106-3 
93-9 
67-3 
65-7 
5 7 1 
78-5 
96-4 
87-9 
83-3 
110-6 
113-6 
69-6 
83-0 
65-5 
83-4 
128-1 
93-2 
94-2 
103-8 
103-5 
6 8 0 
84-5 
64-9 
84-0 
101-0 
96-9 
90-6 
93-6 
109-7 
67-2 
89-2 
65-1 
84-0 
101-2 
97-9 
90-2 
The selected figures, up to Aprii, 1923, are those of the highest and 
lowest average index numbers. Despite the stability of prices in general, 
particular variations are startling. Vegetable foods and miscellaneous vege-
tables have fallen most, owing to the excellent crops of this year. The wheat 
yield is estimated at 61 millions quintals, as compared with 38, 52, and 44 
113. December 8, 1923, pp. 1014-1015. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: 
"Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because a section of 
the originai manuscript, entided "Price variations. Good crops and vintage. Cost of living rising. 
Working-class saving and unemployment. The new regulation of public services", dated "Turin, 
November 24, 1923", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
— 300 — 
DECEMBER, 1923 
millions in the years 1920, 1921, and 1922 respectively. Internai prices of 
wheat have therefore fallen below the parity of foreign imported wheat. 
Imports can only be effected at about 110 lire per quintal, while home 
wheat is selling at 85, to the great discomfiture of the Italian producers. 
The cry for protection is again heard, curiously enough, though protection 
could only raise the cost of the imported commodity higher than 110 hre, 
while the internai price refuses even to reach the present parity. The vin-
tage was also very good. Against 31.9 and 35.6 millions hectolitres of wine 
produced in 1921 and 1922, production this year is variously estimated at 
between 45 and 55 millions. Grape prices have been enormously reduced, 
the general average price at Casale, one of the most important markets in 
northern Italy, now standing at 77.6 hre, as compared with 173.7 last year. 
Cost of hving has not felt, as yet, the beneficiai effect of favourable 
crops. Index numbers of the cost of hving in Turin of a working family 
of two parents and three sons, taking the average for the first half of 
1914 as 100, is as follows: 
Food Clothing ^ s t e H[atghatnd Miscellaneous General Index 
January, 1920 351 327 100 407 345 319 
July, " 409 479 100 415 456 384 
January, 1921 513 547 100 527 514 467 
July, " 446 411 100 354 537 405 
January, 1922 524 454 120 435 591 466 
July, " 487 433 120 365 584 437 
January, 1923 499 433 120 423 574 446 
February, " 484 435 120 428 574 438 
March, " 481 437 120 423 574 436 
Aprii, " 488 437 120 394 574 438 
May, " 493 437 120 370 574 440 
June, " 501 441 120 366 577 445 
July, " 498 434 200 376 580 454 
August, " 509 450 200 406 577 464 
September," 506 450 200 437 577 464 
October, " 504 450 200 447 577 463 
The rise in the cost of living, which has taken place since July, has two 
main causes; the rise in house rents, which carne into force on July ls t, 
when the system of free bargaining, with the right of appeal to judicial ar-
bitration, was substituted for legislative restriction, and the rise in coal and 
wood due to the stoppage of German reparation deliveries. 
Perhaps as a consequence of the persistent high cost of living, the in-
crease in saving deposits is slowing down. The deposits of the ordinary sav-
ings banks, which were 2,727 millions hre on December 31, 1913, rose to 
9,294 millions in December, 1922, and went to 9,896 millions by January 
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31, 1923, owing to the capitalisation of interest due to depositors for the 
year 1922. At June 30th last the sum was 10,107 millions, an increase of 
only 2 per cent, in the five months. On the other hand, the public pawn 
offices recovered the customers lost during the war, and in the immediate 
post-war years. The number of new pawn-loans was 1,071 in December, 
1921, while loans totalled 146.6 millions lire. In the months of December, 
1922, and August, 1923, the numbers had risen to 1,177 and 1,337 respec-
tively, and the sums loaned to 176.4 and 199.6 millions lire. Unemploy-
ment is, however, diminishing; 270,214 at Aprii 30th, 243,928 at May 
31st, and 216,287 at June 30th. The only exception to the decrease is the 
chemical industry. The greatest unemployment to-day is in Lombardy, 
with 44.184 unemployed, while the lowest is in Basilicata with only 76. 
The working-world seems thus to be passing through the hard times of 
high prices and high costs of living, perhaps with some inroads on past sav-
ings, but with a noteworthy measure of success in the main. 
The most important piece of legislation in the current month was the 
Royal decree of November 11, 1923, on public service rearrangement. AH 
categories of public servants, excepting railway men, are comprised in the 
regulation. The number of public servants was as foUows: 
1914 Present Numbers New Regulations 
A B C D 
Civil servants 103,643 136,012 115501 110,467 
Military commissioned officers 18,178 22,986 24,609 22,866 
Non-commissioned military officers 28523 47,943 44,072 48,638 
150,344 206,941 184,182 181,951 
The A, B, and D figures are legai or theoretical ones, i.e., of the number 
of public servants who ought to be on the pay-roU if aU the places were 
occupied. In practice, owing to dismissal, deaths, &c., the actual number 
is always lower than the theoretical one. Signor De Stefani, in the new reg-
ulation, has contrived to keep the number of public servants not only much 
below the present theoretical maximum number, but also somewhat below 
the actual number. This amounts to expressing the hope that the actual 
number wiU be even lower. It is, alas, weU over the 1914 figure, speciaUy 
for the non-commissioned military officers, whose number has greatly in-
creased in consequence of the increased duties laid on the police force 
(Reali Carabinieri) and on the Excise and Custom armed force (Guardie 
di Linanza). 
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The most interesting feature of the new regulations is the uniform clas-
sification of ali public servants, military and civil, into 13 classes. The sys-
tem is akin to the prewar Austrian system. Ali public servants are assimi-
lated to various military ranks, and enjoy the same salary which progresses 
uniformly from class to class. This Royal decree will probably be the Ma-
gna Charta of the pubhc services in Italy for a long time. Perhaps the prin-
cipal object of this general mihtarisation is not so much economy (to begin 
with the reform, with consequent variations of pensions to retired servants 
will perhaps cost 300 millions hre yearly), as the restitution of hierarchy 
and discipline among a body which at a certain moment threatened to be-
come a mob. In the war and early post-war years, the salaries of humble 
servants had become about as high as those of departmental heads and 
great judges. When a section of pubhc servants menaced stoppage of work, 
their salaries were increased under the stress of fear. Soon after agitation 
spread among the others, and the cost went up by leaps and bounds. 
The new regulations recreate a hierarchy, and put ali servants of the same 
class on an equal footing. It will not be possible to increase the salaries of 
military men, or of postai servants, or of teachers only. Ah will be obliged 
to go up or down at the same time, and it is hoped that the new system will 
give force to the government to resist sectional pressure, as a concession to 
a section will imply an ali-round increase of cost. 
114. 
ITALY 
T H E INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS -
NEW SAVINGS AND THEIR INVESTMENTS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, December 26 
Very wild statements have been published from time to time about the 
international balance of payments between Italy and foreign countries. 
114. January 5, 1924, pp. 19-20. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
tided "The International balance of payments. Banking and state paper issue. New savings and 
their investments" and dated "Turin, December 26, 1923", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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Fortunately an inquiry by Professor Jannaccone, published in a new edition 
of "Documents on the Financial and Economie Situation of Italy", pre-
sented by the Minister of Finance, Signor De Stefani, to Parliament, gives, 
for the year 1922, a new estimate of the complete balance of payments (in 
millions of lire): 
Credit Debit 
Difference between imports and exports of goods - 6,462.4 
Difference between imports and exports of gold and money - 37.7 
Difference between sums remitted to Italy and those brought 
about by emigrants 3,400.0 -
Difference between passive and active freights for the transporta-
tion of emigrants and travellers 115.6 
Goods freights due to the Italian mercantile marine 527.0 
Difference between expenditure of Italian mercantile marine 
abroad and foreign marine in Italy - 203.1 
Difference between sums due and sums credited for international 
railway services _ 132.3 
Difference between sums spent by foreign travellers in Italy and 
Italians abroad 2,500.0 
Difference in postai remittances between Italy and foreign coun-
tries 274.7 
Interests on Italian public debt paid abroad - 115.6 
Interest on banking current net accounts - 140.0 
Difference between profits of Italian firms abroad and foreign 
firms in Italy 30 0 
War reparations received from Germany (net cost of occupation, 
control, &c., expenditure) 440.5 -
Public debt bonds sold in foreign countries, mosdy to Italian emi- 7,287.8 7,091.1 
grants 460.0 
Repayment of public debt bonds, sold and repaid in foreign coun-
tries _ 412.8 
Purchase of foreign securities _ 12.0 
To balance: Italian credit at the end of the year _ 231.9 
7,747.8 7,747.8 
The balance of payments last year was thus closed very favourable to 
Italy. It should be added that, while the 412.8 millions of public debt 
bonds were repaid to foreign Governments, such as Brazil, &c., who, dur-
ing the war, sold goods to Italian Governments without payment in cash, 
the 460 million lire of bonds sold in foreign countries cannot be considered 
as true debts to foreigners, as it is highly probable that they were bought by 
Italian emigrants, who will reinvest the yearly accruing interests in Italian 
securities. 
The above is an officiai, i.e., a very prudent, estimate, whose errors, if 
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any, are on the adverse side. A private investigator, Signor Mazzucchelli, 
author of an interesting booklet, "Dati finanziari italiani", published by 
the Credito Italiano, draws an even more favourable picture for the same 
year, 1922 (millions of lire): 
Credit Debit 
Difference between imports and exports of goods - 5,300 
Difference between active and passive freights and other items .. 300 -
Difference between sums spent by foreign travellers in Italy and 
Italians abroad 2,500 -
Remittances of Italian emigrants abroad to Italy 3,600 -
Interest on foreign capital, commissions and profits of foreign 
firms, maritime insurance, &c - 350 
Interests on Italian public debt and others paid abroad - 300 
Interest on Italian securities held mosdy by Italians in America .. - 200 
Interests on Italian capitals invested abroad 500 
6,900 6,150 
Sale of Italian securities abroad 500 -
Difference between Italian investments abroad and foreign invest-
ments in Italy - 250 
Nationalisation of foreign companies in Italy and repayment of Ita-
lian debts to foreign creditors - 1,000 
7,400 7,400 
In 1922 we invested in foreign countries or paid debts to foreigners up 
to 1,250 million lire, while we sold securities or indebted ourselves only to 
the extent of 500 millions, and such securities were, moreover, sold to Ita-
lians hving abroad. 
Various other interesting figures could be extracted from Signor De 
Stefani's report, or Mazzucchelli's brochure. Among other things they 
show that the gold-value of the hra, after touching bottom in 1920, has 
not varied much in the last three years. This fact was favourable to savings, 
which can be said to have increased in proportion to the depreciation of 
the hra. Deposits in saving and other banks were: 
Millions of Lire 
At June 30, 1914 7,822.7 
1918 12,587.8 
1921 27,889.2 
1922 28,819.1 
1923 32,334.0 
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Correspondent accounts - such is the name by which many current de-
posit accounts are styled in Italy - in banks with more than one million hre 
capital were: 
Millions of Lire 
At December 31, 1913 1,053.2 
1918 6,308.1 
1921 14,013.2 
1922 14.746.2 
The total of national savings invested in banking deposits, current and 
correspondent accounts, amounted, according to Signor Mazzucchelli, at 
December 31, 1922, at 50 milliards hre, and increased to 53 milliards at 
June 30, 1923. The new savings invested in State bonds, pubhc and private 
securities, banking deposits, current and correspondent accounts, house 
building, industries, agricultural improvements, and in various other sun-
dry ways may be estimated in ah for 1922 at 12 milliards hre. In 1891 
the then director general of the National Statistical Service, Signor Bodio, 
estimated the annual increment of the national wealth at 500 millions hre. 
Even after taking into account the depreciation of the hra, the present 
12,000 millions, brought down, for the sake of comparison, to 2,000 mil-
lions [gold-1891] hre, compare very favourably with the 500 millions hre 
which was the figure for that date. It is significant that new savings are 
being increasingly invested in industriai enterprises. The number and capi-
tal of joint-stock companies have increased as follows: 
Number With a Capital 
of Millions Lire 
1863 379 1,331 
1880 581 1,811 
1913 2,882 5,170 
1920 5,995 17,683 
June 30, 1923 7,266 22,706 
November 30, 1923 7,683 23,755 
The few figures given above may be taken as a good omen for the eco-
nomic progress of Italy in the New Year. 
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115. 
ITALY 
WHOLESALE PRICE VARIATIONS - COST OF LIVING -
IMPROVING PUBLIC FINANCE - PUBLIC DEBT 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, January 28 
Average wholesale prices have increased a little in the month of De-
cember, as the new Milan Chamber of Commerce's index (basis 
1913=100) shows: 
Average . 
May-Decem. A Y " a f 
1921 
Vegetable Foods 516-8 
Animals 649-4 
Textiles 480-1 
Chemicals 440-1 
Minerals and metals . 514-4 
Building materials .... 570-3 
Misceli, vegetables .... 499-5 
Misceli, manufactured 537-5 535-8 
General index 516-5 529-3 
555-2 
587-4 
533-1 
437-2 
524 1 
519-7 
508-2 
Jan. 
1923 
546-5 
531-6 
618-9 
407-3 
525-6 
529-9 
560-7 
534-5 
523-5 
Aprii 
1923 
567-1 
570-6 
656-3 
525-9 
570-9 
519-4 
598-1 
533-8 
549-7 
August 
1923 
515-3 
562-5 
651-7 
427-8 
544-3 
517-6 
429-8 
541-9 
527-0 
Decem. 
1923 
Average 
1923 
497-9 
588-8 
743-9 
410-0 
548-2 
531-6 
459-1 
529-6 
534-8 
533-9 
566-8 
673-3 
421-6 
547-7 
519-0 
515-9 
554-6 
535-8 
I have quoted for 1923 the opening and the closing month and the in-
termediate minimum (August) and maximum (Aprii). The average for 
1923 is slightly higher than for 1922, and therefore the purchasing power 
of the lira is lower. The greatest increase was in the textile group, owing to 
international change in the prices of cotton, wool, and silk. Cost of living 
was also slightly higher in 1923. The Index number of the cost of living in 
Turin of a working family of two parents and three sons, taking the average 
for the first half of 1914 as 100, is as follows: 
115 February 9 1924 pp. 251-252. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, 
entitled "Wholesale price variations. Cost of living. Improving public finance. Treasury 6 months 
or less bill's issue suspended. Public debt" and dated "Turin, January 29, 1924 , is kept in the 
Einaudi archives. 
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Food Clothing House Rent Heat and 
Light Miscellaneous General Index 
January, 1920 .. . 3 5 1 0 327-2 100 406-5 344-5 318-5 
July, . 409-3 479-0 100 415-0 455-8 384-4 
January, 1921 .. . 5 1 3 1 547-3 110 527-3 513-6 467-4 
July, . 446-2 411-4 110 354-2 537-1 404-7 
January, 1922 .. . 523-7 454-2 120 435-3 590-7 465-6 
July, . 487-3 432-6 120 365-3 584-1 436-9 
January, 1923 .. . 499-0 432-6 120 423-4 574-4 446-0 
July, . 498-0 434-6 200 376-1 580-0 453-6 
December, " 504-7 470-3 200 460-0 577-3 466-6 
The hardening impression is confirmed by the annual average, which 
were for the general index 337.73 in 1920, 449.19 in 1921, 448 09 in 
1922, and 451.59 in 1923. 
Pubhc finance is improving. The Finance Minister has suspended the 
issue of Treasury bills for six months or less. The current income for the 
first six months of the financial year (July to December, 1923) was 
8,546.6 million hre, against an estimate of only 7,832.3 millions, or an in-
crease of 732.3 million hre, while the expenditure was 8,771.2 mil l ions , 
against an estimate of 9,362.5 million hre. It was thus possible to limit 
new debt and to begin making a reduction among various kinds of debt. 
A comparison of pubhc debts at June 30, 1923, and December 31, 
1923, shows that a net reduction of 234 million hre has been effected in 
internai debt in that period. 
The outstanding external debts are exclusively towards the Govern-
ments of the United States (8,536.8 million hre) and Great Britain 
(13,858.4 million hre). 
This item of external debt is the only remaining stumbling-block in our 
pubhc finance, as it means a paper debt of about 90,000 million lire, or 
more than the whole internai debt. Pubhc opinion is increasingly leaning 
toward the old idea of the contemporaneous adjustment of inter-allied 
debts and war reparation. The recovery of our national finance would be 
otherwise impossible. 
There has been in the last six months an increase in long-dated loans 
and bonds (war indemnities loan dated 25 years and nine years Treasury 
bonds), and a decrease in short-dated Treasury bills. The volume of these 
latter is too great, but it is hoped that by not reissuing bills of less than six 
months' currency the total will become more manageable. Italian Bourses 
have greeted with enthusiasm the news of the suppression of the issue of 
short bills 5 per cent. Consols, which opened the new year with a quotation 
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of 89.28 per cent, dose to-day at 92.95, and 3.50 per cent, old Rentes rose 
between the same dates from 76.79 to 80.80. Bourses are very animated, 
and great advances have been made not only by fixed-interest securities, 
but also by variable dividend shares. 
116. 
I T A L Y 
FOREIGN TRADE. - From July 1, 1921, at which date the statistical 
method of valuing goods imported and exported was changed, to Novem-
ber, 1923, the figures are as follows (in millions of lire, precious metals ex-
cluded): 
_ Excess of Imports 
Imports Exports Over Exports 
1921-July to December 6,645.7 3,939.0 2,706.7 
1922 - Whole year 15.764.5 9,302.2 6,462.3 
1923 -January to November 15,365.7 9,454.1 5,911.6 
For the whole of 1923 the import balance will be about the same as in 
the preceding years. 
CROPS. - Agricultural results were very good. Whereas the average 
wheat crop was 4,989,600 tons in 1909-13, and 4,831,700 tons in 
1919-23, the 1923 crop reached 6,070,000 tons. The yield per hectare 
was 13.1 quintals, the highest since 1909, and probably since 1860. 
Grapes were also much better. In the old provinces the yield was 81.7 
million quintals, against an average of 59.8 in 1910-21 and 54.4 in 
1922; in the new Venetian provinces 2.2 millions, against 1.8 and 1.9 re-
spectively in 1921 and 1922. 
INDUSTRY. - The silk industry benefited from a good crop of cocoons, 
amounting to 58,000 tons, against 43,500 in 1922, 42,900 in 1921, and 
41,200 in 1920. The total value of silk products, which may be put at 
600-650 millions lire before 1914, increased to 2,800-,3000 millions lire 
116 February 16 1924, pp. 310-311. The article, unsigned, was published in the supplementi 
The Economist. Commercial History & Review of 1923. Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain 
because the originai manuscript, without date and entitled "Foreign trade returns , is kept in the 
Einaudi archives. 
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in the financial year 1922-23. Cotton was fairly active. The consumption of 
raw cotton, which was 909 thousand bales yearly in 1911-13, and de-
creased to 770 thousand in the cotton year 1919-20, reached 893 thousand 
in 1922-23. The number of bales consumed in 1922-23 per 1,000 spindles 
was 196, against 172 in 1912-13. The Italian cotton industry may be esti-
mated to have added, in 1922-23, a value of over 3,000 million lire to raw 
cotton and materials imported and used, against 420 millions in 1909-13. 
The woollen industry works mostly for the home market, and the value of 
the total output (40,000 tons in 1923, against 30,000 tons in 1913) may be 
estimated at 1,500 million lire. Iron and steel had an indifferent year, but 
not more so than in 1922. A marked decrease has been registered in the 
number and importance of strikes. For the years ending October 31, 
1921, 1922, and 1923, the number of strikes was 1,223,680 and 156 re-
spectively, and of days lost 8,210,811, 7,336,393, and 246,975 respectively. 
The number of unemployed, 391,974 on January 31, 1923, slowly but con-
tinuously decreased to 178,612 in August, and rose again to 199,694 in Oc-
tober. 
PRICES AND WAGES. - The following indices have been compiled by 
Professor Mortara: 
t, , Paper Price Wholesale Cost of „„ Paper Issue J^Gold ^ L i y m g Wages 
Basis 1913-14 100 100 100 100 100 
1921, T* half-year ... 772 460 551 560 540 
1921,2nd " 760 455 525 522 520 
1922, lst " 751 389 517 503 515 
1922,2nd " 751 430 542 498 505 
1923, lst " 716 401 539 495 485 
1923,2nd " 727 442 531 491 475 
Both wages and cost of living have increased nearly five-fold since 
1913-14. Prices have not risen in proportion to increase in the paper issues. 
MONEY AND STOCKS. - The officiai rate of discount has been firm at 5V2 
per cent, though the cali on the money market is increasing. The clearings 
at the Italian clearing-houses, which in 1920 amounted to 578,030 milllion 
lire, were 690,821 millions in 1921, 601,851 millions in 1922, and 829,500 
millions in 1923. The price of 3 72 and 5V2 Consols, which touched bottom 
in October, 1920, at 67.26 and 69.23 respectively, were 77.86 and 86.96 at 
the end of December, 1922, and increased almost continuously to 86.96 
and 91.58 at the end of December, 1923. Professor Bachi's index number 
of Italian share-values, on a basis of 100 in December, 1918, rose to 110.02 
in the "boom" of 1919, and subsequently reached its lowest point, 56.45, 
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in Aprii, 1922. The year 1923 opened with an average of 72.82 in January. 
In August the index rose to 80.53, and in December to 85.67. The greatest 
rise occurred in silk; shares (286.74), cotton shares carne a good second 
(246.02), then wool (223.41) and hemp (222.54) - ali textiles. At the bot-
toni were shipping shares, which, however, rose from 62.06 in December, 
1922, to 67.79 in December, 1923; and iron and steel, which rose from 
20.33 to 22.44. 
PUBLIC FINANCE. - Excluding foreign debt, new debts incurred for bal-
ancing the public Budget amounted in 1918-19 to 11,800 million lire, in 
1919-20 to 10,865 millions, in 1920-21 to 11,224 millions, in 1921-22 to 
6,232 millions, and in 1922-23 to 2,605 millions. In the second six months 
of 1923 only 517 millions of new debt were contracted. The year marks a 
definite improvement in the situation. State and municipal finances are 
well on the way to equilibrium; the money market has been restored to 
a normal state; the worst period in the iron and steel industry has passed, 
and great progress has been made in other staple industries. 
117. 
ITALY 
GENERAL ELECTIONS - BOOM IN STOCK EXCHANGES -
CREDIT FOR EMIGRANTS - RENT RESTRICTIONS -
STATE CONTROL OF TRADE UNIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, March 2 
On February 26th the General Election campaign was officially inaugu-
rated. There are 20 parties or candidates' lists in the field - 13 national and 
seven purely locai parties. No one, except the Fascist list, aspires to gain 
the majority (355 places out of total of 535). The 355 candidates placed 
on the Fascist hst, and agreed by Signor Mussohni, are practically sure 
117 March 15 1924, pp. 586-587. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: ' Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the ongmal manuscript, 
without date, entided "General elections. Boom in stock exchanges. Credit for Italian work 
abroad. New restrictions for house leases and rents. State control on trade unions , is kept in 
the Einaudi archives. 
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to be elected at Aprii 6th, as no other list can contest the first place or hope 
to muster the 25 per cent, of the votes polled, which are necessary for vic-
tory. The change from 1919 and 1921, when the electors sent to the House 
over 150 Socialists and Communists, ali over 100 Populars (Catholics) is 
indeed extraordinary. Ali the other 19 lists of candidates struggle only 
for the conquest of the 180 minority places. Fascists will have a share also 
of minority, as, in four electoral districts out of 15, they offer themselves in 
an additional minority list. Other parties are: Dissentient Fascists (two dis-
tricts), Democratic Liberals, friendly or neutral towards Fascism (nine dis-
tricts), Democratic Liberals in the opposition (eight), Catholic Populars 
(15, or the whole of the districts), small agricultural proprietors and farm-
ers (four), Republicans (12), Democratic Socialists (15), officiai Muscovite 
Socialists (13), Communists (14), Independents (five), Social Democrats 
(five). Among the seven locai lists, the only worth mentioning are the Sar-
dinian Party and the Slav-German Party. 
The public interest in the electoral contest is, however, not very lively, 
perhaps in consequence of the absolute certainty of the victory of the Party 
in power. In economie circles, interest is centring around Stock Exchange 
quotations. There is developing, on the Italian bourses, a boom compar-
able in extent, if not as yet in violence, to the famous boom of 1905-6, 
when the motor-car securities went up from day to day in a frantic manner. 
Almost ali classes of securities shared in the rise; but textiles, naviga-
tion, land and housing and electrical companies were easily first. The rise 
is explained, by professional with a theoretical turn of mind, as a belated 
attempt of security quotations to adjust themselves to the depreciation of 
the lira. A great many securities were quoted, until recently, at prices 
not much higher than prewar level. Politicai uncertainty, confiscatory taxa-
tion, and fear of Bolshevism co-operated to keep quotations down. As the 
economie and politicai horizon seems to-day clearer, values are bound to 
rise until equilibrium with the general price level is reached. There is much 
to say in favour of this theory; but there is the risk that the rise is too in-
discriminately affecting both old securities representing gold-lira invest-
ments and new securities, with depreciated lira investments and water at 
the back of them. 
New economie and social legislation has been fortheoming during the 
month. A decree of December 15, 1923, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 
of February 2, 1924, creates a National Credit Institute for Italian work in 
foreign countries. Emigration is on the increase again: 400,000 in 1923, 
with an increase of 93,000 over 1921 and 104 over 1922. Of this number, 
178,000 emigrated to transadantic countries, 94,000 to Argentina, 58,000 
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to United States, 15,000 to Brazil, 6,000 to Canada, 2,800 to Uruguay, 
1,150 to Australia, 1,100 to Central America. While in 1922 and previous 
years the greatest number were going to U.S., restrictive legislation di-
verted emigration currents to South America. The new Institute aims at fi-
nancing Italian emigrants abroad, their industriai enterprises, colonisation 
plans, co-perative societies, &c. The Institute will be a semi-pubhc bank, 
financed by savings banks and pubhc insurance offices, and will cater 
for emigrants' savings. The State will nominate a part of the directors 
and guarantee a minimum interest of 3.50 per cent, on debentures issued 
by the institute, and a minimum dividend of 4.50 per cent, on share capital. 
More interesting to the general public is a decree of February 21st on 
the housing problem. While the decree of January 7, 1923, declared that 
rents would be freely discussed between proprietors and tenants; and, in 
case of disagreement, allowed rents to be fixed up to June 30, 1926, by Ar-
bitration Commissions, the new decree adds that Prefets - i.e., representa-
tives of the Central Government in Provinces, have the authority to seize 
ah vacant houses which the proprietor has not seen fit to let within a month 
after notice has been given. The Prefet will let the apartment to houseless 
people, according to needs and circumstances. Rents will be fixed by Ar-
bitration Commissions. The requisition right applies to old vacant houses, 
and also to new houses which have been declared fit for habitation before 
October 27, 1922. Old regulated rents were much lower than free rents for 
vacant or new houses - frequently only one-fifth. The new decree aims at 
equalising the two types of rent; but it is uncertain if it will succeed in low-
ering permanently rents of new houses to the regulated level of old ones; 
for who will build new houses now the fear is abroad of being obliged 
to let them under cost? 
Workmen's organisations (trade unions) are much concerned about a 
legislative decree, dated January 24, 1924, which subjects them to the locai 
representative (Prefet) of the Central Government. Workmen's organisa-
tions are defined as those which are maintained by the working-men's con-
tributions. If the "Prefet" supposes that the funds of trade unions are not 
spent in the interest and for the economic or moral benefit of workers, he 
can make inquiries, dissolve managing councils, dismiss presidents and se-
cretaries, and entrust assets and management to an officiai commissioner. 
The commissioner, within the maximum term of a year, is bound to make a 
report. On the basis of this report the Prefet can restore the old officers, 
prolong up to another year the receivership, or dissolve the trade union 
and distribute assets among associates or hand them over to another insti-
tution with purposes akin to those which the dissolved organisation pur-
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port ed to possess. A few days ago the decree was put into force for the first 
time by the Prefet of Rome, who instituted inquiries into the management 
of the Agricultural Workers' Federation - i.e., the national organisation of 
Agricultural Workers' Trade Unions. It appears that the federation had 
made savings out of past years' contributions. As 1923 and 1924 are bad 
years for organisations of its politicai colour (Socialist), managers were 
using past savings for keeping alive the federation, whose membership 
was dwindling and whose remaining members were unwilling to pay. It 
seems that an inquiry will be started by the Prefet about the legality of 
using reserve funds towards defraying present expenses. 
118. 
ITALY 
MINISTERS ON FINANCE AND BANKING - D E B T INCREASE CHECKED -
FOREIGN EXCHANGES - BANKING FIGURES 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, February 5 
Important speeches were delivered, on the eve of the general elections, 
by two financial leaders, Signor De Stefani, Finance Minister, and Signor 
Stringher, Director-General of the Bank of Italy. 
The former's speech was marked by the somewhat unexspected de-
claration that the financial year will close without any new internai debt: 
so we have improved from 11,864 million lire of new internai debt in 
1920-21, to 6,283 in 1921-22, 2,265 in 1922-23, to nothing in 1923-24. 
This declaration goes a long way towards explaining the firmness of stock 
markets. While the sum total of internai debts is stationary, its composition 
is changing. The Treasury issued from July 1, 1923, to February 29, 1924, a 
sum of 2,704 million lire nine-years and 25-years' bonds, and has repaid 
2,309 million lire of short-dated bills from three months to five years, 
which were falling due. 
118. Aprii 12, 1924, pp. 787-788. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Italy. Speeches by signors De Stefani and Stringher. No more internai debts. Indexes of 
bettering budget situation. Foreign exchange fluctuations reduced. Inflation in banking situa-
tions", dated "Turin, February 5, 1924", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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"No new internai debts" is not technically equivalent to a declaration 
of a Budget equilibrium, which external debts toward Great Britain and 
United States may gravely imperil. At the present rate of exchange, and 
at 5 per cent, interest, the sum annually required for the bare interest ser-
vice of the external debt would probably reach 5,000 million lire, an un-
bearable burden for which neither of the two creditor nations will presum-
ably ask. For a complete budgetary equilibrium, from the British point of 
view, are perhaps wanting also the means for paying sums left over by pre-
vious financial years, of which the true value is not completely known. 
The position of pubhc finance is, however, sound. Italy can face the fu-
ture without uncertainty as to how to make both ends meet. Some impor-
tant problems remain to be solved; but they can be viewed with equani-
mity, as we are on a firm basis. 
The Finance Minister also indicated that the proportion between 
"permanent" and "total" tax income is increasing: from 79.68 per cent, 
in the second half of 1922 to 87.03 per cent, in the first half of 1924. So 
we are less at the mercy of extraordinary sources of tax revenue. He also 
showed that the number of new industriai, commercial, and professional 
taxpayers was 39,813 in 1921, 47,822 in 1922, and 107,909 in 1923. The 
taxing-net is filling with new fishes, so that the burden is more equally 
distributed. Sales of war stores, which gave 1,611 million lire in 1920-
21, 1,186 million in 1921-22, and 956 million in 1922-23, will yield only 
200 million hre in 1923-24. The Budget is now almost free from this ex-
traordinary non-tax revenue. The State railway deficit fell from 1,258 mib 
lion in 1921-22 to 906 million in 1922-23, and to less than 374 million in 
the current financial year, and is estimated at 110 million lire for 1924-25, 
including in the latter figure the deficit of new provinces hitherto ex-
cluded. The total number of civil and military State servants has been 
lowered, between July 1, 1923, and January 1, 1924, from 509,145 to 
477,028, and their total salaries and wages from 4,859 to 4,562 million 
hre, to which will be added, next year, 65 millions saved by new system 
of pensions to retired servants. 
Signor Stringher dwelt more on monetary and banking subjects. The 
rates of foreign exchanges in 1923 were characterised by more restricted 
fluctuations: 
Rates on: 1922 1923 
New York: 
18-38 19-35 
21-20 21-74 
25-96 23-83 
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London: 
Maximum 81-01 90-18 
Average 93-83 99-80 
Minimum 115-46 108-82 
Whether the two leaders are aiming only at stabilisation, or also at re-
valuation of the lira, is not wholly clear. Perhaps their policy is not defi-
nitely settled. They keep revaluation in the background, and say that it will 
come gradually; but they assert emphatically that stabilisation is the most 
urgent necessity. How one aim is to coincide with the other is not stated. 
Banks of issue were busier than ever in 1923. The yearly averages for 
the Bank of Italy were as follows: 
(Millions of Lire) 
Discounts L ° a n s a n d Total 
Advances 
1914 580.3 125.9 706.2 
1919 862.5 868.2 1,730.7 
1920 2,432.6 2,213.4 4,747.0 
1921 3,189.3 2,662.4 5,851.7 
1922 4,440.7 3,043.0 7,483.7 
1923 4,954.4 2,462.6 7,417.0 
December 31, 1923 6,020.4 3,324.2 9,344.6 
The figure for December 31, 1923, is swollen by the inclusion of 
2,564.6 million lire of credit granted to the Consortium for the salvage 
of Ansaldo concerns, Banca Italiana di Sconto, and Banco di Roma. This 
is a blot on a banking position which had been somewhat inflated since 
1919. Industriai concerns and banking societies are rediscounting at the 
banks of issue in a measure which previously would have been deemed 
perilous, and for sums much higher than would be warranted by the deva-
luation of the lira. Signor Stringher seems to feel that the mass of banking 
paper will come to a good end. From the net profits of the Bank of Italy a 
sum of 100 million lire was deducted in 1923 to face losses on the said 
2,564.6 million lire granted for salvage purposes. An additional sum of 
391.8 million lire was deducted to the same end from the extraordinary 
tax on excess issue, which should have been paid into the reserves against 
probable losses. The liquidation of the salvage consortium ought to be fin-
ished at December 31, 1932. A Royal decree of January 1, 1924, has for-
mally forbidden the consortium to discount other paper. The State will 
no more come to the aid - through the agency of banks of issue - of falling 
concerns. 
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119. 
ITALY 
BANKING AFFAIRS - STOCK EXCHANGE BOOM 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, May 12 
Banking affairs have been prominent during the past month. In mid-
April a sudden burst of buying sent up the prices of Credito Italiano's 
shares from about 900 lire to 1,100 lire and more, It appears that a com-
petition in buying had been started between the board of directors of the 
bank and a group of industriai Turinese magnates. A generation of rivals of 
the late German industriai leader, Herr Stinnes, is growing up in Italy. The 
Turinese leaders are Senator Agnelli, chief of the Fiat motor-car company, 
Signor Gualino, head of a gigantic artificial silk concern, with 600 million 
lire capitahsation, and Signor Abegg, a leading cotton man. They com-
pianteci of credit difficulties, and strove to obtain the majority of the shares 
in Credito Italiano, so as to be able to control this great fountain of credit, 
with over 4,000 million hre deposits and current accounts. Five years ago, 
Credito Italiano and Banca Commerciale Italiana were made the object of a 
similar attack. On that occasion the banks saved their independence by the 
device of two financial holding companies, to which were entrusted the 
majority of shares of the banks, and which were ultimately controlied by 
bank directors. Signor Nitti, then Premier, induced, by moral pressure 
and promise of credit facilities, the two attacking groups to sell their shares 
at a profit to the holding companies. It appears that the Banca Commer-
ciale Italiana has never lost control of its holding company, so that direc-
tors are sure of a majority in the shareholders' annual meetings. Not so 
with the Credito Italiano directors, who, having persuaded themselves that 
ali perii of losing control of their bank was past, let their shares be freely 
negotiated on the market, with the result that in the first ten days of Aprii 
directors awoke to the painful truth that the Turinese group had almost 
gained control of a majority of shares. At this point began a fierce struggle 
between bank directors and would-be conquerors of the bank; of which 
119. May 24, 1924, p. 1057. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas Cor-
respondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham Hutton. It is 
also dated Turin. 
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few particulars are known. The ultimate result was that the Government, 
by a decree of Aprii 15, suspended the right of buyers of banking shares 
to cali on sehers for immediate surrender of shares sold for end-of-month 
settlement. This right, called "diritto di sconto", was invented in 1907 to 
oblige speculative bears, who had sold securities for end-of-month settle-
ment in the hope of covering themselves before settlement at a lower price, 
to buy precipitately the securities of which immediate surrender was called. 
In the present case, however, buyers of Credito Italiano shares who hoped 
to get, in virtue of the "diritto di sconto", immediate possession of bought 
shares, were prevented, by the suspension of the same right, from obtain-
ing material possession before May 2nd. In the meantime, directors of the 
Credito Italiano called for an extraordinary meeting of shareholders at 
Aprii 28th. At this meeting the old directors easily persuaded the assembly 
to vote an increase of capital from 300 to 400 million hre, of which 50 were 
to be offered to shareholders and 50 were left at the disposai of the board 
of directors. It seems that the Turinese group, when they saw that their 
manoeuvre had failed, sold their shares with a good profit to a reconsti-
tuted holding company, and received a new promise of credit facihties. 
Ah is well which ends well, but this strange episode of a banking fight gives 
an instructive glimpse into methods of obtaining credit facihties. Credito 
Italiano is a most conservative and trusted bank, and we can be sure that 
credit facihties will be given to the Turinese group with the utmost care for 
the interest of depositors. In future, bank directors will take great care not 
to let a similar attack develop. 
While this drama was being acted in Milan and Turin, another banking 
drama was recited before the Senate acting as the High Court of Justice. 
Two Senators and many banking men, ah connected with the late Banca 
Italiana di Sconto, were tried before the High Court of Justice under the 
accusation of having issued in 1921 a false balance-sheet, with the purpose 
of distributing to shareholders and among themselves profits not truly 
gained. By virtue of the Statute of the Kingdom, when a Senator is accused 
of some criminal offence, he and ah his accomplices are not sent to ordin-
ary Courts of Justice, but appear before the Senate as High Court of Jus-
tice. Senator Marconi, who was president of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, 
did not appear, because he was found, in the preliminary stage of the pro-
ceeding, entirely innocent and unaware of balance-sheet malpractices con-
ducted in his absence. After a week of abundant eloquence proceedings 
were suspended, as the High Court of Justice resolved to cali an investiga-
tion into the true state of the Banca Italiana di Sconto at December 31, 
1921, so as to ascertain whether the Banca was truly in default, or whether, 
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with a little courage, the bank could have been saved. The affair has thus, 
from being a trial of the men responsible for the fateful end of the Banca di 
Sconto, been turned into an investigation against past Ministers (Bonomi 
and Belotti), who dared not save the bank. 
Amid these banking turmoils Italian Stock Exchanges continue to be 
highly optimistic. The campaign for the so-called valorisation of securities 
in consequence of the depreciation of the lira is as yet in full swing. For a 
week, towards the end of Aprii, it appeared as if the upward movement 
had come to stay; banks endeavoured to restrict prolongations, and in-
creased very strongly the charges for speculative accounts up to 7, 7V2, 
and even 8 per cent., but ali in vain. Money is too abundant, and is an-
xiously seeking investment. Bona fide investors are sending up prices of 
5 and 3.50 per cent. Consols, the first reaching 99 and the second 87. What 
a long way from the prices of 67 and 62 quoted in 1920! The Treasury is 
planning, it is said, an issue of nine-year bonds at 43/4 per cent., and they 
will find an easy market. 
General commodity prices and the cost of living are being maintained 
at a high level. 
120. 
ITALY 
POLITICS AND THE STOCK EXCHANGE FEVER -
PLENTY OF MONEY - NEW ISSUES - UNEMPLOYMENT - FOREIGN TRADE 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, June 21 
Politicai events have been prominent since the meeting of the new Leg-
islature. As my letters relate to economie affairs, I will only note that the 
lurid Matteotti affair acted as a check on the frantic upward movement 
which was going on in Italian Stock Exchanges. If we take as basis 100 
120. June 28, 1924, pp. 1304-1305. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Over-
seas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, 
entitled "Italy. Politics and stock exchange fever. Plenty of money. New issues. Unemployment. 
Bankruptcies. Foreign trade. Industriai situation's indices", dated "Turin, June 21, 1924", is kept 
in the Einaudi archives. 
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the quotations for December, 1918, the Bachi index number of State secu-
rities, which was as low as 73.8 in September, 1920, reached 100.2 in Jan-
uary, 1924, 101.3 in February, 103.0 in March, 103.9 in Aprii, and 109.5 in 
May, 1924. That is a general average; 5 per cent, consols, which at a time in 
1920 went as low as 67, touched in early June 102.50. 
Yesterday (June 20th) they fell to 98.85. But the wildest fluctuations 
took place in "variable dividend" shares. Bachi's general index number 
(basis 100 at December, 1918) touched bottom in Aprii, 1922, at 56.45. 
At the end of 1922 the index was 72.08; at the end of 1923, 85.67. In 
1924 every month, save Aprii, saw a rise to 89.79 in January, 96.18 in Feb-
ruary, 101.70 in March, 100.51 in Aprii, 114.34 in May. 
The leaders in the upward movement were easily the silk shares, espe-
cially artificial silk. At a time, the greatest artificial silk concern, Snia-Vi-
scosa, with a paid capital of 600 millions lire, was capitalised at 1,500 mil-
lions lire; the next one in importance, the Soie de Chàtillon Company, 
with a paid capital of 75 millions, at 675 millions lire. Following these 
spectacular rises, operators multiplied; crowds congregated every day 
on the floors and outside Stock Exchanges; fortunes were made. Stock 
Exchange men were ali Fascists; no more strikes, social peace, abundant 
work, State Budget in equilibrium, no more prosecution against capital. 
Everyone was persuaded that Bourse quotations would rise indefinitely. 
On this excited state of mind the Matteotti affair acted like a bombshell. 
Something like a stampede took place. Snia receded from 504 to 400, 
Chàtillon from 900 to 680, Fiat from 754 to 565, Bank of Italy from 
1,950 to 1,625. Perhaps nothing more tragic will happen save losses suf-
fered by over-enthusiastic bulls. Money is abundant and is anxiously 
seeking employment. After many years, during which the State absorbed 
ali available savings, the situation has wholly changed. Public internai 
debt has decreased from 95.544 millions lire at June 30, 1923, to 
93.655 millions at Aprii 30, 1924. No wonder that the market situation 
was favourable to buoyancy and to new issues. In 1923 new issues of 
shares by joint stock companies, less decreases of capital or winding-up 
of companies, amounted to 2.131 million lire. In the first five months 
of 1924 the figure went up to 1978.8 million lire, against 515.2 in the cor-
responding months of 1923. 
As far as can be guessed by the belated unemployment figures, the in-
dustriai situation seems better than a year ago. At February 28, 1923, un-
employed were 327,892; they decreased to a minimum of 178,612 at Au-
gust 31, 1923; seasonably rising to 258,580 at end of December, 1923, 
to 280,765 at January 3 lst, and decreasing to 259,360 at February 29, 1924. 
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Foreign trade in the months from January to Aprii, 1924, compared as 
follows with the corresponding period of 1922 and 1923 (in millions of hre): 
1922 1923 1924 Difference Between 1922 & 1924 1923 & 1924 
Imports 4,837-7 5,525-5 5,815-8 + 978-1 + 290-3 
Exports 2,744-4 3,143-5 4,357-8 + 1,613-4 + 1,214-3 
Excess of imports over 
exports 2,093-3 2,382-0 1,458-0 -635-3 -924 -0 
The excess of imports is decreasing, thanks principally to more abun-
dant exports, the most notable incrases being in silk and artificial silk (from 
850.1 million lire in 1923 to 1,077.3 million hre in 1924), fruits and vege-
tables (249.9 to 373.4), flour, macaroni, pulses, &c. (56.1 to 239.7), milk 
and cheese (71.8 to 136.4), meat, eggs (59.8 to 146.4), cotton goods 
(448.8 to 648.8), motor-cars and other vehicles (91.5 to 120.6), wool, 
&c. (73.0 to 129.8), hides (105.4 to 158.8). 
The general trend is towards increasing imports of raw materials, ma-
chinery for industry, exports of manufactured goods, increasing at the 
same time at a more rapid pace. 
An index of industriai conditions is the increase in the consumption of 
electric power. 
121. 
ITALY 
POLITICAI. UNEASINESS -
T H E SUMMER SLUMP IN STOCK EXCHANGE QUOTATIONS -
B I G CAPITAL INCREASES - POOR WHEAT CROP 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, September 2 
July and August were troublous months in politics and economics for 
Italy. In pohtics, there is not in sight a ray of hope of a solution of the Mat-
121. September 13, 1924, pp. 421-422. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: 
"Overseas Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is probable according to Graham 
Hutton. It is also dated Turin. 
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teotti crisis. Two decrees which suppress the liberty of the Press, giving to 
the locai agents of the Government (prefetti) the power to prohibit future 
issues of obnoxious newspapers, have not quieted the unrest of public opi-
nion, which is bent on obtaining justice against ali guilty parties. The par-
liamentary opposition is determined not to return to the House after the 
autumn recess, unless conditions of absolute liberty are restored to ali par-
ties. Fascism in power, however sure of its two-thirds majority, is planning 
constitutional reforms; universal suffrage is, it seems, to be substituted by a 
sort of professional representation, where trade, industry, agriculture, Ub-
erai professions groupings will have a voice. 
Ali these may be simply rumours, which keep the politicai world un-
easy guessing the future. In the business world unrest also prevails. In a 
previous letter I gave figures illustrating the stock exchange fever, which 
culminated at the end of May. Recently the fever has subsided. Bachi's gen-
eral index number for State securities (taking as the basis 100 the quota-
tions for December, 1918), which had increased continuously from 96.4 
in December, 1923, to 109.5 in May, 1924, fell to 106.9 in June and 
105.8 in July. Quotations for the end of August do not show a noticeable 
advance. As usuai, fluctuations were greater for "variable dividend" secu-
rities. From 85.67 in December, 1923, these had advanced to 114.34 in 
May, 1924; in June they fell to 110.82, in July to 107.62. Navigation, hemp 
and flax, cotton, motor-cars, sugar, land and houses were foremost in the 
fall. Operators were obliged to liquidate speculative holdings at a great 
loss. The end of August account saw many forced sales on the stock ex-
changes. Bull positions were almost cleared out, and new engagements re-
duced almost to nothing. If the politicai uncertainty were not repressing 
any sustained speculative endeavour, the autumn months would probably 
see another frantic rise. 
Banks and financial circles are interested in the rise, in view of the big 
increases of capital which are in contemplation. In the first half of 1924 
there were constituted 845 new joint-stock companies with a capital of 
510.4 million lire, and 650 old companies increased their capital by 
2,389.9 million lire. Only 246 companies with a capital of 288.9 million lire 
were wound up; 187 reduced their capital by 259.5 million lire. In the ag-
gregate the number of joint stock companies rose by 583 to 8,335; and 
their capital by 2,289.4 million lire to 26,111 million lire. The movement 
has not spent itself; perhaps a total of 1,000 million lire increases of capital 
are planned at present. A very big figure, which is an indication of a great 
abundance of new capital in the country. The balance-sheets of three fore-
most Italian banks (Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, and Ban-
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co di Roma) have increased their liabilities from 13,925.3 to 14,963.1 mil-
lion hre between February 29 and June 30. The increase is whohy due to 
increased deposits. 
The black spot in our economic situation is the indifferent agricultural 
crop prospects. The wheat yield, which was 6.1 million tons last year, is 
calculated for 1924 at only 4.8 million tons, a big decrease, which will cause 
a corresponding increase of wheat imports. In part, the low yield is due to 
diminished sowings - 4,550,000 hectares in 1923 against 4,743,640 in 
1922. Agriculturists were discouraged last year by the low prices quoted 
for internai wheat at sowing time. Owing to the abundant internai crops, 
mills were able to buy from agriculturists at prices much below those ruling 
in the international markets. Today, owing to scarcity of yield, internai 
prices are higher: 110-120 hre per 100 kg, against 85 last year. But the in-
ternational level is higher stili - perhaps from 130 to 140 hre at Genoa. The 
prospect of imports of from 2.5 to 3 million tons at those prices is already 
hardening foreign exchanges. 
122. 
ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION 
By Luigi Einaudi 
The financial year 1923-24 closed with a deficit of 623 million lire, 
against an estimate of 2,616 million hre. In the first three months of the 
current year the yield of taxation has continued to expand. This increasing 
ability of taxpayers to pay has made the condition of the exchequer almost 
affluent, the effective income in the three months in question (July to Sep-
tember, 1924) being 3,894.6 million hre, against an effective expenditure of 
3,622.7 million hre. These figures do not infer that the State budget has 
reached equilibrium, as certain disbursements may have merely been post-
poned. But they have an important meaning for the money market, for 
while the pubhc exchequer, with its issues of bonds and exchequer bills, 
absorbed, in the financial year 1921-1922, 7,040 million hre from the pri-
vate savings, and in 1922-23, 3,237 millions, in the financial year 1923-24 
122. November 29, 1924, pp. 38-39. The article, signed, was published in the "Monthly Supple-
ment" of The Economist. 
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bills and bonds up to 1,087 million lire were repaid, and in the three 
months from July l s t to September 30th the internai debt diminished 
further by 567 million hre. 
This is, perhaps, the dominating factor in the present economic situa-
tion of Italy: the State is no more the greatest, and almost the only, consu-
mer of current savings; it is refunding to the money market part of the 
sums previously received. Private savings, which found, in the war and 
after war years, an easy harbour in the continuous State issues, are obliged 
to find employment in agriculture, industry, and trade. The impetus which 
industry received during the war from State war demands was spent in 
1920; after two years of uncertainty and social commotion, 1923 saw a re-
turn of abundant money due to the new factor in the capital situation. 
Another potent element in economic progress is the increasing stabili-
sation of the lira. The increasing fixity of the gold value of the national cur-
rency, and the decreasing importance (owing to death or passage to pro-
ductive occupations) of classes interested in the appreciation of the hra 
have induced many people to take heart of grace. The fear of Bolshevism, 
meanwhile, has vanished; the values of land, houses, and shares in joint-
stock companies have risen in proportion. The average price of joint-stock 
company shares rose from 100 in Aprii, 1922 - perhaps the worst of ali 
months on the Italian bourses owing to the prevalent Bolshevist fever -
to 213.6 in October, 1924. This movement of capital prices put m i l l i o n s 
in the pockets of investors and speculators. 
Savings deposits, which amounted to 28,126 million hre at June 30, 
1922, increased to 32,333 millions at June 30, 1923, and to 35,000 in June, 
1924. Net investments in joint-stock companies, which were 955 million 
hre in the year 1922, rose to 2,088 millions in 1923, and touched 2,300 mil-
lions in the first six months of 1924. Failures unfortunately increased, also, 
from a monthtly average of 47 in 1918 to 49 in 1919, 53 in 1920, 149 in 
1921, 305 in 1922 , 474 in 1923, and 612 in the first nine months of 
1924. In order to appreciate this movement, one should remember that 
in the war years failures wee almost non-existent, and that the present fig-
ures are a return to the old monthly average of 616 for 1913, and represent, 
probably, a more true index of the necessary elimination of the unfit in the 
economic struggle. 
As an instance of the effects of the growing influx of new savings in the 
industry, we may quote a few figures relating to the electrical industry. In 
the year 1898, the acting KW. were 87,000; in 1908, KW. 426,000; in 
1918, KW. 1,240,000. At present there are in progress such a number of 
new installations, that the KW. acting in 1928 may be estimated, even ex-
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cluding future additions, at 2,341,000. The consumption, from KW. 
180,000,000 in the year 1898, rose to 1,000,000,000 in 1908, to 
2,300,000,000 in 1915, to 4,120,000,000 in 1917-18, decreased to 
3,830,000,000 in 1919-20 owing to social unrest, and may be estimated 
at 5,500,000,000 in the present year. The capital invested from 200 million 
lire in 1898, rose to 3,000 millions in 1924. 
Only for agriculture we have up-to-date statistics of production. The 
year 1924 was unfortunate; 4.64 millions tons of wheat were produced, 
against 6.12 in 1923, and 7 millions of vine grapes, against 8.3. A partial 
compensation can be sought in the increase from 1.34 to 1.63 million tons 
in the yield of mulberry leaves (cocoons 42,500 to 49,500 tons), from 0.52 
to 0.56 in rice, and from 2.26 to 2.6 in maize production. Higher prices 
have largely compensated the agriculturist for the smaller production, 
which, compared with the pre-war average of 1909-1914, is not so unsatis-
factory as may be judged by comparison with 1923, which was an excep-
tionally bountiful year; the percentage of 1924 production on the 1909-
1914 average being 94 per cent, for wheat, 98 per cent, for vine grapes, 
150 per cent, for mulberry leaves (118 per cent, for cocoons), 114 per cent, 
for rice, and 101 per cent, for maize. 
Current figures of industriai production may be had only for goods 
subject to excise, beer production rising from 1,187,508 hectolitres in 
the financial year 1922-1923 to 1,466,507 in 1923-1924; coffee substitutes 
from 7,804.4 to 8,351.8 tons; sugar from 270,279.4 to 318,987.3 tons; illu-
minating gas from 259.1 to 292.6 million cubic metres: electrical power 
consumed from 4,721.4 to 5,390.5 kilowatt-hours. Figures for metallurgi-
cal production are more belated; coke pig-iron produced in 1923 
amounted to 218,039 tons, as against 140,211 in 1922; electrical-made 
coke to 15,704 tons, against 14,401; homogeneous iron and steel to 
1,141,761 tons, against 981,419; lead to 17,131 tons, against 10,709; zinc 
to 3,684 tons, against 3,082. 
The foreign trade figures show that Italy is gaining ground in outside 
markets as regards agricultural products and the output of the textile, rub-
ber and motor-car industries. These are the most progressive industries in 
our country. I doubt very much, however, whether the voice of these in-
dustries, which should be mostly a Free Trade voice, will be able to make 
itself heard, against the potent Protectionist interests of the heavy iron and 
steel industries, in the negotiations for the conclusion of a Treaty of com-
merce with Germany, a Treaty which will fix the character of other most 
important commercial treaties to follow. 
It is impossibile to make an exact estimate of the real condition of the 
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working classes. Statistics of wages are too old to be of much use. Accord-
ing to Mortara's index, wages increased from 100 in 1913-1914 to 480 in 
1923, keeping approximately in touch with the lessening purchasing power 
of the lira. If we take 100 as the cost of hving for a working family of 5 (2 
adults and 3 children) in Turin in the first six months of 1914, we have the 
following minima and maxima after July 1, 1920: 
Minimum Maximum 
1920 July 384-4 December 465-6 
1921 " 404-7 March 472-2 
1922 Aprii 424-5 January 465-6 
1923 March 435-8 December 466-7 
1924 June 462-1 October 492-9 
The maximum in the cost of living after August 1, 1924, was reached in 
October, 1924. This ominous feature is counteracted by conditions of 
more continuous employment. The number of unemployed, which had 
reached its maximum of 606,819 in January, 1922, and oscillated in 
1923 between a maximum of 391,974 in January, and a minimum of 
178,912 in August, was reduced in 1924 to a maximum of 280,775 in Jan-
uary, and to a minimum of 117,963 in July (in Augustus, 118,955). Emigra-
tion is increasing, in spite of American restrictions, the excess of emigrants 
over returned men being 165,172 in 1921, 188,102 in 1922 , 284,475 in 
1923, and 163,322 in the first seven months of 1924. 
On the whole, it seems that more continuous employment, and prob-
ably the larger number of members of the family which find employment, 
permits a higher level of hving to the majority of workers and their depen-
dants. The per capita consumption of wine, in a number of the most popu-
lous cities, increased from 40 litres in 1913 to 50 in 1923; of beer from 2.19 
to 3.19 htres; of edible oils from 19 to 29 kilograms; of fresh meat from 14 
to 21 kilograms; of salted meat from 4 to 19 kilograms; of sugar from 5.31 
to 7.72 kilograms; of coffee from 0.615 to 1.263 kilograms; of tobacco from 
0.615 to 0.709 kilograms; while the number of lamps from eletrical illumi-
nation increased from 0.27 to 0.48. These indices of increasing well-being 
go far to justify the assumption that, in spite of politicai uncertainties, and 
the arduous struggle for a return to a normal condition of public and social 
hfe, the foundations of Italian economics are strong, and the oudook for 
the future is promising. 
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123. 
I T A L Y 
T H E DIRECTION OF FOREIGN TRADE -
REVIVAL OF TRADE UNIONS' MOVEMENT -
FASCIST CORPORATIONS AND CLASS FEDERATIONS 
From our Correspondent 
Turin, November 30 
It is very difficult, on the basis of published statistics, to analyse the di-
rection of Italian foreign trade. Only for a few States are the figures up to 
date. Imports from leading countries (in millions of lire) are shown below: 
Imports 
1923 
From Jan. 1 to 
1913 Aug. 31, 1924 
Austria-Hungary 264 1 - -
Successor States: 
325-6 275-5 
Czecho-Slovakia 158-5 146-9 
Serbo-Croats-Slovene Kingdom 489-3 356-2 
280-9 1,322-6 922-8 
612-5 1,299-1 946-0 
601-1 2,189-7 1,389-2 
88-5 375-8 243-5 
173-8 1,053-0 707-5 
505-6 4,619-5 3,183-8 
Total of the principal States 2,526-5 11,833-1 8,171-4 
Other States 1,111-3 5,365-4 4,229-9 
General total 3,637-8 17,198-5 12,401-3 
The increase of the total import value figure is roughly in the ratio of 1 
to 4.5, which is the ratio of the depreciation of the lira in terms of gold. 
Two-thirds of the total trade is to-day, as in 1913, transacted with the seven 
principal States, or their successors, but the relative importance of the sin-
123. December 13, 1924, p. 964. The article, unsigned, was published in the section: "Overseas 
Correspondence". Its attribution to Luigi Einaudi is certain because the originai manuscript, en-
titled "Italy. The direction of Italian foreign trade. Tendency to a return to old pre-war positions. 
Revival of Trade Unions' movement. Fascist corporations and class federations", dated "Turin, 
November 30, 1924", is kept in the Einaudi archives. 
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gle States is changed. The United States, which held the third place in 
1913, is to-day easily first; Great Britain has gained the second place; 
and France became third. It is, however, probable that Germany in 
1924 will reconquer a part of the lost ground. Preliminary conversations 
for a commercial treaty have taken place, and on December 4th the officiai 
delegates of the two countries will meet in Rome. 
The 1923 exports of the three successor States to Italy, judged by va-
lues, were four or five times those of the whole of Austria-Hungary in 
1913. The new Serb Kingdom is one of the most promising fields of trade 
for Italy. The following table shows Italy's principal customers: 
Exports (in Millions of Lire) 
1913 1923 
From Jan. 1 to 
Aug. 31, 1924 
Austria-Hungary 218-8 - -
Successor States: 
Austria - 335-2 415-6 
Czecho-Slovakia - 67-2 79-5 
Serbo-Croats-Slovene Kingdom _ 336-0 233-6 
France 230-9 1,601-2 1,140-4 
Germany 338 692-9 944-8 
Great Britain 261-1 1,200-2 889-0 
Switzerland 248-6 1,201-4 970-3 
Argentina 190-3 740-7 491-6 
United States 257-7 1,512-5 677-5 
Total of the principal States 1,745-7 7,687-3 5,842-3 
Other States 758-2 3,372-2 2,696-9 
General total 2,503-9 11,059-5 8,539-2 
Here France steps into the first place; United States comes next; while 
Great Britain and Switzerland maintain their old positions. But here, again, 
Germany promise to return in the current year to her old position as the 
best market for our agricultural, silk, and other textile goods. 
Perhaps the most significant economic event in the month of November 
was the revival of the working-class movement. The 1924 total of strikes and 
working days lost by strikers will be much over that for 1923. The atmo-
sphere, above ali, is changed, and workers are no more prone to submit to 
the omnipotent influence of the Fascist Corporations. These held last week 
their Congress at Rome, preaching, as usuai, the gospel of harmony between 
capital and labour. It was, however, a significant indication of the new spirit 
that the Corporations denounced fiercely those captains of industry who were 
obdurate enough not to accept ali the proposals made on behalf of workers. 
The great majority of workers suspects organisations which are not 
simply for Labour against Capital, and is true in its allegiance to the old 
Federations. Fascist Trade Unions are called "Corporations" perhaps as 
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in reminder of the medieval Corporations, in which ali classes of capitalists 
and workers were amalgamated; while old Trade Unions, sympathisers 
with Socialism, maintain their old name "Federations", and are directed 
by the "General Labour Confederation". At Milan, which was said to be 
a stronghold of the Fascist Corporations, when the latter signed a new 
wages contract in metallurgical industry, the men flatly refused to accept 
it. At a referendum, almost the entire body of workers ranged themselves 
under the old banner of the Federation. And when entrepreneur organisa-
tions, disdaining to take note of the referendum, maintained that the wages 
contract signed between themselves and the Fascist Corporations was to be 
observed, the men struck for a day in proportions which ranged from 50 to 
100 per cent, of the number employed in various establishments. 
After a lapse of two years, a Congress of the Trade Unions adhering to 
the General Labour Confederations will shortly be held. While in Novem-
ber and December, 1922, there was much wild talk about D'Aragona and 
Buozzi, and other leaders of the workers' movement going into the Mus-
solini Cabinet, to-day the only debated question is whether the Trade Un-
ion Organisation will be captured by Communists or Marxian Socialists, or 
held, as at present, by the United Socialist Party, which is a sort of British 
Labourism, perhaps, with a greater tinge of pure politicians of the Turati 
and Treves type. Expectations favour a victory for the latter. 
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